Introduction ↑
The report analyses the official results of the regional and local elections on the single voting day of 14 September 2025, including trends that may affect the results of the federal elections in 2026. Following the elections of 14 September 2025, the heads of 20 regions, 11 regional legislative assemblies and 24 city dumas of administrative centres of regions were elected.
This single voting day had a special, test-experimental significance — as the last such large-scale vote before the upcoming elections of State Duma deputies. In previous years, elections held on the eve of federal ones showed possible trends in changes to voters’ electoral preferences and the chances of various political projects. Thus, the elections in autumn 2006 and spring 2007 were simultaneously a test for the new A Just Russia project and a signal of the growing ambitions of the renewing Union of Right Forces (SPS). The response to this challenge was Vladimir Putin’s open entry into the Duma campaign (the notorious “Putin’s Plan”), the forceful destruction of the SPS in autumn 2007 and a substantial purge of A Just Russia that reduced its ambitions (the exclusion of Sergei Shargunov, Evgeny Roizman and others from the lists). Significant fronde and the activation of the Duma opposition in the elections of autumn 2010 and March 2011 preceded its rise in the elections of December 2011. At that time, the authorities tried to intercept the growth of protest sentiment by urgently electing Mikhail Prokhorov as leader of Right Cause, but then themselves effectively closed down their own project just two months later, as soon as it began to slip out of control. In the 2020 elections, four new projects were tested (New People, For Truth, Green Alternative and the Party of Direct Democracy), as a result of which New People received the green light to enter the State Duma in 2021, and the A Just Russia project was relaunched in a patriotic-nationalist direction through a merger with Zakhar Prilepin’s For Truth party and Gennady Semigin’s Patriots of Russia.
This time, no new projects were registered (various independent initiatives such as Konstantin Kalachev’s Beer Lovers Party were rejected and did not receive legal party status). On the contrary, during the nomination and registration campaign, the compression of the party field continued, effectively down to the five parliamentary parties. Thus, in 2020, in the legislative assembly elections in these same 11 regions, 125 lists were nominated (11.4 per region), and 93 were registered (8.45 per region) — these were the best figures for the 2016–2020 period, close to the level of 2015. This time, only 74 lists were nominated (6.72 per region on average), and 71 were registered (6.45 per region on average). Initially, only six lists collected signatures (8.5 times fewer than five years ago), of which two dropped out without submitting signatures. In the elections of legislative assembly deputies, the parliamentary parties accounted for 1,049 of the 1,239 registered candidates in single-mandate constituencies, or 84.7%; self-nominated candidates accounted for only 1.13% of all constituency candidates. In the elections for the single-mandate part of the city councils of regional centres, the parliamentary parties accounted for 3,214 of the 3,782 registered constituency candidates, or 84.98%.
Thus, the main questions of the vote on 12–14 September 2025 were:
what the dynamics of the parliamentary parties will be, and whether the system is capable of surviving following the upcoming elections, and what risks exist for it;
what the dynamics of electoral activity are by region, taking into account three-day voting (which is extremely important when assessing the hypothetical electoral contribution of regions in the 2026 elections, since an increase in turnout in “non-anomalous” regions raises the chances of the parliamentary opposition);
how REV works as the geography of its application expands.
This report does not assess the volume of falsifications or other electoral manipulations in any way (that is a completely different topic; all research indicates that they are localised and have their own ceilings). Rather, it assesses the degree of controllability of elections in the current situation and the environment’s resistance to this control — where the final formal result is a consequence of the authorities’ desire, on the one hand, to obtain the required result, and the environment’s resistance, on the other.
The elections of recent years, extreme in the severity of campaigning conditions amid the demoralisation of many local activists and public figures, are reminiscent of the principle from “Alice in Wonderland”: you have to run just to stay in place. If you simply stand still, you will quickly find yourself left behind.
1. Final indicators of political competition. Pre-election purges ↑
The August report analysed the screening out of candidates and party lists, as well as the degree of competition after the end of the registration stage.
At the last stage of the campaign, the composition of participants remained almost unchanged. In the gubernatorial elections, only one person withdrew their candidacy — Vladimir Evgenyevich Potapenko, born in 1977, an individual entrepreneur. He was nominated for governor of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Thus, in total, 134 candidates were nominated in 20 regions (6.7 per region on average), of whom 94 made it to the elections (4.7 per region on average). At the same time, in 10 regions (half), all nominated candidates were registered, which indicates an extremely high level of prior coordination. The screening-out rate was only 30%, and the bulk of it is accounted for by three regions (Komi, Kamchatka and Perm Krais).
In the elections of deputies to legislative assemblies, the number of registered lists did not change after the publication of the previous report. 74 lists were nominated (6.72 per region on average), and 71 were registered (6.45 per region on average). The screening-out rate between nomination and registration is formally extremely low — 4% (the screening-out between nominated and registered party lists in the legislative assembly deputy elections in 2020 was 25.7%). However, this is merely a consequence of the fact that parties that need to collect signatures have almost stopped participating in elections.
The Party of Social Protection (PSP) in the elections to the Kostroma Oblast Duma finally dropped out at the very end of the campaign and was unable to return to the ballot (as in 2020). The party is headed by the now former deputy of the Kostroma Oblast Duma, entrepreneur Vladimir Mikhailov, who is popular in the region and has previously changed many parties — from United Russia to Yabloko. If it had entered the Kostroma Oblast Duma, the party could have received a benefit for participating in the State Duma deputy elections. Initially, on 27 June 2025, the PSP list was refused certification, in particular because the ballot at the conference indicated “Parfyonova NatalYa Vitalyevna”, while the submitted documents indicated “Parfyonova NatalIa Vitalyevna”. In the commission’s opinion, this meant that, following the secret ballot, a different list of candidates was nominated, differing from the list submitted to the election commission. The list was certified on the second attempt, on 4 July 2025.
When, after this, the party collected signatures and submitted them to the election commission, it was already refused registration by a resolution of 28 July. The grounds were that, according to the commission’s data, Anna Vladimirovna Kochkina and Svetlana Aleksandrovna Ivanova, nominated on the list, remained members of United Russia and could not be nominated by another party. Also, according to the commission’s data, 17 people who had not formalised their exit from United Russia took part in the conference of the PSP regional branch on 2 July (20 people took part from the Zavolzhsky District of the city of Kostroma, of whom seven were members of United Russia; 34 took part from the Tsentralny District of the city of Kostroma, of whom four were members of United Russia; 26 people took part from the Fabrichny District of the city of Kostroma, of whom six were members of United Russia). This entailed the lack of authority of the said general meetings of local branches of the political party in Kostroma Oblast, and consequently, of the regional branch conference held on 2 July 2025.
On 5 August, the Kostroma Oblast Court partially satisfied the lawsuit of the Party of Social Protection, obliging the oblast election commission to register the party’s list for the elections to the Kostroma Oblast Duma. PSP representatives argued in court that the participants in the meetings to nominate delegates to the conference had long since left the party of power and lost contact with it. To verify this, the court involved United Russia in the proceedings as a third party and even requested documents from it confirming the connection of the mentioned delegates with the party. At the same time, in a similar case concerning the removal from the elections of two of the party’s candidates in single-mandate constituencies (V. Mikhailov and M. Postnikov), another judge of the same Kostroma Oblast Court sided with the oblast election commission and refused to reinstate the candidates.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court returned the case for appeal, pointing out that the lower instances had incorrectly calculated the quorum: members of United Russia could not be excluded from the list composition of the PSP branches, since, according to its charter, the quorum is calculated from the number of all persons on the register. At the same time, the Supreme Court confirmed the conclusions on the need to disqualify the votes of “multi-members” when electing delegates to the conference, and these delegates, the court insists, must be elected from each local branch. On 8 September, the First Appellate Court overturned the decision of the Kostroma Oblast Court, which had previously obliged the regional election commission to register the PSP list. The court considered that people with dual membership could not be excluded from the list of meeting participants, and taking this circumstance into account, the party did not have enough people for a quorum. Previously, the oblast court had considered that even minus the “alien” delegates, the number of conference participants was sufficient for a quorum, and obliged the election commission to register the list. On 9 September, the same First Appellate Court satisfied the lawsuit of the Pensioners’ Party for Social Justice, which also demanded the removal of the PSP list from the elections, citing all the same arguments about the membership of some conference participants in another party.
