Introduction ↑

The current election campaign is unique by many measures. It is the first federal parliamentary election since the start of military action in 2022, held under conditions of military censorship and intensified repression. Competition in these elections is at an all-time low, and a party that had already been registered was removed from the ballot. The Supreme Court issued a clearly unsubstantiated, unlawful decision that has already affected the entire electoral system. 

All of this is accompanied by the persistent, long-standing problems of Russian elections — abuse of administrative resources and pressure on voters. 

At the same time, if one looks more closely, even such elections can tell us a great deal about what is happening in Russian society and how it is responding to the unusual challenges it faces today.

The report is based on weekly monitoring reports of television airtime and social networks, as well as reports from long-term observers in Russia’s regions.

This is the seventh report published by the Election Atlas during the current election campaign. Previous reports were devoted to analysis of changes in federal electoral legislation, the evolution of the party system, the legal parameters of regional elections, the nomination and registration of candidates for the State Duma elections and regional elections. In addition, four parts of a report analysing the composition of regional election commissions were published: their publicity and openness, party composition, and the role of NGOs, local self-government and bureaucracy in them.

Key findings ↑

1. The key event of the election campaign was the initial registration of the Yabloko party’s federal list and its subsequent cancellation. This was the first time in Russian history that an already obtained party list registration was revoked in a federal election. The obvious reason for this decision was the explosive growth of voter interest in the party. In the three weeks between the party’s registration and its removal, the number of reactions and comments on social media posts mentioning the party increased 80-fold. By this measure, even despite the cancellation of its registration in mid-August, the party holds a confident second place, second only to United Russia. 

2. The registration of the Yabloko list and its subsequent cancellation broke the original plan of the organisers of the Russian elections, who had expected that, under the conditions of socio-political strain the political regime is currently experiencing, the elections should proceed as routinely, mundanely and controllably as possible. Instead, as social media monitoring shows, the topic of arbitrary, unlawful restriction of political competition became the most discussed among voters. Moreover, this lively reaction was noted across different segments of the political spectrum.

3. The Supreme Court’s decision affected the entire electoral system, finally destroying the already weak legal certainty of key provisions of electoral legislation: an expansive interpretation of violations of the rules on financing parties and candidates and of copyright violations, combined with the disproportionality of the punishment, led to a wave of cancellations of candidate registrations and party lists at all levels of elections. 

4. The system of guarantees of voters’ rights to receive and disseminate information about elections has significantly degraded over the past five years. Even before, the real state of affairs did not meet even the minimum standards of free expression of will, and the introduction of military censorship, combined with continuing pandemic restrictions and repressive law enforcement practices, has made normal discussion of the country’s development paths virtually impossible. Moreover, election commissions voluntarily joined the system of state military censorship, gaining the right to pre-approve the placement of campaign materials by parties and candidates. Together with traditional methods of restricting campaigning, this has made conducting a campaign extremely problematic.

5. These problems are most evident in the broadcasts of the largest television channels, which are closely tied to the state. Ignoring the principle of equality of parties’ rights, the largest Russian media outlets created a system of maximum favour for the “party of power.” The amount of television time devoted to it was greater than that for all other parties combined. At the same time, the television channels failed to fulfil their basic function of informing citizens about the ongoing elections and their participants. The total airtime that six television channels devoted to covering the activities of political parties participating in the elections amounted to just over 19 hours over 13 weeks of the election campaign — roughly 13 minutes per day across all news broadcasts. This is half as much as five years ago — during the previous State Duma elections in 2021.

6. Two regimes effectively operate within the electoral system for different candidates: administrative candidates receive a regime of maximum favour, while others face opposition to their attempts to campaign or communicate with voters. The “party of power” made massive use of official accounts of public authorities and budgetary institutions for campaigning, and the practice of using official trips and state events for the pre-election PR of officials also continues. There are also cases of direct illegal campaigning by officials. At the same time, other candidates face obstruction of their campaigning. In particular, cases of seizure, damage and forcible dismantling of campaign materials have been recorded. 

7. In the worst cases, one of the main methods of coercive pressure on candidates, leading to their removal from the ballot, has become the abuse of anti-extremism legislation. The removal of candidates from the ballot can also be achieved through a decision by the party that nominated them, or through pressure on the candidate themselves from employers or law enforcement agencies. 

8. Russian voters traditionally face coercion to participate in voting. Since the introduction of the combination of three-day voting and remote electronic voting (REV) into the practice of Russian elections, this problem has become even more acute than before: employers have gained additional opportunities to control the expression of will of their subordinates. Reports of voters being coerced into participating in REV regularly come from various regions. However, the presence of REV is not a necessary condition for coercing voters. Administrations are quite capable of acting “the old-fashioned way” as well. 

9. Overall, judging by reactions on social networks, society appears to have once again developed a demand for discussion of what is happening in the country and for more active political participation. However, the political system is moving in the exact opposite direction — towards maximum restriction of such discussion, in effect towards the restriction of citizens’ sovereignty. 

Despite the initial desire to turn the current election campaign into a boring and routine affair, it nearly became a “game-changing election.” Only at the cost of extraordinary administrative and coercive efforts was it kept under administrative control. Political life in Russia still breaks through the asphalt of restrictions, so it appears that, despite the mass cleansing of the ballot, the authorities still intend to make significant efforts on voting days and during the tabulation of election results to neutralise protest voting by voters. 

1. Campaigning ↑

1.1. Degradation of the system of guarantees of voters’ right to receive and disseminate information about elections in 2021–2026  ↑

The Constitutional Court of Russia emphasises that the will of citizens can be freely expressed only under conditions where the right to objective information and freedom of expression are genuinely guaranteed. According to Constitutional Court Ruling No. 7-P of 16 June 2006, when conducting electoral procedures, the federal legislator is obliged to establish a procedure for information support, including campaigning and its financing, that would properly guarantee citizens’ right to participate in the management of the state. 

The same is stated in the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, which obliges states to ensure that law and public policy permit political campaigns to be conducted in an atmosphere of freedom and fairness, and that no legal or administrative barriers are established to unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals.

The situation in which the previous elections of State Duma deputies took place in 2021 was already far from the standard described above, but it has deteriorated significantly since then. The current elections are taking place in a situation of military action in Ukraine. This has led to the adoption of a number of special normative acts that have increased the number of restrictions on suffrage, freedom of expression and even freedom of movement.

Of particular importance for the election campaign is the large-scale assault on the remnants of freedom of expression in Russia, which accelerated in 2022. 

