based on the results of the nomination and registration of candidates for the elections of senior officials of the regions, scheduled for 14 September 2025

INTRODUCTION ↑

Despite general trends in domestic politics, Russia remains a large and diverse country, where elections can be very different in their essence and form — in some places there has been no political competition for a couple of decades, while in others a covert or even overt struggle among elites continues, and independent candidates are nominated who oppose the incumbent heads of regions.

In order to show the differences in the elections currently underway, the “Election Atlas” project has created the Index of (Un)freedom of Gubernatorial Elections. This index makes it possible to assess how freely one can exercise the right to elect and be elected in the elections of regional heads.

In doing so, we deliberately bracket out the nationwide restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the existence of the municipal filter, regular mobile internet shutdowns affecting the ability to campaign, etc., since these conditions exist across the entire country and do not reflect regional specifics. However, it is worth remembering this and keeping in mind that even the highest score on the Index does not mean that truly free elections are taking place in the region.

The Index is, of course, preliminary — it speaks more to the conditions in which people will have to make their choice on voting days. And it does not include such important factors as the course and freedom of campaigning, or the presence or absence of actual falsifications on voting days. These can only be assessed after the elections are over.

How does the Index of (Un)freedom of Gubernatorial Elections work?

All regions initially receive 10 points. Points will be deducted from this number for the presence of various factors restricting the freedom of elections. These factors are divided into three blocks.

The first block is related to real competition based on the results of candidate nomination and registration. It can deprive a region of up to half of its points if:

• at the nomination stage, there were already no real competitors to the incumbent head of the region — minus 5 points;
• at least one real opponent was nominated but was not registered — minus 2 points;
• at least one real opponent was nominated and registered, but has far fewer resources (financial, administrative, etc.) — minus 1 point.

If a real opponent to the incumbent head was nominated and registered and their resources are roughly equal, no points are deducted. Such a situation, for example, occurred in the 2023 election for the head of Khakassia, when the opponent of the incumbent head from the Communist Party (CPRF) was a State Duma deputy from United Russia.

The second block is related to creating conditions for voter coercion and/or falsifications on voting days, as well as restricting opportunities for observation. This concerns the organization of voting in ways that are poorly controllable by observers or not controllable at all, and that facilitate coercion. We note that the Constitutional Court of Russia considers election observation an integral part of citizens' active electoral right, i.e., the right to elect. Its restriction is a restriction of the freedom of expression of will.

This block includes:

• the presence of remote electronic voting (REV) in the region — minus 1 point;
• the presence of multi-day voting — minus 1 point;
• the presence of voting in adjacent territories (“stump voting”) — minus 2 points (this is the worst form of voting, not only generating arbitrariness by members of election commissions but also provoking aggression from residents).

The third block consists of one factor — forceful pressure on parties, candidates or journalists that could affect the course of the election campaign. The presence of such a factor deducts 1 point.

In total, each region can score from 0 to 10 points. The lower the score, the worse the elections in the region.

If you want to see general information on the results of candidate nomination and registration, read the overview prepared by experts from “Election Atlas.”

INDEX OF (UN)FREEDOM OF REGIONAL HEAD ELECTIONS ↑

Below is the rationale for the assessment for each region and general information on the results of the nomination and registration of gubernatorial candidates.

RATIONALE FOR SCORES BY REGION ↑

REPUBLIC OF KOMI ↑

The Republic of Komi has for many years remained one of the most problematic regions for the federal authorities, although this was not always the case. The previous three governors left their posts early following criminal cases or high-profile scandals. In 2014, Vyacheslav Gaizer won the election for head of the region, but was arrested a year later along with a group of high-ranking officials and politicians — the vice-governor, the speaker of the State Council and a senator. The next governor, Sergei Gaplikov, resigned early due to mass protests by residents against the construction of a landfill at Shiyes station, which began in 2018 and continued throughout 2019. His successor, Vladimir Uyba, constantly clashed with the local elite and local residents, was noted for strange statements, publicly swore, violated traffic rules and was rude to traffic police inspectors. He also resigned early on 5 November 2024. The acting head of the region became Rostislav Goldstein, the governor of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. In the election for head of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, he received 82.5% of the vote with a turnout of 73.02%. Prior to that, Goldstein lived in Komi for 17 years, worked in the State Council of the republic and represented the region in the State Duma.

The election for the head of the Republic of Komi, combined with elections of deputies to the regional State Council and the Syktyvkar city council, could have become one of the most competitive campaigns of 2025. The authorities' results in the region in recent years were relatively low: in the 2020 regional parliamentary elections, United Russia gained only 28.71% of the vote on party lists; in 2021, United Russia received the third-worst result among all regions in Komi in the State Duma elections (29.44% against 26.88% for the Communist Party (CPRF)); and in the 2024 Russian presidential election, Komi had the lowest turnout in Russia – 58.52%.

The region also has a strong opponent to the current authorities — one of the leaders of the Shiyes protests, State Duma deputy from the Communist Party (CPRF) (won in the Syktyvkar single-mandate constituency in 2021) Oleg Mikhailov. He ran as a candidate for governor in 2020 but was not allowed to participate, and the winner, Vladimir Uyba, ultimately competed with little-known representatives from the LDPR, “Green Alternative” and the CPSS.

This time, candidates had to collect 10% or 169 signatures of municipal heads and deputies, of which 40 had to be top-level from no fewer than 15 territories (only United Russia has a sufficient number of its own deputies and heads). In addition, candidates nominated by parties without the “parliamentary privilege” had to collect signatures of 1% of residents (about 6,300) in support of their nomination. 

In the end, 12 candidates were nominated, including Oleg Mikhailov (from the Communist Party (CPRF)), but only five were registered: Rostislav Goldstein (acting governor, United Russia), Sergei Karginov (State Duma deputy from the LDPR, with no connection to the region), Alexander Kasyanenko (“Communists of Russia,” physical education teacher), Tatyana Saladina (State Council deputy from A Just Russia — For Truth), Stepan Solovyov (a Muscovite, deputy chairman of “Green Alternative,” regularly participates in elections in various regions as a “technical candidate”: in 2024 he was simultaneously a candidate in the gubernatorial elections of Chelyabinsk and Samara oblasts; in 2020 he was unable to register as a candidate for deputy of the municipal urban okrug of “Syktyvkar” but was registered as a candidate for deputy of the State Council of Komi).

Six candidates were denied registration: independent candidates Natalya Goiman, Svetlana Ignatova, Tatyana Kuznetsova, Ilya Popov, as well as Vladimir Gorbunov (“Rodina”), Oleg Mikhailov (Communist Party (CPRF)) and Artem Sinyavsky (RPSS). Independent candidate Tatyana Kuznetsova lost the status of a nominated candidate.

Oleg Mikhailov submitted 173 signatures, but eight of them were declared invalid. Election commission chairman Dmitry Mityushev explained that the signatures turned out to be “duplicated,” meaning they were also given for other candidates. Some of the duplicate signatories had signed for another candidate just a few minutes before giving their signature to Mikhailov. One of the “duplicate signatories” was a municipal deputy from the Communist Party (CPRF). In 2020, Mikhailov faced a similar problem. We note that the candidates from “Rodina” and the RPSS, as well as two independent candidates, collectively submitted 301 signatures of municipal heads and deputies, but did not submit voter signatures in support of their nomination. All of this looks like a staged campaign to complicate signature collection for Mikhailov.

Thus, acting governor Rostislav Goldstein, like his unlucky predecessor Vladimir Uyba, is freed from the need to compete with the most popular opposition politician in the region. Moreover, as early as 22 May, information appeared in the public domain that Goldstein's headquarters would be collecting signatures for several candidates at once: Sergei Karginov, Tatyana Saladina, Stepan Solovyov, Vladimir Gorbunov, Alexander Kasyanenko, Artem Sinyavsky and Ilya Popov. The elections had not even begun then, and journalists did not even know who some of the named potential candidates were (all of them were eventually nominated). The Telegram channel “New Republic” even published a “quota” for the Syktyvdinsky District for deputy signatures for various candidates. For instance, in the rural settlement “Mandach,” Goldstein, Sinyavsky and Kasyanenko were to receive two signatures each, and independent candidate Popov — one; in Chasovo, Saladina, Popov, Karginov and Goldstein — two signatures each, etc. In total, the district must provide 27 signatures for Goldstein, 18 for Karginov, 12 for Saladina, eight each for Sinyavsky, Solovyov and Kasyanenko, and nine signatures for Popov.

The nomination of candidates began on 8 June and immediately turned into a scandal. According to the election commission's resolution, on weekends and holidays, candidates' registration in the queue for submitting documents for nomination must be done by phone. Mikhailov was the first to register, but the election commission arbitrarily changed the list of candidates and the communist ended up last in the queue. The first 18 places went to Goldstein and other individuals (many of whom ultimately never brought the documents required for nomination). The nomination deadline is very important for overcoming the municipal filter, since in the case of “duplication” of signatures, the one given earlier is retained. As a result of such haste, for example, one of the deputies signed for Vladimir Gorbunov (“Rodina”) before he had even managed to be nominated.

