Legal parameters of regional parliament elections

In September 2026, in addition to the State Duma, 39 regional parliaments are to be elected. Their list is exactly the same as in 2016 and 2021. 

This report examines how the legal parameters of these elections have changed over five years. It continues a previously published report on changes to federal electoral legislation over the same period — most of the changes noted in the earlier text also apply at the regional level. The focus is, above all, on increasingly severe restrictions on citizens’ electoral rights and on procedures that are ever less transparent and beyond public oversight.

Key findings ↑

1. Regional electoral systems retain their diversity, but in most cases their characteristics are even worse than those of the federal electoral system. This applies in particular to the severe distortion of representation. Such distortion is made possible because the majority of seats are allocated in majoritarian districts, while the Imperiali method is used to distribute seats among party lists. This method cannot be considered a method of proportional seat allocation and therefore does not comply with federal legislation. Yet it will be used this year in 14 regions (five years ago there were 13).

2. Representation is likely to be distorted most severely in Primorsky Krai, Murmansk Oblast and Novgorod Oblast — regions that are traditionally problematic for the authorities. By contrast, the system that theoretically ensures the best correspondence between representation and the will of voters has ended up in three regions that experts regard as zones of total falsification — Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya. 

3. In Perm Krai and Chuvashia, the use of the Imperiali method could produce a situation in which a party that receives more than 5% of the vote obtains no seats at all as a result of the allocation. This would conflict with the requirements of the federal law. 

4. In many regions the minimum number of candidates on a list exceeds the number of seats distributed in the single district. This happens because of the unjustified requirement to split lists into a large number of territorial groups and the requirement to include at least two candidates in each such group. For example, in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Vologda Oblast and Sverdlovsk Oblast it exceeds that number more than twofold. Territorial groups are absent in only five regions: Ingushetia, Chechnya, Amur Oblast, Tyumen Oblast and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. 

5. Thus, the formally best rules for seat allocation are found in those regions where the official voting results cause no concern to the authorities, thanks to a long-established system for distorting those results. However, where voters still retain a theoretical possibility of influencing the real outcome of an election, lawmakers use legal tricks to secure unjustified advantages for the ruling party. 

Main parameters of electoral systems in elections of deputies to regional assemblies ↑

Table 1 presents the main parameters of the electoral system for these elections — the ratio of the proportional and majoritarian components and the method of seat allocation. The third important parameter — the threshold — is the same everywhere: it is 5%.

Table 1. Main parameters of the electoral system in regional parliamentary elections

In most regions these parameters have not changed since the previous elections. However, in four regions the number of deputies to be elected has changed.

In Kirov Oblast and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug — Yugra (KhMAO) the number of deputies has been increased — in Kirov Oblast by five, in KhMAO by two — while the ratio of list and majoritarian seats has largely been preserved (in Kirov Oblast two list and three majoritarian seats were added, in KhMAO one of each).

In Lipetsk Oblast and Murmansk Oblast, by contrast, the number of deputies has been reduced. In Lipetsk — by six, from the list component; in Murmansk — by four, from the majoritarian component.

In Kursk Oblast the total number of deputies has not changed, but the list component has been reduced and the majoritarian component increased by one.

As the table shows, a fully proportional system is used in three republics (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya); the remaining regions use a mixed system. The fully proportional system was also used in these three republics previously; at present this system remains only in the republics of the Caucasus.

A trend of the previous five-year period was a reduction in the share of the proportional (list) component. The law allowing this share to be reduced from 50% to 25% was adopted back in 2013, but until 2019 the regions hardly used it (apart from Moscow). In 2022 federal lawmakers went further, completely removing the requirement to use the proportional system in regional elections. However, no region has yet taken advantage of this “relaxation”. Moreover, the reduction of the list component has also halted.

As Table 1 shows, of the 36 regions where a mixed system operates, 26 retain parity between the list and majoritarian components. In two regions (Orenburg Oblast and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast) the list component is one seat larger, while in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug the list component accounts for 60% and the majoritarian component for 40%.

In seven regions the majoritarian component is larger, and this situation has persisted since the previous elections. In Kursk Oblast the majoritarian component is not much larger (53%, though previously it was 51%). In the six other regions it varies from 63% (in Novgorod Oblast) and 64% (in Murmansk Oblast) to 75% (in Primorsky Krai and Lipetsk Oblast), and in Amur Oblast and Kirov Oblast it is exactly two-thirds. At the previous elections in Lipetsk Oblast it was also two-thirds, and in Murmansk Oblast — 69%.

It should be noted that for municipal elections the federal law prohibits distributing fewer than 10 seats under the proportional system. There is no such prohibition for regional elections. Previously, fewer than 10 seats (i.e. nine) existed in only one region — Chukotka Autonomous Okrug; in 2021 it was joined by Amur Oblast, and now also by Lipetsk Oblast.