After 24 February 2022, the situation with restrictions on freedom of expression deteriorated significantly: on the very day the military action began, Roskomnadzor issued an official statement warning the media that when covering the conflict they were obliged to use only official information from Russian state bodies, under threat of blocking. In practice, this meant a ban on calling the events in Ukraine a “war,” since the official position states that it is merely a “special military operation” for the “protection of the population, denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine.” 

On 14 July 2022, the President of Russia signed several laws at once that significantly affected the freedom to disseminate information and freedom of expression. Amendments came into force to the laws “On the Mass Media,” “On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information” and “On Measures of Influence on Persons Involved in Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of Citizens of the Russian Federation.” The Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia received the right to issue demands for the suspension of a media outlet’s activities or for declaring a media outlet’s registration invalid, as well as for the termination of a broadcasting licence; and to demand the permanent blocking of websites. The grounds are described very vaguely: unreliable information that creates a threat of harm to life, health of citizens, public order, etc.; unreliable information about the use of the Armed Forces of Russia; information that can be regarded as “disrespect for the authorities”; information discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the execution by state bodies of the Russian Federation of their powers for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintaining international peace and security; calls for the organisation of or participation in unauthorised public events, mass disturbances of public order or public safety, the introduction of political, economic and (or) other sanctions against the Russian Federation, its citizens or Russian legal entities, or containing propaganda, justification and (or) justification for the implementation of extremist activities. Almost any information about the activities of the army or state bodies, except official information, can fall under such definitions. 

On the same day, amendments to the Criminal Code were signed, under which citizens are punished for “public calls for activities directed against the security of the Russian Federation, or for obstructing the execution by authorities and their officials of their powers to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.” In addition, Article 275.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for punishment for confidential cooperation with a foreign state, international or foreign organisation. Activities directed against state security, for example, include the activities of organisations recognised as undesirable in Russia, including a number of such media outlets. 

As of 14 September 2026, the Register of Foreign Persons of the Ministry of Justice of Russia contains 1,262 entries, 893 of which appeared after 24 February 2022. The list of undesirable organisations contains 415 entries, 268 of which — after the start of military action. 

According to Roskomsvoboda data as of 5 August 2025 (i.e., more than a year ago), the number of websites and links blocked in Russia exceeded 25,000. Among them are all the largest foreign media and almost all major Russian media independent of the state. In the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders (recognised as an undesirable organisation in Russia), Russia fell to 172nd place out of 180 in 2026 (in 2021 it was 150th), with its score dropping from 51.3 to 23.15 out of a possible 100. 

Currently in Russia, leading foreign social networks and messengers — Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, X, Telegram — are blocked. Advertising, including political advertising, including election campaigning, is prohibited on blocked social networks and messengers. The Russian services VKontakte, Odnoklassniki and the MAX messenger are controlled by a company whose head is Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of the deputy head of the Russian Presidential Administration who oversees domestic policy, including elections.

In 2025, Russia became the world leader in the number and scale of internet shutdowns. The Russian government even had to create a system of “white lists” — websites on the list continue to work when the internet is shut down.

To this it should be added that epidemiological restrictions on holding mass events, introduced during the COVID pandemic, continue to apply in Russia. They do not interfere with the holding of entertainment events (football matches, concerts, etc.) or events organised by the authorities, but they regularly become an obstacle to holding even a small political rally or picket by the opposition.

Election commissions, unfortunately, also took part in strengthening the system of state censorship (primarily military censorship). In 2022, amendments were made to the legislation that established the obligation for candidates and electoral associations to provide the relevant election commission with a copy of campaign material intended for placement on the channels of television and radio broadcasting organisations or in periodical print publications. As a result, a number of candidates faced a ban on the placement of their campaign materials in the media by election commissions, without any justification. 

For example, on 31 August 2026, the Moscow City Election Commission banned the broadcast of campaign videos “Russia needs peace!” from Yabloko single-mandate candidates. 

The Election Commission of Murmansk Oblast sent to the prosecutor’s office for verification of an administrative offence (likely referring to extremism) two pre-election speeches by Yabloko State Duma candidate Igor Khomechko broadcast on the Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 television channels. 

After the broadcasts, Khomechko submitted recordings to the election commission for publication on social networks. To avoid violating the copyright of the Murmansk State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, the candidate re-recorded the texts of his speeches outside the studio. In his speech, Khomechko called for peace and the signing of a ceasefire agreement, spoke about pressure on the party and its candidates, and about the connection between the military action and the deterioration of the economic situation and infrastructure in Murmansk Oblast.

He recalled the sentences of Lev Shlosberg, Vasily Neustroyev and Maxim Kruglov, the removal of the party’s federal and regional lists and single-mandate candidates, and also spoke about the region’s debts, the unprofitability of enterprises and problems in healthcare, education, transport and communal infrastructure. Earlier, Khomechko’s video “Russia needs peace!” was removed from broadcast without explanation.

The Election Commission of Novgorod Oblast also initiated a prosecutor’s office check of a Yabloko campaign video. As a result, the prosecutor’s office of Veliky Novgorod issued warnings to the head of the regional branch of Yabloko, Anna Cherepanova, and State Duma candidate Viktor Shalyakin after checking the party’s campaign video. In the 30-second video, the supervisory authority found signs of inciting social discord, discrediting the Armed Forces and disseminating unreliable information. The campaign material was removed from broadcast on local television and radio. The election commission also reported this to the regional branch of VGTRK and the holding company “Agency of Information Communications,” which suspended the broadcast of the video.

In total, candidates of the Yabloko party faced obstacles during the election campaign in at least 21 regions — campaign materials are sent for checks, editorial offices and printing houses refuse to distribute them, and warnings are issued for distributing the materials. In Kaliningrad, a candidate was asked to remove the words “peace,” “ceasefire” and “political repression” from the programme, and in St. Petersburg they refused to broadcast a video featuring a silent female candidate and a slogan about freedom of speech.

Under conditions of military censorship and epidemiological restrictions still in effect since 2020, political parties and candidates find themselves extremely limited in their ability to campaign and communicate with their voters — to convey their programmatic proposals and criticise the current state of affairs. 

1.2. Inequality of parties’ rights on federal television airtime ↑

As the Constitutional Court of Russia rightly stated, elections can be considered free only when the right to information and freedom of expression are genuinely guaranteed. At the same time, inequality of the rights of candidates and parties must not be allowed.

Television is one of the main sources of information for a significant part of Russians. During an election campaign, television’s influence on shaping the attitude of the majority of voters towards the elections and candidates is often decisive.