In the elections of 15 city councils of administrative centres of regions using the proportional system, there were no changes to the list of registered lists after the publication of the previous report: 101 lists were nominated (6.73 per city), and 91 were registered (6.06 per city on average).
2. Three-day voting, REV and turnout trends ↑
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, it has become the norm when holding elections to conduct voting not only on the day of the scheduled elections, but also on one or two preceding days. In 2020, this was explained by the sanitary-epidemiological situation; now it is explained by convenience for voters: in reality, it is explained by convenience for the authorities, for whom it is now easier to control the voting of administratively dependent categories of voters (especially on Friday, a working day). At the same time, controlling voting on the part of the opposition and observers over three days is much more difficult than over one, especially since the procedures for observers’ activities have been continuously complicated for them over several years.
The decision to conduct voting in elections or referendums over several consecutive days, but not more than three, is made by the election commission organising the given elections or referendums. At the federal level, the corresponding decision is made by the Central Election Commission (CEC); in the case of electoral campaigns at the regional and local levels — by the election commissions of the subjects of the federation and local election commissions. When elections of different levels are combined (on a single voting day), the decision on how many days the voting will last must be made by the election commission that organises the higher-level elections. The decision on multi-day voting is made by the corresponding election commission within 10 days after the official publication on the calling of elections or a referendum and is not subject to revision. Pre-election campaigning must be completed by 00:00 local time on the first day of voting.
In the regions where major elections were held this year, one-day voting was retained in Tatarstan, Ivanovo and Ulyanovsk Oblasts; two-day voting was organised in Kurgan Oblast; in the remaining regions, voting lasted three days.
By decision of the election commission organising the elections, voting by voters may also be conducted outside the polling station on territories and in places suitable for equipping for voting (on adjacent territories, in common areas and in other places). In the elections held in September 2025, three regions made such a decision: Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts.
The experience of three-day voting in 2020–2024 (that is, already after the start of the SMO) showed that mass three-day early voting, from the point of view of turnout, produced ambiguous results and it cannot be asserted that it unequivocally worked to increase turnout: the situation differed greatly across regions. In some places, turnout grew, in others it even fell, but on the whole it fluctuated around previous values for analogous elections. This suggests that the main goal was not to increase turnout, but to strengthen control and reduce observation, while the previous flows of administratively voting people were simply redistributed chronologically. Where electoral deviations existed previously and the results were ultimately anomalous, they remained anomalous; the technologies for fabricating results simply redistributed somewhat due to a shift to the days of preliminary-early voting. Where competition was previously higher and the results looked adequate, they remained adequate.
In effect, the three-day voting introduced in 2020 became an answer to the question of maintaining control over administratively dependent voters, when in the elections of 2018–2019 it became noticeable that although the technologies of administrative voter mobilisation had not gone anywhere, turnout remained low (for example, in the elections of Moscow City Duma deputies in 2014 and 2019 it was identical — 21%), but voters increasingly began to vote to spite the authorities’ instructions (“for the bald devil”). In voting stretched over three days, when people are forced to vote at a specific time and in the presence of superiors, the risks that someone will find out how you voted increase. Not to mention that voting over three days, sometimes also “on tree stumps” and car boots, creates great difficulties for ensuring the secrecy of the vote.
For example, in the elections in September 2024, a decrease in turnout compared to the previous analogous elections occurred in Kemerovo Oblast (–16.16 p.p. compared to 2019), in Khabarovsk (–10.94 p.p.) and Stavropol (–9.43 p.p.) Krais in the elections of governors and the mayor of the regional centre. Turnout grew most noticeably from 2019 to 2024 in Vologda (+20.51 p.p.) and Kursk (+20 p.p.) Oblasts.
Against the background of the elections in 2020–2024, the elections in 2025 for the first time recorded a new unambiguous trend: an almost total significant increase in turnout compared to the previous analogous elections. This time, out of 20 elections of regional heads, turnout grew in 17 cases, decreased in two (Tatarstan, Kursk Oblast) and remained virtually unchanged in one (Krasnodar Krai). In the 11 main elections of regional parliaments, turnout grew in all cases.
Almost the same picture of a widespread increase in turnout compared to the previous analogous elections is observed in the elections of councils of administrative centres of regions, with rare exceptions (these are Kazan, representing electorally anomalous Tatarstan; Stavropol — but here the comparison with previous elections is not valid, as they were combined with federal elections, where turnout is always higher; turnout remained almost unchanged in Ivanovo, Cheboksary, Tomsk). Previously, a trend of decreasing turnout dominated in municipal elections (see Tables 1–3).
Table 1. Comparison of voter turnout in the elections of heads of subjects of the RF on 12–14.09.2025 with previous elections (areas of turnout growth are highlighted in italics)
Region | Turnout in elections 13.09.2015 (other dates are given in brackets) | Turnout in elections 13.09.2020 (other dates are given in brackets) | Turnout in elections 14.09.2025 |
Republic of Komi | 40.67% (18.09.2016) | 30.16% | 37.75% |
Republic of Tatarstan | 84.2% | 78.78% | 75.85% |
Chuvash Republic | 58.6% | 55.5% | 58.49% |
Kamchatka Krai | 31.9% | 37.15% | 46.52% |
Krasnodar Krai | 46.0% | 68.63% | 68.67% |
Perm Krai | 42.53% (10.09.2017) | 35.76% | 49.03% |
Arkhangelsk Oblast | 21.0% | 32.65% | 36.32% |
Bryansk Oblast | 57.4% | 50.37% | 58.18% |
Irkutsk Oblast | 29.2% | 32.63% | 33.08% |
Kaluga Oblast | 36.1% | 35.39% | 44.8% |
Kostroma Oblast | 35.8% | 31.98% | 39.8% |
Kursk Oblast | 41.56% (08.09.2019) | 61.55% (08.09.2024) | 54.1% |
Leningrad Oblast | 44.5% | 51.52% | 62.83% |
Novgorod Oblast | 28.35% (10.09.2017) | 32.81% (11.09.2022) | 37.71% |
Orenburg Oblast | 39.56% (08.09.2019) | 52.56% (08.09.2024) | 49.37% |
Rostov Oblast | 48.6% | 42.99% | 60.95% |
Sverdlovsk Oblast | 37.31% (10.09.2017) | 28.47% (11.09.2022) | 39.91% |
Tambov Oblast | 57.8% | 64.6% | 54% |
Jewish Autonomous Oblast | 31.9% | 73.02% | 74.23% |
Sevastopol | 34.21% (10.09.2017) | 48.28% | 66.96% |
Table 2. Comparison of voter turnout in elections of legislative bodies of subjects of the RF on the single voting day 14.09.2025 with previous analogous elections (areas of turnout growth are highlighted in bold)
Region | Turnout in elections 2010-2011[1] | Turnout 13.09.2015 | Turnout | Turnout 12–14.09.2025 |
Republic of Komi | 49.8% | 50.9% | 30.1% | 37.66% |
Belgorod Oblast | 64.7% | 53.9% | 54.48% | 59.15% |
Voronezh Oblast | 56.4% | 50.4% | 44.14% | 54.82% |
Kaluga Oblast | 41.3% | 36.0% | 35.36% | 56.3% |
Kostroma Oblast | 40.3% | 35.7% | 31.97% | 39.77% |
Kurgan Oblast | 38.2% | 30.4% | 31.05% | 38.37% |
Magadan Oblast | 40.3% | 33.6% | 33.17% | 41.71% |
Novosibirsk Oblast | 35.8% | 30.7% | 28.25% | 33.05% |
Ryazan Oblast | 44.3% | 37.4% | 32.49% | 45.43% |
Chelyabinsk Oblast | 45.7% | 41.4% | 33.87% | 39.97% |
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug | 51.3% | 69.4% | 47.11% | 50.6% |
Table 3. Comparison of voter turnout in elections of representative bodies of administrative centres of subjects of the RF on 12–14.09.2025 with previous elections held using the proportional system (all except Stavropol, 2015 and 2020)
City | Turnout 13.09.2015 | Turnout 13.09.2020 | Turnout 14.09.2025 |
Kazan | 70.3% | 61.65% | 54.84% |
Izhevsk | 28.2% | 17.33% | 25.73% |
Cheboksary | 46.5% | 42.83% | 41.43% |
Krasnodar | 30.6% | 26.4% | 41.3% |
Stavropol | 42.17% (together with State Duma 2016) | 70.9% (together with State Duma 2021) | 44.12% |
Voronezh | 25.0% | 18.33% | 19.46% |
Ivanovo | 17.9% | 16.37% | 16.3% |
Kaluga | 27.0% | 25.18% | 32.24% |
Orenburg | 25.6% | 18.76% | 30.87% |
Oryol | 33.2% | 28.3% | 30.94% |
Rostov-on-Don | 45.5% | 29.18% | 50.03% |
Smolensk | 26.0% | 27.52% | 35.83% |
Tambov | 31.7% | 32.82% | 40.35% |
Tomsk | 17.1% | 19.39% | 18.02% |
The bulk of those who voted consisted of those who voted in the first two days of voting (Friday and Saturday). In the gubernatorial elections, on average, almost half of all voters who took part in the voting voted on Friday, and together on Friday and Saturday — 76% of all those who voted. A similar situation exists in the regional parliament elections, but administrative mobilisation is slightly weaker there: the first day of voting yielded an average of 48% of all those who voted, the first two days — 71.95%.