In most regions single-mandate districts are used in the majoritarian component. The exceptions are Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, where two three-mandate districts are formed, and Krasnoyarsk Krai, where in addition to 22 single-mandate districts two two-mandate districts are used (in the former autonomous okrugs).

Table 1 also shows that three different methods of seat allocation are used in the regions. The most comprehensible and fair method — Hare-Niemeyer — has remained only in Ingushetia and Chechnya. In 14 regions the Imperiali divisor method is used, which, as research has shown, cannot be considered a method of proportional seat allocation, and therefore its application does not comply with federal legislation. This method gives a clear advantage to the leading party.

In 23 regions the Tyumen method is used, which consists of first giving one seat to each list admitted to the seat allocation, and then distributing the remaining seats using the Imperiali divisor method. In its results this method is close to the d’Hondt method known from foreign practice. The Tyumen method also gives advantages to the leading party, but not always, and this advantage rarely exceeds one seat. The merit of the Tyumen method is that it guarantees at least one seat to all parties that have crossed the threshold.

Unfortunately, the scope of application of the Imperiali method continues to expand. This time the Imperiali method was introduced in one more region — Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which switched to it from the Tyumen method.

It is known that the Imperiali divisor method can result in a party that received more than 5% of the vote obtaining no seats at all as a result of the allocation. Calculations show that this is possible when the number of seats being distributed is less than 37. In other words, this applies to all regions that have chosen this method. However, such a situation conflicts with the requirement of the federal law.

In 12 regions, in order to avoid violating this requirement, the law provides for a correction for such a situation. Five different correction methods are used.

The Electoral Code of Primorsky Krai and the laws of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Orenburg Oblast in such a case simply prescribe switching to the Tyumen method, which guarantees a seat to every list admitted to the seat allocation.

The laws of Saint Petersburg, Murmansk Oblast, Samara Oblast and Tambov Oblast require that one seat be given to the list that was admitted to the seat allocation but received no seat. After that, the remaining number of seats is redistributed without the participation of that list.

The laws of Kamchatka Krai and Novgorod Oblast for such a case stipulate that the numbers of deputy seats due to the candidate lists that received the largest and the next-largest numbers of seats in descending order (but more than one seat) are reduced by one seat each. If two or more candidate lists received an equal number of deputy seats, the number of deputy seats received by the candidate list for which fewer votes were cast is reduced first. This reduction in the number of seats is carried out until the number of freed-up seats corresponds to the number of candidate lists admitted to the seat allocation but that received no seats.

The law of Stavropol Krai provides that lists admitted to the seat allocation but that received no seats are given one seat each from lists that received more than one seat, starting with the list that has the smallest quotient value in the auxiliary series of the krai candidate list.

The laws of Krasnoyarsk Krai and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug state that such lists receive seats from lists that received a smaller number of votes.

The difference between these correction methods is quite substantial. In Kamchatka Krai and Novgorod Oblast, in the situation described, a seat of the leader that was obtained in violation of the principle of proportionality would have to be sacrificed, and the seat allocation as a result becomes fairer. The seat allocation would also be more proportional in Saint Petersburg, Primorsky Krai and Stavropol Krai, and in Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Samara and Tambov oblasts. But in Krasnoyarsk Krai and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, in this case, they propose sacrificing a seat of a party that most likely received only two seats. As a result, the allocation would move even further away from proportionality.

The laws of the Chuvash Republic and Perm Krai provide no correction at all for the event that a list admitted to the seat allocation receives no seats. Thus, following the elections, a situation could arise there in which the methodology prescribed by law cannot be applied, because the result of its application would conflict with the requirements of the federal law. This has already happened repeatedly. Incidentally, in Tambov Oblast there was no correction in 2016 and 2021, which led to the misunderstanding described above. This time a correction was introduced in Tambov Oblast after all (as well as in Krasnoyarsk Krai and Orenburg Oblast).

Rules for forming party lists ↑

Table 2 presents data on the rules for forming party lists. The numbers in the table include not only those directly stated in the law, but also those that can be calculated from the provisions of the law.

Table 2. Division of party lists into territorial groups

* Depending on the number of voters in the relevant territory.

Regarding the splitting of lists into territorial groups, there are more changes compared to the previous elections: substantial changes have been made in 10 regions.

Splitting lists into groups is justified in large and heterogeneous regions, but in small homogeneous regions extreme fragmentation of lists has more negative than positive qualities from the standpoint of serving voters’ interests, and often makes the seat allocation the result of a confluence of random factors and outright manipulation.

Moreover, overly rigid rules for splitting lists, in particular dividing lists into too many groups, produce an effect opposite to the one declared: territorial representation is distorted — some territories receive an excess of seats, while others receive none. The sensitivity of election results (i.e. the composition of the deputy corps) to errors in vote counting and to falsifications also increases.

