Introduction

The Election Atlas project reviews the results of the nomination and registration process for the State Duma elections. The registration stage has not yet formally concluded, but all party lists have already been registered. The only substantive uncertainties concern a small number of self-nominated candidates, the overwhelming majority of whom are unlikely to be registered.

The previous State Duma elections took place under fundamentally different circumstances, although they too were exceptional to some extent. They were held against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, which was used to justify the introduction of multi-day voting, the possibility of so-called “stump voting” in certain areas, and what amounted to a ban on virtually all large-scale political gatherings. The latter remains in force to this day, despite the evident end of the pandemic.

Since February 2022, however, Russia’s political and party systems have been operating under even more restrictive conditions: censorship, coercive and repressive pressure, and extensive control over political actors.

The current election has evidently been designed by its organisers as a demonstration that the political system can preserve a calm status quo despite the dramatic challenges it faces.

The only elections that may disrupt this carefully constructed electoral idyll and introduce a degree of political uncertainty appear to be regional and local contests, where control is less comprehensive.

After this report had already been completed, Rodina filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court of Russia seeking to have Yabloko removed from the election.

During the current campaign, Election Atlas has already published several reports. They have examined changes to federal electoral legislation over the past five years, the state of the party system, the legal framework governing regional parliamentary elections, and the composition of regional election commissions (Part 1, Part 2). We also conduct weekly monitoring of federal television coverage and social media.

Key findings

1. The preventive removal of candidates who might create difficulties for administration-backed contenders, improve the ratings of opposition parties or raise issues inconvenient for the authorities during the campaign fits into what appears to be the broader strategy designed for the coming election: to make it as uneventful and predictable as possible and prevent any surprises. At a time of significant social and political strain on the political regime, the election is expected to proceed as routinely, quietly and controllably as possible.

2. The contraction of genuine competition, the increasing manageability of campaigns and the chilling effect on political activity have become particularly apparent. This affects not only opposition activity. Over five years, the number of party lists nominated for election has fallen by 27%. Among parties that participated in both the 2016 and 2026 elections, the number of candidates included on party lists has declined by 16.6% over ten years. The number of candidates nominated in single-member constituencies has fallen by 25% over five years, while the number of self-nominated candidates has more than halved over the same period and fallen fourfold over ten years.

3. Many uncertainties and potential risks were eliminated at the “distant approaches”, before the official start of the election campaign. A combination of legal and administrative mechanisms – “foreign agent” status, administrative fines under “extremism” provisions, criminal cases involving alleged “fake news” or “discrediting the army”, and corruption charges – selectively deprives politicians of the right to stand for election and of organisational resources. Both smaller parties and major parliamentary parties have faced coercive pressure, while the case of Boris Nadezhdin demonstrates how quickly and easily law-enforcement decisions can be used to block participation in elections. Even United Russia’s internal primaries have been accompanied by allegations of coercion, predetermined outcomes and the exclusion of unwanted candidates from the electoral process.

4. Citizens’ willingness to engage in political competition is also negatively affected by the established practice of agreements between the largest political parties, which determine the winners in single-member constituencies in advance and leave voters with little opportunity to express their actual preferences.

5. The collection of voter signatures as a mechanism for gaining ballot access has finally degenerated into a politically controlled barrier based on political arbitrariness by election commissions and the Interior Ministry, pseudo-legal formalism and procedural hair-splitting. The existing candidate-registration mechanism pushes new and smaller parties out of the political system and ultimately contributes to their dissolution. As a result, in 2026, for the first time, not a single party without an exemption from signature collection even attempted to nominate a candidate list.

6. The 2025 redrawing of single-member constituencies systematically strengthened the authorities’ position. Additional constituencies were created primarily in exceptionally loyal regions, including the new territories, while regions considered more problematic for the administration each lost a constituency. Altai Krai is a telling example: the constituency that was abolished was both the region’s largest and the one experiencing the smallest decline in its electorate, as well as being held by the opposition. As a result, some opposition figures moved to different constituencies, switched to party lists or did not stand at all, reducing competition. Combined with the expansion of electronic voting, particularly in Moscow, and the shortening of the constituency-boundary review cycle to five years, this strengthens the manageability of election campaigns and reduces uncertainty over their outcomes.

7. The current rules governing the division of party lists into territorial groups create problems for most parties, particularly those that do not expect to win large numbers of seats. Parties are forced to create territorial groups that are effectively guaranteed representation alongside others that have virtually no chance of winning a seat, replacing voters’ interests with electoral strategy. Territorial groups covering enormous areas also undermine the connection between deputies and particular territories, discrediting the stated aim of territorial representation. Conversely, very small groups effectively deprive residents of those territories of any realistic prospect of obtaining their own parliamentary representative.

8. Election commissions’ use of contrived grounds to deny registration to candidates and party lists in regional and local elections affects public perceptions of the entire system of election commissions, including those administering State Duma elections. At the same time, there are positive examples from a number of regions showing how such conflicts can be avoided. The practice of receiving candidates’ documents publicly deserves particular attention and wider adoption, as it resolves at least some disputes over whether particular documents were actually submitted by a candidate or party.

1. Nomination and registration of federal lists in the State Duma elections and analysis of their division into regional groups

1.1. Parties that nominated federal lists

In the current State Duma election, 11 of the 17 political parties registered by the Ministry of Justice and entitled to participate in elections nominated federal candidate lists: United Russia, the CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia, New People, Yabloko, the Party of Pensioners, Rodina, Communists of Russia, the Greens and the Party of Direct Democracy.

All 11 parties are entitled to participate without collecting voter signatures.

None of the six parties without such an exemption – the Democratic Party of Russia, the Party of Progress, the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice, the Party for Justice!, the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation and the Party of Russia’s Revival – nominated a list.

All parties that did nominate lists were ultimately registered.

After this report had already been completed, Rodina filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court of Russia seeking to have Yabloko removed from the election.

The situation partly resembles the previous two election campaigns. In those campaigns, all parties exempt from signature collection – 14 out of 32 – also nominated lists, and all were registered.

Unlike in the current campaign, however, one party without an exemption attempted to collect signatures in 2021: the Russian All-People’s Union. It was unsuccessful.

In 2016, four such parties attempted to qualify through signature collection. Several additional parties held nomination congresses, but their lists were not certified by the Central Election Commission. None of the four succeeded in qualifying, and their lists were not registered.

Table 1. Participation of political parties in State Duma elections, 2016–2026

Thus, since the 2016 election, only parties exempt from signature collection have had any genuine prospect of securing registration. In 2026, for the first time, not a single party without such an exemption even attempted to nominate a candidate list. It appears these parties have concluded that obtaining registration through signature collection is unrealistic and have already resigned themselves to eventual dissolution for insufficient electoral participation. Some are likely to face dissolution immediately after the State Duma campaign, while others may survive for another year or two.

Practice in recent years shows that a similar situation exists at lower levels of elections. Political circles have developed a widespread understanding that registration in national and regional elections requiring a substantial number of voter signatures is fundamentally a political decision made by those managing the campaign, and that registration cannot be obtained without their approval.