These data underscore that administrative mobilisation is more pronounced in gubernatorial elections than in elections of deputies to regional parliaments (see Tables 4 and 5).
Table 4. Distribution of voter turnout in elections of heads of subjects of the RF on 12–14.09.2025 by days of voting
Region | First day of voting | Second day of voting | Final turnout 2025 elections |
Republic of Komi | 18.72% | 27.45% | 37.75% |
Republic of Tatarstan | NONE | NONE | 75.85% |
Chuvash Republic | 28.49% | 43.43% | 58.49% |
Kamchatka Krai | 22.02% | 32.32% | 46.52% |
Krasnodar Krai | 30.21% | 53.83% | 68.67% |
Perm Krai | 18.39% | 33.11% | 49.03% |
Arkhangelsk Oblast | 18.03% | 26.31% | 36.32% |
Bryansk Oblast | 32.3% | 46.77% | 58.18% |
Irkutsk Oblast | 13.2% | 21.93% | 33.08% |
Kaluga Oblast | 20.25% | 32.28% | 44.8% |
Kostroma Oblast | 18.44% | 28.4% | 39.8% |
Kursk Oblast | 35.39% | 43.88% | 54.1% |
Leningrad Oblast | 27.33% | 46.79% | 62.83% |
Novgorod Oblast | 20.78% | 29.35% | 37.71% |
Orenburg Oblast | 25.59% | 38.4% | 49.37% |
Rostov Oblast | 27.32% | 45.05% | 60.95% |
Sverdlovsk Oblast | 21.77% | 31.04% | 39.91% |
Tambov Oblast | 26.76% | 42.97% | 54% |
Jewish Autonomous Oblast | 49.23% | 66.47% | 74.23% |
Sevastopol | 47.92% | 56.83% | 66.96% |
AVERAGE | 26.43% | 39.3% | 52.43% |
Table 5. Distribution of voter turnout in elections of legislative assemblies of subjects of the RF on 12–14.09.2025 by days of voting
Region | First day of voting | Second day of voting | Final turnout 2025 elections |
Republic of Komi | 18.72% | 27.44% | 37.66% |
Belgorod Oblast | 35.64% | 49.04% | 59.15% |
Voronezh Oblast | 25.41% | 41.67% | 54.82% |
Kaluga Oblast | 20.2% | 32.23% | 56.3% |
Kostroma Oblast | 18.42% | 28.38% | 39.77% |
Kurgan Oblast | - | 22.38% | 38.37% |
Magadan Oblast | 22.75% | 31.58% | 41.71% |
Novosibirsk Oblast | 11.93% | 21.43% | 33.05% |
Ryazan Oblast | 18.8% | 33.02% | 45.43% |
Chelyabinsk Oblast | 16.72% | 28.75% | 39.97% |
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug | 28.42% | 41.57% | 50.6% |
AVERAGE | 21.7% | 32.5% | 45.17% |
As for remote electronic voting (REV), its average share in the elections of regional heads, where it was used (10 regions out of 20), was 18.2% on average of the total number of voters on the list and 34.7% on average of all those who voted. The maximum was in Chuvashia (35%) and the Republic of Komi (25.5%). In the legislative assembly elections (seven regions out of 11), the average share of those voting via REV was 15.08% of the total number of voters or 33% of all those who voted (see Tables 6 and 7). Last year, according to CEC data, 13.9% of the total number of those who voted used the electronic form of voting — in 25 regions by choice and by default in Moscow.
Table 6. Share of remote electronic voting (REV) in elections of regional heads on 14.09.2025
| Voted via REV | Share of those voting via REV of the total number of those who voted | Winner’s percentage overall | Winner’s percentage in REV |
Republic of Komi | 59,524 | 25.52% | 70.04% | 73.37% |
Chuvash Republic | 186,222 | 35.03% | 67.06% | 61.3% |
Perm Krai | 154,425 | 15.96% | 70.94% | 62.75% |
Arkhangelsk Oblast | 86,143 | 26.77% | 67.32% | 65.91% |
Kaluga Oblast | 51668 | 14.79% | 72.24% | 76.6% |
Kostroma Oblast | 27869 | 14.1% | 67.63% | 64.96% |
Novgorod Oblast | 18775 | 10.65% | 62.19% | 58.54% |
Rostov Oblast | 232510 | 12.22% | 81.25% | 83.9% |
Sverdlovsk Oblast | 238024 | 18.1% | 61.3% | 67.04% |
Sevastopol | 22250 | 9.29% | 81.73% | 73.64% |
Table 7. Share of remote electronic voting (REV) in the legislative assembly deputy elections of 14.09.2025
| Voted via REV | Share of REV voters out of total voters | Winner’s percentage overall | Winner’s percentage in REV |
Republic of Komi | 59524 | 25.58% | 44.5% | 51.84% |
Belgorod Oblast | 84218 | 11.9% | 72.98% | 69.66% |
Kaluga Oblast | 51668 | 14.82% | 58.56% | 59.06% |
Kostroma Oblast | 27869 | 14.12% | 50.26% | 50.63% |
Kurgan Oblast | 30089 | 12.27% | 54.91% | 51.33% |
Magadan Oblast | 5794 | 14.41% | 65.89% | 58.68% |
Chelyabinsk Oblast | 128009 | 12.45% | 54.48% | 49.57% |
In total, remote electronic voting (REV) was used in 23 regions during the past elections, which is two fewer constituent entities than in the previous analogous elections of 2024. A total of 34 constituent entities expressed a desire to hold elections using this format of voting, but the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation considered that this might be inexpedient due to “hostile external challenges”[2]. At all campaign levels, REV was used in Komi, North Ossetia, Chuvashia, Perm Krai, Arkhangelsk, Belgorod, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kurgan, Magadan, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk oblasts, Sevastopol, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. And in five more regions, REV was used in individual campaigns: in Karelia, Lipetsk, Samara, Smolensk, and Tomsk oblasts. 11 regions that used this voting method in 2024 did not submit applications to conduct REV in 2025: these are Crimea, Altai and Kamchatka krais, Vologda, Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Kursk, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Yaroslavl oblasts.
As for the correlation between the voting results for the baseline pro-government candidate and the baseline pro-government list across the territory as a whole and separately for REV, there is no single scenario. In three regions out of 10, the incumbent’s percentage via REV is higher; in all the rest it is lower (and in Sevastopol and Perm Krai, substantially lower). In the legislative assembly elections in seven regions where REV was used, United Russia’s share via REV is higher in three (Komi, Kaluga and Kostroma oblasts, nominally so in the latter two); in the rest, United Russia’s share via REV is lower. If we take the voting in the previous year, 2024, then for all parties except the CPRF nationwide and United Russia in Moscow, the electronic result turned out to be better than the “paper” result, calculated the Central Election Commission[3]. The maximum boost from REV in the 2024 gubernatorial elections was received by Andrei Turchak, who became head of the Altai Republic.
Data on the 2024 elections according to information from the CEC of the Russian Federation:
Thus, the only example of unidirectional discrepancies between REV data and voting at polling stations in favour of pro-government candidates remains the State Duma deputy elections in single-mandate constituencies within the territory of the city of Moscow on 19 September 2021.
What might the data on an almost universal increase in turnout and a multidirectional picture of REV voting results indicate?