Therefore, the Election Atlas project launched a programme of weekly monitoring of federal television channels during the period of the Russian State Duma elections. The goal of the media monitoring is to regularly identify and warn of cases of violation of the equality of parties’ rights in the coverage of their election campaign in terms of airtime volume and tone of information presentation.

For monitoring, we selected six television channels included in the first multiplex: Channel One, Rossiya 1, NTV, Channel Five, TVC and OTR. 

In our assessments, we proceeded from the premise that the media perform a certain social function — to inform people about the elections taking place in Russia. Unfortunately, we are forced to acknowledge that the federal television channels have shirked this function. Thus, on Rossiya 1, the share of news broadcasts mentioning election participants barely exceeded 35%; on Channel One and TVC it did not reach 25%; and on the other channels it was below 11%. 

It is obvious that the editorial boards of the television channels (whose ultimate owners in five cases are the state, and in one case businessmen close to it) consciously chose a strategy of very meagre informing of their fellow citizens about the upcoming elections — in the vast majority of news blocks on these socio-political channels, the elections and their participants were not mentioned at all. The most important domestic political event of the year remained on the sidelines of the attention of key Russian media. 

The total airtime that six television channels devoted to covering the activities of political parties participating in the elections amounted to just over 19 hours over 13 weeks of the election campaign — roughly 13 minutes per day across all news broadcasts. This is approximately half as much as five years ago — during the previous State Duma elections in 2021.

For example, Channel Five devoted just over 30 minutes to this topic over the entire election campaign, OTR — less than one hour, NTV — one and a half hours, TVC — just under three hours. Even the leaders — Rossiya 1 and Channel One — found only six hours of airtime each over three and a half months to talk about the activities of parties and their election programmes. 

Informing about elections should contribute to the conscious expression of will by citizens and the transparency of elections. With such limited airtime, this is impossible to achieve. 

The exercise of freedom of mass information imposes special duties and special responsibility on the media. Representatives of these organisations must take ethical and balanced positions and cover election campaigns in a fair, balanced and impartial manner, including by ensuring equal access for candidates to the media. 

According to Part 2 of Article 45 of Federal Law No. 67-FZ “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation,” “the content of information materials placed in the mass media... must be objective, reliable, and must not violate the equality of candidates and electoral associations,” and Part 5 of the same article states that “in information television programmes... reports on the conduct of pre-election events... must be given exclusively in a separate information block, without commentary... They must not give preference to any candidate or electoral association, ... discrimination (diminution of rights) must not be allowed, including in terms of the time devoted to covering their pre-election activities.”

However, the opposite situation — total inequality of election participants — was deliberately constructed on federal television airtime. More than half of the modest airtime that was actually devoted to the activities of parties went to just one of them: United Russia was allocated a total of almost 622 minutes (more than 10 hours), i.e., more than all the other parties combined. But even among the remaining 10 parties (including Yabloko, which dropped out of the election race in mid-August), obvious inequality is observed. The parliamentary parties had a clear priority in coverage of their activities over the “small” parties: the gap between the last parliamentary party by this measure, A Just Russia, and Yabloko — which became the leader among the “small” parties only because of the coverage of the court decision to cancel the party’s registration in the elections — was fourfold. If we talk about the difference between the leader, United Russia, and the least covered Party of Pensioners, it was an astronomical 182 times.

Unsurprisingly, under such conditions, the stories about parties were, for the most part, extremely brief and insubstantial — it was impossible to form a real impression of the parties’ programmatic proposals from them, or to hear any criticism of what is happening in the country from them. In most cases, direct speech from party representatives was not heard either; instead, the activities of election participants were commented on by news programme announcers. The information policy that developed during the cancellation of the Yabloko party list registration is telling in this regard: over several days, the content of the lawsuit and the party’s activities were commented on by its competitors, while direct speech from Yabloko representatives was not heard on air even once (nor was it heard at all during the entire election campaign). 

No political party had an average duration of an information story about its activities that reached even one minute, and Rodina, the Party of Pensioners and the Party of Direct Democracy, in those rare moments when they were mentioned on air, received an average of no more than five seconds. There was only one exception: the average duration of a story about United Russia exceeded two minutes — these were extensive stories in which several of its candidates or President Vladimir Putin, who supported the party, could speak in direct speech.

Under these conditions, the coverage was, overall, benevolently neutral. Only three parties fell into the negative zone of the tonality rating (the difference between positive and negative assessments) on one occasion — in the first half of August, A Just Russia and the Party of Direct Democracy dipped slightly into it, while Yabloko came under heavy criticism during the information campaign launched by the television channels in support of removing the party from the ballot.

It is worth separately addressing the debates, i.e., the “joint campaign events” on television airtime. The main problem, especially in regional broadcasts, was the non-appearance of candidates at the debates. For example, not a single incumbent head of a region facing re-election attended such a broadcast. Even the Chair of the Central Election Commission of Russia, Ella Pamfilova, was forced to publicly react to this, drawing attention to episodes in Karelia, Bashkortostan, Crimea, and Ryazan, Tula, and Leningrad Oblasts, where “no one simply came to the television and radio broadcast to participate in the debates” and “the debates simply did not take place.” 

Such episodes best characterise the real state of political competition in the 2026 elections — candidates are so uninterested in real competition that they do not use expensive airtime that is provided to them for free. 

The distortion of the information field caused by administrative control over the media ultimately leads to a distortion of the expression of will of voters, and conscious insufficient informing may indicate a desire by those who control the relevant media to remove their fellow citizens from discussion of the political and socio-economic future of the country, to encroach on their sovereignty.

1.3. Coverage of the elections in social networks ↑

By analogy with the television airtime monitoring, we launched a programme of weekly social network monitoring. The analysis used mentions of 11 parties that had the right to nominate lists and candidates without collecting voter signatures: United Russia, the Communist Party (CPRF), the LDPR, A Just Russia, New People, Yabloko, Communists of Russia, the Party of Direct Democracy, Rodina, the Party of Pensioners, and the Greens. 

We were interested in the following parameters: 

• the number of mentions (posts) on social networks broken down by political party,

• the number of mentions broken down by platform,

• engagement (reposts, reactions, activity in comments),

• duplicate posts, which very often indicate centralised distribution of materials,

• key themes,

• use of administrative resources.