As Table 2 shows, the splitting of party lists into territorial groups is provided for in all regions except the Republic of Ingushetia, the Chechen Republic, Amur Oblast, Tyumen Oblast and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. In four regions there was no splitting at the previous elections either; this time they have been joined by Amur Oblast.

In most regions the lists provide for a central (region-wide) part, from which candidates receive seats first. At the previous elections only Novgorod Oblast had no central part. This time it has been joined by the Chuvash Republic and Vologda Oblast. The absence of a central part makes it harder for the leaders of parties’ regional branches to be elected to the regional parliament.

On the other hand, in six regions the maximum number of candidates in the central part has been increased: in Orenburg Oblast from three to four, and in Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk and Tomsk oblasts and KhMAO — from three to five. And this is a very telling point. In effect, enlarging the central part renders the splitting of the list into territorial groups meaningless, especially where the list component amounts to only 10 seats, as in Murmansk Oblast. In the latter, most likely no party will receive more than five seats, and, unless there are refusals of seats, candidates from the territorial groups will receive no seats. In the other listed regions, candidates from territorial groups will get seats for the leading party, but hardly for the other parties.

In most regions the most rigid splitting option was chosen: groups are tied to single-mandate districts and may not be combined. There are few exceptions. These include, in particular, Leningrad Oblast and Tambov Oblast, where a group may include one or two adjacent single-mandate districts, and Stavropol Krai, where a group may include the territory of one or more single-mandate districts. Almost as rigid is the splitting in Dagestan, where groups are tied to urban okrugs and municipal districts, but in Makhachkala, at the party’s discretion, there may be from three to seven groups, in Derbent, Khasavyurt and Derbent District — one or two groups, in Khasavyurt District — one or three groups. In these four regions there is a requirement that the groups cover the entire territory of the region.

In most regions where groups must correspond to single-mandate districts, it is permitted to create a smaller number of groups, but in that case part of the territory will not be covered by candidates. In such a situation serious parties usually strive to split their list into the maximum number of groups so that there are candidates in every territory, but the permission to reduce the number of groups can sometimes make it easier for parties to nominate a list. In Krasnoyarsk Krai and Primorsky Krai the laws strictly require a fixed number of territorial groups on the list.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the Chuvash Republic, and in Kirov, Lipetsk and Tomsk oblasts, the law has reduced the minimum number of territorial groups compared to the previous elections.

In the Chuvash Republic territorial groups were previously strictly tied to single-mandate districts (of which there are 22). Now the law states that each group must correspond to two, three or four adjacent single-mandate districts; the number of groups must be no fewer than seven and no more than eleven. This is one of the most sensible requirements for splitting a list, giving parties the opportunity to adopt the options that are optimal for them.

An original solution was adopted in Tomsk Oblast, where 21 single-mandate districts are formed. There a party may tie territorial groups either to single-mandate districts or to the territory of three adjacent single-mandate districts. That is, there may be either seven territorial groups (with the right to reduce their number to four) or 21 (with the right to reduce their number to 11).

Special attention should be paid to the six regions where two to three times fewer seats are distributed in the single district than in single-mandate districts. Of these, only in Amur Oblast are lists not required to be split into groups.

In Murmansk Oblast the requirement to split the list into groups corresponding to single-mandate districts has been retained. As a result, only 10 seats are distributed in the single district, while the list must be split into 18 groups (it is permitted to have fewer groups, but the groups are still rigidly tied to the districts).

In Novgorod Oblast the territory corresponding to a group must include two adjacent single-mandate districts. In Lipetsk Oblast the territory corresponding to a group must include three adjacent single-mandate districts. These territories are determined by the oblast election commission.

In Primorsky Krai the law does not clearly state how many districts a group’s territory must correspond to, leaving this question to the discretion of the krai election commission. The commission has formed territories each of which corresponds to three single-mandate districts.

In Kirov Oblast there are 30 single-mandate districts, while 15 seats are distributed in the single district. The law this time established a requirement to divide the list into 10 territorial groups (with the right to reduce their number to five). Each group thus corresponds to three single-mandate districts.

The laws described provide for a minimum number of candidates on the list, or such a minimum follows from the minimum number of territorial groups. In many regions the minimum number of candidates exceeds the number of seats distributed in the single district; in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Vologda Oblast and Sverdlovsk Oblast it exceeds that number more than twofold. In fact, for parties that split their list into the maximum number of groups, this minimum is even higher because of the minimum number of candidates per group established in most laws. Given that all parties except United Russia can count on only a small number of seats, these legal provisions force them to include on the list a large number of candidates who are certain not to receive seats and therefore have little incentive to take part in the elections. At the same time, the unjustified increase in the number of candidates raises the organisational and financial burden on parties when preparing for elections and completing documents.