Firstly, this may indicate that administrative mobilisation of voters is growing while electoral control mechanisms are effectively being dismantled. Under extraordinary political conditions, with numerous bans and sanctions, parties and candidates are not prepared to publicly contest election outcomes and conflict with the authorities. The independent observer movement has been crushed, especially after the “Melkonyants case”: on 14 May, Judge Evgenia Nikolaeva of Moscow’s Basmanny Court found Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of the formally unregistered movement “Golos” (included by the Ministry of Justice in the foreign agent register), guilty of organising the activities of an “undesirable” non-governmental organisation and sentenced him to five years in a general-regime penal colony. In addition, the court banned Melkonyants from engaging in public activity for nine years. On 8 July 2025, the All-Russian Public Movement for the Protection of Voters’ Rights “Golos” (recognised in the Russian Federation as an undesirable organisation and included by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in the foreign agent register) announced the cessation of its work. “Golos” explained that any form of participation in its work could now entail criminal liability. The movement reported the liquidation of all its regional branches, the early termination of the powers of their chairs and council members, as well as members of the audit commission, members of the Council, and co-chairs of the movement. In addition, it was decided to cease the work of all projects and resources created by “Golos”, including the movement’s website, the “Map of Violations” at elections, and social media accounts.
However, these factors (three-day voting, the demoralisation of the opposition amid the special military operation and numerous bans, the crushing of the observer movement) were also present earlier, in 2022–2024. But back then there was no such universal trend of increasing turnout. The experience of many years of observing elections across regions year after year suggests that the same categories of voters usually participate in elections. At the same time, electoral anomalies and falsifications across regions also generally have a stable geographical localisation.
Thus, one can hypothetically assume that the noted increase in turnout is not only a consequence of administrative technologies, but also of a trend — so far little recorded but existing — towards growing political activity, at least in the form of voters’ personal participation in voting even with a minimal campaign. This assumption is supported by election campaign monitoring data, which indicate that most gubernatorial election campaigns were not accompanied by an active campaigning effort; its external attributes (large advertising structures, campaign pickets, distribution of campaign materials, etc.) were practically absent.
Secondly, the multidirectionality of REV application results across regions may indicate that the sole federal directive is the expansion of REV use itself, without a strict link to results (which, in a situation where tacit coordination of behavioural strategies among participants dominates, may be superfluous). As a result, regions accustomed to rigidly administering elections by habitual methods may view REV as an excessive mechanism that rather hinders the achievement of “planned results” (since the federal centre, at a minimum, directly receives all electronic results). It can also be assumed that in many regions they simply do not know how, or do not want, to organise electoral mobilisation campaigns through REV (where there is administrative mobilisation, a skew towards administrative candidates arises). In the absence of administrative mobilisation, REV tends to work for the opposition; where it is present, it works for administrative candidates. Most likely, “result management” or the correction of results through REV is targeted (either in regions with an overly strong opposition, as was the case in 2025 in the Republic of Komi, as a channel for additional administrative mobilisation; or to soften overly non-competitive results in a region “from above”).
3. Results of candidates and political parties ↑
3.1. Gubernatorial elections ↑
It is not surprising that all gubernatorial elections, where there was almost no real contest, predictably ended in victories for the incumbents amid mass early voting.
The group of regions with traditionally anomalous results, such as Tatarstan (Rustam Minnikhanov with 88.09%), Krasnodar Krai (Veniamin Kondratyev with 83.17%), and Bryansk Oblast (Alexander Bogomaz with 78.8%), is joined this time by Sevastopol (Mikhail Razvozhayev with 81.73%), the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Maria Kostyuk with 83.02%), Leningrad Oblast (Alexander Drozdenko with 84.2%), Kursk Oblast (Alexander Khinshtein 86.82%), Orenburg Oblast (Evgeny Solntsev with 83.85%), and Rostov Oblast (Yuri Slyusar with 81.25%).
Against this background, Perm Krai (Dmitry Makhonin with 70.9%), Komi (Rostislav Goldstein with 70.04%), Kaluga Oblast (Vladislav Shapsha with 72.2%), Chuvashia (Oleg Nikolaev with 67.06%), Arkhangelsk Oblast (Alexander Tsybulsky with 67.32%), Kostroma Oblast (Sergei Sitnikov with 67.63%), and Tambov Oblast (Evgeny Pervyshov with 73.84%) look more moderate.
The worst and more credible-looking results were achieved by the incumbent heads in Irkutsk Oblast (Igor Kobzev with 60.79%), Novgorod Oblast (Alexander Dronov with 62.19%), Kamchatka Krai (Vladimir Solodov with 62.97%), and Sverdlovsk Oblast (Denis Pasler with 61.3%).
Among the opponents of the incumbent heads, the best performance was by the CPRF’s candidate for governor of Irkutsk Oblast, Sergei Levchenko, with 22.65%. He is followed by Alexander Ivachev (15.25%, Sverdlovsk Oblast, CPRF), Olga Efimova (14.4%, Novgorod Oblast, CPRF), Vasilina Kulieva (13.82%, Kamchatka Krai, LDPR), Roman Litvinov (13.3%, Kamchatka Krai, CPRF), Andrei Kuznetsov (12.66%, Sverdlovsk Oblast, A Just Russia), and Tatyana Saladina (11.01%, Komi, A Just Russia).
3.2. General dynamics of changes in political party results in elections to representative bodies of power by party lists ↑
In the legislative assembly deputy elections in 11 regions by party lists, in all cases except Belgorod and Ryazan oblasts, no fewer than four lists crossed the threshold (in 2020, no fewer than four lists crossed in all 11 regions). At the same time, the election results in Ryazan Oblast, where just five years ago seven lists made it into the oblast duma, look frankly deviant and indicative of at least an administrative overreach.
All five parliamentary parties made it through in seven regions — the legislative assemblies of Komi, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kurgan, Magadan, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk oblasts. The largest number of lists, six, made it through in Kaluga, Kostroma, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk oblasts: in all these five cases, the sixth list was the Party of Pensioners.
United Russia, the CPRF, and the LDPR made it through in all 11 regions. A Just Russia failed to cross the threshold in Belgorod, Voronezh, and Ryazan oblasts (thus making it through in eight regions). New People failed to overcome the threshold in Ryazan Oblast, thus also making it through in eight regions (in Belgorod Oblast and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the list was not initially nominated) (see Table 8).
Table 8. Results of political parties in the elections to legislative bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, 12–14.09.2025 (%) *
Region | United Russia | CPRF | LDPR | A Just Russia | New People | Non-parliamentary parties |
Republic of Komi | 44.5% | 14.87% | 14.11% | 7.07% | 5.96% | Green Alternative — 3.86%; Communists of Russia — 3.61%; RPSS — 1.75%; Rodina — 0.96% |
Belgorod Oblast | 72.98% | 8.08% | 9.19% | 3.95% | - | RPPSS — 3.4%, Communists of Russia — 1.36% |
Voronezh Oblast | 73.88% | 9.26% | 5.8% | 2.24% | 5.67% | Rodina — 1.61% |
Kaluga Oblast | 58.56% | 9.48% | 9.53% | 7.88% | 5.46% | RPPSS — 5.71% |
Kostroma Oblast | 50.26% | 11.26% | 12.12% | 6.13% | 6.83% | RPPSS — 7.25%, Communists of Russia — 3.56% |
Kurgan Oblast | 54.91% | 10.69% | 12.85% | 5.87% | 7.37% | RPPSS — 6.24% |
Magadan Oblast | 65.89% | 8.4% | 12.83% | 5.22% | 5.07% |
|
Novosibirsk Oblast | 51.91% | 11.21% | 9.33% | 7.78% | 7.91% | RPPSS — 6.63%; Rodina — 1.12%; The Greens — 0.89% |
Ryazan Oblast | 72.85% | 6.39% | 7.96% | 2.53% | 4.14% | RPPSS — 3.18%; Communists of Russia — 0.71% |
Chelyabinsk Oblast | 54.48% | 5.94% | 9.79% | 13.43% | 8.11% | RPPSS — 5.64% |
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug | 65.6% | 10.46% | 16.12% | 6.41% |
|
|
*Note: results of lists that crossed the threshold are marked in bold.