It is important to emphasise the peculiarities of our sample. For social network monitoring, data from only four resources are used: VKontakte, the MAX messenger, Telegram and YouTube. The first two platforms are controlled by the state and are under the direct management of the son of the deputy head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Sergei Kiriyenko. The remaining two — Telegram and YouTube — are blocked in Russia. Other platforms popular among Russians — Instagram, X and TikTok — are not represented in our monitoring for technical reasons (to fully collect materials from these platforms, one needs to contact companies that have contracts with Meta, X and TikTok. But in the current conditions, both Russian and European firms are afraid to get involved with anything related to Russian elections). That is, our sample is noticeably skewed towards the “statist” point of view. This has obvious consequences: the results of United Russia and A Just Russia are somewhat inflated here (see below regarding A Just Russia), while the results of the CPRF and especially New People are understated).

The total number of analysed publications over the entire campaign, including publications mentioning Yabloko, is 2,784,335; excluding publications mentioning this party, the number of publications is 2,678,414. 

Among the four platforms, VKontakte was the clear leader in the number of mentions of parties. At the same time, Telegram, despite its blocking, took a confident second place. This suggests that the “iron curtain” has not been fully lowered, and discussion of political and socio-economic problems takes place, including on platforms blocked in Russia (which is why it is especially regrettable that we were unable to set up monitoring of Instagram and Facebook — it turned out that both Russian and some foreign services are equally afraid to engage in monitoring Russian elections). 

The total number of publications on these two platforms (VKontakte and Telegram) amounted to almost 90% of the total number of mentions of parties over the entire campaign period. 

In terms of the number of posts mentioning parties, there are two clear leaders — with a large margin, United Russia and A Just Russia occupy the first two places by this measure, but this result was achieved by specific methods.

Throughout the campaign, we systematically tracked two different phenomena that together potentially create unequal conditions for campaigning on social networks. These are, firstly, centralised networks of accounts that give certain parties a multiple greater reach (though without an increase in real audience interest), and secondly, the possibility of direct abuse of administrative resources.

Thus, A Just Russia created a network of several thousand pages with almost identical names “A Just Russia — News [city/village],” which have a minimal number of subscribers and, consequently, views and reactions. This network mechanically republishes absolutely identical texts (for example, statements by Sergei Mironov) and in some weeks its contribution to the party’s statistics amounted to almost half or more of all publications mentioning it.

In addition, for several weeks a network of small Telegram channels of a kompromat format (about 2,500 publics) operated, which was used to disseminate negative stories against specific parties. The network ensured a quantity of publications, but the view and engagement indicators were close to zero (most publications had one view each).

Separately, it is worth mentioning the network of publics in the “Podslushano” format, which is obviously controlled by the Russian authorities: in the first week, it reproduced Gennady Zyuganov’s unsuccessful statement about the seizure of bank deposits almost 150 times verbatim, and in the third week it participated in the centralised dissemination of a quote from United Russia deputy Oleg Matveychev that a vote for any other party is a “vote for Ukraine.” 

From the very beginning of the election campaign, outright abuse of administrative resources by United Russia is also evident, which also affects the number of mentions and views of publications (but does not affect the number of user reactions as strongly). For example, openly campaign posts in support of United Russia were often placed in the official accounts and groups of public authorities and budgetary institutions. From the timing of the placement of identical posts, it becomes clear that all such accounts in a particular region are administered by one person, likely working under a contract with the authorities, and this practice is widespread throughout the country. 

As a result, in terms of the number of views of publications mentioning parties, a fairly clear hierarchy of the five parliamentary parties emerged: United Russia, the LDPR, the CPRF, A Just Russia, New People. Moreover, almost on a par with New People was Rodina — this happened solely because the party filed a lawsuit to cancel Yabloko’s registration and became part of the discussion surrounding the fate of that party (more on this below). The remaining non-parliamentary parties practically did not work on social networks and were not noticeable to their users. 

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the gap in the number of views between United Russia and the other parliamentary parties turned out to be not as large as the gap in the number of publications, and A Just Russia even slid to fourth place, despite its huge number of mentions. This is precisely the effect of centralized information dissemination through networks of accounts and communities with a minimal number of subscribers and participants.

In such a situation, the most accurate indicator for assessing user interest in the activities of parties appears to be the engagement rate, i.e., the sum of reactions, comments and reposts on posts mentioning political parties.

By this indicator, United Russia still holds an undisputed first place among the parties remaining on the ballot, while the CPRF moves into second (although by number of mentions it was effectively tied for third and fourth place with the LDPR). The LDPR ends up in third place, while A Just Russia, with its massive centralized posting, is effectively tied for fifth and sixth place with New People.

But in fourth place is Rodina — and also solely because of its role in removing Yabloko from the elections.

Thus, if Yabloko is excluded from the monitoring, the picture of the election campaign becomes incomplete — in reality, its, without exaggeration, key event disappears.

Let us show the course of the campaign in dynamics (in the next two graphs we removed the other non-parliamentary parties to get rid of "information noise").

In the sixth week of the campaign, the registration of Yabloko's party list took place. Until that moment, Yabloko was at the level of the other non-parliamentary parties in all indicators — they lagged behind the four parliamentary opposition parties by a factor of 5-10. But from the moment of Yabloko's registration, a rapid growth in social media user interest in this party began. During the sixth and seventh weeks of the campaign, the number of reactions to posts mentioning the party increased fourfold — the party overtook A Just Russia and came very close to New People and the CPRF (interestingly, New People's indicators grew in parallel with Yabloko's due to the active discussion about which party anti-war voters should support). In the eighth week, when a lawsuit to cancel the party list's registration was filed and the corresponding Supreme Court hearing took place (for social media monitoring, we counted weeks starting from 16 June, i.e., Tuesday to Monday), Yabloko's indicators grew by another 18 times. In total, over three weeks, engagement with mentions of Yabloko on social media jumped by 80 (!) times.

As a result, by mid-August, Yabloko had become the clear leader in engagement, i.e., in social media user interest in events related to the party. The same thing happened with the number of views.

Moreover, it is worth noting that this explosive growth in social media user interest began in a decentralized manner — the main opinion leaders from this part of the political spectrum and even media outlets associated with emigrant circles were clearly late and subsequently only tried to catch up with this wave.

Let us recall that the set of social networks and messengers in our monitoring is forcibly skewed towards the pro-government side. This limitation gives the results obtained additional analytical value. The very fact that in a segment of the digital space deliberately skewed towards pro-government positions, a demand for open discussion of politics and more active political participation is noticeably manifest, allows us to assume a broader spread of such sentiments in society.

As a result, if Yabloko is added to the overall statistics on party visibility in social networks, the picture of the campaign changes significantly. Even by the number of mentions, Yabloko, despite its list being removed from the elections back in mid-August, entered the top five, overtaking New People.