In addition, at the height of the campaign, pressure is being exerted on the opposition and the media: on 8 July, the FSB conducted searches at the Syktyvkar “Revolt Center” and opened a criminal case for high treason (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) against its co-founder and ex-director of the regional outlet “7x7” (added by the Ministry of Justice of Russia to the register of foreign agents) Pavel Andreev. Several State Council deputies (one of whom is the gubernatorial candidate from A Just Russia, Tatyana Saladina) sent a statement to the Prosecutor General's Office to check Oleg Mikhailov for connections with Andreev.

As a result, the Index of (Un)freedom of the Election for the Head of the Republic of Komi amounts to only 5 points, although politics in the region is quite competitive against the all-Russian backdrop.

REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN ↑

The political history of Tatarstan is not distinguished by diversity. In the 34 years since the establishment of the post of head (president) of the Republic of Tatarstan, this post has been held by only two people — Mintimer Shaimiev led the region for 19 years, and Rustam Minnikhanov has headed the republic for more than 15 years. The election results throughout this entire period were also predictable — Tatarstan has always shown anomalously high results in support of the authorities. For example, in the 1996 election for head of the region, Mintimer Shaimiev received 97% of the vote, and in 2001 — 79.5%. Rustam Minnikhanov followed in the same footsteps. In his first election in 2015, he allegedly garnered 94.4% of the vote, and in 2020 a more modest 83.3%.

Elections in Tatarstan have traditionally been accompanied by evidence of mass falsifications and pressure on observers.

In such a situation, it is not surprising that the regional authorities do not need to use any additional tricks to achieve the desired results — there will be neither REV nor “stump” voting in the region, and the election itself will take place over a single day. The head of the republic's CEC stated that party representatives spoke out against REV and multi-day voting: “Multi-day voting is a huge strain, both psychological and physical, for commission members. Imagine, security must be ensured at all facilities for three days: that's 2,752 precinct election commissions, 65 territorial ones. It's a huge strain of effort,” — he noted.

The speaker of the State Council of Tatarstan, Farid Mukhametshin, also supported holding the election in one day: “I view this positively. The practice of past years shows that single-day voting is more effective. When elections are stretched over three days, people postpone going to the polling stations and then forget about them. I have even seen statistics confirming this. Single-day voting allows more people to take part in the election. Besides, one can vote not only at one's own precinct but also at another, which also increases the number of voters.”

Such decisions allowed Tatarstan to score more points in our Index than one might expect. However, it is important to understand that these points are given in advance, as they do not account for mass falsifications and coercion of people on voting day, although the entire history of the region suggests that such a development of events is very likely.

There will simply be no competition in this election, as the region lacks independent opposition politicians capable of even theoretically challenging the power of the incumbent head of the republic. Three people have been nominated as “competitors” to Rustam Minnikhanov this time — State Council of Tatarstan deputy Khafiz Mirgalimov is running from the Communist Party (CPRF), pensioner and rural deputy Vitaly Smirnov, who represents the Pensioners' Party, and the LDPR has nominated State Council of Tatarstan deputy Ruslan Yusupov, who has been convicted three (!) times on criminal charges (in 1991 — for theft, in 2000 — for arbitrary actions, in 2002 — for robbery). All three successfully overcame the municipal filter and were registered. A Just Russia — For Truth and New People did not field anyone.

Formally, one could consider that two incumbent deputies of the regional parliament from the largest parties represent serious competition for the governor, but this is not the case. Both the communist Mirgalimov and the LDPR member Yusupov have already participated in the election for the head of Tatarstan as competitors to Minnikhanov — in 2015 they received 2.6% and 0.8% of the vote, respectively.

As a result, the Index of (Un)freedom of the Election for the Head of the Republic of Tatarstan amounts to the same 5 points as in Komi, although it will probably have to be revised after voting day.

CHUVASH REPUBLIC ↑

Chuvashia is a rather unusual republic. It is the smallest by territory and the most densely populated region of the Volga area. Unlike most ethnic republics within Russia, the titular ethnic group predominates here — according to the 2021 census, the Chuvash make up 63.7% of residents, Russians — 30.7%. However, the share of Russians is significantly higher among city dwellers; the Chuvash live mainly in rural areas. The development of human potential in Chuvashia is hampered by the low level of education of the population. In terms of economic development, the republic traditionally occupied a place between the “middling” and outsider regions, but since the start of the SMO, Chuvashia has demonstrated economic growth thanks to state orders through the military-industrial complex. The industrial potential is concentrated in the two largest cities – Cheboksary and its satellite Novocheboksarsk.

The political history of the republic is also unusual. The first head of the region, Nikolai Fedorov, held his post for 16 years (until 2010) and continues to exert strong influence over the situation in the region while holding the status of senator. He governed the region in a rather authoritarian style, while categorically opposing the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections, and actively attracted international organizations (the World Bank, IBRD and the now-banned British Council in Russia) to carry out reforms.

Attempts by the current governor, Oleg Nikolaev, to rid himself of Fedorov's influence have already led to a major scandal in the elections this year. Nikolaev initially did not include Fedorov in the trio of candidates for the senate, and he was to lose his seat in the upper house of the federal parliament. However, Fedorov went on the attack against the incumbent head of the region: he publicly appealed to the regional prosecutor with a complaint that district deputies were being coerced into signing in support of Oleg Nikolaev's nomination for the election. After this, Nikolaev withdrew his list of potential senators and included Fedorov in it — the conflict was resolved. We note that Nikolaev's predecessor as head of the region, Mikhail Ignatyev, was removed from office in 2020 by decision of the President of Russia due to loss of trust. He also had spoiled relations with Fedorov.

The incumbent head of the region, Oleg Nikolaev, is the only governor representing the A Just Russia party. And this is also a peculiarity of Chuvashia. He was elected to the post in 2020 with a result of 75.6% of the vote and, unlike many current heads of regions, was not an “outsider” — he was born into a Chuvash peasant family. In 2016, he was elected to the State Duma on the list of A Just Russia. Throughout his career, he was supported by another prominent SR, State Duma deputy since 1999 and former deputy prime minister of the republic, Anatoly Aksakov.

Despite Nikolaev's affiliation with A Just Russia, the entire leadership of the republic is linked to United Russia. Because of this, an opposition formed within the governor's own party in the region, which included the head of the regional branch, Igor Molyakov, and State Council deputy Vladislav Soldatov. On 26 February 2025, they were expelled from A Just Russia.

In 2020, United Russia did not field competitors against Nikolaev. This time, the Communist Party (CPRF) joined them. On the eve of the election, Nikolaev flew to Moscow to meet with the chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPRF), Gennady Zyuganov. An agreement was probably reached then.

As a result, besides Oleg Nikolaev, who ran as an independent candidate, five other people put forward their candidacies. The LDPR fielded its perennial candidate, State Council of the republic deputy Konstantin Stepanov, who took third place in the previous election (gained 5.5% of the vote). New People, the Pensioners' Party and the Greens nominated little-known directors of enterprises and public organizations. All of them were registered; only independent candidate Viktor Fedorov lost the status of a nominated candidate.

Thus, only two of the five parliamentary parties are formally taking part in the election for the head of the region, and the head of the region has no real competitors. But even in such a non-competitive campaign, the election organizers preferred to use three-day and remote electronic voting.

As a result, the Index of (Un)freedom of the Election for the Head of the Chuvash Republic amounts to only 3 points.

KAMCHATKA KRAI ↑

On 30 July 2025, a powerful earthquake of magnitude 8.8 occurred in Kamchatka. Fortunately, no one died, and there was no large-scale destruction either. Aftershocks may still follow such an earthquake, but a month and a half remained from the moment of the earthquake until voting day. Despite such a long period, the CEC of Russia decided on the possibility of holding voting in adjacent territories in the region (so-called “stump” voting, modeled on the 2020 constitutional referendum). However, the krai election commission has not yet made such a decision. The main voting will last three days, and early voting in hard-to-reach areas began on 24 August. However, it will be small in scale.

The region's population is small — less than 300,000 people, although the krai's area is very large.

The current head of the region, Vladimir Solodov, took office in 2020, gaining 80.5% of the vote in the election. However, the candidate from the Communist Party (CPRF) was not allowed to participate. The head of the krai has not gained popularity in the region over five years of work. Under a post about his nomination for a new term, more than 1,000 dislikes quickly accumulated against 400 likes, along with many negative comments. In this situation, eight of the 12 nominated can­di­dates for the post of gov­er­nor turned out to be un­known in­de­pen­dent can­di­dates from the bud­get­ary and mu­nic­i­pal spheres or a “house­hus­band.”

The most prominent opponent of the head of the region in the election was supposed to be former TV presenter Alexandra Novikova. She became known after she could not contain her laughter on air while reporting on a meager indexation of benefits. A Just Russia — For Truth planned to nominate her. The decision to nominate Novikova as a candidate in the election was officially made by the presidium of the central council of the SRs under the chairmanship of Mironov on 17 June. But already on 20 June, the party canceled Novikova's nomination without explanation, according to the presidium's decision. Between these dates, a conference of the party's regional branch took place, at which Novikova was elected head of the organization and her nomination as a gubernatorial candidate was approved. However, Novikova did not even manage to submit documents to the election commission. According to media reports, the party withdrew the candidacy after a demand from the Presidential Administration.