Voter-signature collection has therefore finally degenerated as an electoral mechanism. Election commissions have played an important role in this process: in their hands, verification of collected signatures has become an almost insurmountable barrier built on political arbitrariness, pseudo-legal formalism and procedural hair-splitting. Whereas collecting signatures once provided a route into the political system for new politicians and political projects by demonstrating an initial level of voter support sufficient to justify participation in an election, it has now become a mechanism for excluding new entrants and political actors who have lost ground during the preceding period. As an effectively insurmountable barrier without official approval, signature collection contributes to the closure and preservation of the existing political system.

Nine of the 11 parties nominating lists participated in both the 2016 and 2021 elections: United Russia, the CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia, Yabloko, Rodina, Communists of Russia, the Greens and the Russian Party of Pensioners for Social Justice, or Party of Pensioners.

New People was founded in 2020 and participated only in the 2021 election.

The Party of Direct Democracy was also founded in 2020 but did not participate in the previous State Duma election because it did not yet qualify for a signature-collection exemption. It obtained this status only during the 2021 election cycle, after winning 5.9% of the vote – 4,508 votes – in the election to the Legislative Assembly of the Jewish Autonomous Region.

1.2. What the law requires

The State Duma consists of 450 deputies: 225 are elected from party lists and 225 from single-member constituencies.

Under the law, federal lists consist of a central section and regional groups.

Below, we examine how the parties divided their lists between these regional groups and the central section. The issue is not merely political. The choices made by the parties also provide a clear illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant legal provisions from the perspective of ensuring territorial representation in the State Duma.

The rules governing the division of federal lists into regional groups have repeatedly been altered in response to the political circumstances of the moment.

In the 2003 election, lists had to contain at least seven regional groups, while the central section could include no more than 18 candidates.

In 2007, the minimum number of groups was increased to 80, while the central section was limited to three candidates.

In 2011, the minimum was reduced to 70 groups and the maximum central section expanded to ten candidates.

For the 2016 election, the maximum size of the central section remained unchanged, while the minimum number of groups was reduced to 35.

In 2021, the minimum of 35 groups remained in place, while the maximum central section was increased to 15 candidates.

The current election retains the rules used in 2021 – the first time the rules for structuring party lists have not been changed before an election. In a system where legislators are fully manageable, such “stability” between two electoral cycles points to the consolidation of the party and electoral systems: the informal administrators of elections can finally feel that they have full control over both the situation and the leadership of every party.

Table 2. Rules governing the division of federal party lists, 2003–2026

Some provisions, however, have remained in force for considerably longer.

In State Duma elections, unlike most regional elections, parties themselves determine how to divide their lists into groups, within the constraints established by law.

Since 2007, parties have also been permitted to divide large regions into several groups.

Since that year, the law has required the groups collectively to cover all regions and has allowed regions to be combined into a single group only if they border one another, with exceptions for enclave territories.

In theory, a party may divide its federal list into groups corresponding exactly to the single-member constituencies, meaning that the maximum possible number of groups is 225.

Compliance with these rules causes few difficulties for the dominant party but generally creates problems for opposition parties, especially smaller parties whose principal objective is merely to clear the electoral threshold.

1.3. How the parties divided their lists

The minimum requirement of 35 groups has now applied for three consecutive campaigns.

Analysis of the 2016 election showed that reducing the minimum number of territorial groups from 70 to 35 was entirely justified. Only three of the 18 parties created more than 70 groups. Most stayed close to the statutory minimum: seven created between 35 and 38 groups, while another four created between 40 and 45.

A similar pattern emerged in 2021. Of the 15 participating parties, only one created more than 70 groups. Six parties created between 36 and 38, while another four created between 40 and 46.

The current campaign shows much the same picture (see Table 3). Only one party, Yabloko, created more than 70 groups – 71 in total. Four parties created between 35 and 37 groups, while another three created either 40 or 43.

Table 3. Structure of federal party lists

As for the central sections, only two parties – the CPRF and Rodina – used the maximum permitted size of 15 candidates. LDPR included ten.

In the 2021 election, the CPRF received 18.9% of the party-list vote and 48 seats, while LDPR received 7.5% and 19 seats.

If a similar pattern holds, it can therefore be assumed that between one-third and one-half of the seats won by these parties in the next State Duma will effectively be guaranteed to candidates placed in the central sections of their lists.

The Party of Direct Democracy chose to have no central section at all, something relatively uncommon in State Duma elections.

The remaining seven parties placed between three and eight candidates in their central sections.

For a party confident of clearing the 5% electoral threshold, expanding the central section protects candidates whom the party considers important from uncertainty over results in particular territories.

The purpose of dividing lists into groups is twofold. First, it is intended to bring deputies closer to voters. Second, it is intended to create incentives for candidates to campaign for votes.

These incentives are strongest when the “marginally electable zone” is as broad as possible.

Candidates virtually guaranteed election once their party clears the threshold, and candidates with virtually no prospect of election, have far weaker incentives than those whose chances of entering the State Duma genuinely depend on how many votes their party receives in the relevant territory.

On this basis, parties should ideally determine their number of groups according to the number of seats they expect to win: roughly one and a half times fewer than the anticipated number of seats after subtracting the candidates in the central section.

This would give every regional group a reasonable chance of winning at least one seat while allowing some to compete for a second.

Ideally, parties should also seek to equalise the groups’ prospects as much as possible. As a first approximation, this means balancing them by electorate size, with subsequent adjustments for expected party support in particular regions.

From this perspective, United Russia should have divided its list into roughly 80 groups, while the other parliamentary parties should seek to minimise the number of groups within the existing legal constraints, which we continue to regard as excessive despite the earlier reduction.

For parties whose principal objective is simply to cross the 5% threshold, the issue matters less, since most of their groups will be non-viable in any event.

As Table 3 demonstrates, all four parliamentary opposition parties structured their lists broadly in accordance with this logic.

1.4. How evenly balanced are the groups?

The degree to which the groups are balanced in size can be assessed using two indicators.

The first is the ratio between the largest and smallest groups by number of voters.

The second is the standard deviation of the full distribution of group sizes, reflecting the spread of values, divided by the average group size.

These indicators are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Characteristics of federal party-list divisions

As the table shows, the lowest values for the first indicator, between 21 and 23, belong to four non-parliamentary parties: Yabloko, the Party of Direct Democracy, the Greens and the Party of Pensioners.

Achieving such a result mainly requires combining smaller regions into larger groups. As the experience of the Greens and the Party of Direct Democracy demonstrates, large regions do not necessarily need to be subdivided.

Even so, a twentyfold difference remains substantial and could clearly have been reduced further. The lowest ratio was 5.8 in 2021 and 5.4 in 2016.

The lowest overall dispersion figures belong to the CPRF, at 48%, and LDPR, at 50%. These too are relatively high. The lowest value was 33% in 2021 and 28% in 2016.

Comparing Tables 3 and 4 once again provides empirical confirmation, as it did in 2016 and 2021, of a conclusion we reached theoretically some time ago: the fewer groups a party creates, the easier it is to balance their sizes.

All parties with relatively strong balancing indicators have no more than 43 groups.