However, the following two graphs are more indicative.

By total views over the entire campaign, Yabloko already occupies third place, even overtaking the CPRF.

The indicators of total engagement are even more impressive — Yabloko moved into a confident second place, lagging behind United Russia by only 1.5 times.

Moreover, Yabloko achieved this result in practically one month — from the end of July to the end of August, and if you look at the period from the moment of Yabloko's registration to the party's removal from the elections, it even overtook United Russia in engagement.

In effect, the removal of Yabloko became the main event of the campaign for social media users and largely determined its course even after the cancellation of the party list's registration. All the more so because the model of cancelling registration through the courts was then repeated several more times in different regions, and not only in relation to representatives of the Yabloko party.

In addition to the court proceedings against Yabloko, the case of Nikolai Bondarenko (CPRF) was indicative; in the tenth and twelfth weeks of the campaign, it became the main driver of indicators not only for the CPRF, but for the entire weekly agenda. None of these storylines were planned campaigning: in all cases, the resonance on social media arose around a court or administrative decision, not around a party message.

Thus, in the week of 18 to 24 August, the main event for social media users was not the second stage of the United Russia congress with Vladimir Putin's speech, but the ongoing wave of removing candidates and parties from the elections and, above all, the CPRF candidate Nikolai Bondarenko. While messages promoted by party and administrative resources mentioning Vladimir Putin's speech at the second stage of the United Russia congress garnered 40.27 million views, publications about the cancellation of registrations and removal of various candidates from the elections received 85.3 million views. That is twice as many, or 28.4% of the total volume of views of all "party" publications for the week. The gap is also noticeable in engagement: publications about the president's speech garnered 1.16 million reactions, while posts about Nikolai Bondarenko alone (excluding other candidates) received 1.48 million.

In this sense, social networks behaved throughout the campaign as a more vibrant space than official campaigning. The most discussed storylines each time turned out to be court episodes or personal statements, rather than planned party publications, and it was these, not the number of posts, that determined where audience attention shifted in a given week.

In one of our previous reports, we noted that "in the conditions of socio-political strain that the political regime is currently experiencing, the elections must proceed as routinely, mundanely and controllably as possible." The spontaneous growth of voter interest in Yabloko's position obviously broke this scenario, desired by the administrators of Russian elections. In this situation, the decision to cancel the registration of Yabloko's party list looks like an urgent, but politically understandable, reaction from the authorities.

1.4. Cancellation of Yabloko's registration and its impact on the course of the election campaign ↑

Extremely important for assessing the course of the campaign is a legal analysis of the grounds for removing the party from the elections, especially since it led to a wave of similar lawsuits in different regions and in elections at various levels, i.e., it directly affected not just one election campaign, but the entire electoral system.

Rodina's lawsuit to cancel the registration of the Yabloko party's federal list of candidates consisted of four parts. The first was devoted to "copyright infringement" in Yabloko's campaigning. This is one of the few grounds under Russian law that directly entails the removal of a party or candidate from the elections. The norm itself has long provoked protest from lawyers, because it allows a disproportionately strong interference of civil-law relations into public-law ones. Moreover, filing such a lawsuit does not even require complaints from the copyright holders themselves.

Rodina made claims not against the campaign materials officially registered with the CEC, but against the party's website, which contains articles and publications from many years. Part of the claims concerns materials from 2012 — i.e., appearing 14 years before the start of the current campaign. There are also references to publications from 2016, 2017, 2018, 2023, 2024, 2025 and early 2026, which also have no relation to the current elections.

The arguments themselves also look rather weak. As electoral lawyer Andrei Buzin noted, the plaintiff did not provide a single example of using a work in its entirety. All examples concerned either short excerpts (for example, the lines "may there always be sunshine, may there always be mommy" from Lev Oshanin's poem), or small fragments (data from the Levada Center), or images only remotely resembling protected works. Moreover, these examples were taken from the internet and are not supported by notarized copies.

In particular, the plaintiff claimed that the Yabloko logo violates copyright, being a borrowing from the work of avant-garde artist El Lissitzky. Meanwhile, this logo has existed for a long time: in its current form — a wedge in a circle — the party used it in the 2011, 2016 and 2021 elections, and no claims were ever raised before.

The grounds for removing parties and candidates from elections for copyright violations are defined extremely vaguely in Russian legislation. Because of this, electoral disputes constantly arise: some candidates are removed from the elections, while others — on comparable grounds — are left. There have also been completely absurd precedents. For instance, one candidate was disqualified for posting the phrase "Do what you must do and be what will be" on social media — the court considered it a violation of the copyright of the ancient Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius.

For many years, lawyers and politicians have been trying to achieve greater legal certainty, but without result. The Constitutional Court of Russia has been quite openly evading clarifications on this issue for several years now. As a result, this entire block of claims is effectively deliberately left to the discretion of judges, who can decide the issue of removing a party or candidate on this basis almost arbitrarily.

The second block of claims looks even stranger. The plaintiffs claim to have found a large number of materials on social networks in which users express support for Yabloko. The competitors from Rodina classify this as campaigning in favor of the party not paid for from the election fund. Meanwhile, back in 2005, the Constitutional Court of Russia directly stated that the right of citizens to actively advocate their position during elections is an inalienable part of their active suffrage.

During the hearings, a certificate from Rosfinmonitoring appeared marked "for official use." This means its contents cannot be disclosed, but from the remarks of the parties it became clear what it was about. The agency identified a certain number of Russian citizens who received funds from abroad and simultaneously made donations to individual Yabloko candidates. The amount in question is negligible — less than 20 thousand rubles. Moreover, the "funds from abroad" could well have been the personal money of those same citizens, simply transferred from their accounts in foreign banks. Either way, this certificate is irrelevant to the subject of the dispute.

The third block of claims could have created the greatest risks for Yabloko. It is related to accusations of signs of extremism in campaign materials. This is another area of Russian law deliberately leaving wide scope for enforcement arbitrariness. This accusation can lead not only to the cancellation of registration in the elections, but also to a complete ban on the party as an extremist organization, as well as to criminal prosecution of its members and candidates in elections at all levels.

The plaintiffs accuse Yabloko of supporting the "LGBT movement" (banned in Russia), of calls to violate the country's territorial integrity (on the grounds that the party advocates ending the war with Ukraine), and of inciting discord against the authorities and other political parties. The latter includes, in particular, formulations such as "If you vote for Yabloko — it means you are for change, for peace, for freedom, for a different life" and "the authorities are passing more and more repressive laws."

