"And who will do the counting?" Part 2: The simulation of a multi-party system

Analytical report on the composition of election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation at the start of the 2026 State Duma elections, in four parts

Part 2: Imitation of a multi-party system

Introduction ↑

The Elections Atlas project has analysed the composition of the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (regional election commissions), as well as the territorial election commission of the Sirius Federal Territory. It is these election commissions (ECs) that will play a key role in organising and conducting the vote-counting procedure in the upcoming elections directly across all territories of modern Russia. The previously published first part of this report was devoted to the extent to which an ordinary voter is able to understand who exactly bears responsibility for the integrity of elections in their region.

This second part shows the actual party affiliation of members of regional election commissions. According to the law, half of the composition of a regional election commission must be formed on the basis of proposals from so-called “parliamentary” political parties, i.e., parties admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates in the State Duma and in the representative body of the corresponding constituent entity of the Russian Federation (Clause 7, Article 23 of Federal Law No. 67-FZ). However, only one commission member with a decisive vote may be appointed from each political party (Clause 4, Article 22 of Federal Law No. 67-FZ).

According to the legislators’ design, forming part of the commission’s composition from party representatives should guarantee the collegiality, independence and political neutrality of election commissions, since parties are the main competing subjects in elections.

In total, we analysed the composition of 90 regional election commissions (89 regional election commissions and the TEC of the Sirius Federal Territory). The current election commissions were mainly formed in late 2021–2022 (71 compositions; for most of them this is the nominal “seventh convocation”), i.e., after the State Duma elections in September 2021, taking their political outcomes into account. The TEC of the Sirius Federal Territory was formed in February 2026; this is its second composition since 2021. The election commissions in the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions were first formed in February 2023. Eight regional election commissions (Khabarovsk Krai, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Kaliningrad, Orenburg, Tambov, Tver oblasts and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) were formed in spring 2021 and, in accordance with the schedule, were renewed on the eve of the start of the State Duma election campaign in late April–May 2026. As a result, we have data on 98 compositions of regional election commissions.

Taking into account the previous compositions (spring 2021 – spring 2026) of the eight recently re-elected commissions, as well as commission members with a decisive vote who have left the current compositions, our database contains a total of 1,473 commission members with a decisive vote. Unfortunately, establishing the exact number of commission members with a decisive vote who have passed through the compositions of these commissions is problematic due to the incompleteness of the information contained on the official websites of election commissions and government bodies (this problem is addressed in the previous part of our report). For example, it proved impossible to identify the full compositions of the ECs of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts due to their classified status. Therefore, all figures in this report are a lower, confirmed estimate.

According to the established staffing composition of regional election commissions, a total of 1,201 commission members with a decisive vote may participate in organising the 2026 elections in the regions, provided they are fully staffed (see Appendix 1). Since, due to various circumstances, election commission members may leave the commission at any time and a new commission member with a decisive vote is appointed in their place, the total number of individuals who have been in the composition of regional election commissions is higher than the nominal number. We were able to identify 1,355 individuals who have definitely been in the composition of the current commissions during the period of their operation.

No fewer than 327 commission members with a decisive vote work on a permanent (staff) basis (staff commission members), i.e., they receive a state salary for this. Unfortunately, these data are also imprecise, because many regional election commissions do not unambiguously indicate who else, besides the commission chair, deputy commission chair and commission secretary (the “leadership troika”), is on the election commission’s staff. In some places the number of staff commission members was established indirectly; in others it was not possible to do so.

Key findings ↑

1. The study demonstrates a systemic transformation of regional election commissions over the past 11 years. The formal expansion of party representation (from 62% to 82% of compositions) has become an instrument for strengthening administrative control, not democratisation. Genuine political diversity has been replaced by imitation through technical and systemic parties.

2. The key result has been the creation of a multi-level control system, in which United Russia has increased its influence 1.5-fold, gaining not only formal seats but also control through other nomination channels. With a formal right to 90 seats, the actual number of United Russia representatives reaches no fewer than 230 individuals (140 nominated through the CEC, local government bodies, public organisations and even other parties). The average number of United Russia members in a commission has grown from 1.6 to 2.5 individuals. At least 32 of them receive a state salary; 24 hold the positions of commission chair, deputy chair or secretary.

3. The most “pro-United Russia” election commissions are those of Perm Krai and Kursk Oblast (eight members of the regional election commission with ties to the party, out of 14), and Volgograd, Tula and Chelyabinsk oblasts (six out of 14).

4. Simultaneously, the opposition has been practically squeezed out of the electoral system and critically weakened. The CPRF and the LDPR have no significant influence: although they are formally represented in almost all regional election commissions, they hold practically no staff positions, are not part of the “leadership troikas” and are de facto isolated: the CPRF has only two staff election commission members (without leadership positions); the LDPR has none. It should be noted that the experience of these parties’ nominees is practically identical to the average experience of United Russia representatives: 1.5–1.6 terms for the CPRF and the LDPR, compared to 1.7 terms for United Russia. A Just Russia has three staff members (one deputy chair), but the party is sometimes forced to play the role of a technical nominator for EC apparatus staff. Yabloko has reduced its representation from 17 to four regions (Karelia, Pskov, Tver oblasts, Saint Petersburg), losing 76% of its representations over 10 years, which signifies the squeezing out of the independent democratic opposition.

5. The role of New People as a systemic party is particularly indicative: under the guise of a new political actor, it effectively serves as a channel for advancing officials and election commission staff. Fewer than 50% of New People nominees have a real connection to the party. Yet among the party’s nominees there are: at least 10 officials, 10 staff election commission members, 10 individuals with ties to United Russia, and 25 employees of budget-funded institutions. Paradoxically, New People, with significantly less average experience of working in election commissions, received five staff positions — more than the CPRF and the LDPR combined — which is explained by the de facto representation of the administration’s interests, not the party’s. This testifies to the low level of independence of this political party even in such secondary matters. In effect, the emergence of a new parliamentary force brought no new quality to the work of election commissions — the party had no influence whatsoever on the election commission system.

6. The formal growth of party representation does not signify genuine pluralism. Over 11 years, both the number of regional election commissions with “minor party” representatives in their composition has increased (from 53 out of 85 regional election commission compositions, i.e., 62%, to 74 out of 90 compositions, or 82%), as has the number of regional election commissions in which “party representation” constitutes half of the commission’s composition (11 regions in 2015, 51 regions in 2026). However, ties between minor party nominees and United Russia and the regional administration are found more often than ties with the parties that nominally nominated them. Minor party representatives end up in the leadership “troika” more often than representatives of the parliamentary opposition. The Pensioners’ Party alone, which has become the main instrument for regional administrations to advance “the right people” (officials and election commission apparatus staff) into the composition of regional election commissions, was found to have more staff (i.e., salaried) members of regional election commissions than all four large parties of the “parliamentary opposition” combined.