The would-be candidate herself commented on the situation as follows: “The news [of the cancellation of the approval] caught up with me practically on the doorstep of the election commission, when the full package of documents was ready. My first reaction was incomprehension, rejection, resentment. But the party leaders explained to me that this was the only way to protect me from major trouble.”

As a result, four candidates overcame the municipal filter and were registered. Besides the head of the region, the candidates are: State Duma deputy from Zabaikalye Vasilina Kulieva (LDPR), deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Kamchatka Krai, first secretary of the krai committee of the Communist Party (CPRF) Roman Litvinov, and a representative of the spoiler party “Communists of Russia,” legal adviser Dmitry Tyurin.

The Index of (Un)freedom of the Election for the Governor of Kamchatka Krai amounts to only 4 points.

KRASNODAR KRAI ↑

Kuban is a region of enormous economic and political importance, the third in the country by number of voters (after Moscow and Moscow Oblast), while also occupying a strategic geographical position (transit corridors across the Black Sea).

Like many large regions, Krasnodar Krai is quite distinctive, has its own political traditions, and a well-established regional self-awareness, the main feature of which is an elevated level of regional (“Kuban”) patriotism; largely connected with this is the phenomenon of a strong Cossack movement, which occupies patriarchal-conservative positions.

A krai so internally differentiated and located in such a complex region is characterized by a multitude of problems: ethnic, criminal, environmental, economic. Kuban is periodically subjected to attacks by Ukrainian drones. Strikes are carried out on energy facilities and infrastructure objects. In August, the oil depot in Sochi was raided twice. As a result, two people died, and female bloggers who filmed the fire were detained and forced to record apologies at the police station. Strikes were also carried out on oil depots and other facilities in Novorossiysk, Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Tuapse, Ilskaya, Tikhoretsk, Taman, Temryuk, and others.

In nationwide elections, starting from 2008, the authorities' candidates began to formally receive significantly more than the average Russian indicators, and the elections are accompanied by constant scandals related to the falsification of their results. The region has gained a reputation as one of the most dishonest and unfree in electoral terms. In the 2024 presidential election, Vladimir Putin gained 92.59% in the krai (10th place in the country).

Over the past 24 years the region has had only two heads: from 2001 to 2015 it was led by Alexander Tkachev (elected with a steady result above 80% of the vote), and since 2015 his former deputy Veniamin Kondratyev has remained the permanent head (with similar results). After stepping down as governor, Tkachev served as Russia’s minister of agriculture, and in 2018 moved into business. Since 2021 he has been the controlling shareholder of the N. I. Tkachev Agrocomplex — the core entity of Russia’s largest agricultural landowner.

The formal results of the regional parliament elections also traditionally stand out from the national average. In 2017, for instance, only three party lists made it into the krai parliament — United Russia, the Communist Party (CPRF) and the LDPR (and in the previous convocation only two made it at all). United Russia received 70.8% of the vote. In 2022 the A Just Russia list also broke through into the parliament, but the “party of power” still received the same 70.8% of the vote.

Among civic structures the Cossacks are unquestionably the strongest; they are in a close alliance with the krai administration and are controlled by it.

This time only four people put forward their candidacies for the gubernatorial election — and all of them were candidates the last time. In addition to the incumbent head of the region Veniamin Kondratyev (United Russia), three people are on the ballot: Alexander Safronov (CPRF, received 8.2% of the vote in 2020), Ivan Tutushkin (LDPR, 4.4% in 2020) and Denis Khmelevskoy (A Just Russia — For Truth, 1.9% in 2020). The New People party declined to nominate its own candidate for the election. Since the return of direct elections of regional heads in Russia, this is the smallest number of candidates in the past decade.

The region has no popular politician who could compete with the administrative candidate, or even a politician who has expressed a desire to take part in the gubernatorial campaign.

Krasnodar Krai was among the eight “frontline” regions where the CEC authorised “adjoining-territory” voting for the 14 September elections, but the krai election commission never adopted such a decision.

The (un)freedom index for the Krasnodar Krai gubernatorial election is 4 points.

Perm Krai ↑

Large, economically influential and heavily populated Perm Krai until very recently belonged to the ranks of conditionally democratic and civically active regions, with relatively high support for opposition politicians. However, the situation changed seriously with the start of the “special military operation” in 2022.

The administration of incumbent governor Dmitry Makhonin was able to bring the region under control very quickly. No particular fronde is observed either inside United Russia (which was the case under all previous governors) or outside it. As a result, the 2024 Russian presidential election became the first in which signs of truly large-scale falsifications, by Russian standards, appeared on the territory of the krai. Thus, in the 2021 State Duma election turnout was just 39%, and United Russia received only 33.6% of the vote — far below the national average — while in March 2024 the results were entirely different: Vladimir Putin received almost 85% of the vote in Perm Krai, and even in Perm his result was above 80%.

Makhonin himself was first elected to the post of head of the region in 2020, replacing Maxim Reshetnikov, who became Russia’s minister of economic development. Makhonin received 75.7% of the vote at that time, but his main competitor in that election, the A Just Russia candidate and major developer Alexander Repin, was not registered; he was filtered out at the municipal filter stage.

This time A Just Russia was also unable to register its candidate. The party nominated reserve officer Vyacheslav Luchnikov. He heads the “Donbass Volunteers” foundation, is involved in collecting aid for the “special military operation”, and is the organiser of the “Immortal Regiment” in Mongolia. He had not previously participated in elections; he is a participant in the regional development programme for “special military operation” participants “Heroes of Prikamye” (other “special military operation” veterans consider that he unjustifiably appropriated this status). Until this moment Luchnikov had no connection to the A Just Russia party, and the leader of the party’s regional branch, Veronika Kulikova, once again did not put forward her own candidacy.

Luchnikov needed to collect 48 signatures of municipal heads and deputies in no fewer than 33 municipalities. A Just Russia itself had 40 deputies, but in only 21 territories. In the end, 40 signatures from 22 municipal formations were accepted. 10 signatures were not accepted. The party stated that there had been administrative pressure on deputies, as well as a mass and excessive collection of signatures in favour of Makhonin.

Besides Luchnikov, five other candidates were unable to register — self-nominees and candidates from the parties “For Justice!” and “Communists of Russia”.

As a result, five candidates remained on the ballot, including the incumbent head of the region. The long-time leader of the CPRF regional branch and krai legislative assembly deputy Ksenia Aitakova was already Makhonin’s competitor in 2020 and received 13.63%. She is amenable to agreement for the governor’s administration and has no noticeable name recognition. Krai legislative assembly deputy and long-time leader of the LDPR regional branch Oleg Postnikov is also not very public; he received 5.66% in 2020. A third legislative assembly deputy, entrepreneur Denis Shitov, represents New People. Pensioner, honoured teacher and labour veteran Lyudmila Karavayeva from the Pensioners’ Party appears to be playing the role of a “technical candidate”.

As a result, a region that was once one of the most electorally free scored only 3 points on the (un)freedom index for the Perm Krai gubernatorial election.

Jewish Autonomous Oblast ↑

The Jewish Autonomous Oblast is one of the country’s smallest regions by population; fewer than 150,000 people live here. Despite its “ethnic” name, ethnic Russians make up almost 98% of the population, while Jews account for just 0.6% and are outnumbered even by Ukrainians. The region has only one city — Birobidzhan, with a population of 67,000.

The region has traditionally strong protest sentiment and strong positions for the CPRF and the LDPR. In the 2021 regional deputy elections these parties received 21% and 24.6% of the vote respectively; in 2016 — 20.1% and 17.1%. It is unsurprising that in this situation the heads of the region try to eliminate even a hint of real competition in advance. In 2020, when Rostislav Goldstein (now attempting to be elected head of his native Komi Republic) participated in the election for head of the region from United Russia, the CPRF candidate was not allowed onto the ballot, and the LDPR simply did not nominate anyone.

This time nine candidates were nominated. In the end, five were registered. Besides acting head of the region Maria Kostyuk (United Russia), the municipal filter was overcome by Birobidzhan city duma deputies Vasily Gladkikh (LDPR) and Alexander Shcherbina (third secretary of the Birobidzhan city committee of the CPRF), individual entrepreneur Vladimir Potapenko (New People) and a CPRF spoiler from “Communists of Russia”, pensioner Alexander Krupsky. It is worth noting that the CPRF put forward the third secretary of a municipal cell as its candidate for the post of the region’s highest official, rather than, for example, the head of the faction in the regional parliament.

Already after registration, less than three weeks before the first of the voting days, the already registered New People candidate, 47-year-old entrepreneur Vladimir Potapenko, withdrew from the election. On 27 August the election commission annulled his registration.

Representatives of Rodina, the Greens, the Pensioners’ Party and, most importantly, the highest-status possible competitor to the acting governor — deputy chair of the budget and economic policy committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast Vladimir Dudin (A Just Russia — For Truth) — were not registered. That said, Dudin also received only 5.5% of the vote in 2021.