The fourth block is the weakest. It does not even contain a reference to the specific legal norm on which the plaintiffs rely. It is merely about doubts that individual candidate documents were completed within the established deadlines.

As a result, the court granted the lawsuit on two grounds: copyright infringement and illegal foreign funding.

Consequently, the cancellation of registration on these two grounds became one of the main trends of the current election campaign.

For example, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, based on lawsuits from candidates of the Green Party (whose interests in court were represented by United Russia lawyer Ilya Khabin), the Sverdlovsk Regional Court removed the entire group of Yabloko candidates: Yaroslav Shcherbakov (for a Banksy image, a photo of Andrei Sakharov and a quote from Andrei Gromyko), Andrei Talevlin (for a photo of the Genbaku Dome and a quote from S. Taniguchi), Oksana Boyarskaya (due to an unidentified male voice-over in a video), and Sergei Faryma (for the logo of the Rossiya 1 TV channel). Only Valentina Komkova was removed for an incomplete set of documents.

The Supreme Court of Udmurtia on 7 September 2026 cancelled the registration of Yabloko candidate Iya Boronina based on a lawsuit by Anton Golovkov (A Just Russia) due to the use of the song "Bad to the Bone" in a video without a confirmed license from the copyright holder.

In Chuvashia, Yabloko candidates Viktor Stenshin and Vladislav Arkadyev were removed based on lawsuits from the Communists of Russia and the Green Party due to the use of the paid font Colville in printed campaign materials allegedly without a license, as well as claims regarding "foreign funding."

In Moscow Oblast, Yabloko candidate Sergei Kryzhov lost his registration. His competitor from the Green Party, Anatoly Balashov, filed a lawsuit claiming that on Kryzhov's personal website (in publications from 2021), logos of the social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki were posted, which, in the plaintiff's opinion, constituted a violation of exclusive rights and copyright on trademarks.

1.5. Obstruction of campaigning ↑

Candidates regularly face obstruction of their attempts to conduct campaigning or communicate with voters. The attempts themselves to hinder opposition candidates and parties from carrying out campaign work are a long-standing problem of Russian elections, which, unfortunately, is not being systematically resolved. Obstruction of candidate campaigning is carried out both with obvious administrative resources and without them (or, at least, without the possibility of identifying them).

In the city of Zima, Irkutsk Oblast, meetings for New People candidate Yevgeny Faizulin at schools No. 1 and No. 5 were disrupted (the doors were simply locked). An outdoor meeting near the Gorizont Palace of Culture was declared "unauthorized" by the city mayor Andrei Konovalov, who threatened liability and deployed police units on 3 September 2026.

In Kostroma Oblast, authorities refused to provide the village club hall in Vokhma for CPRF candidate Valery Izhitsky, forcing him to hold the meeting outdoors, and also pressured local entrepreneurs in Vokhma and Pyshchug not to provide him with premises.

In Murmansk Oblast, a candidate from A Just Russia in Apatity was refused the rental of a hall at the MRIBI business incubator under the pretext of renovations. In unofficial correspondence, management acknowledged the existence of a direct ban from the administration.

In Moscow, the prefecture repeatedly refused CPRF candidate Ivan Ulyanchenko permission to hold a rally against the removal of candidates from the elections, citing existing "COVID restrictions."

Examples of such restrictions could be continued indefinitely.

Above we already wrote about how election commissions have joined the system of state censorship and are obstructing the placement of candidates' campaign materials. In some regions, the initiative came not even from election commissions or the prosecutor's office, but from the enterprises themselves that were supposed to place the campaigning.

In Kostroma Oblast, a municipal enterprise prohibited Yabloko candidate Andrei Tarasov from placing advertising with commercial operators on city billboards. Subsequently, the Kostroma State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company removed his videos from the air, sending them for "verification" to the Ministry of Justice and the CEC.

In Pskov Oblast, the Pskov State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company refused to broadcast Yabloko's election videos, claiming that calls for a ceasefire agreement contain "signs of extremism." The regional election commission supported the broadcaster's position.

A long-standing problem of Russian elections is the seizure, damage and forcible dismantling of campaign materials.

In Moscow, police officers on 19 August 2026 seized banners from CPRF candidate Alexander Ishchenko in Tushino constituency No. 205. United Russia structures immediately appeared in the vacated spaces. In Babushkinsky constituency No. 195, employees of the Svilovo state budgetary institution Zhilishchnik tore down leaflets of LDPR candidate Alexander Khankeyev from special TEC stands.

In Krasnoyarsk Krai, an official of the administration of the Zheleznodorozhny district of Krasnoyarsk, Varygina, under threat of dismissal, forced PEC members to dismantle advertising of a program featuring a photo of candidate Vyacheslav Dyukov (Green Party).

In Buzuluk, Orenburg Oblast, on the night of 20 August, eight officially approved banners of CPRF candidate Vladimir Turchin, installed on private residential properties, were stolen.

In Samara Oblast, on 4 September, an attack was carried out on CPRF candidate Andrei Tverskov, inflicting bodily harm, while he was trying to stop the vandalism of his posters. In Samara, posters of CPRF candidate Dmitry Aseyev were pasted over with forms from the district administration containing data on landscaping estimates.

In Kirov Oblast, numerous cases of damage and destruction of campaign cubes belonging to the parties A Just Russia (Vyacheslav Tsaryuk accused district administrations of damaging posters by employees), the LDPR and New People were recorded.

1.6. Main themes of the campaign ↑

There is a significant difference in the coverage of the main themes of the election campaign on television, where the topics are chosen by editorial boards, and on social networks and the streets, where the preferred topics are determined by the election participants and voters themselves.

Thus, on television, the theme of the SMO dominated throughout the campaign. In particular, in the thirteenth, penultimate week of the campaign (7-13 September), one of the main storylines was Vladimir Putin's meeting with United Russia candidates, during which issues of unfinished construction, mortgage lending, protection of Russian citizens and support for participants in military operations were discussed. TV channels in their brief election-related airtime also reported:

• on the trips of one of the leaders of the United Russia list, Vladislav Golovin, to Ryazan and Ulyanovsk Oblasts, where he met with SMO participants and visited a rehabilitation center;

• on the work of the United Russia headquarters for youth outreach and candidates who are SMO participants;

• on the launch of the educational program "Your Own Business" for SMO participants;

• on the party's delivery of humanitarian aid to residents of Belgorod Oblast;

• on support for SMO participants from the CPRF;

• on Gennady Zyuganov's visit to a military hospital in St. Petersburg;

• on support for SMO participants from New People;

• on support for SMO veterans from the LDPR;

• on a drone attack on the building of the territorial election commission in Samara Oblast;

• on early voting in the SMO zone.