Party representation in regional election commissions ↑

As follows from the law, the following basic conditions exist for party representation in regional election commissions:

• five parties represented in the State Duma have a mandatory “parliamentary quota” in all regions;

• a “regional quota” in the corresponding federal subject exists for parties whose lists received at least one deputy mandate in the regional parliament following the elections that preceded the formation of the current commission composition;

• “privileged” parties have the right not to use their quotas, i.e., not to nominate anyone to the composition of the EC of the given region, but if such a nomination has taken place, no one has the right to refuse them this;

• the inclusion in the EC composition of “other parties” that do not have quotas occurs at the discretion of the government bodies appointing the commission members, i.e., the head of the region and the deputies of the regional parliament, with the participation of the CEC of the Russian Federation.

Before the State Duma deputy elections in September 2021, only four parties had the privilege that allowed them to place their representatives in all regional election commissions. In 2021, New People was added to them. In any case, only the presence of deputies from at least two or three other parties in regional parliaments guaranteed the fulfilment of this legal requirement. Before 2021, such a situation was rare. Thus, in 2015, “party representation” constituted half of the commission’s composition in only 11 regions.

Ahead of the 2026 elections, in 51 regions, half or more of the election commission members are nominated by political parties, i.e., a clear trend towards an increase in party representation in the composition of regional election commissions is observed (see Appendix 1). At the same time, in many regions the number of “parliamentary parties” remains insufficient to fulfil the legal requirement (since the staffing number of regional election commissions is 10 people in only five regions, and 12 or 14 in the rest, this legal norm applies almost everywhere only if the lists of one or two more parties have entered the regional parliament). The law allows that representatives of other political parties may be included in the composition of a regional election commission; however, this is a matter of goodwill on the part of those who actually form the commissions, i.e., the regional administrations (in 32 regional election commissions they limited themselves to the representation of only four State Duma parties). Moreover, this does not depend in any way on election results.

Such growth in “party representation” (almost fivefold over 11 years) can hardly be called a stable trend at the regional level; rather, it is situational in nature. In 2021, despite the increase in the number of parliamentary parties to five and certain successes of “minor parties” at the regional level, a reduction in formal party representation in regional election commissions occurred in a number of regions. For example, in the fifth composition of the EC of Chelyabinsk Oblast (2011–2016), seven parties were formally represented (the four parliamentary parties, Yabloko, Patriots of Russia, Right Cause) and this was highlighted as a significant achievement during the formation of its composition. In the sixth (2016–2021) and seventh (2021–2026) compositions, only representatives of parliamentary political parties (four and five, respectively) were appointed as election commission members.

1. The “big five” parliamentary parties in the composition of regional election commissions ↑

It seems logical that if a party expects a successful performance in a region, it is more likely to use its quota and occupy the seat reserved for it. The parliamentary parties do this almost always:

• The parties United Russia and the LDPR have their representatives in all regional election commissions;

• A Just Russia is not represented only in the EC of Sevastopol (although the party received 7.55% there in the 2021 State Duma elections, in 2024 it did not overcome the threshold in the Legislative Assembly elections and did not enter the regional parliament);

• The CPRF is not represented in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (while a CPRF representative was a member of the previous composition of the Chukotka EC, and the party has its own deputy in the local Duma, no one from the party entered the new EC composition in 2021. Conversely, the New People party, whose nominee, entrepreneur Sergei Yurakh, is included in the commission’s composition, does not even have a registered regional branch in Chukotka);

• New People is not represented in five election commissions: in Chechnya (0.24% in the 2021 State Duma elections; the party did not participate in the regional parliament elections in the same year 2021), Zabaykalsky Krai (the party received 9.36% in the 2021 State Duma elections, 4% in the 2023 regional elections), Irkutsk Oblast (2021 State Duma — 9.81%, 2023 Legislative Assembly elections — 7.34% and two mandates), as well as in Crimea (2021 State Duma — 3.96%, 2024 State Council elections — 3.14%) and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Thus, with the exception of Chechnya, it cannot be said that the party lacks socio-political support in these regions and that non-participation in the work of the regional EC appears justified. At the same time, after the State Duma elections in September 2021, a New People representative was introduced into the composition of the EC of Ivanovo Oblast, even though the commission had been formed earlier and the party initially had no quota in it. In December 2024, its representative joined the EC of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, replacing a representative of the Party of Growth who had stepped down, after that party effectively merged into New People in spring 2024.

1.1. United Russia ↑

In total, our list contained slightly more than 100 individuals who were nominated to the composition of regional election commissions by the United Russia party. During this time, party representatives were replaced in only four commissions (Adygea, Kalmykia, Stavropol Krai, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast) — this is the lowest indicator among the parliamentary parties. In 32 ECs, United Russia nominees work as members on a permanent (staff) basis, of whom: one is a chair (Omsk Oblast), 14 are deputy chairs, and nine are secretaries. Naturally, this is the highest indicator among all parties. For comparison, New People is in second place in terms of the number of staff commission members — they have only five such members of regional election commissions and only one of them is part of a “leadership troika” (as is the case for A Just Russia).

Fifty-four United Russia nominees were members of previous EC compositions, while 36 nominees had no prior experience of working in the electoral system. On average, United Russia members have been in the EC composition for 1.7 terms. One of the party’s most experienced representatives in election commissions is Svetlana Blinova, head of the secretariat of the Deputy Chair of the Government of the Republic of Mari El. She joined the commission’s composition back in 2003, i.e., this is her fifth term, and before the current composition she was a staff commission member. Party nominees in Dagestan, Kaliningrad, Kursk and Novosibirsk oblasts are serving their fourth term in EC compositions.

In more than 80% of cases, we found a factual connection between the nominee and the party. These are either open supporters/members/activists of the party, or individuals who ran for election from the party and became deputies, current or former staff of the party’s apparatus and governing bodies, party functionaries, lawyers, political technologists, and Young Guard activists. For example, Konstantin Yuferov, a member of the political council of the regional branch in Sverdlovsk Oblast and former chair of the party’s regional control commission, is in his third term on the commission; Ivan Pogorelov, deputy chair of the EC of Lipetsk Oblast, was previously a United Russia deputy of the Lipetsk City Council; Lyudmila Taskaeva, a member of the party’s regional political council in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, is the secretary of the election commission; Dmitry Khritonenkov, a member of the EC of Pskov Oblast and a pensioner, once headed the executive committee of the party’s regional branch, was its deputy, and headed the apparatus of the oblast assembly of deputies. In at least 15 ECs, the party’s interests are represented by legal specialists from regional executive committees. In Stavropol Krai and Tatarstan, the party is represented by deputy heads of executive committees – heads of the party-building department. There are also the head of the party faction’s apparatus in the regional parliament (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) and assistants to deputies.