As a result, there is no reason to expect any competition in this election — which will be held over three days.

The (un)freedom index for the Jewish Autonomous Oblast gubernatorial election is 4 points.

Arkhangelsk Oblast ↑

Arkhangelsk Oblast is traditionally one of the most difficult regions for the Russian authorities. In 2015 the region’s governor Igor Orlov narrowly avoided a runoff, receiving 53% of the vote. Having provoked mass protests against the construction of a landfill at Shiyes station, he was forced to resign. He was replaced by former deputy minister of economic development of Russia and governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Alexander Tsybulsky. Tsybulsky won the 2020 election, but the Yabloko candidate Oleg Mandrykin — one of the leaders of the environmental protests — was not allowed to participate (a year later he took second place in the State Duma election for the Arkhangelsk single-mandate constituency with 18% of the vote). The United Russia list received 32% in Arkhangelsk Oblast that year (compared to almost 50% in Russia as a whole).

The current campaign was supposed to be much calmer. New People did not nominate a candidate, the LDPR nominated little-known Arkhangelsk city duma deputy Maria Kharchenko, and A Just Russia nominated oblast assembly deputy Oleg Chernenko. The candidates of the Pensioners’ Party, the Greens and the Green Alternative are unknown to anyone and lack the necessary resources.

However, the CPRF nominated an unexpected opponent for incumbent governor Tsybulsky. The Communists put forward for the election a major construction businessman, first deputy chair of the State Duma committee on construction, housing and utilities Roman Lyabikhov. In June 2022 the Munich prosecutor’s office reported an investigation into a criminal case against deputy Lyabikhov and his wife for violating EU sanctions. According to the prosecutor’s office, the couple rented out three apartments in Munich.

Despite the fact that the CPRF candidate is well-resourced, he has a serious limitation — he is perceived by local residents and elites as a “varangian”, even though he was born in Severodvinsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast. It is also not yet clear how seriously he intends to fight in this election — it could well be merely a “warm-up” before the main goal — the State Duma election that will take place in autumn 2026. At the very least, Lyabikhov’s smooth passage through the municipal filter raises questions — the only unregistered candidate was the Greens’ representative Larisa Medvedeva.

Nevertheless, formally Arkhangelsk Oblast has joined the ranks of the very rare regions where serious competition can be expected in the gubernatorial election. It cannot be ruled out that this assessment is merely an advance.

The (un)freedom index for the Arkhangelsk Oblast gubernatorial election was 7 points.

Bryansk Oblast ↑

Bryansk Oblast is one of the “frontline” regions where the Russian CEC authorised “stump” voting, i.e. voting on adjoining territories and in common areas along the lines of 2020. In the end, the regional election commission decided that such voting would take place in several border districts and would be early voting. The main voting will be held over three days.

The region, moreover, was previously distinguished by results that were highly dubious from the standpoint of reliability. For example, in the 2021 State Duma election United Russia received 64% of the vote in the region with almost 70% turnout — results that were unrealistic for that period.

The current governor Alexander Bogomaz has headed the region for more than 10 years. He was appointed acting governor in September 2014, after the resignation of his predecessor Nikolai Demin, who was convicted of abuse of office.

In his first gubernatorial election in 2015, Bogomaz received almost 80% of the vote. Admittedly, he had only two competitors — from Patriots of Russia and A Just Russia. The CPRF and LDPR did not even nominate anyone, and the candidates from Yabloko and Rodina were not registered. In 2020 there were more competitors, and the result was slightly more modest — 71.7% of the vote. In that election for head of the region, CPRF representative Andrei Arkhitsky participated, and he is putting forward his candidacy this time as well. In 2020 he received 10% of the vote. Besides them and Bogomaz, candidates from A Just Russia, Civic Platform and the Cossack Party participated in that election. The candidate from the International Party was not registered. The LDPR once again did not participate in the election.

This time four candidates have been nominated and registered for the region’s highest post. Besides Bogomaz and Arkhitsky, these are oblast duma deputies Gennady Selebin from Rodina (a library director) and Alexei Timoshkov from A Just Russia — For Truth (unemployed). Once again there is no LDPR candidate. New People also did not put forward its candidacy.

The (un)freedom index for the Bryansk Oblast gubernatorial election was just 2 points.

Irkutsk Oblast ↑

Irkutsk Oblast is one of the most economically and politically significant regions of the Russian Federation, distinguished by great political distinctiveness, a complex structure of regional elites and a high degree of internal competitiveness. Against the national backdrop, Irkutsk Oblast stands out for its powerful natural-resource potential and high level of urbanisation, thanks to the fact that the base companies of many financial-industrial groups are located there.

On Russia’s electoral map, Irkutsk Oblast has traditionally stood out for low voter turnout; the general mood of voters can be characterised as protest-nihilist and personalist-oriented, and anti-Moscow sentiment is traditionally strong. Indicators of political and economic competition are also far higher than the national average, thanks in part to the presence of strong elite groups in various cities of Irkutsk Oblast.

The most vivid manifestation of this competition was the 2015 gubernatorial election, in which the head of the region Sergei Yeroshchenko lost in the runoff to CPRF candidate Sergei Levchenko. The election campaign was extremely sharp, and besides the actual contest between Yeroshchenko and Levchenko, a parallel campaign was waged by part of the regional elites exclusively against Yeroshchenko.

As governor, Levchenko initially had to face substantial opposition from the federal centre. A means of pressure on Levchenko was the criminal case against his son Andrei, a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Irkutsk Oblast and general director of ZAO Stalkonstruktsiya in Angarsk. He was arrested in September 2020 and found guilty of fraud in connection with the replacement of lifts during major repairs of buildings in Irkutsk Oblast. In December 2019 Levchenko resigned. Rallies in support of the resigned Sergei Levchenko were held in Irkutsk and other cities of the Angara region, as well as across Russia.

His gubernatorial term was due to expire in autumn 2020, but the 2020 election was declared early. Because of this, Levchenko lost the right to put forward his candidacy (meanwhile, the practice of calling elections in the event of early resignation of regional heads, if the new election fell in the same year as the scheduled one, varied — they were often not called early).

The CPRF was forced to put forward State Duma deputy Mikhail Shchapov as its candidate. He showed a decent result (25.5% of the vote), but could not compete with the new governor Igor Kobzev — the latter received 60%. Turnout was the lowest in Russia, at around 32%.

The results of parliamentary elections in the region also show a difficult situation for the authorities. In 2013 United Russia received 42% of the vote, and in 2018 — just 28%, losing to the CPRF. Only in 2023, already in the era of the “special military operation”, was the “party of power” able to show a high result in Irkutsk Oblast — in 2023 it received 55% of the vote, albeit with very low turnout, 24%.

However, even this calm proved illusory. Intra-elite conflicts (primarily within United Russia itself) continued. In 2024 a conflict between governor Igor Kobzev and senator from the region Andrei Chernyshev spilled into the public sphere. In the 2024 mayoral election in Bratsk they supported two different candidates — both members of United Russia — and in the end the governor’s candidate, supported and nominated by the United Russia regional branch, lost to a self-nominee supported by Chernyshev. As a result, on the eve of the election for head of the region, discussion began about replacing the senator, but in the end Chernyshev ended up on the governor’s list.

Ultimately, six candidates were nominated for the 2025 gubernatorial election, four of whom were registered: first deputy head of Ushakovskoye municipal formation Viktor Galitskov from the LDPR, deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Irkutsk Oblast Larisa Yegorova from A Just Russia — For Truth, incumbent head of the region Viktor Kobzev from United Russia and former head of the region Sergei Levchenko from the CPRF. Two self-nominees dropped out of the race at the start of the campaign.

Thus, Irkutsk Oblast has once again become a unique region where two governors — the current one and the former one — are competing in an election. Despite the fact that Levchenko reported obstruction during the collection of municipal filter signatures, he successfully passed it. Levchenko was helped with signatures not only by CPRF deputies (there are quite a few of them in the region, although several of them gave their signatures for other candidates), but also by deputies from other parties, including United Russia.

In general, Igor Kobzev is going for a record — in Irkutsk Oblast previously only governor Boris Govorin ran for a second term and won. All other governors were unable to serve even one term, which also says a lot about the region.

In parallel with the gubernatorial election, several interesting municipal campaigns are underway in the region that could influence the main election. For instance, in the election for head of Irkutsk District, where 144,000 voters live, former United Russia member and ex-head of the Irkutsk branch of the Young Guard of United Russia Konstantin Bushuyev was nominated by the CPRF against the United Russia candidate, incumbent mayor Leonid Frolov.

As a result, in terms of names and the internal political context in the region itself, the current Irkutsk Oblast gubernatorial election looks the most competitive in Russia. But much depends on how the candidates conduct their campaigns. For now, the (un)freedom index for the Irkutsk Oblast gubernatorial election was 8 points.

Kaluga Oblast ↑

Kaluga Oblast is a fairly average region, although in the 2021 State Duma election it showed United Russia results far below the national average — 36.3%, though this testified rather to the fact that the voting results were counted relatively honestly.