The worst balance is found in Rodina’s list, which was divided into 60 groups, although the principles used to construct those groups also contributed to the result.

The specific methods used to divide or combine regions vary enormously. Each party appears to take account of its support in different territories, the condition of its regional organisations, the presence of strong local leaders and similar considerations.

This diversity supports the principle embedded in federal law that parties should have autonomy in making these decisions. It is regrettable that the same approach has not prevailed in regional electoral legislation.

As Table 4 shows, the largest group for six parties contains 7,835,409 voters – in other words, Moscow.

Rodina also chose not to divide Moscow, but created an even larger group by combining seven Siberian regions: the republics of Buryatia and Tuva; Altai and Krasnoyarsk krais; Kemerovo and Tyumen regions; and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area.

For some reason, however, the party placed the relatively small Khakassia and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area in separate groups.

The resulting territorial group covers almost four million square kilometres – approximately the size of the entire European Union.

United Russia’s Territorial Group No. 1 is even larger. It comprises the Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Zabaykalsky Krai, Kamchatka Krai, Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Amur Region, Magadan Region, Sakhalin Region, Jewish Autonomous Region and Chukotka Autonomous Area, and covers almost seven million square kilometres.

Territorial groups of such enormous size render absurd the idea that dividing lists into territorial groups allows prospective deputies to maintain a closer relationship with people “on the ground” than deputies elected from the nationwide section of a list.

The Party of Pensioners divided only St Petersburg.

United Russia, LDPR, Rodina, the Greens and the Party of Direct Democracy did not subdivide any region.

Four parties – the CPRF, A Just Russia, Communists of Russia and Yabloko – divided Moscow into several groups.

The CPRF divided only Moscow. A Just Russia divided Moscow, Tatarstan and, for reasons that are unclear, Penza Region. Communists of Russia divided Moscow, St Petersburg and Bashkortostan.

Each of these three parties divided Moscow into two large groups.

New People did not divide Moscow or other large regions, but, for reasons that are similarly unclear, divided Arkhangelsk and Luhansk regions.

As in the previous campaign, Yabloko used an unusual structure. In its case, however, there were clear reasons for doing so: the party’s support varies sharply between regions.

In 2021, 38.4% of all votes received by Yabloko came from Moscow and St Petersburg.

There is therefore little reason for the party to equalise its groups by electorate size. It makes more sense to equalise them according to potential party support.

Following this logic, Yabloko created groups in Moscow, Moscow Region and St Petersburg that broadly correspond to pairs of single-member constituencies. In Moscow, however, two groups covered one constituency each and two covered three constituencies each.

The party also divided Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Region and Sverdlovsk Region into two groups each.

For four parties, the largest group contains fewer voters than Moscow. These are the CPRF, whose largest group combines St Petersburg, Karelia, Leningrad and Murmansk regions; A Just Russia, whose largest group combines St Petersburg, Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions; Communists of Russia, whose largest group is Moscow Region; and Yabloko, whose largest group consists of the new territories.

The difference, however, is not dramatic. Yabloko has the smallest maximum group at 5,403,848 voters. The three other parties have maximum groups exceeding six million voters, or more than 78% of Moscow’s electorate.

Dividing Moscow therefore did relatively little to reduce the disparity between their smallest and largest groups.

For four parties – all members of the parliamentary opposition – the smallest group contains just 32,308 voters. This is Chukotka Autonomous Area, which they chose not to combine with any other territory.

Other parties likewise left small regions on their own.

The smallest Communists of Russia group is Magadan Region, with 93,752 voters; Rodina’s is the Altai Republic, with 164,058; United Russia’s and Yabloko’s is Ingushetia, with 254,159; the Party of Pensioners’ is Adygea, with 340,444; and the Party of Direct Democracy’s is Sakhalin Region, with 371,422.

For the Greens, the smallest group combines three sparsely populated regions – Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Region and Chukotka Autonomous Area – and contains 351,679 voters.

In other words, no party, with the possible exception of United Russia, made its smallest group even approximately competitive.

1.5. Groups with small and large electorates

Overall, most parties demonstrate some attempt to balance their groups, whether by number of voters or according to other considerations.

At the same time, some parties have deliberately created groups with small electorates – groups that are effectively certain not to win seats, since mandates are distributed between territorial groups according to the number of votes they receive – alongside groups with large electorates that are effectively guaranteed representation.

This is particularly clear in the case of the four parliamentary opposition parties, which have a realistic prospect of winning seats.

At the previous election, these parties won between 13 and 48 mandates, some of which went to candidates in their central sections.

Let us assume that in the present election they expect their regional groups to win 20–30 seats.

With a statutory minimum of 35 groups, this inevitably means that several groups will receive no mandate.

Each of the four parties has deliberately created groups with virtually no prospect of winning a seat, effectively depriving residents of those territories of a realistic chance of obtaining their own parliamentary representative.

The CPRF, for example, has four groups with fewer than 350,000 voters: Nenets and Chukotka autonomous areas, Adygea and Ingushetia. Its next-smallest group already contains two million voters and is therefore competitive.

LDPR also has four clearly non-viable groups, each with fewer than 250,000 voters: the same two autonomous areas, the Jewish Autonomous Region and Kamchatka Krai. Its next-smallest group contains 1.5 million voters.

A Just Russia, which currently cannot expect to win as many seats as the CPRF or LDPR, has 14 groups containing no more than 1.02 million voters. Its 15th-smallest group jumps to 2.6 million. These 14 groups can likewise be regarded as effectively non-viable.

New People has 11 such groups, each with fewer than 900,000 voters. Its 12th-smallest group contains 2.7 million.

These examples clearly demonstrate that the statutory minimum of 35 groups remains too high. Parties are forced to use various devices both to comply with the law and to structure their lists in a way that serves their electoral competition for seats.

By contrast, these parties have relatively few groups that are effectively guaranteed representation.

Their reluctance to subdivide Moscow and Moscow Region is understandable. We therefore classify as deliberately created, effectively safe groups only those combining at least two regions and containing no fewer than five million voters. Groups comprising the new regions are excluded, since opposition parties are at a disadvantage there.

The CPRF has only two such groups: one combining St Petersburg, Karelia, Leningrad and Murmansk regions; and another combining the Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk regions, and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area.

New People also has two: Orenburg, Samara and Saratov regions; and Buryatia, Yakutia, Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Region.

A Just Russia has four: the republics of Altai, Buryatia, Tuva and Khakassia together with Altai Krai and Novosibirsk Region; Yakutia, Zabaykalsky, Primorsky and Khabarovsk krais together with Irkutsk Region; Perm Krai and Sverdlovsk Region; and St Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions.

LDPR has none.

1.6. Who was Kaliningrad and Sakhalin combined with? And other geographical problems

The treatment of Kaliningrad and Sakhalin regions is of particular interest.

The law requires regions combined into a single group to border one another, except in the case of regions that do not border any other Russian region.

Kaliningrad Region fully meets the latter definition and may therefore legally be combined with any set of mutually adjacent regions.

Five parties – United Russia, Communists of Russia, Rodina, the Greens and the Party of Direct Democracy – left Kaliningrad Region as a separate group.