In at least 15 cases, the party nominated state or municipal officials to the composition of the regional election commission, for example: to the EC of Sakhalin Oblast — Vladislav Epifanov, First Deputy Head of the Administration of the Governor and Government of the region; to the EC of the Republic of Karelia — Anastasia Lvova, Head of the Department of Labour Relations and State Expertise of Working Conditions, Deputy Head of the Department of Labour and Employment of the republic; to the EC of Ivanovo Oblast in May 2021, the party delegated Alexander Solovyov, who at that time was the chair of the Control and Accounts Chamber of the city of Ivanovo. In other cases, these are mainly officials from the apparatuses of regional administrations and parliaments.

1.2. The Communist Party (CPRF) ↑

In total, our list contained 108 individuals who were nominated to the composition of regional election commissions by the CPRF party. During this time, party representatives were replaced in 13 commissions. In most cases, the reasons for replacement are not explained (apparently, in several cases this is connected with nomination as candidates, in two cases — with the death of previous members). In Kurgan Oblast, Anatoly Popov, an EC member from the CPRF, spoke at a party plenum after the 2025 elections to the Kurgan Oblast Duma with criticism of the leadership of its regional branch, and subsequently resigned his powers by personal application and was replaced by another representative.

Only in two ECs (Dagestan, Ulyanovsk Oblast) do CPRF nominees work as members on a permanent (staff) basis, holding no leadership posts anywhere. In the Republic of Tyva, the party’s nominee Mergen Sambala, in the commission formed in December 2021, is one of the most experienced members of the election commission — in four previous compositions since 2007 he was the secretary, but shortly before the end of the previous commission’s term he left the position, and in the new composition he is an ordinary commission member with a decisive vote. CPRF representatives in the Altai Republic, Krasnodar Krai and Orenburg Oblast are serving their fourth term in the EC. In terms of experience of working in the election commission, CPRF nominees do not differ greatly from United Russia members. Forty-eight nominees were members of the previous EC composition, while 41 had no prior experience of working in the electoral system. On average, CPRF members have been in the EC composition for 1.5 terms.

Also, in more than 80% of cases, we were able to find a stable connection between the CPRF nominee and the party: around 10 CPRF nominees were candidates in elections and deputies; about 40 of the party’s representatives in the EC are its non-ordinary members (first and second secretaries of regional and local party branches, bureau members, chairs of control and audit commissions, leaders of youth branches, heads of various departments); another roughly 20 commission members with a decisive vote are assistants to deputies, party lawyers, and apparatus staff. On the whole, CPRF representatives are party figures of a fairly high level. The drawback of this approach is that many of them become candidates during elections and have to suspend their powers in the election commission or seek a replacement. On the other hand, there are almost no administratively dependent persons among CPRF nominees; there are only three officials — these are employees of property relations agencies (Buryatia and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) and the employment service (Smolensk Oblast). Among CPRF nominees there are several workers in the education system and research staff.

1.3. The LDPR ↑

In total, our list contained 117 individuals who were nominated to the composition of regional election commissions by the LDPR party. During this time, party representatives were replaced in 20 commissions, with LDPR representatives changing twice in two regions (Tyumen and Chelyabinsk oblasts), and three times in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. In three cases, the replacement was connected with the election commission member receiving a deputy mandate; in one case — with their death. In Ryazan Oblast in 2024, Anatoly Denisov (father-in-law of the former head of the Ryazan branch of the LDPR and State Duma deputy Alexander Sherin, who was expelled from the party in 2022 after attempting to lead the party) was replaced by Natalia Gordeeva by decision of the party’s Supreme Council, because Denisov had allegedly lost contact with the LDPR regional branch and had not fulfilled the duties of a commission member. In the remaining cases, the reason could not be established.

As far as can be judged from the data on regional election commission websites, LDPR nominees do not work as members on a permanent (staff) basis; however, among them there are EC apparatus staff (Chechen Republic, Kostroma Oblast). Forty-nine of the party’s nominees were members of the previous EC convocation; 53 nominees had no prior experience of working in the electoral system. On average, LDPR members have been in the EC composition for 1.3 terms, i.e., they are less experienced than representatives of the CPRF and United Russia. Only six LDPR nominees have been in the EC composition for three terms; the rest for one or two terms.

In more than 80% of cases, we were able to find a stable connection between the LDPR nominee and the party. Among the party’s nominees, no fewer than 15 individuals participated in elections as candidates, and two became deputies (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Republic of Komi). An interesting case occurred in Tyumen Oblast, where in 2021 the party’s nominee was, not for the first time, Alexander Yakovenko, coordinator of the LDPR regional branch since December 2018. In January 2022, he received a mandate as a deputy of the Tyumen City Duma, but in July 2024 he headed the regional branch of the New People party and left the commission. Among the election commission members from the LDPR, there are quite a few regional coordinators or deputy coordinators of the party (more than 10), members of coordination councils and other party bodies, and assistants to deputies. Administratively dependent persons (officials) were hardly nominated by the party to EC compositions.

1.4. A Just Russia ↑

In total, our list contained 112 individuals who were nominated to the composition of regional election commissions by the A Just Russia party. During this time, 17 party representatives were replaced (twice in Khabarovsk Krai): of these, two due to death; the nominee in Leningrad Oblast became the head of the administration of one of the districts; the commission member with a decisive vote in the Republic of Khakassia was appointed chair of the TEC of Abakan. Denis Khripel resigned his powers in 2024 in connection with his nomination as a candidate for the post of governor of Vologda Oblast. Marina Markovskayte in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug received a vacant mandate as a deputy of the local parliament. Alexei Nikishov from the EC of Buryatia possibly found it difficult to combine participation in the commission with work in the party’s central apparatus (since 2025 — Deputy Head of the Central Apparatus of the party). Olga Balabanova in Moscow Oblast was recalled by the party for ineffective work and causing political harm to the party due to her anti-war stance. The reasons for the replacement of other commission members with a decisive vote are unknown.

We note that the legal norm allowing political parties to recall their representatives from election commissions on the basis of a reasoned submission appeared in summer 2020, but the final decision is made by the commission itself.

Judging by everything, only three of the party’s commission members with a decisive vote were members on a staff basis (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Dagestan, Arkhangelsk Oblast). Alexei Petrusyov is the deputy chair of the EC of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Fifty-one nominees were members of the previous EC composition, while 40 nominees had no prior experience of working in the electoral system. On average, the party’s nominees have been in the EC composition for 1.6 terms. The most experienced EC member among A Just Russia nominees is Alexander Shirmanov — a member of the EC of Novgorod Oblast since 2003 (fifth term). Five commission members with a decisive vote are already in the fourth composition of their region’s election commission.