The current governor Vladislav Shapsha took up his post in 2020, replacing long-serving Anatoly Artamonov, who moved into the senator’s seat after 19 years of leading the region. Shapsha is a “local” for the region; he is the former mayor of the science city of Obninsk. In 2020 he won the gubernatorial election with 71.2% of the vote. As now, his competitors were Nikolai Yashkin from the CPRF (received 9.9% of the vote; in 2015 against Artamonov he received 12.2%) and Nadezhda Yefremova from A Just Russia (received 5%). Yashkin’s spoiler from the CPSS received 5.9% of the vote at that time, while the candidates from the LDPR and the Party of Growth received very little.

This time the campaign is also expected to proceed very calmly — the incumbent governor’s main opponents can already be considered tested candidates who will not get more than planned. Besides Yashkin and Yefremova, this year the little-known LDPR candidate Stepan Oparishev and Kaluga city duma deputy Ivan Rodin from the Pensioners’ Party put forward their candidacies.

The election will be held over three days using REV.

The (un)freedom index for the Kaluga Oblast gubernatorial election was 3 points.

Kostroma Oblast ↑

Kostroma Oblast combines the conservatism and unhurriedness of the regional hinterland (here, the forest districts) with the frondeur and merchant traditions of the oblast centre. Local politics has also been influenced by the proximity to the traditionally internally competitive Yaroslavl. At the same time, the region is small, without a clearly expressed dominant actor or actors, and with internal competition in a timber industry broken up into a multitude of independent structures. This predetermines the dominant position of the oblast administration as practically the only significant centre for the crystallisation of certain interests. The main political life is concentrated in the regional capital.

Besides the oblast and city administrations, there are many less significant individual figures and structures that are in a state of constant “Brownian motion” and form constantly emerging and disintegrating situational alliances. As a rule, these alliances arise not “for” but “against” — mainly to fight one of the players that has grown strongest at a given moment. At the same time, the governor retains authority largely precisely because of the general mosaic nature of the local political field and administrative control over the regional periphery (his main support, regardless of personality, is the most remote forest districts, where the oblast administration’s activity is mainly concentrated — Sharya district, etc.), and although the region’s protest potential is quite high, it is realised, owing to this mosaic unsystematic nature (everyone plays at protest, different figures periodically replace one another in the role of the main protest force, and a politician who came to power on a wave of protest soon himself becomes the object of protest), mainly as a result of random circumstances.

As for the adequacy of electoral data, electoral statistics indicate that, so far, violations have not been significant overall. Intra-regional differences are typical for most regions — more protest-oriented behaviour in the regional capital and its suburbs, and more loyalist behaviour in the agrarian periphery. At the same time, the concentration of protest votes around one party or another in a specific district or city clearly has a personal or financially conditioned character.

The current head of the region Sergei Sitnikov has held his post for 13 years already. In 2012 he replaced the scandal-ridden governor Igor Slyunyayev and was able to calm the region, but the number of lines of intra-elite tension remains quite large owing to the governor’s personal weakness, the great mosaic nature of the elite itself and high internal competition in local business. In the 2015 Kostroma Oblast gubernatorial election he ran from the United Russia party, receiving 65.62% of the vote. In 2020 he essentially repeated the result, receiving 64.65% of the vote.

In both elections his main competitor was the CPRF candidate Valery Izhitsky, who showed relatively decent results (21.4% and 16.3% of the vote). This time Sitnikov should greatly strengthen his position thanks to the weakness of his competitors, since he is now facing not the leaders of regional branches but party “no-names”. Among the strong politicians who did not nominate themselves this year are the traditional competitor from the CPRF Valery Izhitsky, the chairman of the Social Protection party and oblast duma deputy Vladimir Mikhailov, and oblast duma deputy and former United Russia member Yevgeny Shchepalov, who in 2021 publicly began a conflict with governor Sitnikov (he wanted to run from the CPRF).

It appears that CPRF leader Valery Izhitsky reached agreements with the oblast administration for the sake of a parallel campaign for the oblast duma. He nominated himself in a single-mandate constituency with a weak United Russia candidate and did not include well-known politicians — the head of the CPRF public reception office Andrei Tarasov and former United Russia member Yevgeny Shchepalov — on the party list.

The opposition is now weakened: the oblast administration managed to achieve this through the transfer of popular deputies to United Russia. For example, oblast duma single-mandate deputy (Galich district) Alexander Plyusnin (former leader of the SRs) and CPRF faction member in the oblast duma, single-mandate deputy Olga Drobysheva, moved to United Russia. Before this, the CPRF faction in the oblast duma split off from the party’s oblast committee because of the refusal of list deputy Yelena Shakhova to cede her mandate to regional branch leader Valery Izhitsky. As faction head, she openly expressed loyalty to the governor. The LDPR also experienced an exodus of several active branch members on the wave of Slutsky’s defeat in the presidential election.

As a result, the systemic parties nominated their most obscure representatives. Even the leaders of the local branches of the LDPR, the Communist Party and the Pensioners’ Party did not run. The LDPR nominated 61-year-old municipal deputy from Volgorechensk Yuri Mindolin, who worked for a long time as a power engineer at a state district power plant and has never won an election above the local level. The Communist Party nominated a rather odd party functionary, Sergei Shpotin. He is 51 years old, trained as a fitter at a vocational school and only in 2023, while already a CPRF party functionary, graduated from the Moscow Financial-Industrial University “Synergy”. He works in the CPRF as secretary for organisational and party work of the regional branch and holds nationalist (pro-Slavic) views. The Pensioners’ Party fielded 63-year-old Yuri Kudryavtsev — former leader of the LDPR’s regional branch and a deputy of the regional duma for three convocations. Since 2020 he has worked in the public sector, as head of the archives department of the Kostroma Region Department of Culture. He left the LDPR only in January 2025. In the regional parliament he was remembered as a “quiet deputy” who does not criticise the authorities.

New People fielded no one at all.

Only A Just Russia nominated the leader of its faction in the regional duma, Nikolai Tsvil, as a candidate, but he too is little known — he reached the regional level from the hinterland through party-list elections, before his election he headed a district municipal unitary enterprise in the housing and utilities sector, and he obtained his higher education (by correspondence) only during the current deputy convocation. At the regional level his name recognition is near zero due to his limited experience in this post.

In this situation, the (Un)freedom Index for the Kostroma Region gubernatorial election stands at 3 points.

Kursk Region ↑

The Kursk Region stands somewhat apart in contemporary Russian domestic politics.

On the one hand, the region traditionally shows fairly average results in elections: in the 2016 regional parliamentary elections United Russia received 50.2% of the vote, and in 2021 — 43%. Political parties here have relatively lively regional organisations, although some are in relative crisis. On the whole, however, party organisations tend to reach agreements with the authorities and avoid harsh confrontation.

On the other hand, the region’s residents and elites have lately been under far greater stress than other Russians. The reason is the incursion of the Ukrainian army into the region’s territory and the subsequent corruption scandals over the construction of border fortifications, which led to the arrest of Governor Alexei Smirnov, the suicide of his predecessor, Russia’s Minister of Transport Roman Starovoit, and the appointment to the region of the rather scandal-ridden State Duma deputy Alexander Khinshtein.

Corruption charges against the region’s leaders are already a tradition in the Kursk Region. From 2000 to 2018 the governor was Alexander Mikhailov. Opponents repeatedly reproached Mikhailov for anti-Semitism (the basis was his ambiguous interviews) and alcohol abuse, and his entourage for corruption.

On 11 October 2018, Roman Vladimirovich Starovoit, non-partisan at the time, was appointed the new acting governor of the region. In the election held on 8 September 2019, Roman Starovoit received 81.1%. His competitors were not the best-known local politicians.

On 14 May 2024, Starovoit was appointed Minister of Transport of Russia, and his successor was First Deputy Governor Alexei Smirnov. On 8 September 2024, less than a year ago, he won the election for head of the region with 65.28% of the vote. Between these events, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine broke through into the territory of the Kursk Region, occupying several dozen settlements, including the town of Sudzha. They were supposed to have been stopped by the border fortifications erected under Starovoit, but the Ukrainian army overcame them without difficulty. It subsequently became known that a significant portion of the funds (800 million roubles) allocated for the construction of the fortifications had been embezzled. On 15 April 2025, Smirnov was arrested and later pleaded guilty. On 7 July 2025, his predecessor Roman Starovoit was dismissed from the post of federal minister, and on the same day his suicide became known.

To replace Smirnov and Starovoit, the well-known State Duma deputy from the Samara Region, former journalist Alexander Khinshtein, known for his anti-corruption investigations and probably closely linked to the security services, was dispatched.

As his opponents, representatives of three parliamentary parties were nominated and registered, all of them deputies of the regional duma: Gennady Bayev from A Just Russia — For Truth, Alexei Bobovnikov from the CPRF and Alexei Tomanov from the LDPR. All three took part in the gubernatorial election less than a year ago. The best result, 13.5% of the vote, was shown by Bobovnikov. Tomanov received 11.8%, Bayev — 6.7%.

The election will be held over three days, using “stump” voting. Moreover, the Central Election Commission of Russia postponed the holding of 43 municipal campaigns in eight border districts of the Kursk Region that were supposed to take place in September. This decision will affect 44,253 voters. However, the concurrently held election for head of the region will go ahead, and those same voters will have the opportunity to vote.