In the elections to representative bodies of 15 regional centres where a proportional electoral system was applied, in nine cases all five parliamentary parties crossed the 5% threshold. United Russia, the CPRF, and the LDPR made it through everywhere. In the elections in Ivanovo, Rostov-on-Don, and Smolensk, the lists of A Just Russia did not make it through (thus making it through in 12 out of 15 cities). The lists of the New People party did not make it through in Makhachkala, Kazan, and Tambov (also making it through in 12 out of 15 city councils).
The largest number of party lists, six, made it into the city councils of Oryol and Orenburg, the city duma of Kaluga, and the Assembly of Deputies of the city of Cheboksary; the smallest number, four lists, made it through in Makhachkala, Kazan, Ivanovo, and Rostov-on-Don. In four cases, the threshold was crossed by the Russian Party of Pensioners for Social Justice; in one case by Rodina; and in one case by Communists of Russia (see Table 9).
Overall, these results can be viewed as a desire to preserve the status quo among the existing political parties within the political system (however, the authorities in some regions are administratively overreaching).
Table 9. Results of political parties in the elections to representative bodies of regional centres, 12–14.09.2025 (%)
City | United Russia | CPRF | LDPR | A Just Russia | New People | Non-parliamentary parties |
Makhachkala (Dagestan) | 72.58% | 8.72% | 5.78% | 11.21% | 1.6% |
|
Kazan (Tatarstan) | 69.94% | 13.38% | 5.25% | 6.76% | 3.62% |
|
Izhevsk (Udmurtia) | 53.55% | 10.59% | 18.58% | 5.05% | 10.41% |
|
Cheboksary (Chuvashia) | 40.73% | 8.6% | 16.52% | 7.95% | 10.67% | RPPSS — 6.32%; The Greens — 2.4%, Communists of Russia — 2.11%, Party of Social Protection — 1.17%, Civic Platform — 0.71%, Rodina — 0.56% |
Krasnodar | 63.44% | 15.49% | 8.89% | 5.68% | 5.52% |
|
Stavropol | 64.72% | 10.62% | 9.66% | 6.4% | 7.23% |
|
Voronezh | 39.39% | 17.68% | 10.44% | 7.22% | 16.5% | Rodina — 3.5% |
Ivanovo | 57.08% | 9.94% | 16.18% | 3.67% | 8.81% | Communists of Russia — 2.26% |
Kaluga | 50.18% | 9.06% | 10.29% | 9.79% | 7.23% | RPPSS — 6.67%; The Greens — 2.7% |
Orenburg | 55.66% | 9.96% | 8.73% | 7.69% | 8.97% | Communists of Russia — 6.08% |
Oryol | 39.25% | 15.24% | 8.6% | 18.63% | 8.49% | RPPSS — 5.24% |
Rostov-on-Don | 67.64% | 11.38% | 7.56% | 3.42% | 7.33% | Communists of Russia — 2.05% |
Smolensk | 53.65% | 11.86% | 10.2% | 4.78% | 11.52% | RPPSS — 6.34% |
Tambov | 51.44% | 9.81% | 7.44% | 6.54% | 4.81% | Rodina — 17.42% |
Tomsk | 42.58% | 12.76% | 10.7% | 14.67% | 12.66% | Yabloko — 4.86% |
* Note: results of lists that crossed the threshold are marked in bold.
The election results by party lists (11 elections of deputies to regional parliaments and 15 elections of city councils in administrative centres of regions) allow us to say that, under the current political situation after the start of the special military operation, United Russia retains super-dominance. Compared to the analogous regional elections in 2020, the growth in United Russia’s average result was about 12.87 percentage points; compared to the voting in the State Duma deputy elections in 2021 in these regions, the average result grew by 17.53 percentage points. The results of the LDPR and the New People party changed insignificantly on average (the LDPR, compared to the 2020 elections, showed an average of minus 0.7 p.p.; compared to the State Duma in 2021 — plus 1.5 p.p.; fluctuations for New People were minus 0.3 p.p. and minus 0.77 p.p., respectively). The strongest drop was for the CPRF: compared to the 2020 elections in these regions — minus 7.46 p.p.; compared to 2021 — minus 11.3 p.p. (that is, a loss of more than half of the support percentage obtained). A Just Russia also lost 1.57 p.p. compared to 2020 and 2.83 p.p. compared to 2021 (see Table 10).
The set of regions where regional parliamentary elections were held in 2025 is historically relatively protest-oriented — these are predominantly regions without rigid electoral distortions, with historically inflated opposition results in federal elections on average, which makes the dynamics quite indicative.
Table 10. Legislative assemblies — average percentage of parties in the regions where legislative assembly deputy elections took place in 2025
Party | Results of regional elections, 2015 | Results of State Duma deputy elections, 2016 | Results of regional elections, 2020 | Results of State Duma deputy elections, 2021 | Results of regional elections, 2025 | Difference: 2020 to 2025 | Difference: 2021 to 2025 |
United Russia | 59.11% | 47.1 | 47.66% | 43% | 60.53% | +12.87% | +17.53% |
CPRF | 12.33% | 14.75% | 13.49% | 20.95% | 9.64% | -7.46% | -11.31% |
LDPR | 9.91% | 15.67 | 11.57% | 9.37% | 10.88% | -0.69% | +1.51% |
A Just Russia | 9.83% | 8.27% | 7.8% | 9.06% | 6.23% | -1.57% | -2.83% |
New People | - | - | 7.05% | 6.59% | 6.28% | -0.77% | -0.31% |
We see similar dynamics in the city council elections by party lists — a drop for the CPRF compared to both the 2020 elections and 2021. For A Just Russia, it is also worse than in 2020, but better than in 2021. For the LDPR, it is worse than in 2020 and better than in 2021. In the growth zone are United Russia (about 13–14 p.p.) and New People, whose result growth in the cities is indisputable (+1.95 p.p. compared to 2021; in 2020, the party had almost no lists in local elections) (see Table 11).
Table 11. City councils of administrative centres — average percentage of parties in the administrative centres of regions where elections of deputies to city representative bodies took place in 2025
Party | Results of representative body deputy elections, 2015 | Results of State Duma deputy elections, 2016 | Results of representative body deputy elections, 2020 | Results of State Duma deputy elections, 2021 | Results of representative body deputy elections, 2025 | Difference: 2020 to 2025 | Difference: 2021 to 2025 |
United Russia | 53.16% | 43.56 | 39.9% | 39.13% | 53.52% | +13.62% | +14.35% |
CPRF | 16.11% | 15.43% | 18.16% | 22.74% | 11.88% | -6.28% | -10.86% |
LDPR | 9.63% | 14.8% | 10.99% | 7.38% | 10.65% | -0.34% | +3.27% |
A Just Russia | 10% | 8.85 | 10.54% | 9.89% | 7.73% | -2.78% | -2.16% |
New People | - | - | Insufficient statistics | 6.89% | 8.84% | - | +1.95% |
3.2.1. United Russia ↑
The results of the 2025 elections, just like other elections after the start of the special military operation, allow us to say that the “party of power” retains super-dominance. In 10 out of 11 regional parliamentary elections this year, its result exceeds both its result in the previous regional elections of 2020 and its result in the territory of the region in the State Duma deputy elections (on average +17 p.p. for the State Duma). Only in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which consistently belongs to the zone of “electoral anomaly”, are the party’s results stable and remain super-high with minimal correction. A similar situation is observed in the elections to councils of administrative centres of regions: results grew everywhere (on average +14 p.p.), except for anomalous and rigidly managed regions (Kazan, Stavropol), as well as Oryol (the governor of Oryol Oblast is CPRF member Andrei Klychkov).
But where United Russia’s results were previously relatively low, they have grown substantially everywhere. It appears that the reason for this lies not in the quality of the party’s own election campaigns, which remain fairly formulaic and differ little from previous campaigns (emphasis on administrative mobilisation and mass indirect campaigning under the guise of covering professional activities), but in the general political situation in the country and the demoralisation of opponents, whose ability to run a campaign is severely limited. In essence, United Russia runs election campaigns that, while not the most creative, are well-organised and systematic, covering all territories within regions, at a time when the opposition cannot afford to do so.