In slightly less than 80% of cases, we were able to find a stable connection between the nominee and the party. Among the party’s nominees in the EC, no fewer than eight individuals participated in elections as candidates, and two were deputies. Among the election commission members from A Just Russia, there are mainly members of the party’s regional collective governing bodies (around 30), as well as party functionaries (around 10). At the same time, among the party’s nominees one can count no fewer than 10 mid-level regional officials. For example, Irina Grishina — Head of the Department for Family Policy and Protection of Orphans’ Rights of the Ministry of Social Development and Labour of Astrakhan Oblast; Anton Shishkin — Head of the Legal Monitoring Department of the Main Legal Directorate of the Government of Tyumen Oblast; Mongush Sergei Daryy-oolovich — First Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Tyva. Among the party’s nominees there are ordinary state-funded employees and several heads of budget-funded organisations.

Unlike the LDPR and especially the CPRF, A Just Russia sometimes has to play the role of a “technical nominator” for electoral system staff. Thus, in Tomsk Oblast, the party nominated Galina Baida to the composition of the EC of Tomsk Oblast, who had been a TEC member for more than 20 years but had never been connected with the party.

1.5. New People ↑

In total, our list contained 105 individuals who were nominated to the composition of regional election commissions by the New People party. During this time, 18 party representatives were replaced, three times in the Republics of Adygea and Khakassia, Kursk and Moscow oblasts. In the CEC of Adygea, Ekaterina Dunaevskaya, a chief specialist-expert of the regional election commission apparatus, who had been nominated by the Cossack Party to the 2017–2022 composition and for a time served as acting secretary of the election commission, was initially included as a “representative” of New People. Then, from late 2023 to late 2025, the party was “represented” by Ekaterina Lovchenko, but in early 2026 she was replaced by Viktor Khizhnyak, a chief specialist in the apparatus of the CEC of the Republic of Adygea and an expert in the legal department.

Several of the party’s nominees to election commissions became deputies. However, while entrepreneur Alexei Voitov from the EC of Smolensk Oblast became a deputy in the Smolensk City Council, and Nyurgun Efremov became a deputy of the Yakutsk City Duma — both from the New People party — in the Republic of Komi, Vladislav Matveev left the regional election commission after being elected a deputy of the Syktyvkar City Council from the United Russia party (from February 2020 to September 2025, i.e., the entire time he was in the EC composition, Matveev was Deputy Head of the Syktyvkar Administration for Social Communications and Legal Support). Larisa Efimenko-Mikhailova, director of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company “Khakassia”, became a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia, a member of the United Russia party and joined its regional political council. In the EC of Bryansk Oblast from 2021 to 2023, the party’s “representative” was lawyer Evgeny Zorin, who had previously managed to be in other parties: in 2017 he was scandalously expelled from the leadership of the LDPR regional branch, and in 2020 — from A Just Russia, where he had managed to become the head of the party’s leading social project — the Centre for the Protection of Citizens’ Rights, and since 2019 had represented the interests of that party in the oblast election commission.

The degree of “seriousness” of the local authorities’ attitude towards New People is illustrated by a case that occurred in Chuvashia. Initially, Marina Yarantseva, head of the labour and wages department of CJSC “Cheboksary Enterprise ‘Sespel’”, was appointed to the composition of the republic’s CEC by decree of the governor. Formally, she was nominated by the environmental public organisation “Green City”, but then it emerged that the republican authorities had forgotten to take into account the interests of the New People party, which had entered parliaments at all levels. The oversight, it is said, was pointed out by the CEC, so Yarantseva had to be urgently recalled from the commission. In her place, a New People representative was introduced, who turned out to be Vladimir Kirillov, former chair of the TEC of the Leninsky District of Cheboksary and head of the department for interaction with local self-government bodies of the Internal Policy Directorate of the Administration of the Head of the Chuvash Republic. Yarantseva, in June 2025, was appointed authorised representative for financial matters of the incumbent head of the republic, Oleg Nikolaev (a member of the A Just Russia party), who was running for re-election as a candidate for a new term.

There are several New People nominees among members on a permanent (staff) basis, but these are mainly commission apparatus staff: in the Altai Republic this is Valentina Chukova, a staff commission member since 2025, formerly a legal adviser in the apparatus of the EC of the Altai Republic; in the Republic of Kalmykia this is Darina Amninova, head of the finance department – chief accountant of the EC apparatus. In Chelyabinsk Oblast, the party’s “representative” and staff commission member Oksana Ergunova also came from the commission apparatus: from 2005 to 2020 she served as a leading specialist, consultant, head of the legal department, and deputy chair of the commission; in 2020–2021 she was deputy head of the Main Directorate for Youth Policy of Chelyabinsk Oblast, but then returned to the commission in the status of a staff commission member and a nominee from New People. In Magadan Oblast, the party’s nominee Vladimir Snikhovsky became deputy chair of the commission.

Since the party only obtained its parliamentary quota in 2021, just 17 of its nominees had previously served on election commissions. These are predominantly either staff members of commission apparatuses and/or individuals who were previously nominated by other parties (the Cossack Party, Patriots of Russia, the Pensioners’ Party) as well as pro-government NGOs. For example, the aforementioned Chukova in the Altai Republic was previously nominated by Patriots of Russia; Kristina Gritsenko was previously nominated by Russian Student Brigades for the Orenburg Oblast election commission. The most experienced among New People’s current nominees is Ruslan Tapov from the Kabardino-Balkar Republic election commission, who is already serving his fifth term on the commission, having started in 2007. In 2016 he was nominated to the commission by the Nalchik City Council of Deputies. Valentina Kornyukhina has already served three terms; in 2016 she was nominated to the election commission by the CEC of Russia. In Krasnodar Krai the party has nominated the experienced politician and election organiser Sergei Danilenko, who was chairman of the region’s election commission as far back as 1994–1999 and was a member of the CEC of Russia in 1999–2003. For some time he engaged in party activity — first in the Rodina party, then in A Just Russia. In 2017 he returned to the electoral system and became chief of staff of the CEC of Russia, and in 2018 he was chairman of the Sevastopol City Election Commission.

At the same time, no fewer than 70 of the party’s nominees to regional election commissions had no prior experience whatsoever of working in the electoral system. On average, the party’s nominees had served one term on an election commission.