Three parties combined it with north-western regions: LDPR with Karelia and Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions; A Just Russia with Leningrad Region and St Petersburg; and the Party of Pensioners with Karelia, Leningrad and Murmansk regions.

Three other parties chose more exotic solutions.

The CPRF combined Kaliningrad Region with Saratov Region, New People with Kemerovo and Tomsk regions, and Yabloko with Sakhalin Region.

The island region of Sakhalin presents a different case.

In 2007, the Central Election Commission issued a specific clarification, adopted by Resolution No. 25/192-5 of 15 August 2007, stating that Sakhalin Region was not an enclave territory but shared a maritime border, through waters classified as the internal waters of the Russian Federation, with Kamchatka and Khabarovsk krais.

This clarification, however, appears to have been thoroughly forgotten.

In 2016, four parties combined Sakhalin Region with Primorsky Krai, despite the fact that, according to the CEC’s own clarification, the two regions do not border one another. The CEC did not treat this as a violation.

Two parties did the same in 2021, again without objection.

This time, five parties – A Just Russia, Communists of Russia, Rodina, the Greens and the Party of Direct Democracy – left Sakhalin Region on its own.

Four – United Russia, LDPR, New People and the Party of Pensioners – included it in a large Far Eastern group also containing Kamchatka and/or Khabarovsk krais.

As noted above, Yabloko combined Sakhalin with the enclave of Kaliningrad.

The CPRF, meanwhile, treated Sakhalin as an enclave and combined it with territories far removed from the island: Altai Krai and the republics of Altai and Tuva.

Combining Kaliningrad and Sakhalin with distant regions raises practical as well as purely legal issues and is part of a broader problem.

When combining regions into a territorial group, parties must consider not only the legal requirement that the regions share borders, but also whether they have practical transport links.

This is particularly important in eastern Russia, since candidates assigned to a group need to be able to travel between its regions during the campaign.

Such mobility becomes even more important if the party enters the State Duma and its deputies are expected to work in those regions.

From this perspective, it is not only the combinations of Kaliningrad with Saratov, Tomsk or Sakhalin, or Sakhalin with Altai Krai, that are surprising.

Other questionable combinations include the Komi Republic, Sverdlovsk Region and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area under the CPRF; Krasnoyarsk Krai, Tomsk Region and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area under both the CPRF and A Just Russia; Yakutia with Krasnoyarsk Krai and Magadan Region under LDPR; and Karelia, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions with Kirov Region and Udmurtia under A Just Russia.

All are legally valid, but from a practical perspective they make little sense.

Overall, both the political administrators of elections and the parties themselves appear to be guided more by political and campaign-strategy considerations than by voters’ interests when dividing lists into territorial groups. The existing system frequently fails to fulfil its stated purpose of linking deputies to particular territories.

1.7. Decline in the number of candidates on party lists

Table 5 shows the number of candidates included on the lists of the nine parties that have participated in every State Duma election since 2016.

Table 5. Comparison of candidate numbers across three election campaigns

Comparison with the 2016 and 2021 figures shows a substantial decline in candidate numbers for many parties.

United Russia, the CPRF, A Just Russia, Yabloko and the Party of Pensioners have seen their candidate numbers fall consistently from one election to the next.

LDPR and the Greens have more candidates than they did in 2021, but fewer than in 2016.

Communists of Russia fielded roughly the same number in 2016 and 2021, but considerably fewer this year.

Among parties that contested both the 2016 and 2021 elections, only Rodina has increased its number of candidates, and only slightly.

New People, which is not included in the table, also increased its candidate list from 212 to 298. This is readily explained by the fact that it was a new party in 2021 and had greater difficulty recruiting candidates at the time.

Overall, only two parties have lists containing more than 300 candidates. For most parties, therefore, the number of candidates is now closer to the statutory minimum of 200 than to the maximum of 400. The total number of candidates fielded by these parties is considerably lower than it was ten years ago, a decline of 16.6%.

The obvious conclusion is that fewer people are willing to become candidates in State Duma elections. This is probably linked to steadily increasing requirements. Candidates must submit large volumes of paperwork, while those holding foreign deposits or other financial instruments are required to dispose of them before registration. Candidate status itself provides few particular advantages, but increases the risk of inspections, pressure and, in some cases, repression. These risks existed previously as well, but it appears that a substantial section of the political class has taken some time to fully appreciate them.

2. Nomination of candidates in single-member constituencies

2.1. Changes to the single-member constituency map in 2025

In spring 2025, the map of single-member constituencies used in State Duma elections underwent its scheduled revision.

Under the law then in force, constituency boundaries were reviewed every ten years to reflect changes in voter numbers. In 2025, a decision was made to shorten this cycle to five years.

The previous constituency map had been adopted in 2015 and was used in both the 2016 and 2021 elections.

The changes were substantial.

Seven constituencies were created in the four new territories that began to be referenced in the Russian Constitution after 2022: the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

One additional constituency was also created in each of three regions where the number of voters had increased significantly over the preceding decade: Moscow, which now has 16 constituencies; Moscow Region, with 12; and Krasnodar Krai, with nine.

Every region receiving additional constituencies has produced exceptionally pro-government electoral results in recent years.

Vladimir Putin received 87.3% of the vote nationwide in 2024. His result was 95.2% in the Donetsk People’s Republic, 94.1% in the Luhansk People’s Republic, 92.8% in Zaporizhzhia Region, 88% in Kherson Region and 92.6% in Krasnodar Krai.

Only Moscow and Moscow Region recorded results slightly below the national average in spring 2024.

However, the Moscow election that autumn took place under conditions in which most voters could cast ballots electronically rather than on paper.

By the Moscow City Duma elections of autumn 2024, more than 95% of votes were cast electronically, and United Russia doubled its number of seats compared with the previous election.

Ten regions lost one constituency each in the redrawing process, and many of them had been politically “problematic” for the authorities.

In the 2021 election, United Russia won 198 of the 225 single-member constituencies.

Another five were won by administration-aligned self-nominated candidates.

Of the remaining 22 constituencies won by other parties, five were located in regions that subsequently lost a constituency. In other words, these ten regions – 11% of all regions – contained 23% of all constituencies won by the opposition.

Altai Krai lost one constituency and now has three; Zabaykalsky Krai now has one.

Volgograd and Voronezh regions now have three each; Ivanovo and Kaluga regions one each; Rostov Region six; and Smolensk, Tambov and Tomsk regions one each.

The redrawing affected the constituencies of State Duma deputies Maria Prusakova of the CPRF in Altai Krai, Alexei Didenko of LDPR in Tomsk Region, Yury Grigoryev of A Just Russia in Zabaykalsky Krai, Alexei Zhuravlyov of Rodina in Tambov Region and Sergei Leonov of LDPR in Smolensk Region.

In Zabaykalsky Krai and Smolensk, Tambov and Tomsk regions, only one constituency remained, making it virtually impossible for the previously opposition-held constituencies to survive intact.

In the much larger Altai Krai, however, only one of four constituencies was abolished.

The constituency that was eliminated was precisely the opposition-held district that remained the largest by number of voters – 486,000 at the time of abolition – and had experienced the smallest decline in its electorate (see Table 6).