In effect, since 2022, an unofficial moratorium on criticising the authorities on all key issues (foreign policy, defence, the economy, demography, etc.) has been in place in the country. Amid bans on criticising the official position on the special military operation from any side, whether liberal or patriotic (which is fraught with fines and other measures under the laws on discrediting the Armed Forces, obtaining foreign agent status and being deprived of the right to participate in elections, etc.), restrictions on holding public campaign events that have persisted since COVID-19, problems with financing and finding sponsors (business representatives are being pushed out of politics not only by economic problems in various spheres per se, but also by internal measures such as the ban on using foreign financial instruments, as well as the presence of additional risks in the form of increased chances of being placed on sanctions lists when raising one’s public profile and obtaining deputy status), the opposition is effectively “bound hand and foot” in terms of its ability to qualitatively organise and conduct election campaigns.
If we conduct a retrospective, with such a trend, United Russia should substantially improve its 2021 results in the 2026 State Duma elections. However, if we look at the dynamics of these regional elections to legislative assemblies, then as a rule, in federal elections United Russia’s result was lower than in regional ones (turnout is higher in federal elections, precisely due to the opposition-minded urban voter; however, in the city council elections in 2020 and the State Duma deputy elections in 2021 within the territory of these same cities, the average result almost coincided) (see Tables 12 and 13).
Table 12. Comparative results of United Russia in regional parliamentary elections (%)
Region | United Russia result | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2010–2011 regional elections | 2011 State Duma elections | 2015 regional elections | 2016 State Duma elections | 2020 regional elections | 2021 State Duma elections | 2025 regional elections | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Komi Republic | 50.53 | 58.81 | 58.05 | 37.8 | 28.61% | 29.44% | 44.5% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Belgorod Oblast | 66.20 | 51.16 | 62.36 | 54.7 | 63.95% | 51.65% | 72.98% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Voronezh Oblast | 62.55 | 50.05 | 73.84 | 59.1 | 61.52% | 55.9% | 73.88% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Kaluga Oblast | 53.45 | 40.42 | 56.99 | 45.7 | 42.43% | 36.33% | 58.56% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Kostroma Oblast | 50.02 | 30.74 | 50.96 | 36.6 | 31.92% | 30.26% | 50.26% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Kurgan Oblast | 41.23 | 44.41 | 56.74 | 41.5 | 44.57% | 36.07% | 54.91% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Magadan Oblast | 50.02 | 41.04 | 57.71
Table 19. Comparative results of A Just Russia in elections to representative bodies of administrative centres of Russian regions by party lists (%), excluding Makhachkala
Nevertheless, the party retains some strengths:
3.2.5. New People ↑Because the New People party emerged only in 2020, and even then its participation in elections was not widespread, a chronological analysis of the change in its electoral geography is objectively limited. In legislative assembly elections the party’s average percentage has remained almost unchanged compared with voting in the 2021 State Duma elections, and there is a slight decline compared with the 2020 elections. At the same time, there is growth in regions such as Kurgan, Voronezh and Novosibirsk oblasts, and a decline in Kaluga and Ryazan. At the same time, the party’s position strengthened significantly in municipal elections: almost everywhere its lists were registered, they passed (except in Tambov and Kazan, although in Kazan the list’s failure to pass is partly offset by the election of a candidate in a single-mandate constituency). While A Just Russia is losing what it had, New People is strengthening in places where it previously had no presence (see Tables 20 and 21). Table 20. Comparative results of the New People party in regional parliament elections (%)
Table 21. Comparative results of the New People party in elections to representative bodies of regional centres (%)
The party’s problems include the following:
But the party also has its strengths:
3.2.6. Other parties ↑Russian Party of Pensioners for Social Justice (RPPSJ) The party’s activity has declined in recent years. Whereas in the 2020 regional elections it passed into seven of the nine regional parliaments where its lists were on the ballot, this time it passed into only five regional parliaments out of seven registered lists. In the 2020 elections to city councils of administrative centres of regions, its lists passed in all six cities where they were registered, whereas this time only four lists passed into the city councils of regional centres (all of those registered). In these years the party has mainly nominated candidates only where it enjoys a local concession during candidate registration. At the same time, as before, the party’s successes have often been achieved either with minimal campaigning or with its virtual absence, which may be an effect of relatively low turnout and, in connection with this, an increased share of older people among voters. The party’s lists passed into a number of councils in Krasnoyarsk Krai: the councils of Achinsk Municipal Okrug (5.93%), Boguchany Municipal Okrug (5.73%), Bolshaya Murta-Sukhobuzimo Municipal Okrug (6.10%), Yeniseysk Municipal Okrug (5.62%), Ilansky-Nizhny Ingash Municipal Okrug (5.39%), Kazachinsko-Pirovsky Municipal Okrug (5.97%), Kozulka Municipal Okrug (5.0%), Kuragino Municipal Okrug (9.83%), Uzhur Municipal Okrug (5.21%), Rybinskoye Municipal Okrug (6.23%). The RPPSJ’s lists also passed into the Council of Deputies of Belgorod Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast) with 5.76%; the Council of Deputies of Shebekino Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast) with 11.33%; the councils of deputies of Kargat Raion (7.06%), Kolyvan Raion (5.51%), Kyshtovka Raion (18.32%), Moshkovo Raion (6.33%), Novosibirsk Raion (8.74%), Kuybyshev Raion (6.6%) in Novosibirsk Oblast; the assemblies of deputies of Ostrov (7.81%) and Pustoshka (7.02%) municipal okrugs in Pskov Oblast. YABLOKO In the 2025 legislative assembly elections, the party did not nominate any lists at all. In elections of deputies to city councils of administrative centres of regions, four lists were nominated, but only one was registered – for the Tomsk city duma, and it failed to pass with 4.86% (unlike 2020). The following were not registered:
For comparison: in 2020, YABLOKO’s lists were refused registration in the legislative assembly elections in Ryazan, Kurgan and Chelyabinsk oblasts, and were eliminated from local list-based elections in Rostov-on-Don, Ivanovo, Krasnodar, and Smolensk. As a result, in the main elections of 2020 the party was represented in the elections for the Kostroma Oblast Duma, the Cheboksary city assembly, and the Voronezh, Kaluga and Oryol city dumas/councils. Consequently, in 2025 one deputy was elected to the Kaluga city duma in a single-mandate constituency – the constituency was won by a “co-ordinated” and de facto administrative candidate, Alexei Kolesnikov. Also, this time the party’s lists passed into the assemblies of deputies of four municipal okrugs in Pskov Oblast: Gdov (23.38%), Dedovichi (5.62%), Pustoshka (6.48%) and Novosokolniki (6.88%). Green Alternative The Green Alternative party lost the right to participate in Russian State Duma elections without collecting signatures. It had acquired this right in 2020 thanks to clearing the electoral thresholds in the elections for the State Council of Komi and the Legislative Assembly of Chelyabinsk Oblast. Moreover, in the elections for the Legislative Assembly of Chelyabinsk Oblast, the party managed to clear the threshold with 5.36% only because of strange results in the city of Zlatoust: at eight polling stations in constituency No. 8, its average result was 19.12%, and at some stations (Nos. 66, 70, 71, 73) it allegedly received from 29% to 39% while United Russia received around 3%; at other stations the ratio of these parties was reversed, which appears of low credibility. The Green Alternative list in Chelyabinsk Oblast was headed by Mikhail Makhov, an eco-activist and Legislative Assembly deputy from the Communist Party (he was supposed to be in the top three of the CPRF list). Given that in the 2020 Syktyvkar city soviet elections United Russia received 28.71%, and in the simultaneous elections to the Komi State Council across Syktyvkar’s city constituencies it received 19–21% (except for one constituency with 26.43% and one with 24.31%), this may indicate that Green Alternative took away votes primarily from United Russia. The fact is that it was not on the ballot in the city soviet election, which immediately gave United Russia roughly 8% additional votes. This time the party did not nominate a list in Chelyabinsk Oblast at all (the organisation has de facto collapsed, its leaders have moved to United Russia). One list was registered for the elections to the Komi State Council; it received only 3.86%. Communists of Russia The party’s activity has sharply declined (more precisely, continues to decline): this year only four lists were registered in elections of deputies to regional parliaments, and none of them passed; in elections of deputies to councils of administrative centres, four lists were