In fewer than 50% of cases were we able to find any connection at all between New People’s nominees and the party. Moreover, the connections found are far weaker than those of representatives of other parties, most often taking the form of rare mentions of the “nominees” on party resources. In only 15 cases are the party’s nominees someone from among the heads of the party’s regional branches, candidates in elections, or staff of regional campaign headquarters and party apparatuses. Among the party’s highest-status nominees one can single out: Nyurgun Efremov — deputy secretary of the party’s regional branch in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), who became a deputy of the Yakutsk City Duma and left the election commission; Sergei Chudaev — secretary of the party’s regional branch in the Udmurt Republic; Pyotr Tebenko — referent of the faction’s apparatus in the Legislative Assembly of Kemerovo Oblast. Only another 15 of the party’s nominees to election commissions can be more or less confidently classified as its members or public supporters.

At the same time, at least 10 of the party’s nominees have been found to have a past or current connection with the United Russia party. For example, Vladislav Matveev, a former nominee of the party in the Komi Republic and at that time deputy head of the Syktyvkar administration, was listed as a member of United Russia, and he left the election commission of the Komi Republic when he stood as a candidate for deputy of the Syktyvkar Council from United Russia. Ivan Zdanevich from the Kursk Oblast election commission is listed as a supporter of United Russia on its resources. In Primorsky Krai, New People’s representative became Alexei Oskin, who was previously a commission member with a consultative vote from United Russia. Irina Vinogradova in the Sverdlovsk Oblast election commission was the press secretary of the Young Guard of United Russia.

In addition, among New People’s nominees we were able to identify no fewer than 10 officials of various ranks, 10 commission members with a decisive vote (staff), employees of commission apparatuses and mid-ranking regional officials. For example, in the Leningrad Oblast election commission the party has nominated Timur Zainullin, chairman of the Oblast Press Committee since February 2025; before that, from 2022, he headed the oblast’s Regional Management Centre (TsUR). Elena Kovalchuk was an official in the Ministry of Education of Khabarovsk Krai. Vladimir Kirillov is head of the department for interaction with local self-government bodies of the Internal Policy Directorate of the Administration of the Head of the Chuvash Republic. Marina Prozorova is deputy head of the department of territorial executive authorities of Moscow. In Kaluga Oblast the party nominated Natalia Gerasimova — leading specialist of the youth socialisation and youth initiative support division of the youth policy directorate of the Ministry of Education and Science; in the Komi Republic — the already repeatedly mentioned deputy head of the Syktyvkar administration Vladislav Matveev, who left the commission in 2025. In his place, New People nominated Roman Koidan, referent to the Head of the Komi Republic, in November 2025.

At the same time, among New People’s nominees there is a noticeable presence (no fewer than 25 cases) of employees of budget-funded institutions, including youth policy specialists at higher education institutions (Ivanovo Oblast) and heads of university departments. Another type of New People representative is entirely unremarkable individuals who are difficult to classify as politicians or public figures, which is apparently the result of a personnel shortage in many regions. However, among the party’s nominees there are also political careerists of a sort; for example, in the Bryansk Oblast election commission such a “representative” of New People in 2021 was Evgeny Zorin, who in 2017 was expelled in scandal from the leadership of the LDPR regional branch, and in 2020 — from A Just Russia; however, in 2023 New People did replace him.

1.6. General data on the representation of the “parliamentary five” in the membership of regional election commissions ↑

When analysing the general data on the representation of the five parliamentary parties in the membership of regional election commissions, the colossal imbalance in the number of commission members working on a permanent staff basis — and especially in the “leadership troika” — representing different parties is striking (see Table 1).

Table 1. Representation of parliamentary parties in the membership of regional election commissions

Thus, with a practically equal number of formal party representatives in all election commissions, United Russia has at least 32 commission members with a decisive vote receiving a state salary (of whom at least 24 hold the posts of chairperson, deputy chairperson or secretary of the commission); A Just Russia has three (one of them a deputy chairperson); the CPRF has just two (none in the “leadership troika”); and not a single one has been identified for the LDPR at all. One might suppose that this is due, for example, to lesser experience; however, the average number of terms on a regional election commission served by United Russia nominees (1.7 terms) is almost equal to that figure for A Just Russia (1.6 terms) and the CPRF (1.5 terms). Paradoxically, among the representatives of the “parliamentary opposition”, the largest number of staff positions was obtained by the nominees of New People (five, including one deputy chairperson) — the party with the least average experience of working on regional election commissions.

This is probably explained by the fact that New People’s representatives are often only formally nominated by the party but have no real connection with it. In reality they are representatives of the administration or the election commission system (often one and the same), and sometimes even of formal competitors — United Russia, as in Komi. However, this is characteristic of New People not only at the level of regional election commissions. Even at the level of the CEC of Russia, the party was unable to find a person who would genuinely represent its interests; instead it nominated to the country’s main election commission a person who had spent his entire career heading structures created with the participation of the Russian presidential administration and designed to simulate public observation at elections.

An analysis of the biographies of party representatives on regional election commissions indicates that the level of representation — and therefore of independence — of opposition parliamentary parties on regional election commissions largely depends on the political weight of the party itself in the region. Greater influence (successful electoral results, competitiveness in elections, authoritative deputies) provokes more serious pressure from the regional authorities and United Russia, which must be resisted more skilfully. Therefore, such party branches try to send their best-prepared representatives (lawyers, advocates, political technologists) to regional election commissions. For example, the A Just Russia members of Yakutia on the republican election commission are traditionally represented by strong lawyers who have been through many election campaigns (previously Sardana Tappagarova, now Olga Sargydaeva) — primarily in the interests of the party’s regional leader, State Duma deputy Fedot Tumusov. Conversely, in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast there has been a clear decline in the status of the CPRF representative on the regional election commission — instead of the secretary of the regional branch for organisational and party work, Nina Kalyukina, it became Elena Kryatova, a kindergarten teacher and a completely non-public person.

At the same time, the inclusion of heads of party regional branches in the membership of a regional election commission speaks rather of a personnel shortage and other problems in the regional branch. During an election period, the leader of a party’s regional branch often becomes the leader of the party’s candidate list, and it is necessary to replace them on the commission with someone. It appears that the optimal candidate for inclusion in the membership of a regional election commission is a party electoral lawyer or a specialist in political technologies.