On social networks, the SMO theme is also mentioned, but much less frequently — most often it appears in posts dedicated to the activities of United Russia. Over all weeks of monitoring the campaign, the content of campaigning for each party remained fairly stable.

United Russia was predominantly in the institutional agenda: it was about social and economic promises and achievements in recent years. Many posts were devoted to the topics of urban improvement, housing and communal services, healthcare and education. The SMO narrative was also present in the campaign theme ("vote for victory in the SMO").

The CPRF was predominantly in the theme of covering systemic pressure on the party (Matveyev, Bondarenko), however, at the start of the campaign it actively used the fuel crisis as an electoral argument in its favor. Much was also said about social problems.

Gennady Zyuganov made an unsuccessful statement at the beginning of the campaign about the seizure of bank deposits, which became a reason for the quote to be circulated in pro-government communities and accounts in a light unfavorable to the party. The CPRF leader did not ignore the Yabloko case and spoke negatively about competitors. From the middle of the campaign, only Zyuganov's statements regarding the court proceedings against the party's candidates, when the registration of these candidates was under threat, were noticeable. In the second half of the campaign, Zyuganov did not make any resonant statements, and the information primacy passed to his party colleague Nikolai Bondarenko.

The LDPR did not focus on any specific thematic point, but mainly spoke out on topical issues: management companies, migrant rights, taxes for large families, preferential mortgages. Leonid Slutsky consistently ran his own channel with specific, locally targeted messages (from complaints about a leaking roof to proposals for preferential mortgages) with noticeably higher engagement than the party network that duplicated his quotes.

New People were predominantly focused on the social agenda (a bill on domestic violence, support for women in difficult life situations); the party maneuvers between support and a neutral position regarding the SMO, so a separate resonance occurred around the words of candidate Alexander Zitser about the inadmissibility of personnel quotas for SMO participants without considering their professional qualifications.

A Just Russia was the least stable and sometimes jumped into unexpected topics (for example, at the end of the campaign it began actively promoting an anti-migrant agenda, previously uncharacteristic of the party's image), but overall it formed a social agenda from the first person of the party leader Sergei Mironov: housing and utility tariffs, "grandmother's" and "parent's" salary, support for large families and veterans. Mironov came out with a new resonant initiative almost every week of the campaign: proposals for the death penalty for corrupt officials, increasing state-funded university places, a "food sharing" program for products nearing their expiration date and the "three P rule" ("came, worked, said goodbye") addressed to migrants, a plan to exit the fuel crisis and a ban on employers withholding part of a salary, a proposal to index pensions four times a year. It was this series of personal initiatives that steadily maintained audience interest in A Just Russia for almost the entire duration of the campaign.

Rodina distinguished itself not by systematic program proposals, but by the harsh rhetoric of party leader Alexei Zhuravlev on the military theme: from a proposal to use tactical nuclear weapons to statements about the destruction of Zelenskyy, as well as the fact that it was they who initiated the lawsuit against Yabloko.

The SMO theme became key for Yabloko, which openly took an anti-war stance — "For peace and freedom!", for a speedy ceasefire and truce.

In ordinary campaigning, pro-war parties avoid public discussion of current problems related to the continuation of hostilities and their consequences: mobilization, the gasoline crisis, internet shutdowns and the destruction of goods on marketplaces. These problems are allowed to be commented on and discussed only by official representatives of federal and regional authorities, in particular governors.

The CPRF and LDPR support the SMO theme, but shift the emphasis to social and economic issues: assistance to veterans and criticism of the Ministry of Finance for insufficient (in their opinion) support for defense enterprises and mobilized personnel, trying not to venture into the territory of criticizing the Ministry of Defense itself.

However, all parties actively raise the social agenda: payments, benefits, social facilities, housing and communal services, price increases, security. Candidates actively work with what is closer to people here and now: housing and communal services (condition of yards, entrances, tariffs), territorial improvement, quality and accessibility of medical care, the situation in education. Specific promises are often made: to repair a school, build a playground, solve the problem of queues at the clinic.

Incumbent United Russia deputies at all levels traditionally disguise their election campaign as reports to voters. At meetings with voters, they mainly raise topics of urban improvement, housing and communal services, and road construction, only occasionally touching on the SMO theme.

But there are candidates who specialize in the SMO theme — primarily combatants, who usually appear in military uniform, and organizers of aid to the front.

At the regional level, the technology of information substitution is widely used: candidates from the party of power, who are incumbent deputies, heads of large enterprises or heads of budgetary institutions, appear daily in the media exclusively within the framework of their professional or charitable activities. Legally, these materials are not labeled as campaign materials, since the candidates are acting in their official/professional capacity, but this creates a powerful cumulative effect of recognition and forms the image of "effective practitioners."

A tactic of information ignoring or minimizing the presence of the systemic opposition (CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia) and the Yabloko party is applied. Regarding the CPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia, the thesis of their "political passivity," "collusion" with the authorities to preserve the status quo, and lack of a real alternative agenda is often broadcast. Against Yabloko, harsh rhetoric linking the party with an "anti-state position" and the foreign agent status of its former leaders is used.

2. Abuse of administrative resources during campaigning and coercion of voters to vote ↑

In addition to the already mentioned massive use of official accounts of public authorities and budgetary institutions, there are other common ways of abusing administrative resources. One such method has long been the use of official trips and state events for the election PR of officials.

For example, in Kirov Oblast, Governor Alexander Sokolov, since spring, has involved United Russia State Duma candidates Andrei Berezin and Boris Vesnin in government trips to districts, highlighting them in state media as "advisors" and "members of expert councils."

In Udmurtia, the official resources of the Izhevsk administration, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education of Udmurtia systematically covered inspections of school, hospital and road construction sites by United Russia candidates Andrei Isayev and Oleg Garin.

In Chelyabinsk Oblast, the project "Party Landing Force" was launched — Governor Alexei Teksler and United Russia candidates (Oleg Gerber, Dmitry Vyatkin, Andrei Orekhov, Vladimir Dremov) inspected schools and transport under construction under the party's brand. Public pages of administrations (Troitsk, Sosnovsky, Katav-Ivanovsky districts) posted posts with the hashtags #ER74.