Table 6. Changes in voter numbers in Altai Krai single-member constituencies over ten years

The potentially manipulative nature of the new constituency map is also apparent in Irkutsk Region.

The region could, for example, quite plausibly have lost a constituency because its electorate had also declined substantially.

According to local experts, Governor Igor Kobzev agreed, in order to prevent this, to concede one constituency to Communist candidate and cosmonaut Oleg Novitsky, who is regarded as an agreed candidate.

This arrangement even required incumbent deputy Alexander Yakubovsky to be transferred from the Bratsk constituency, where Novitsky is now standing, to the Irkutsk constituency.

As a result, of the five representatives of opposition parties whose constituencies were affected by the reductions, only Yury Grigoryev was again nominated in a single-member constituency in the same region, Zabaykalsky Krai. He also heads A Just Russia’s Far Eastern territorial group.

Alexei Zhuravlyov moved from a constituency in Tambov Region to Bashkortostan and also heads Rodina’s federal list.

LDPR’s Sergei Leonov did not stand in the sole remaining constituency in Smolensk Region. Media reports suggest that the presidential administration intends this seat to go to A Just Russia candidate and State Duma deputy speaker Alexander Babakov. Leonov was instead nominated on the party list.

Maria Prusakova was initially nominated both on the CPRF list and in the Slavgorod constituency, which absorbed part of her former district. Two days later, however, the party partly reversed its decision and nominated regional legislator Lyudmila Klyushnikova in the constituency instead.

Alexei Didenko did not stand in the election at all.

The opposition had also performed relatively strongly in some other regions that lost constituencies, including Kaluga Region in 2021, although it had failed to win there.

Thus, one year before the start of the campaign, constituency boundaries were redrawn in a manner displaying signs of manipulation and political bias.

2.2. Candidate nomination procedure

The procedure for nominating party lists and candidates in single-member constituencies is set out in considerable detail in legislation and, at first sight, should not create significant difficulties.

Nevertheless, like many other formal procedures, informal political administrators and the formal organisers of elections have turned it into an administrative and political barrier that regularly causes problems and scandals for certain parties and candidates.

The 2026 campaign has been no exception.

The purpose of the nomination procedure is for a candidate or party to notify the organisers of the election – the election commissions – of their intention to participate, demonstrate their legal eligibility to do so, and provide the required personal information supported by the appropriate documents.

A candidate standing in a single-member constituency must submit these documents personally to the relevant election commission.

Once the procedure has been completed, the individual acquires the status of a nominated candidate and proceeds towards the next stage: registration, which allows their name to appear on the ballot.

The documents a candidate must provide are specified in the relevant legislation.

The commission is required to issue confirmation that the documents have been received.

Yet even such a straightforward procedure has, in a number of regions, been turned by election commissions, administrations and political competitors into a source of difficulties for certain, generally unwanted, candidates.

These incidents usually occur in regional and local elections.

Nevertheless, the commissions involved belong to the country’s unified electoral system, and their conduct affects perceptions of the system as a whole.

Past examples have included “missing” election commissions whose physical location candidates could not find; artificial queues of supposed “prospective candidates” designed to prevent genuine candidates from submitting nomination documents before the deadline in the 2019 St Petersburg municipal elections; and cases in various regions where documents already submitted by candidates subsequently disappeared.

Such incidents should be regarded as direct interference with citizens’ right to stand for election.

Similar cases have occurred during the 2026 single voting day campaign, once again involving commissions in St Petersburg.

According to Yabloko and various media reports, commissions in the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly election “lost” documents submitted by several candidates.

Candidate Anton Kostik, dealing with Territorial Election Commission No. 48 in Moskovsky District, received notification that his file did not contain a certificate from his principal place of employment or written confirmation that he held no foreign financial assets.

Dmitry Khorzov, dealing with Commission No. 19 in the same district, was informed that employment information and copies of other documents were missing.

Yaroslav Tambovtsev, dealing with Commission No. 26 in Krasnoselsky District, was likewise alleged to have failed to submit two certificates.

The candidates and the party maintained that all documents had been submitted, citing inventories and video recordings as evidence.

Dmitry Khorzov recorded the document-submission process on video and later made the footage public. The papers were then immediately found, and he was registered as a candidate.

An even more detective-like episode involved candidate Platon Vasilyev, dealing with Commission No. 44 in Krasnogvardeysky District, who made an audio recording while submitting his nomination papers.

Every document he submitted can be clearly heard being mentioned in the recording.

Nevertheless, the higher-level St Petersburg Election Commission refused to consider the recording during its review.

At the same time, the video recording made by the commission itself of the submission process mysteriously disappeared.

The commission also failed to use the standard document-receipt form recommended by higher election commissions and instead devised its own.

In addition, the chair of Commission No. 44, Svetlana Nefyodova, made inappropriate remarks about the candidate’s appearance during the procedure.

A similar incident involved A Just Russia candidate Manefa Korolyova, also dealing with Commission No. 44.

She too was accused of failing to provide a declaration confirming the absence of foreign financial assets.

Korolyova maintained that she had submitted the required document and had recorded the exchange on a voice recorder.

The same commissions also obstructed candidates and their representatives when they sought access to documents prepared by the commissions describing alleged deficiencies, and interfered with their statutory right to correct them.

Such actions by St Petersburg election commissions unquestionably discredit both the elections themselves and the electoral system as a whole.

There are, however, positive examples from other regions demonstrating how such conflicts can be avoided.

Regional election commissions in Perm Krai, Kirov Region and Kostroma Region, for example, have introduced the practice of receiving nomination documents publicly.

In Perm Krai, the regional election commission turned candidate nomination into a public event involving civil society representatives, members of the regional Civic Chamber, journalists and the Human Rights Commissioner.

The document-submission procedure was filmed.

Reports containing photographs of the candidates themselves were then published on the commission’s social media accounts the same day (example 1, example 2, example 3, example 4, among others).

The same practice was extended to lower-level territorial election commissions receiving documents from candidates in regional and local elections.

The public receipt of candidate documents deserves greater attention and broader adoption. It removes at least some potential sources of dispute and conflict, particularly over whether particular documents were actually submitted by a candidate or party.

2.3. Results of candidate nominations in single-member constituencies

The 2026 election shows a marked decline in competition in single-member constituencies. A total of 1,723 candidates notified constituency election commissions of their nomination in 2026, compared with 2,296 in 2021. Competition has therefore already fallen by 25% at this stage, from an average of 10.2 candidates to 7.7 candidates per constituency.

Part of this decline can be explained by the smaller number of parties participating in the election.

However, even among participating parties, there has often been a substantial decline in the number of candidates nominated in single-member constituencies (see Table 7).

Table 7. Nomination of candidates in single-member constituencies

While parliamentary parties seek to field candidates in almost every constituency, the smaller parties have often experienced substantial declines.

Yabloko nominated 15% fewer single-member candidates than in 2021, Communists of Russia 40% fewer, Rodina 54% fewer, and the Party of Pensioners almost 50% fewer.

Only the Greens increased their number.