As already noted, intra-party conflicts can also be reflected in the representation of parties on regional election commissions. On the Bashkortostan election commission, the CPRF representative Vadim Sadykov became a figure in a major scandal in 2018. Party comrades accused him of attempting to disrupt observation at one of the polling stations in Ufa by replacing CPRF observers with ones loyal to United Russia; nevertheless, the party proposed his candidacy for the new composition of the regional election commission. In Tyumen Oblast, the LDPR replaced three representatives in the previous composition of the Tyumen Oblast election commission (re-formed in spring 2026): Alexander Yakovenko (who left the party and in 2024 became head of the regional branch of the New People party) was replaced in 2022 by Denis Shevtsov, who was already recalled from the commission in March 2023 for betraying the interests of the LDPR and expelled from the party membership. He was replaced by Svetlana Vedmid, a member of the control and audit commission of the LDPR regional branch and a candidate of legal sciences. On the Kaliningrad Oblast election commission in 2023, in the course of an unfolding intra-party struggle for control over the CPRF regional branch that began with the arrival of its new head, Maxim Bulanov from Nizhny Novgorod, Viktor Dyakov (one of the leaders of the young communists) was replaced by Vladislav Ryabtsev. Ryabtsev was one of Bulanov’s active supporters.

Sometimes loyalty and the possibility of co-optation into the electoral system become more important than loyalty to the nominating party. In KhMAO, Alexander Mashchenko had been a member of the election commission since 2003: out of five terms, he was nominated three times by the CPRF, but in 2013 he was expelled from the party. He was accused of “forging party documents and idleness as a member of the KhMAO district election commission, and wrecking the Khanty-Mansiysk city party organisation”. After that, he was nominated to the 2016–2021 composition by the previous composition of the commission, and to the 2021–2026 composition by the Pensioners’ Party, with which he naturally had no connection whatsoever.

Formally, under the law, parties cannot be represented on an election commission by more than one commission member with a decisive vote. However, in addition to direct party nominees, who, as we have seen, far from always represent the interests of the parties that nominated them, other “party members” are also present in the membership of commissions. Moreover, this applies only to members and supporters of United Russia. We did not find “secret” supporters of other parties in the membership of election commissions.

These “additional” representatives of the party of power were nominated by other subjects: the CEC of Russia, local self-government bodies, public organisations, previous compositions of commissions, and sometimes other parties. Some of them do not conceal their party affiliation and state it directly on the election commission’s website (for example, in Perm Krai), but in the majority of cases their connections to the party of power are established through information on party resources, through data on candidates participating in party primaries and elections, and from mentions in the media.

If formally 98 seats were reserved for United Russia in the 98 compositions of regional election commissions we studied, then together with its informal representatives nominated by other subjects, we counted no fewer than 240 commission members with a decisive vote who have served in these compositions and who are in reality connected in one way or another with this party; 150 of them were nominated by other subjects. No fewer than 230 of them are currently members of regional election commissions, 140 of them nominated by other subjects. For comparison, in 2015 there were 168 commission members with a decisive vote in 85 regional election commissions for whom a connection with United Russia was found.

Among the nominees from other parties, with the exception of the CPRF, LDPR and A Just Russia, there are also individuals with a United Russia background. For example, among New People we counted at least five such persons (in the Komi Republic, in Sverdlovsk Oblast, in Kursk Oblast, in Orenburg Oblast, in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug). Four commission members with a decisive vote nominated by the Pensioners’ Party (Krasnoyarsk Krai, Volgograd, Leningrad and Moscow oblasts) were at one time deputies from United Russia and were members of the support headquarters for Vladimir Putin organised by the party. The deputy chairperson of the Election Commission of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Ivan Androsov, nominated by the Pensioners’ Party, was at one time a deputy of the State Assembly (Il Tumen) from United Russia and was a member of its regional political council, and according to some data is still a member of it. Robert Khamikoev, nominated by the Pensioners’ Party to the Election Commission of the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania in 2021, is a member of United Russia’s regional political council and in 2023, with the party’s support, became head of the republic’s Irafsky District, after which he left the commission. In his place, Marieta Kazakhova was appointed to the commission from the Pensioners’ Party and became secretary of the election commission.

The most “pro-United Russia” regional election commissions are: the election commissions of Perm Krai and Kursk Oblast — eight party supporters each; Volgograd, Tula and Chelyabinsk oblasts — six each; Bryansk, Kirov, Kurgan, Leningrad, Orenburg — five each; another nine compositions of regional election commissions — four each; 13 compositions — three each. For comparison, in 2015 the most “pro-United Russia” regional election commissions were: the election commission of Primorsky Krai — six; Vladimir, Yaroslavl and Kurgan oblasts — five; the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Leningrad, Lipetsk, Oryol, Volgograd and Saratov oblasts — four; and 12 compositions had three commission members with a decisive vote connected with United Russia each.

In our view, a certain decline in the status of United Russia nominees can be observed. Whereas previously representatives of the party’s governing bodies (executive committees, political councils) often joined regional election commissions from the party, now they are often party lawyers and mid-level functionaries. Sometimes, due to agreements, the party is forced to nominate election commission cadres: secretaries, staff of commission apparatuses, whose loyalty to the commission leadership may be higher than loyalty to the party. In such cases, the party tries to strengthen its influence with loyal party members, political technologists, and high-status United Russia members through other nominating subjects. For example, on the Kirov Oblast election commission, Alena Vladimirskaya, a staff member of the commission apparatus, is formally nominated by United Russia, but in addition to her, the composition includes former party political technologist, member of the presidium of the United Russia regional branch and vice-governor Andrei Luchinin. In the Komi Republic, United Russia is represented by Marina Loginova, who holds the post of head of the document management directorate of the State Council, but the commission also includes Igor Trufanov, who is her direct superior in the republic’s representative body, holding the post of first deputy chief of staff.

Thus, over the past 10 years, United Russia’s influence in regional election commissions has grown substantially: on average, the number of United Russia members has increased from 1.6 to 2.5 per commission. Both formal nominees and informal representatives of the party occupy more influential positions in the membership of regional election commissions compared to other parties. 

Unlike other opposition parties, New People’s nominees turn out to be more closely connected both with the regional authorities and with United Russia.

2. “Small parties” in the membership of regional election commissions ↑

On the whole, the “big parties” are actively present in the membership of regional election commissions and their nominees can be classified as full-fledged representatives of the party. Perhaps the only exception here is New People. With the “small parties”, including those that have a “regional quota”, the situation looks more complicated.

In 2015, nominees of 13 “small parties” were formally present in the membership of 53 out of 85 regional election commissions (i.e. 62%). By 2026, the number of such commissions had become 74 out of 90 (82%), and the number of parties themselves — 18 (see Appendix 2). There has been an obvious expansion of the practice of including nominees of “small parties” in the membership of regional election commissions.

Five commission members with a decisive vote from “small parties” joined the election commission of the LNR — it appears that this was a kind of loyalty test for their leadership. In the remaining regions, the number of nominees of “small parties” was lower. Four “small parties” each are represented in the membership of election commissions in three regions: the Udmurt Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai and Sverdlovsk Oblast (in 2015, four “small parties” each were in two regions — the Republic of Crimea and Tambov Oblast). Three “small parties” each are represented in the membership of 11 election commissions: the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the Chechen Republic, Volgograd, Kostroma, Murmansk, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Ryazan, Tver (the 2021 and 2026 compositions) oblasts, and the city of Moscow (in 2015 there were four such regions — Sevastopol, Krasnoyarsk Krai, the Republic of Dagestan, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic). In the membership of the remaining 59 election commissions, nominees of one or two “small parties” are present.