Thus, the (Un)freedom Index for the Kursk Region gubernatorial election stands at 2 points, although even this assessment seems overstated given the cancellation of municipal campaigns across a significant part of the region’s territory.

Leningrad Region ↑

The head of the Leningrad Region, Alexander Drozdenko, is one of the old-timers of the gubernatorial corps — he has led the region since May 2012, more than 13 years. The new term will already be his fourth. He has confidently won all previous elections, albeit without much competition. The most competitive was the gubernatorial election in 2015 — the only one in which a candidate from the CPRF was allowed to run. But even then, against the backdrop of the “Crimean consensus”, Drozdenko easily won with 82% of the vote. The other two competitors were regional deputy Andrei Lebedev from the LDPR (4% of the vote), regional deputy Alexander Perminov from A Just Russia (3% of the vote) and Alexander Gabitov from Civic Platform (less than 2%). In 2020 the set of candidates was exactly the same, but without the CPRF representative. Drozdenko already received 83.6% of the vote, the rest placed in the same order as five years earlier, gaining slightly more thanks to the absent communists — 7.3%, 4.6% and 3.1% of the vote respectively.

The current campaign is notable for the absence of even a hint of genuine competition. Following the 2024 municipal elections, no party except United Russia has the required number of votes to pass the filter: the regional branches of the CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia and New People together have only 170 votes, and independent candidates can provide another 165 votes. United Russia, meanwhile, won 1,626 seats last year. Compared to 2019, the CPRF received three times fewer municipal seats; five years ago they had 135 seats.

Each candidate, however, needs to collect 155 signatures, 44 of which must be from district-level deputies from no fewer than 14 districts.

In the end, only five candidates overcame the municipal filter. Besides the incumbent governor, they are the already traditional sparring partner from the LDPR Andrei Lebedev, Magadan Regional Duma deputy and entrepreneur Igor Novikov from A Just Russia — For Truth, Altai Krai Legislative Assembly deputy Sergei Malinkovich (who lives in St Petersburg) and, from the Green party, entrepreneur Sergei Lisovsky, editor of the newspapers “Society and Ecology” and “Kievan Rus Today”.

The remaining contenders were not registered. They represented Civic Initiative, the Party of Social Protection, Rodina and the CPRF. Notably, the CPRF initially fielded a rather weak candidate — municipal deputy of the Koltushskoye urban settlement and environmental activist Larisa Mukhina. During the signature collection process, Mukhina’s campaign headquarters complained that deputies of the Opolyevskoye and Kingiseppskoye settlements were explicitly instructed whom they must sign for. Complaints were filed with the prosecutor’s office.

In recent years the CPRF regional branch has been weakened, although in 2021 the party won a fairly large faction in the regional parliament, seven deputies. In December 2024, single-mandate deputy Vadim Budeyev was stripped of his mandate (for false information in his declaration). Viktor Tsarikhin left for Moscow, to the party’s central apparatus, and Vadim Grishkov, who ran for the gubernatorial post in 2020, resigned his powers in autumn 2024 and became rector of the Lesgaft University of Physical Education, Sport and Health.

Already at the height of the gubernatorial campaign, on 29 July, officers of the regional main directorate’s “E” centre arrested a deputy of the regional Legislative Assembly and leader of the CPRF faction, Ivan Apostolevsky. He was getting off a train travelling from Moscow. The court ruled to arrest him for seven days under Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation for an “extremist” publication mentioning Alexei Navalny. While the CPRF faction leader was serving his term of arrest, the CPRF candidate was denied registration.

In addition, on 28 July, an administrative offence report was drawn up on the CPRF candidate herself for allegedly distributing illegal campaign materials. The pretext was a meeting in the party’s district committee at which the design of the communist’s booklet was discussed. Three days later it emerged that the booklet had drawn objections from the election commission and its distribution had been banned. However, the police considered that the campaign material had already been distributed at the meeting.

Given the undisguised coercive pressure on the CPRF and its candidate, the (Un)freedom Index for the Leningrad Region gubernatorial election stands at 2 points.

Novgorod Region ↑

The Novgorod Region is a small and rather poor region, whose residents nonetheless have a strong local identity linked to the times of ancient Novgorod and the Novgorod veche. Perhaps because of this, democratic traditions are strong here.

The Novgorod Region is one of the few regions where the Yabloko party still retains strong positions. In the 2023 elections for deputies of the Novgorod City Duma, the party’s list received 7.4% of the vote and one seat. United Russia received 41.3% of the vote — that is 16% more than five years earlier, but still fairly modest by today’s standards. Admittedly, outside the regional capital, support for Yabloko is already much more modest.

The current gubernatorial election was called after Andrei Nikitin, who had headed the region since 2017, moved to Moscow. He replaced Roman Starovoit, who had taken his own life, as Russia’s Minister of Transport.

Nikitin confidently won the elections of 2017 and 2022 with results of 68% and 77% of the vote respectively. In both elections his main competitor was Olga Efimova from the CPRF. She received 16% and 11% of the vote respectively. She will also be the opponent of the new acting governor, Alexander Dronov, who previously worked as first vice-governor of the Novgorod Region. Another familiar competitor will be regional duma deputy Alexei Chursinov from the LDPR. In 2022 he received less than 4.5% of the vote in the election for head of the region. They will be joined by regional duma deputy from the Pensioners’ Party Nikolai Zakharov and Novgorod City Duma deputy from A Just Russia — For Truth Nikolai Shvabovich. None of them can realistically claim victory.

Two candidates were denied registration: the general director of the ANO “School of Health and Beauty” Tatyana Yakovleva (Green Alternative) and the Yabloko candidate, military pensioner Viktor Shalyakin.

Shalyakin demanded that the gubernatorial election be cancelled. In the Novgorod Region, candidates for registration had to submit no fewer than 89 signatures of municipal deputies. At the same time, only United Russia possesses the necessary deputy corps. The CPRF has only 32 deputies, the LDPR, A Just Russia — For Truth and Yabloko have seven each, and the Pensioners’ Party has just one. The “party of power” decided to provide signatures to all candidates except Shalyakin. Even the Green Alternative representative Tatyana Yakovleva received 50 signatures. According to Shalyakin, none of the candidates or their campaign headquarters collected signatures independently. Each Council of Deputies and Duma of a municipal district or okrug received “cards” from the regional administration with the names of the “agreed candidates”, with the exception of the Yabloko candidate. The deputies were then centrally distributed among the candidates. According to Yabloko’s estimates, the United Russia contender Alexander Dronov received no fewer than 300 signatures out of a maximum possible 93, while the five agreed candidates received around 420–450 signatures. Under such circumstances, the Yabloko candidate had no chance of passing the municipal filter.

In his complaint, Shalyakin draws attention to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 24 December 2012 No. 32-P, which recognised as inadmissible the creation of artificial obstacles to the nomination of other candidates by collecting deputy signatures in a quantity greater than that specified by regional law.

As a result, the (Un)freedom Index for the Novgorod Region gubernatorial election stands at 3 points.

Orenburg Region ↑

The previous gubernatorial election in the Orenburg Region took place less than a year ago, but the winner, Denis Pasler, bid an early farewell to his voters and became acting head of the more prestigious Sverdlovsk Region, where he was once chairman of the government. In 2019 he became governor of the Orenburg Region, succeeding Yuri Berg, who resigned early.

Yuri Berg led the region from 2010 and won the 2014 election. That was a unique campaign: the CPRF, LDPR and A Just Russia, as part of a united opposition, nominated a single candidate — Sergei Katasonov, who at the time was a sitting State Duma deputy. Unexpectedly, however, Katasonov’s candidacy was withdrawn by the personal decision of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The formal pretext was an allegedly existing threat of criminal proceedings being launched against Katasonov. The LDPR leader stated in the media that, directly in the presence of acting governor Yuri Berg, he was told that Sergei Katasonov would be sent to prison if he ran in the election. In the end, the United Russia candidate Yuri Berg won the election with 80% of the vote. In exchange for effectively abandoning the fight, the LDPR received a senator’s seat from the region for Elena Afanasyeva, at that time a State Duma deputy.

The very next gubernatorial election campaign, in 2019, showed that significant protest potential remained in the region. Denis Pasler received 66% of the vote, the CPRF candidate Maxim Amelin — 23%. The “party of power” also lost ground in the 2021 elections to the regional legislative assembly, receiving only 39% of the vote in the single constituency. The CPRF, meanwhile, further strengthened its positions, receiving 29%.

The 2024 campaign was complicated for Pasler by a catastrophic flood, as a result of which the 200,000-strong city of Orsk, the region’s second-largest city, was entirely inundated in the spring. The authorities’ actions during this emergency situation drew criticism from the region’s residents. Many questions were raised by the construction of a dam costing 1 billion roubles, the breach of which caused the flooding. Pasler himself also acted unsuccessfully; residents of the flooded city, after an unsanctioned rally, secured a meeting with him — at the meeting he demanded that phones be switched off and generally behaved extremely harshly.