The number of self-nominated candidates has more than halved.

The rejection rate is clearly likely to be very low this year because more than 95% of candidates in single-member constituencies were nominated by parties that are not required to collect voter signatures.

Such candidates can generally be prevented from registering only if they themselves choose not to proceed.

The situation for self-nominated candidates is fundamentally different: their chances are extremely limited unless some prior agreement with the authorities exists.

As of 7 August, only two self-nominated candidates had been registered.

A further 33 retained the status of nominated but not registered candidates.

The rest had already dropped out.

Self-nominated candidates are often concentrated in particular regions and even particular constituencies.

Of the 83 self-nominated candidates, 11 are standing in Moscow.

Their campaign activity is not currently visible.

For example, candidate Iosif Dzhagayev regularly nominates himself in elections at various levels, generally preferring central districts, but traditionally fails to make it onto the ballot even in municipal elections.

Four self-nominated candidates are standing across two constituencies in Yaroslavl Region.

Five are standing in Chelyabinsk Region and seven in Moscow Region.

Several constituencies have three self-nominated candidates each: Syktyvkar in Komi, Khakassia, Yaroslavl, and the Tushino and Central constituencies in Moscow.

Formally, the most competitive constituencies at the nomination stage are Angarsk in Irkutsk Region and Tushino and Central in Moscow, each with 12 nominated candidates.

Another 11 constituencies have 11 candidates each.

The lowest level of competition is found in the Ingush and Nenets single-member constituencies, with only four candidates each.

The CPRF and A Just Russia nominated candidates in all constituencies.

United Russia left the Moskovsky constituency in Tatarstan vacant.

The party initially nominated Alexei Grushin there at its congress, but the candidate allegedly failed to prepare his documents in time.

Media reports suggest that the constituency has instead been allocated to LDPR candidate and Tatarstan State Council deputy Ruslan Yusupov.

It is one of the least competitive constituencies in the country, with only six nominated candidates.

After nominations had closed, on 6 August, United Russia candidate Nikita Sergeyev voluntarily withdrew from the Kotlas constituency in Arkhangelsk Region.

LDPR candidate Maria Kharchenko is regarded as the principal contender there.

LDPR, in turn, did not nominate candidates in three constituencies, all in Stavropol Krai.

New People did not field candidates in 35 constituencies.

Citing sources in the Russian Presidential Administration and United Russia, media reports suggest that the ruling party is prepared to allow candidates from other parties to win in 16 constituencies:

• Moskalensky constituency, Omsk Region – expected winner: Oleg Smolin, CPRF;

• Tolyatti constituency, Samara Region – Leonid Kalashnikov, CPRF;

• Bratsk constituency, Irkutsk Region – Oleg Novitsky, CPRF;

• Mari constituency, Mari El – Sergei Kazankov, CPRF;

• Kotlas constituency, Arkhangelsk Region – Maria Kharchenko, LDPR;

• Moskovsky constituency, Tatarstan – Ruslan Yusupov, LDPR;

• Horlivka constituency, Donetsk People’s Republic – Andrei Kramar, LDPR;

• North-Eastern constituency, St Petersburg – Andrei Skoblov, LDPR;

• Kanash constituency, Chuvashia – Anatoly Aksakov, A Just Russia;

• Korkino constituency, Chelyabinsk Region – Valery Gartung, A Just Russia;

• Iskitim constituency, Novosibirsk Region – Alexander Aksenenko, A Just Russia;

• Smolensk constituency, Smolensk Region – Alexander Babakov, A Just Russia;

• South-Eastern constituency, St Petersburg – Oksana Dmitrieva, New People;

• Neftekamsk constituency, Bashkortostan – Alexei Zhuravlyov, Rodina;

• Yaroslavl constituency, Yaroslavl Region – self-nominated Anatoly Lisitsyn;

• Lipetsk constituency, Lipetsk Region – self-nominated Sergei Kurbatov.

Such political “trades” are problematic because they exclude the will of voters – the very thing elections are supposed to determine. Backroom agreements between party leaders and senior officials turn elections into an imitation of electoral competition.

3. Pressure on prospective candidates and obstruction of nominations

Restrictions introduced several years ago barring politicians designated as “foreign agents”, or those subjected to criminal or even administrative penalties under “extremism” provisions, from participating in elections have become an important mechanism for selectively depriving Russian citizens of their right to stand for election.

3.1. Yabloko

At least eight prospective Yabloko candidates have been preventively deprived of the right to stand in the State Duma election since autumn 2025.

On 4 December 2025, party chairman Nikolai Rybakov was fined 1,500 roubles for displaying “extremist symbols”. He had expressed condolences following the death of Alexei Navalny and posted a photograph of him on social media.

On 21 April 2026, former party chair and current Karelia Legislative Assembly deputy Emilia Slabunova was fined 1,000 roubles under a similar provision.

Three days later, a court upheld a similar fine of 1,500 roubles against Alexander Shishlov, leader of Yabloko’s faction in the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly.

St Petersburg Legislative Assembly deputy Olga Shtannikova was fined 1,500 roubles on 27 November 2025.

Dmitry Rybakov, a member of Yabloko’s federal bureau and Petrozavodsk city councillor, was fined 1,000 roubles on 26 May 2026.

Pskov Yabloko leader and regional assembly deputy Artur Gaiduk was fined on 2 April 2026, while Anton Kostryukov, a member of the party’s Novgorod regional branch, was fined on 9 June.

Earlier, in 2024, deputy party chairman Boris Vishnevsky was designated a “foreign agent”. He too is barred from standing in elections, and in spring 2026 a court declared a collection of his articles extremist material.

This wave of targeted administrative cases under Article 20.3 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences against Yabloko’s regional leaders and deputies in St Petersburg, Karelia, Pskov, Novgorod and elsewhere has therefore resulted in numerous prominent party figures being deprived of electoral rights for one year because of relatively small fines. The modest size of those fines itself indicates that the offences were considered to pose little public danger. Yet the resulting disqualification lasts through the end of the current election campaign.

At the same time, the party has faced a series of criminal cases involving provisions on alleged “fake news” and “discrediting the army”, including Article 207.3 and related offences.

One of the most severe cases involved Maxim Kruglov, who was sentenced to seven years in prison.

Human rights organisations and international media have described these prosecutions as politically motivated.

Maxim Kruglov, a deputy chairman of Yabloko, was detained on 1 October 2025 and convicted on 24 June 2026 under Article 207.3, Part 2(d) of the Criminal Code, concerning the public dissemination of knowingly false information about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, commonly referred to as “fake news about the army”.

The criminal case was based on two Telegram posts from April 2022 concerning the deaths of civilians in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere.

The prosecution of another prominent Yabloko politician, Lev Shlosberg, who also served as deputy chairman of the party, stands apart.

In June 2023, the Ministry of Justice added him to the register of “foreign agents”.

On 5 November 2025, he was sentenced in a “foreign agent” case to 420 hours of compulsory labour.

In December he was remanded in pre-trial detention and faced a new criminal case under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code concerning alleged “fake news about the army”.

Almost simultaneously, on 9 December, Rosfinmonitoring added Shlosberg to its list of terrorists and extremists.