In total, in the 98 commission compositions we studied (for the eight regional election commissions that were re-formed in April–May 2026, we also studied the outgoing compositions), 13 parties had a quota based on the results of regional elections (see Table 2).

Table 2. Nominees of “small parties” in the membership of regional election commissions.

The largest number of quotas was held by the Russian Party of Pensioners for Social Justice (RPPSS or the “Pensioners’ Party”) — in 28 regions. The Rodina party — eight quotas, Communists of Russia — seven, Patriots of Russia — six, Yabloko — four. The remaining parties — from one to three seats. However, on the one hand, far from in all cases did the parties make use of their regional quotas, and on the other hand, some of them obtained seats in election commissions where they did not hold quotas. Again, the leader here is the Pensioners’ Party — 29 additional seats. In total, its “representatives” joined the membership of 59 commissions. In second place is Communists of Russia — 10 additional seats and 16 in total. In third is Rodina — nine and 15 respectively. Nominees of the Party of Growth joined the membership of 11 election commissions, but at the same time never filled their two mandatory quotas (in 2024 the party effectively merged with the New People party). Particular “success” at the regional level is enjoyed by the Cossack Party, which very rarely participates in regional elections, yet its nominees joined the membership of six regional election commissions, as well as the environmental parties (Greens — 10 seats, Green Alternative — nine).

However, this is only the formal “representation” of “small parties”. In reality, few of their representatives have any real connection to these organisations. Therefore, unlike the parliamentary parties, the members of “small parties” who joined the membership of regional election commissions (with the exception of the Yabloko party) are more correctly called their “nominees” rather than “representatives”. It turned out that it is easier to find connections of these nominees with United Russia, with the regional administration and with the electoral system than with the parties that nominated them.

For example, in May 2026, in the Tver Oblast election commission, the Cossack Party nominated Oksana Babkina, the chairperson of the TEC of the Moskovsky District of Tver, who took up the post of secretary of the Tver Oblast election commission. In Volgograd Oblast, the Cossack Party put forward Sergei Skachkov, a member of the region’s civic chamber and chair of the public council of the committee for territorial entities, internal and information policy, who was part of the regional election headquarters of presidential candidate Vladimir Putin. In Lipetsk Oblast, Klim Smirnov, deputy head of the department for interaction with civil society institutions of the Lipetsk Oblast Ministry of Internal Policy, was nominated to the election commission through the Cossack Party. In the Republic of Adygea, Yuri Ovcharov, who held the post of assistant to the chairperson of the local parliament, was sent to the regional election commission — and for the 2017–2022 term he had been nominated by the Pensioners’ Party. In the Krasnoyarsk Krai election commission, the Cossack Party’s nominee was Elena Gridneva, chief specialist of the department for family, motherhood and childhood of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Ministry of Social Policy and head of one of Krasnoyarsk’s multifunctional centres; she had previously chaired the TEC of the city of Sharypovo, to which she had been nominated by United Russia. Overall, among the party’s six “nominees” to regional election commissions, five are or were in administrative service.

Of the 57 nominees of the Pensioners’ Party who have served as commission members with a decisive vote during this period, only six could be found to have a stable connection to the party — they sit on the party’s governing bodies or stood as its candidates in elections. However, in six cases one can also find a stable connection to United Russia (members of regional political councils, candidates, etc.). But the main point is that the Pensioners’ Party is often used to nominate staff from election commission apparatuses — those who are meant to fill the posts of commission members with a decisive (or consultative) vote (15 cases — more than the four opposition State Duma parties combined) — as well as officials close to the regional authorities (12 cases). For example, the following were delegated to regional election commissions as “pensioners”: to the Belgorod Oblast election commission, Tatyana Kireyeva, deputy governor — minister for youth affairs (!) (a retired police colonel who previously headed the press services of the Interior Ministry in various regions and then the Belgorod Regional Management Centre (RMC)); to the Kostroma Oblast election commission — Mikhail Kuznetsov, head of the state-legal department of the Kostroma Oblast Duma apparatus; to the Lipetsk Oblast election commission — Igor Popov, head of the regional Civic Chamber apparatus and previously deputy head of the internal policy directorate; to the Murmansk Oblast election commission — Kristina Astapova, also deputy head of the internal policy directorate of the Oblast Ministry of Internal Policy; to the Novosibirsk Oblast election commission — Dmitry Bogomolov, deputy minister of construction of the region, who left the commission in December 2024 when he was appointed minister; to the election commission of the Republic of North Ossetia – Alania — Robert Khamikoyev, a retired police colonel, deputy minister of natural resources and ecology (2021–2023), who was also a member of the United Russia regional council. Thus, if you see a “representative” of the Pensioners’ Party on a regional election commission, it is highly likely that they are either a current or former employee of the election commission apparatus, or an official from the regional authorities.

The “Communists of Russia” party is often used as a spoiler for the CPRF in regions where it is necessary to weaken the influence of the “real communists”. Among its 17 nominees who have served on 15 regional election commissions, only six can be found to have a connection to the party (mostly as its supporters); only in Ingushetia, Tatarstan and Magadan Oblast were its interests represented by someone from the leadership of the regional branches. At the same time, in Ulyanovsk and Omsk Oblasts, the Republic of Khakassia and Zabaykalsky Krai, local officials entered the election commissions through the party: Inna Mitrofanova — first deputy head of the city of Ulyanovsk, who made her career in the city’s education system; deputy chairperson of the Omsk Oblast election commission Andrei Frolov — at various times held posts in the region’s healthcare system, was deputy head of the department of judicial and administrative-legal work of the Ministry of State-Legal Development, and for many years sat on the city and oblast election commissions; Lidia Karelina was a legal adviser in the Russian Interior Ministry department for the Chita District and assistant to the head for legal matters of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service for Zabaykalsky Krai (it is noteworthy that on the website of the Zabaykalsky Krai election commission she is listed as a nominee of the “Agrarian Party of Russia”, while in the GAS “Vybory” system she is listed under the Communists of Russia); in Khakassia the party is “represented” by state official Oleg Yarovitsky — head of the energy supervision department in the Yenisei Directorate of Rostekhnadzor. In Amur Oblast, the post of election commission secretary has been “assigned” to the party’s nominees; both of the party’s nominees succeeded each other in this post: notably, Olga Efimova has more than 20 years of service in the electoral system, having worked her way up from clerk to deputy chairperson of the election commission of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and then moved to Blagoveshchensk, where she became secretary of the Amur Oblast election commission.