A year ago, the CPRF, having chances for very good results, nominated, instead of the head of the regional branch Maxim Amelin (who received a substantial 23% of the vote in 2019), Vladimir Gudomarov — an experienced politician, a native of Orsk, head of the party’s local branch and a sitting deputy of the regional parliament. This was probably an attempt to play on the highest possible level of protest sentiment in Orsk, which had suffered from the flooding. However, Gudomarov was not registered. Instead, another native of Orsk took part in the election — the representative of Communists of Russia, Ramil Gafarov. Without a CPRF candidate, it was Gafarov, representing Communists of Russia, who took second place with more than 7% of the vote. In third place in 2019 was Ekaterina Kolegina from New People with 6.5%, and in fourth — Oksana Nabatchikova from A Just Russia — For Truth with 6.2%. Pasler received 78%.

The number of nominated candidates in the Orenburg Region is steadily decreasing: in 2014 there were nine contenders, in 2019 — eight. In the 2024 election for head of the region, six people put forward their candidacies, in 2025 — five. Among them are the already familiar Ramil Gafarov from Communists of Russia and the SRZP member Oksana Nabatchikova.

Notably, the LDPR has now had no representative in the contest for the post of governor in the region for four consecutive campaigns.

This time a CPRF candidate has been registered. However, instead of the head of the regional branch and leader of the party’s faction in the Legislative Assembly, Maxim Amelin, a less well-known candidate has again been nominated — municipal deputy of the Orenburg City Council Denis Baturin.

New People nominated the head of its regional branch, Karina Salikhova, who was appointed to the post on 27 November 2024. As her main place of work, the candidate listed the company ANO “Federation of Wise Parents”, which was registered on 3 March 2025. In the region, Salikhova became known last year after the launch of the media project “Family Transformation”.

The obvious favourite of the election campaign is the acting governor of the region, Evgeny Solntsev. From his graduation from the Voronezh State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering in 2002 until his appointment as chairman of the government of the Donetsk People’s Republic in 2022, the candidate worked in structures of OAO “Russian Railways”.

As a result, the (Un)freedom Index for the Orenburg Region gubernatorial election stands at 4 points.

Rostov Region ↑

The Rostov Region is a large industrial and agricultural region located in immediate proximity to the zone of military conflict. It contains a large number of defence industry enterprises (including a helicopter plant named after Boris Slyusar — the father of the acting governor), several hydroelectric power stations, a nuclear power plant, Rostselmash, and agricultural enterprises. As a result, the region attracts the attention of several major players at once, including Rostec, Rosatom, the United Aircraft Corporation, Russian Railways, Transmashholding, and Lukoil. Rostov-on-Don hosts the headquarters of the Southern Military District, which in 2023 was seized by the Wagner PMC during Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny.

Unlike other regions where the presence of several major economic players generates internal political competition, in the Rostov Region almost all major players belong to the state. Therefore, together with the security services, which also play a large role, they ensure effective mobilisation of voters and control over them.

Over the 34 years since the collapse of the USSR, the region has had only two governors: from 1991 to 2010 it was led by Vladimir Chub, and from 2010 to the end of 2024 — by Vasily Golubev. Both began their political and managerial careers in the CPSU.

Golubev fully controlled the region. In 2015 and 2020 he was easily elected governor in the first round with results of 78.2% and 65.5% respectively. Both times all parliamentary parties took part in the election. The best results were shown by CPRF candidates: in 2015 State Duma deputy Nikolai Kolomeitsev received 11.7% of the vote, and in 2020 another State Duma deputy, Evgeny Bessonov — 17.6%.

In November 2024, Golubev resigned, receiving a senator’s seat, and was replaced by Yuri Slyusarev, son of the well-known head of the Rostov helicopter plant, president, chairman of the board and member of the board of directors of the United Aircraft Corporation.

Slyusarev’s main competitor in the election for head of the region will be Evgeny Bessonov, a State Duma deputy from the CPRF, but he is unlikely to be able to show a result higher than the one he already achieved (in 2020 he received 17.6% of the vote; in 2021, in the State Duma deputy election in a single-mandate constituency, he took second place with 28.6% of the vote, losing to the not very well-known Paralympic athlete Sergei Burlakov). From 2008 to 2021 he was a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Rostov Region, and since 2021 — a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the 8th convocation, a member of the presidium of the party’s central control and auditing commission.

Besides them, three more candidates have been nominated and registered: the head of the public reception office of the chairman of the party A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth in the Rostov Region, Sergei Kosinov; a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Rostov Region from the LDPR, Denis Frash; and Yuri Klimchenko from the Pensioners’ Party, who worked a significant part of his life in the space industry.

The Central Election Commission of Russia permitted the Rostov Region to use “stump” voting, but the regional election commission did not take advantage of this possibility. However, REV and multi-day voting will be used in the region.

The (Un)freedom Index for the Rostov Region gubernatorial election stands at 4 points.

Sverdlovsk Region ↑

The Sverdlovsk Region is practically the country’s third region by industrial potential (after the Moscow and St Petersburg agglomerations), with a pronounced political distinctiveness and a well-developed regional identity. The region’s population is more than 4.3 million residents — fifth place in Russia.

It is one of the most urbanised regions in the country; about 84% of its population is urban. Yekaterinburg itself concentrates almost a third of the entire population of the Sverdlovsk Region.

The region hosts a large number of federal financial-industrial groups, including a very powerful defence industry complex uniting about 50 plants and research institutes: Rostec, EvrazHolding, UMMC, RUSAL, the Pipe Metallurgical Company, VSMPO, etc. In effect, they control entire towns, since their core enterprises are located there. With such a division of towns into zones of influence of large companies, the politics of the latter inevitably become not only industrial but also social, and accordingly, the political and managerial teams they control are also inevitable.

An important factor in the region’s internal politics is the peculiarities of the regional political culture, the reformist and frondeur-minded residents of the region’s cities. Internally, the region is highly differentiated electorally — Yekaterinburg and the cities of the Yekaterinburg agglomeration traditionally stand out for the most protest voting (here this is explained by the high level of education of the population and its critical attitude towards any authority, significant competition in business, a high share of employment in small business, and an abundance of media). Another stable protest zone is the northern districts of the region, but here the protest has a more pronounced social character and is caused by the difficult socio-economic situation of the territory (in particular, surges in voting for the LDPR have been noted here). Rural districts and some small old industrial towns are distinguished by traditionally more pronounced conformism and social paternalism.

Overall, the local electoral landscape in the region is characterised by great fluidity, strong internal segmentation and a high level of competition.

Since 2012, the governor of the Sverdlovsk Region was Evgeny Kuivashev, a former presidential plenipotentiary envoy in the Urals Federal District. Kuivashev was always considered a political ally of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin.

Kuivashev’s relations with local elites and the community were complicated, especially during his first term, when in 2013–2018 he had to coexist with the popularly elected head of Yekaterinburg, Evgeny Roizman. Local elite groups disliked him, but after 2018 the situation improved thanks to the governor’s solidarity with the local community against the backdrop of attacks on the region by radically patriotic representatives of the federal elite (Nikita Mikhalkov, Vladimir Solovyov).

Kuivashev won elections fairly confidently, albeit without strong competitors. In 2017 his main opponent from the CPRF was the managing director of PAO “Plus Bank”, Alexei Parfenov. In the end, Kuivashev received 62.2% of the vote, Parfenov — 11.6%. In 2022 Kuivashev received 65.8% of the vote, and the CPRF representative, Legislative Assembly deputy Alexander Ivachev — 12.9%.

From 2012 to 2016, the head of the regional government was Denis Pasler, who had previously worked in business and been a deputy of the House of Representatives of the Legislative Assembly of the Sverdlovsk Region. In 2016 the post was abolished, and Pasler became governor of the Orenburg Region.

On 26 March 2025, Kuivashev resigned, and Pasler was appointed in his place.

As early as 19 June, at the very start of the gubernatorial election campaign in the Sverdlovsk Region, local political analysts asserted that besides acting governor Denis Pasler, there would be four more candidates on the ballot paper in the election. In their view, this is a tradition — representatives of all five parliamentary parties take part in gubernatorial elections. In the end, that is exactly what happened: representatives of seven parties put forward their candidacies (besides the “parliamentary five”, these were the ROS and Civic Initiative), but the representatives of the minor parties were not registered. Moreover, one of the two parties is on the verge of liquidation, the other was liquidated by court decision in July of this year.

The Civic Initiative candidate, editor-in-chief of the news agency “Kontrol” Dinamudin Sadikhov, filed a complaint with the election commission. He asserts that the director of the Department of Internal Policy of the Sverdlovsk Region, Natalya Gurchenok, contacted the chairpersons of councils of deputies and the heads of certain municipalities, obliging/inducing them to ensure the passage of the municipal filter for candidates from the CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia — For Truth and New People, since these parties do not have a sufficient number of their own representatives in the region.

Indeed, each candidate had to collect no fewer than 120 signatures from 55 districts. At the same time, of the 1,500 municipal deputies in the region, United Russia represents about 1,000 elected officials, the CPRF — 54, A Just Russia — For Truth — 45, the LDPR — 21, New People — 6, Yabloko — 2. Around 300 more people were elected as independents.