An earlier criminal case under Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code, concerning “discrediting the army”, had been opened in 2024.

In May 2026, a court extended his detention.

3.2. CPRF

Other parties have also faced pressure, above all the CPRF.

The party’s most serious problems emerged in Altai Krai, one of its strongest regions.

In the 2021 election, the CPRF received 30.5% of the vote there, compared with United Russia’s 33.7%, and won one single-member constituency, with Maria Prusakova taking the Rubtsovsk district.

A series of searches and detentions took place at the regional CPRF organisation in November and December 2025.

They arose from a fraud investigation involving the alleged fictitious employment of assistants to deputies.

Those detained initially included regional legislative deputy Lyudmila Klyushnikova and her assistant Svetlana Kerber. They were later transferred to house arrest and subsequently released under travel restrictions or other measures.

A new investigation followed almost immediately.

In late 2025 and early 2026, further detentions and criminal cases targeted other regional deputies and party officials, including Yury Kropotin and Andrei Chernobai; Vitaly Buldakov and Natalia Chistokletova were also mentioned.

Investigators imposed various restrictive measures on some of those involved, including travel restrictions and house arrest.

The CPRF also faced pressure in neighbouring Omsk Region, where it received 31.2% of the vote in 2021 compared with United Russia’s 32.9%.

In May 2026, Omsk’s Kuibyshevsky District Court fined two representatives of the regional CPRF committee – Ivan Fedin, its second secretary, and regional legislative deputy Vladimir Vinichenko – 1,000 roubles each in administrative cases involving the “public display of symbols of a banned organisation”.

The cases concerned old social media posts containing images or the logo of Meta platforms.

Both politicians were consequently deprived of the right to stand in elections.

Over the past two years, the CPRF’s Omsk regional branch has also reported systematic refusals by the authorities to approve notices for pickets, “red tents” and other street activities.

Administrative fines against CPRF representatives for conducting “unauthorised” street actions have also been recorded in other regions.

In the Jewish Autonomous Region, for example, administrative cases were brought against the regional CPRF leader for laying flowers.

On 27 December 2025, law-enforcement officers in Buryatia obstructed a meeting with State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Markhayev.

During the State Duma campaign itself, on 10 July 2026, Ivan Apostolevsky, the CPRF candidate in single-member constituency No. 113 in Leningrad Region and leader of the party’s faction in the regional legislature, was detained.

St Petersburg’s Smolninsky District Court found him guilty of displaying prohibited symbols under Article 20.3, Part 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to ten days’ detention.

The case concerned links to Facebook and Instagram, which are owned by Meta, an organisation designated extremist and banned in Russia.

The decision has not yet entered into force. If it does, Apostolevsky will lose the right to participate in the election.

In Orenburg Region, CPRF candidates in regional elections Nurlan Munzhasarov and Vladimir Gudomarov were deprived of their right to stand after being fined under Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences for “displaying extremist symbols” in old social media posts.

According to Sergei Obukhov, head of the CPRF’s analytical department, Alexander Gubin, a candidate in the Tomsk regional parliamentary election and participant in the “special military operation”, faced an attempt to accuse him of unauthorised absence from his military unit despite having already been discharged on health grounds.

In Sverdlovsk Region, “special military operation” veteran Andrei Kuzhba was denied registration. He subsequently recorded an appeal to the president asking to be stripped of his veteran status if, despite that status, he could not answer the call to help strengthen the authorities.

Popular CPRF member of the Komi State Council Viktor Vorobyov was designated a “foreign agent” in 2022.

In 2025, former CPRF candidate for the Komi State Council Oksana Bagirova, also known as Kharinova, was remanded in custody for alleged “justification of terrorism”.

The CPRF itself chose not to nominate former Moscow regional party leader Valery Rashkin for the State Duma, either on the party list or in a constituency.

Immediately after the 2021 State Duma election, Rashkin became the subject of a criminal case for illegal hunting.

The deputy and a group of acquaintances were stopped by police at night in a forest with a rifle and an elk carcass in the boot of their vehicle.

Rashkin had begun a preliminary campaign in Irkutsk Region in the hope of standing in the Angarsk constituency, No. 97. He published a newspaper, travelled around local towns and even participated in a party conference, but his nomination ultimately never took place.

3.3. LDPR

Over the five years since the previous State Duma election, LDPR has effectively lost its regional organisation in Krasnoyarsk Krai, one of the party’s most important regions.

During the 2021 campaign, one of the party’s leading regional figures, Alexander Gliskov, suddenly withdrew from a State Duma constituency that he appeared clearly positioned to win.

Voters reacted extremely negatively.

LDPR ultimately received 14.7% of the vote in the regional parliamentary election, almost one-third less than in 2016.

The regional organisation’s principal financial backer, Sergei Natarov, consequently moved from the State Duma to the regional legislature, while Gliskov simply failed to enter the Duma and remained a regional deputy.

Sergei Natarov was detained on 21 December 2021.

The former State Duma deputy was charged with eight counts of embezzlement or misappropriation under Article 160, Part 4 of the Criminal Code.

In May 2026, a court sentenced him to 14 years in a general-regime penal colony.

His detention inflicted serious reputational damage on LDPR in Krasnoyarsk Krai and created organisational and financial difficulties for the regional branch.

The situation worsened in 2023, shortly after the gubernatorial election.

Several months later, Alexander Gliskov was detained on suspicion of receiving a particularly large bribe.

The events he was accused of dated back to 2017.

On 2 October 2024, Gliskov was sentenced to ten years in a high-security penal colony and fined 10 million roubles.

He was also barred from holding elected office in regional legislatures for eight years.

On 25 February 2026, however, the Criminal Division of Krasnoyarsk Krai Court unexpectedly overturned the conviction and returned the case to prosecutors. Gliskov was placed under house arrest.

Pressure on Krasnoyarsk LDPR figures did not end there.

After Gliskov’s detention, much of the organisation’s work, including leadership of the parliamentary faction, fell to regional legislator Alexei Boikov.

In March 2026, media reports stated that Boikov had been placed on an international wanted list.

He is suspected of involvement in the fraudulent theft of property belonging to Rosseti Siberia – Krasnoyarskenergo by an organised group on a particularly large scale under Article 159, Part 4 of the Criminal Code.

His property was seized on 28 July.

Investigators allege that in 2024–2025 the group operated an illegal cryptocurrency-mining farm disguised as an apiary.

In February 2025, a criminal case was opened against Anatoly Yemelyanov, leader of LDPR’s Lipetsk regional branch and a regional legislator.

Yemelyanov was charged with 42 counts of fraud involving significant and large sums.

Investigators stated that 64 people had been recognised as victims and that total losses exceeded 11 million roubles.

Shortly before the case was opened, Yemelyanov stepped down as coordinator of an LDPR regional organisation that had operated relatively successfully in the regional information space for several years.

Following his removal, the branch weakened substantially and came under the control of the regional administration.

The new coordinator, Marina Razdobarina, is a school director in the village of Dobroye and an incumbent municipal deputy.

She openly presents herself as a member of Governor Igor Artamonov’s team.