Only one of the nine nominees of the “Green Alternative” party can be found to have a connection to that organisation (Georgy Leshchev, chair of the political council of the party’s regional branch in the Udmurt Republic). At the same time, for example, Mikhail Zavarzin is mentioned as a member of the regional branch of the A Just Russia party in the Republic of Komi and was previously nominated to the commission by that party. The other “Green Alternative” nominees are also difficult to classify as participants in the environmental movement. It is noteworthy that in Krasnoyarsk Krai, lawyer and specialist in criminal and anti-corruption legislation Evgeny Akunchenko represents the “Green Alternative” party on the commission, while the regional privilege following the local parliament elections was earned by the “Greens”, who nominated no one to the commission.

In turn, among the nominees of the “Greens”, two are staff of election commission apparatuses (Chechen Republic, Belgorod Oblast), another two previously had ties to United Russia (Bashkortostan, Karachay-Cherkess Republic), as well as: the director of the Chita State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, two directors of educational institutions and the director of a budget-funded institution.

If one compares this with the composition of regional election commissions that existed before 2015, the role of technical parties that received many seats on regional election commissions regardless of election results was then played by the Patriots of Russia (36) and Right Cause (18) parties. However, in 2021, Patriots of Russia merged with A Just Russia and lost its role as one of the main channels for placing the “right” people on commissions: of the 37 commission members with a decisive vote it nominated, six were staff of regional administration or government apparatuses, five were full-time employees or members of election commissions, six held senior positions in state and municipal enterprises and institutions, and a number of the party’s nominees were directly connected to United Russia. At present, this role appears to have passed to the “Pensioners’ Party”.

Right Cause was first transformed into the Party of Growth and then merged with New People. Both parties are also actively used to fill election commissions with administrative members.

Among the six nominees of “Civic Platform”, only two can be found to have a connection to the party — history lecturer Natalya Drozdova from the Astrakhan Oblast election commission, and entrepreneur Alexander Popov from the election commission of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic are part of the leadership of the party’s regional branches — which cannot be said of the other “nominees”. Among them, Stanislav Vavilov deserves special mention: he was a senator from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (1996–2007), then worked for a long time as deputy chairperson of the Central Election Commission of Russia (2007–2016), after which he moved to the Moscow City Election Commission. Long-standing member of the CEC of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Pavel Kornilov was nominated for the 2012–2017 term by United Russia, while serving as head of the secretariat of the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); for the 2017–2022 term — by the Yakut branch of the “All-Russian Council of Local Self-Government”, while serving as deputy head of the Regional Directorate for State Construction and Housing Supervision; and for the current 2022–2027 term — already by the “Civic Platform” party, while holding the post of first deputy head of the Directorate. In the Republic of Kalmykia, the party was used to place Batli Taktinova on the commission, who took up the post of deputy chairperson of the election commission.

To nominate officials (especially those with legal backgrounds) to regional election commissions, altogether exotic parties are often used: for example, Tatyana Chervonaya, who is the head of the department for the examination of municipal legal acts and interaction with other bodies and organisations of the committee for legal support of the Stavropol city administration, was placed on the election commission through the “Democratic Party of Russia” from Andrei Bogdanov’s pool of spoiler parties.

The Yabloko party suffered the greatest losses in election commission composition among the democratic parties. Whereas by 2015 the party’s representatives were on 17 regional election commissions, by 2026 only four such commissions remained (Republic of Karelia, Pskov Oblast, Tver Oblast, Saint Petersburg) and all of them are directly connected to the party. Ahead of the State Duma elections, political pressure on the party sharply intensified. It also affected its representatives on election commissions. Thus, the party’s representative on the Pskov Oblast election commission, Elena Mayatnikova, was forced to leave the commission due to a ruling by the Gdov District Court coming into force. The court found that in September 2024, during the early elections for the head of Gdov District, Mayatnikova had visited polling stations without the authority to do so, and fined her under Article 5.69 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences, which entailed a ban on participation in the activities of election commissions.

For placing the “right members” — those from among election commission staff or regional administrators — on commissions, it is not all that important which of the “small parties” nominates them. Therefore, the practice of changing the party that serves as the subject of nomination to the commission is quite widely used. The selection of a suitable new party is most likely carried out by the local administration, which controls the party-political situation in the region.

Among the most characteristic cases, the following can be highlighted: the secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast election commission, Igor Butov, was nominated in 2011 by the Right Cause party, in 2016 by Patriots of Russia, and in 2021 by the Party of Growth; moreover, before his first appointment to the election commission, he headed the legal department of the commission’s apparatus; trade union functionary Tagir Zakirov was nominated to the previous composition of the Bashkortostan election commission by the Union of Labour party, and to the current one by the “Greens”; Elena Fominykh (Pensioners’ Party) was nominated in 2011 by the regional public organisation “Women’s Initiative”, and in 2016 by the Great Fatherland party; in Astrakhan Oblast, Farida Rekesheva (Pensioners’ Party), vice-rector for educational work and youth policy at Astrakhan State University, was put forward in the previous term by Patriots of Russia; in the Republic of Komi, the “Green Alternative” party nominated Mikhail Zavarin, for whom this is already his fifth term, and who was previously nominated on the proposal of the Russian CEC, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Komi, and A Just Russia, on whose website he is still presented as “the party’s face in the executive authorities”, and so on.

With rare exceptions, it can hardly be claimed that the nominees of “small parties” represent specifically “party interests” on election commissions. Overall, “small parties” (with the exception of Yabloko) are used to nominate both “ex-United Russia members” and current and former high-ranking officials, as well as staff from within the electoral system itself. Moreover, these may be different parties in different regions; much depends on how controllable the process is. In the Republic of Kalmykia, the Party of Growth and the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice, which hold regional privileges, did not nominate their representatives to the republic’s election commission, but it did include nominees of “Civic Platform” (the deputy chair of the commission) and the “Pensioners’ Party” (a staff member of the commission apparatus).

In such a situation, it is not surprising that representatives of “small parties” more often turn out to be members of the “leading troika” of regional election commissions than even representatives of the four “parliamentary opposition” parties, which have a real stake in the election results.

In the next part of the report, “And who will do the counting?”, read about the role played on commissions by so-called “public figures” — nominees from public organisations and local self-government bodies.

Appendices ↑

Appendix 1. Numerical composition of the election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation involved in conducting the 2026 State Duma deputy elections ↑

Appendix 2. Party representation in regional election commissions ↑

Note: Bold indicates “small parties” that used the “regional quota”; grey shading indicates regions where political party representatives hold half or more of the commission seats.