In Arkhangelsk Oblast, the head of Severodvinsk, Igor Arsentiev, combined the post of city leader with running an election campaign for United Russia in constituency No. 76, using official news hooks for his own PR.

There were also cases of direct illegal campaigning by officials. For example, the head of the Turukhansk district of Krasnoyarsk Krai, Oleg Sheremetyev, conducted campaigning for United Russia among budget-sector employees directly in the building of the Igarka city administration.

Already traditional for campaigning for the "party of power" is the use of events on Knowledge Day, 1 September. In the city of Ust-Katav, Chelyabinsk Oblast, the distribution of school lesson schedule forms with the party symbols of United Russia and the name of candidate Anton Kovalev was recorded. At the Zvyozdny Lyceum (Khabarovsk), on 1 September, children were given festive greeting cards with a portrait of United Russia candidate Maxim Ivanov, and in Krasnodar, PEC members forced schoolchildren to deliver invitations to the elections and distribute information materials among residents.

The end of August and beginning of September is not only the start of the school year, but also the time of traditional coercion of voters to participate in voting. Since the introduction into the practice of Russian elections of the combination of three-day and remote electronic voting (REV), this problem has become even more acute than before: employers have received additional opportunities to control the expression of will of their subordinates. Data from 2025 show that 50% turnout in REV is achieved in the first 3-4 hours of voting, i.e., on Friday, a working day, in the morning, when voters are just arriving at work.

Activity graph of remote electronic voting in Belgorod Oblast in the 2025 single voting day

Also in 2025, in Fryazino, Moscow Oblast, eight illegal centers were discovered where controlled "remote" electronic voting of voters was conducted.

In the current elections, REV is provided for in 33 regions (including Moscow, where there is no need to submit a preliminary application to participate in REV). According to the Ministry of Digital Development, over 3 million applications for REV had been submitted by 7 September.

Leading regions by number of applications submitted:

• Moscow Oblast — 573 thousand (approx. 9.5% of the total number of voters);

• Sverdlovsk Oblast — 264 thousand (approx. 8% of the total number of voters);

• Altai Krai — over 230 thousand (approx. 13.2% of the total number of voters);

• Rostov Oblast — 221 thousand (approx. 7.1% of the total number of voters);

• Chuvash Republic — 141 thousand (approx. 15.6% of the total number of voters).

Reports of coercion of voters to participate in REV regularly come from various regions.

In Perm Krai, employees of the Magnit and Pyaterochka retail chains, theater actors and kindergarten teachers were forced to register in the REV system with the mandatory provision of confirmation screenshots to management. Coercion to use REV apparently affected the entire Magnit chain.

In New Moscow, the management of budgetary institutions, under pressure, forced employees to subscribe to the social networks of United Russia candidate Dmitry Sablin and to attract 5,000 subscribers per institution. Candidate Ilya Sviridov used the resource vybor-moy.rf to receive complaints about REV coercion.

However, the presence of REV is not a necessary condition for coercing voters. Administrations are quite capable of acting "the old-fashioned way" as well.

In Komi, a table prepared by the administration of the republic's head was circulated in official messenger chats of government bodies, requiring "brigadiers" to be assigned to public-sector employees to ensure 100% centralized turnout.

In Kirov Oblast, at the Avitek plant, management in the spring coerced workers into participating in the United Russia primaries, and in the fall demanded that employees mandatory visit polling stations to support specific candidates.

Representatives of the Communist Party (CPRF) reported severe pressure on teachers and doctors in rural districts (Vokhma, Pyshchug, Kostroma Oblast), with threats of dismissal and reprisals in case of refusal to vote for the authorities' candidates.

In Kursk Oblast, employees of enterprises in the town of Rylsk reported direct recommendations from management to vote for the United Russia candidate Alexei Zolotarev.

3. Pressure on candidates ↑

One of the main methods of coercive pressure on candidates, which led to their removal from the elections, was the abuse of anti-extremist legislation.

For example, on 11 September 2026, the Krasnodar Krai Court removed 75-year-old Yabloko candidate Vladimir Atamanchuk following a lawsuit filed by the Greens party. The grounds were a leaflet calling for a ceasefire and containing the phrase "fratricidal conflict." In parallel, the Sochi police charged him under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences on discrediting the army.

In Bashkortostan, State Duma candidate Alexei Akimenko (Yabloko, Neftekamsk constituency No. 6) was removed by court decision following a lawsuit by Konstantin Shagimuratov, head of the regional branch of A Just Russia. The grounds were Meta social network logos (Instagram/Facebook) and hyperlinks in a post in a VKontakte public page from five years earlier (2018). On 10 September 2026, the Fourth Court of Appeal in Nizhny Novgorod upheld the removal as lawful.

In Saratov Oblast, prominent opposition politician and CPRF candidate Nikolai Bondarenko was fined on 21 August 2026 by the Oktyabrsky District Court of Saratov under Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences for a third-party publication featuring a photo of Alexei Navalny. On 7 September, the CEC of Russia officially annulled his registration.

In Kaliningrad Oblast, Yabloko candidate Anton Gendrikson was sentenced by decision of the Leningradsky District Court of Kaliningrad to 10 days of administrative arrest for distributing Facebook and Instagram logos, after which the regional election commission annulled his registration on 11 August.

In Novgorod Oblast, the registration of Anna Cherepanova (Yabloko) was annulled on 10 September after an administrative protocol was drawn up under Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. In Pskov Oblast, under a similar scheme, historian and deputy Tatyana Pasman (Yabloko) was removed for someone else's social media post.

A decision by the party that itself nominated a candidate may also be used to remove them from the elections.

Thus, in Krasnodar Krai, New People candidate Alexander Barashkov (an entrepreneur and drone developer) was withdrawn by decision of party chairman Alexei Nechaev dated 31 August 2026. The removal was pushed through by the department of internal policy of the krai administration because of Barashkov's attempt to organize independent observation at polling stations.

In Kursk Oblast, 75-year-old refugee from Sudzha Nikolai Skrynnik (LDPR) was forced to withdraw from the elections under pressure from the party leadership and the governor for refusing to delete posts criticizing the authorities in the border area.

In Ulyanovsk Oblast, candidates Yevgeny Skripkin and Dmitry Gondarenko (Yabloko) withdrew under direct pressure from the management of state institutions at their places of work.

Despite the initial desire to turn the current election campaign into a dull and routine affair, it nearly became a "game-changing election." Only at the cost of extraordinary administrative and coercive efforts was it kept under administrative control. Political life in Russia still breaks through the asphalt of restrictions.