The new coordinator has extremely low name recognition. She is effectively known only in her home village of Dobroye, which has a population of roughly 5,000, while her recognition across the region as a whole remains low.

LDPR in Lipetsk Region is no longer engaged in genuine political competition.

According to expert assessments, parliamentary mandates are effectively approved at meetings within the regional government.

3.4. Scandals in United Russia

In United Russia’s case, the principal scandals arise during the party’s internal primaries, which are accompanied by widespread coercion of citizens into participating.

In April and May 2026, numerous complaints were recorded across Russia alleging that public-sector employees were being required to register and vote in the United Russia primaries and to provide screenshots as proof, sometimes under threat of sanctions or loss of bonuses.

In Chelyabinsk Region, specific complaints and discussions of pressure at municipal level appeared in regional media and analytical reporting.

Sosnovsky District was repeatedly described as a politically “difficult” municipality in the context of the primaries and administrative conflicts.

In May 2026, employees of publicly funded institutions, including staff from the Sosnovsky municipal administration, submitted complaints to 74.RU.

They said managers were forcing them to vote for specific United Russia primary candidates, requiring screenshots of their votes to be submitted to personnel departments, and threatening the loss of bonuses or other sanctions for non-compliance.

Following these reports, candidates and party representatives submitted requests to prosecutors asking them to investigate possible misuse of administrative resources by the local authorities.

In particular, officials were alleged to have collected information on employees of local enterprises for the purpose of subsequently pressuring them.

The allegations received substantial media attention and became one of the reasons for increased public and supervisory scrutiny of the regional campaign.

Even participants who lost the United Russia primaries accused the party itself of severe pressure on voters.

A major scandal unfolded in Buryatia.

An internal split involved State Duma deputy Nikolai Buduyev, who initially registered for the primaries and later withdrew.

The United Russia deputy effectively accused his own party of intense pressure on public-sector workers and commercial organisations during the organisation of preliminary voting.

According to Buduyev, compulsory registration on the party website resulted in citizens’ personal passwords to the Gosuslugi public-services portal ceasing to remain secret, exposing them to the risk of fraud.

In late May and early June 2026, Buduyev announced that he was withdrawing from the primaries in favour of a “special military operation veteran”.

He presented his decision as a protest against coerced voting and administrative pressure.

Another major scandal involved the withdrawal from the primaries of Sergei Neverov, a former leader of United Russia’s State Duma faction.

Neverov had intended to stand in a Smolensk Region constituency in which A Just Russia candidate Alexander Babakov has been nominated and is widely believed to be the candidate expected to win under an arrangement with the Presidential Administration.

Neverov withdrew from the internal primary in May 2026 and issued a relatively forceful statement.

Formally, he endorsed the party nomination of “special military operation” participant Artyom Kornyuchenkov.

However, he also urged both the party and regional leadership to support Kornyuchenkov and stated that if they failed to do so, “it would be unfair. Or if somebody decides to play political giveaway, that would be dishonest, indecent – let us support him together.”

Kornyuchenkov withdrew from the primaries the following day.

A somewhat similar situation occurred in Irkutsk Region’s Angarsk constituency, where incumbent deputy Anton Krasnoshtanov was effectively prevented from participating in the primary.

Several members of the Krasnoshtanov family hold elected positions at different levels.

Following a scandal over failed construction projects funded from the federal budget, a decision was apparently made to “clear them out”, beginning with the State Duma.

Family patriarch Alexei Krasnoshtanov served in the State Duma from 2016 to 2021 before passing the seat to his son and moving to the regional Legislative Assembly himself.

Political circumstances have since changed.

In 2015, Alexei Krasnoshtanov supported Communist Sergei Levchenko in the gubernatorial election, something that was also recalled.

His son Anton subsequently made several attempts to run for the State Duma through other parties but failed to secure approval from either A Just Russia or Rodina, despite having the financial resources to fund a campaign and strong prospects of success.

Another United Russia primary withdrawal is similarly revealing.

In Samara Region, Alexander Mileyev, a former deputy speaker of the Samara Provincial Duma and one of the region’s largest businessmen, with interests in the spirits and waste-management industries, was removed from the internal preliminary vote.

In early June 2026, Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev ordered an investigation into Mileyev’s claims to the status of a participant in the “special military operation”.

The investigation concluded that a certificate supporting his claimed veteran status was inaccurate.

According to the party, he had not in fact participated in combat and had merely travelled to Donbas on a humanitarian mission.

The certificate was annulled.

On 9 July 2026, the presidium of United Russia’s regional political council unanimously voted to expel Mileyev from the party on the grounds that he had discredited veteran status and submitted an inaccurate certificate.

Regional reporting has linked the episode to Mileyev’s conflict with the new governor and to internal political purges.

It may be assumed that a substantial share of individuals described as “special military operation veterans” in fact acquired the designation on similarly tenuous grounds, something that is unlikely to be a secret to their fellow party members.

3.5. Boris Nadezhdin

The case of Boris Nadezhdin stands apart.

The former Russian presidential candidate and former State Duma deputy nominated himself in the Mytishchi single-member constituency in Moscow Region and began collecting signatures in support of his self-nomination.

On 10 July, the Ministry of Justice added Nadezhdin to the register of “foreign agents”, depriving him of the right to participate in elections.

Nadezhdin nevertheless stated that he would continue collecting voter signatures.

Three days later, an administrative protocol was drawn up against him for displaying “extremist symbols” because of a link to a video containing a photograph of Alexei Navalny.

This provided an additional basis for depriving him of the right to stand, although the court ruling has not yet entered into force.

On 16 July, it became known that Nadezhdin had been barred from leaving the country because enforcement proceedings were being used to recover a debt of more than 1.4 million roubles.

On 3 August, it emerged that he had nevertheless succeeded in leaving the Russian Federation.

Overall, the removal of candidates who might create difficulties for administration-backed contenders, improve the electoral standing of opposition parties or raise uncomfortable issues for the authorities during the campaign fits into what appears to be a deliberate strategy for the coming election: to make it as uneventful and predictable as possible and prevent any surprises.

At a time of substantial social and political strain on the political regime, or system, the election is expected to proceed as routinely, quietly and controllably as possible. In previous campaigns, uncertainties and potential risks were generally eliminated during the initial stages of the election itself through the mass exclusion of unwanted candidates during nomination and registration. In the 2026 election, this process has instead taken place at the “distant approaches”, before the campaign itself. Almost all fundamental decisions about who can and cannot participate were made before the election was even formally called. This also applies to developments within the pro-government elite itself.

The determination to ensure that nothing disrupts a calm, predictable and controlled outcome may result in somewhat less political pressure being applied to registered candidates and parties during the campaign itself. It may also result in less administrative pressure on voters to mobilise them to participate, compared with previous elections. Reports that mandatory regional targets for turnout and United Russia’s vote share have been reduced provide some indirect support for this possibility.

It should be stressed, however, that this applies only to the State Duma election. Regional and local elections are not subject to the same degree of comprehensive control and, in our assessment, it is precisely these contests that may introduce a degree of political uncertainty and disrupt the carefully constructed electoral idyll.