In the end, signatures to pass the municipal filter were collected and representatives of all five parliamentary parties were registered. True, the LDPR initially nominated a well-known State Duma deputy from Chelyabinsk Oblast, Stanislav Naumov. Naumov graduated from the philosophy faculty of Ural State University, where he studied alongside two other State Duma deputies, Dmitry Gusev and Oleg Matveychev. He worked as a deputy minister of industry and trade of Russia, and headed the Russian Public Relations Association. Such a candidate could have generated enthusiasm both among local elites and among voters, and could have led to a runoff. Naumov was nominated on 21 June following a party conference and a recommendation from the LDPR supreme council; on 22 June the election commission accepted his nomination documents; and already on 7 July Naumov withdrew his candidacy and revoked his nomination, stating that it was impossible to overcome the municipal filter. Here are his words: «I analysed the situation with passing the municipal filter in the elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Many of those I personally approached told me they had already supported one of the other candidates. In this situation I decided to withdraw my candidacy.» However, a few days later the LDPR nominated another candidate — Legislative Assembly deputy and regional branch leader Alexander Kaptyug, who had already run in the gubernatorial election in 2022 and received 3.2% of the vote. Despite being a lower-status candidate and having less time to collect signatures from municipal deputies, he nonetheless successfully passed the registration stage. This is, without doubt, a very vivid illustration of the imitative nature of the ongoing election campaign.

The other registered candidates also have very clear and rather limited potential. The Communist Party (CPRF) put forward deputy chair of the Legislative Assembly of Sverdlovsk Oblast and first secretary of the regional committee Alexander Ivachev. In 2022 he received 12.9% of the vote in the gubernatorial election. A Just Russia — For Truth is running State Duma deputy and regional branch head Andrei Kuznetsov (who received 9.2% of the vote in 2022), while New People is running Legislative Assembly deputy and regional branch head, 29-year-old Rant Kraev.

Although in our Index 5 points are deducted if there were no real competitors at the registration stage, and Stanislav Naumov nominated himself and then withdrew before reaching that stage, we nevertheless consider that a real competitor was nominated. At the same time, we understand that this decision was taken under a certain amount of pressure on the candidate, but there was no public evidence of this — or even statements to that effect.

Thus, the (Un)freedom Index for the Sverdlovsk Oblast gubernatorial election is 6 points.

Tambov Oblast ↑

Tambov Oblast, on the one hand, consistently supports the federal authorities in elections at all levels, and on the other periodically delivers surprises in intra-regional affairs.

Over the past four years, Tambov Oblast has already seen its third person at the helm. From 2015 to 2021 the region was led by Alexander Nikitin, who had previously been speaker of the oblast duma.

The main troublemaker in the region is the Rodina party, controlled by Maxim Kosenkov — mayor of Tambov from 2005–2008 and from 2020 to the present, and deputy governor in 2004–2005. Until 2008 Kosenkov was a member of United Russia, but that year a criminal case was opened against him and he was sentenced to imprisonment for kidnapping. After his release, Kosenkov headed the regional branch of Rodina and led it to success: in 2016 Rodina received almost 9% of the vote in the oblast deputy elections, taking third place, and in 2020 it won the elections to the Tambov city duma, receiving 44.2% of the vote (against 36.3% for United Russia) and 26 seats (against six for United Russia).

The then head of the region, Alexander Nikitin, did not declare “war” on the new city majority and their leader, but struck a deal under which Kosenkov became head of the administration of the regional centre, while adhering to a strategy of loyalty to the oblast authorities. The deal held under the governorship of Maxim Yegorov (2021–2024) as well. In 2021, Rodina party chairman Alexei Zhuravlev won a single-mandate district in the State Duma elections, receiving over 52% of the vote (United Russia did not field a candidate), and joined the LDPR faction.

Nikitin himself was easily elected both times — in 2015 he received 85% of the vote, and in 2020 — 79.3%. In autumn 2021, just a year after his re-election, Nikitin resigned early and took the post of senator from the region. He was replaced by Deputy Minister of Construction, Housing and Utilities Maxim Yegorov (who had worked under Vladimir Yakushev).

Yegorov won the 2022 regional head election with the very same result — around 85% of the vote — but served for only a very short time and resigned on 4 November 2024. Local observers believe that he underestimated the resistance of local officials and overestimated his support in Moscow. In their view, Yegorov got a taste for a beautiful and well-fed life and began making mistakes, after which he was “advised” to resign on his own and not wait for the consequences. The consequences caught up with him anyway — on 24 July 2025 Maxim Yegorov was detained on suspicion of receiving a bribe on an especially large scale.

He was replaced by a State Duma deputy and former mayor of Krasnodar. Krasnodar observers characterise him as a person capable of building constructive relations, including with the opposition, which is uncharacteristic of the political culture of Kuban. Perhaps the reason is that Pervyshov himself began building his career as an opposition politician. He was twice elected as a deputy of the Krasnodar city duma. The first time from Rodina, the second from A Just Russia, and during those campaigns he sharply criticised United Russia, which he later joined. Pervyshov likely never became one of the team of Krasnodar governor Veniamin Kondratyev, and in 2021 he moved from the mayor’s seat of the regional capital to a State Duma deputy’s seat, and a year later he left under contract for the SMO. He was awarded the Order of Courage.

After Nikitin’s resignation in 2020, Tambov mayor Kosenkov maintained all agreements with the regional authorities. Pervyshov, who arrived in 2024, took a sharp approach to Yegorov’s team and purged the ranks of officials, replacing them with members of his own team. After this, new agreements were reached with Kosenkov — he left Rodina and submitted an application to join United Russia.

Overall, for the authorities the region is manageable, not difficult and not opposition-minded. The regional branches of the parties are fairly passive. The election commission of Tambov Oblast received documents from five candidates, nominated exclusively by parliamentary parties. All of them were registered.

Besides acting governor Pervyshov, a fairly standard set of candidates for the region is taking part in the election. Oblast duma deputy from the CPRF Andrei Zhidkov ran in the gubernatorial election in 2015, 2020 and 2022. His best result was 8.7% of the vote. He is recognisable, but cannot claim victory. Oblast duma deputy Pavel Plotnikov, nominated by A Just Russia — For Truth, took part in the regional head election in 2020 and 2022 and received less than 4% of the vote both times. Oblast duma deputy from the LDPR Oleg Morozov ran in the gubernatorial election in 2022 and received less than 2.5% of the vote. A newcomer in this campaign is the candidate from New People, general director of OOO “Tambov Window Company” Elena Semiletova. She was completely unrecognisable at the start of the campaign — this is the first election in her life.

The (Un)freedom Index for the Sverdlovsk Oblast gubernatorial election is 4 points.

Sevastopol ↑

The city of Sevastopol continues to be considered part of the territory of Ukraine by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world. This, together with its proximity to the front, is likely to have an impact on the city’s internal political life.

The first head of Sevastopol elected under Russian rules, in 2017, was Dmitry Ovsyannikov (who received 71% of the vote), who had previously worked as a deputy minister of industry and trade of the Russian Federation. Almost immediately after his election he came into conflict with ex-chairman of the city’s Legislative Assembly Alexei Chaly and with the Legislative Assembly as a whole. Ovsyannikov was constantly embroiled in scandals and resigned in October 2024 (appointed deputy minister of industry and trade of Russia).

He was replaced by Mikhail Razvozhayev — former deputy head of the administration of the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai and former deputy minister for North Caucasus affairs. Razvozhayev was originally intended to be made head of Khakassia. In 2018, after the United Russia candidate lost in the first round of the Khakassia head election and the governor resigned, Razvozhayev was appointed acting head of the republic. His task was to derail the second round of the election, into which the CPRF candidate Valentin Konovalov had advanced. One after another, the first-round participants refused to go into the second round, in which ultimately only one candidate remained, who needed to receive more than 50% of the vote. Konovalov managed this, and Razvozhayev was transferred to Sevastopol.

In the 2020 city head election he received 85.7% of the vote, although there was no CPRF candidate in the election — the second secretary of the party’s city committee, Roman Kiyashko, who had received 16.2% of the vote in 2017, had nominated himself. However, he was not registered.

None of the remaining candidates, including Ilya Zhuravlev from the LDPR, who is running in the 2025 election, managed to receive even 5% of the vote.

Besides him and the incumbent governor, representatives of all the remaining parliamentary parties have been nominated and registered for the current election: Sergei Kruglov, a manager at the regional charitable public organisation “We Are Sevastopol Residents” (A Just Russia — For Truth; nominated three times as a candidate for deputy at regional and local elections, never elected); Gennady Kushnir, general director of OOO “Greco-Panamanian Sevastopol Crewing Company ‘Marine Management Shipping’” (CPRF; nominated three times as a candidate for city deputy, never elected); and Irina Salina, general director of OOO “DIABUKH” (New People; has never run in an election).

None of these candidates can compete with the incumbent governor.

The election will be held over three days; the city election commission has not taken a decision on holding “tree-stump” voting.

The (Un)freedom Index for the Sevastopol gubernatorial election is 4 points.