also registered, and one passed (to the Orenburg city soviet with 6.08%). In other municipal elections, the party’s lists this time passed into only two local councils: the city soviet of the city of Naberezhnye Chelny (Tatarstan) with 5.08%, and the Council of Deputies of the Mineralnye Vody Municipal Okrug (Stavropol Krai) with 5.04%. Rodina Rodina is also reducing its political participation in the life of the regions and worsening its results. The party dropped out of the Komi State Council (in 2020 it made it in thanks to an intensive and expensive campaign that was linked with Yevgeny Prigozhin and his technologists; this time the party took last place in the region with 0.96%). Its lists also failed in Voronezh and Novosibirsk oblasts (a single single-mandate constituency was won in the elections for a Legislative Assembly deputy of Novosibirsk Oblast). The party’s sole list passed into the Tambov city duma with 17.42%. Outwardly this percentage looks decent, but in reality it demonstrates the party’s electoral withering in Tambov after the incumbent head of the administration, Maxim Kosenkov, joined United Russia in April 2025, ceasing to be the leader of Rodina’s regional branch. Earlier, in 2020, thanks to Kosenkov’s popularity, Rodina won the elections of deputies to the Tambov city duma with 44.18% on the party-list portion and 17 out of 18 single-mandate constituencies. In elections of deputies in the city of Cheboksary, the party received 0.56%; in the Ivanovo city duma, 3.5%. The party’s lists passed into three local councils: the council of Kozulka Municipal Okrug in Krasnoyarsk Krai (7.28%), and the assemblies of deputies of Ostrov (10.3%) and Pskov (8.55%) municipal okrugs in Pskov Oblast. The Greens This year, in no election did the party’s list clear the threshold: in Novosibirsk Oblast the party received 0.89%, in Cheboksary – 2.4%, in Kaluga – 2.7%. The party nominated several lists in municipal elections in Krasnoyarsk Krai and in the settlement of Linevo in Novosibirsk Oblast; none of them passed either. Russian Party of Freedom and Justice (formerly CPSS) The party’s electoral activity has been almost unnoticeable since it changed its name in 2021. Its sole list, in the elections of deputies to the Komi State Council, received 1.75%. Civic Platform One list was registered – for the Assembly of Deputies of the city of Cheboksary; it received 0.71%. Party of Social Protection One list was registered – for the Assembly of Deputies of the city of Cheboksary; it received 1.17%. 3.3. Election results in single-mandate constituencies in elections of deputies to regional parliaments and representative bodies of local self-government in regional centresThe 2025 elections confirmed that United Russia maintains the maximum share of victories in single-mandate constituencies under the conditions of the special military operation and the minimisation of the public, organisational and financial capabilities of the opposition. As a result, the party holds a near-total monopoly in elections of a portion of deputies of regional parliaments and local councils in single-mandate constituencies. In total, the main legislative assembly elections this year were held across 239 single-mandate constituencies (another 225 deputies were elected via party lists). This time United Russia won 222 constituencies, or 92.88%. Elections of deputies to city councils of administrative centres were held across 696 electoral constituencies (another 238 deputies were elected via party lists). In these elections, United Russia won 572 constituencies, or 82.18%. These figures are very close to the results of 2015: the first year of the “post-Crimean consensus”. Looking retrospectively at the picture of the last 10 years, in the regional parliament elections of 13 September 2015 United Russia won 213 constituencies out of the 230 in which elections were held at that time (or 92.6%); in elections to city councils of regional centres it won 491 constituencies out of 543 (or 90.9%). In the regional elections of 18 September 2016, combined with federal ones, United Russia’s dominance in the constituencies grew even larger – in the regional parliaments elected at that time it took 747 out of 798 seats in the single-mandate system (93.6%). Subsequently, the party’s dominance began to weaken and undergo erosion. In the regional elections of 10 September 2017, United Russia received 101 mandates out of 119 in single-mandate constituencies (84.9%) in the elections of deputies to regional parliaments, and 149 out of 168 (88.7%) in the elections to councils of administrative centres of regions. In 2018, against the backdrop of the pension reform, the situation improved significantly for the opposition: in the elections of 9 September 2018, United Russia won 268 out of 379 single-mandate constituencies (70.7%) in the main elections of deputies to regional parliaments, and 154 out of 209 constituencies (73.7%) in the main elections of deputies to councils of administrative centres of regions. In 2019, the situation remained roughly the same: in regional parliament elections (excluding the Moscow City Duma, where United Russia nominated nobody at all at that time), out of 265 mandates contested in constituencies, candidates nominated by United Russia received 201 (75.8%). Including administrative candidates in the MCD, the result would have been even lower – 226 out of 310 (72.9%). In elections of representative bodies of regional centres, the party won 311 constituencies out of 468 (66.45%) at that time. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the introduction of tough restrictions that affected opportunities for door-to-door campaigning (from which the opposition suffered first and foremost, as candidates of the authorities retained informational dominance through indirect campaigning in electronic media), following the elections of deputies to regional legislative assemblies in single-mandate constituencies, United Russia almost returned to its 2015 figures: the party’s candidates won 214 constituencies out of 239 (89.54%). In the single-mandate portion of elections of deputies to city councils of regional centres, the party’s candidates won 465 out of 613 constituencies (75.9%). United Russia’s results were roughly the same in the regional elections combined with the State Duma elections in 2021: it won 682 seats out of 800 in single-mandate constituencies (elections were postponed in two constituencies), or 85.25%. At the same time, this time the other single-mandate constituencies, unlike in previous years, mainly went to the CPRF (it won 76 constituencies instead of eight in the same regions in 2016). Thus, whereas in 2016 the CPRF’s share of victories of candidates “not from United Russia” in constituencies was 15.7% (8 out of 51), in 2021 it reached 64.5% (76 out of 118) in the same regions. In elections to city councils of administrative centres in 2021, United Russia took 149 out of 168 seats (88.7%). Finally, after the start of the special military operation, in the 2022 elections United Russia candidates won 133 out of 151 (88.1%) seats in single-mandate constituencies in elections of deputies to regional parliaments, and 233 out of 262 (88.93%) seats in elections of deputies to city councils of regional centres. However, among “candidates not from United Russia”, the CPRF accounted for only four out of 18 victories in the legislative assembly elections (22.2%) and five out of 29 victories in elections to city councils of administrative centres (17.24%). That is, the share of victories by CPRF candidates in single-mandate constituencies dropped sharply as soon as the SMO began and opposition voters’ attitude towards the SMO became an obviously key factor in support/non-support for certain parties and candidates. In the main elections of deputies to regional parliaments in 2023, United Russia candidates won 405 out of 436 single-mandate constituencies (93%) and
*Note: in Kazan – five independent candidates; in Cheboksary – RPSS list (1); in Krasnodar – independent candidates (5); in Voronezh – independent candidates in districts (4); in Kaluga – two independent candidates and one Yabloko (maj.), by lists – RPSS (1); in Orenburg – Communists of Russia by list (1); in Oryol – RPSS by list (1); in Smolensk by lists – RPSS (1); in Tambov – two from the Rodina party in districts and three by list. Table 24. Distribution of seats in elections to representative bodies of regional centres elected under a fully majoritarian electoral system
*Note: in Kostroma – independent candidate; in Lipetsk – one from RPSS; in Novosibirsk – Rodina (1); in Samara one independent candidate. Why, under a fully majoritarian system in Russian regional centres, is the opposition’s share of seats slightly larger than in the majoritarian component under a mixed system? The main reason, apparently, is that in the absence of a proportional component, the regional and city authorities are forced to somehow allocate seats to the opposition, following an unspoken agreement, and for this purpose are compelled to cede several districts to the systemic opposition (in cities where party lists exist, the dominant approach is evidently that “the party lists are enough for them, we’ll take all the districts for ourselves”). Furthermore, it can be assumed that the larger the number of districts, the smaller their size, and accordingly, the cheaper and simpler the election campaigns, which is especially important for the opposition. It appears that the situation for the opposition in city council elections in regional centres is somewhat better compared to legislative assembly elections for a number of reasons:
United Russia’s dominance in majoritarian districts remains its main technology for securing a majority in elected bodies of power. In addition, the distortion of the representativeness of election results is influenced by the use of the Imperiali divisor method and its modification when distributing seats under the proportional component of elections. In all regions where elections were held, United Russia received a larger share of seats in the majoritarian component than in the proportional one, and in most cases, in both components, the share of seats is larger than the share of votes received by the party. In the elections to the Kostroma Oblast Duma, two districts were won by A Just Russia candidates: Vyacheslav Golovnikov, chairman of the committee for maternity and childhood, youth policy and sport (district No. 22), and Maksim Kalentsov, born 1977, deputy for economic affairs at the Spartak sports school in Buy, deputy of the Buy Urban District Duma (district No. 17). In district No. 19, LDPR candidate Marina Smirnova, born 1965, head of the theatre group at the MBU “House of Folk Art and Leisure” of the Kady Municipal District, deputy of the Kady Municipal District Duma, was elected; in district No. 12, CPRF candidate Ilya Dzezyulya, born 1984, deputy of the Council of Deputies of the urban settlement of Nerekhta, first secretary of the CPRF district committee, was elected. Five years ago, in 2020, “non-United Russia” candidates won six districts in the Kostroma Oblast Duma. In the elections of deputies to the Legislative Assembly of Novosibirsk Oblast, six communists were elected: Stanislav Lysenko, born 1983, production director for cardiac and neurosurgery products at JSC “R-Vascular” (district No. 36); Andrei Lyubavsky, born 1974, commercial director of LLC “ProfitAvto”, deputy of the Novosibirsk City Council of Deputies (district No. 35); Dmitry Makarov, born 1978, individual entrepreneur, deputy of the Legislative Assembly (district No. 32); Yakov Novoselov, born 1974, first deputy general director of JSC Scientific and Production Firm “NOV”, deputy of the Legislative Assembly (district No. 30); Anton Tyrtyshny, born 1976, deputy chairman of the Novosibirsk City Council of Deputies (district No. 21); and Roman Yakovlev, deputy of the Legislative Assembly (district No. 31). One candidate each was elected from A Just Russia, the New People party, and Rodina: Vladislav Plotnikov, born 1966, general director of LLC “Edem” (A Just Russia, district No. 37; in 2020 he was elected as an independent, chairman of the board of directors of the Strizhi Group of Companies); Ilya Polyakov, born 1969, director of LLC Specialised Developer “PERVY”, deputy of the Legislative Assembly (New People, district No. 22); and Vyacheslav Ilyukhin, born 1967, director of LLC Group of Companies “SEVER” (Rodina, district No. 24). Previously, in 2020, six CPRF candidates, three independent candidates, and two candidates from the Rodina party were elected to the Legislative Assembly of Novosibirsk Oblast in districts. In the Legislative Assembly of Chelyabinsk Oblast, two A Just Russia candidates were elected: Arkady Agapov, born 1974, director of the production department of the Magnitogorsk cluster at LLC “Centre of Communal Service” (district No. 24), and Yegor Babkin, born 1984, cardiovascular surgeon at LLC “VEKh OMS” (district No. 19). Previously, in 2020, only two districts were also won by A Just Russia candidates (at that time these were different candidates in different districts — Dmitry Larin and Dmitry Sumin); all other districts were won by United Russia. In the Republic of Komi, in the elections of deputies to the State Council, United Russia won all districts this time; in 2020, a CPRF candidate won only one district, No. 10 (former head of the Izhma District Nikolai Bratenkov). In the Voronezh Oblast Duma, United Russia won all districts, although five years ago, in 2020, one district was won by A Just Russia candidate Artem Rymar (district No. 12). In the Legislative Assembly of Kaluga Oblast, United Russia also took all districts this time, although in 2020 it lost district No. 8 — it was then won by A Just Russia candidate Andrei Smolovik. In the Magadan Oblast Duma, United Russia lost only district No. 3 in 2020 — to A Just Russia candidate Alexei Golovan. This time, all districts are behind United Russia. In the Ryazan Oblast Duma in 2020, two districts were also won by A Just Russia candidates — Sergei Pupkov (No. 20) and Igor Trubitsyn (No. 18). This time, United Russia received all districts, and A Just Russia did not even pass by list. In the municipal elections, at the previous elections to the Tambov City Duma in 2020, United Russia won one district out of 18; 17 districts were won by candidates of the Rodina party. Now United Russia has 16 districts here, and the Rodina party won two districts. In the elections to the Tomsk City Duma, in 2015 United Russia won 25 districts, in 2020 only 8 out of 27. Now 26 districts, and only one district was won by CPRF candidate, incumbent deputy Vladimir Cholakhyan, born 1995 (district No. 26). In the elections to the Syktyvkar City Council in 2020, one district was won by former second secretary of the CPRF republican committee Boleslav Skrotsky. This time, the number of districts became 30 (party lists were abolished), of which 27 are United Russia, one district was given to the LDPR, and two to A Just Russia. In the elections to the Kazan City Duma in 2020, United Russia had 16 seats in districts, now 18. Five independents were also elected, and one each from the LDPR and the New People party. In the elections to the Izhevsk City Duma, both in 2015 and in 2020, 19 United Russia candidates were elected across 25 districts. Now United Russia won 23 districts, with one each for the CPRF and LDPR. In the elections to the Krasnodar City Duma, in 2015 United Russia won 35 out of 36 districts (one independent), in 2020 — 33 out of 39. This time, United Russia received 30, independents five, New People two (blogger Sergei Klimov, born 1990, in district No. 26, and Viktor Timofeev, born 1969, deputy director of LLC “Kuban-Transport Expedition”, in district No. 38), and one each for A Just Russia and the LDPR. In the elections to the Voronezh City Duma, in 2020 United Russia won 20 districts, this time 19, independents four, and A Just Russia one. In the elections to the Kaluga City Duma, the number of districts won by United Russia increased from 22 to 23. Two districts were won by independents, one by Yabloko. In the elections to the Oryol City Council, United Russia won 24 districts in 2015, 18 districts in 2020, and 20 this time. A Just Russia won six districts, the CPRF two. In the elections to the Astrakhan City Duma, in 2015 United Russia had 15 victories across 18 districts; in 2020, after the abolition of party lists, it became 21 out of 36. This time, United Russia won 29 districts, two each were given to the CPRF, A Just Russia, and the LDPR, and one to the New People party. In effect, after Oleg Shein was recognised as a foreign agent, the A Just Russia branch was crushed. In the elections to the Kostroma City Duma, in 2015 United Russia had 23 out of 25 districts, in 2020 — 29 out of 33. This time 31, and only two districts were given to someone else: one was won by an independent and one by a CPRF candidate. In the elections to the Magadan City Duma, in 2015 United Russia had all 14 districts, in 2020 it became 19 out of 21, and now all 21 districts. In the elections to the Nizhny Novgorod City Duma, in 2015 United Russia had 27 out of 35 (also three CPRF, two A Just Russia, one Patriots of Russia, two independents); in 2020 it became 26. In the 2025 elections — United Russia 28, CPRF five, LDPR three, A Just Russia two, New People one. In the elections to the Novosibirsk City Council, in 2015 United Russia had 28 out of 40 districts; in 2020 it became 23 out of 50. In 2015, eight communists were also elected, one candidate each from the LDPR and Civic Platform, and two independents (including Vyacheslav Ilyukhin, the former head of the party faction in the city council who had left United Russia). In 2020, it became eight CPRF, four LDPR, one each from Rodina and the REP “Greens”, and 13 independents (including four candidates of the “Novosibirsk 2020” coalition headed by Navalny’s chief of staff Sergei Boiko). This time, United Russia has 40 seats out of 50, CPRF six, New People three, Rodina one. In the elections to the Ulyanovsk City Duma, in 2015 United Russia controlled all 30 districts, in 2020 — 36 out of 40. At the same time, not a single CPRF candidate was elected. After that, communist Alexei Russkikh became governor. Now United Russia 30, CPRF five, LDPR three, A Just Russia and New People one each. In the restored direct elections to the Samara City Duma (in 2015 and 2020, district councils were elected, which then elected city duma deputies by delegation from their own ranks), United Russia 30, LDPR three, SR two, one each from the CPRF and an independent. Other elections A fully proportional system in the elections of representative bodies on 12–14 September 2025 was used in 16 municipal formations of Dagestan, Kalmykia, and the Chechen Republic. In all of them, United Russia is in first place. The results in them are as follows: Assembly of Deputies of the urban district “city of Buynaksk” (Dagestan): United Russia 65.43%; A Just Russia 13.04%; LDPR 9.26%; CPRF 7.66%; New People 2.64%. Assembly of Deputies of the urban district “city of Dagestanskiye Ogni” (Dagestan): United Russia 63.32%; CPRF 10.45%; LDPR 10.59%; A Just Russia 10.21%; New People 5.43% Assembly of Deputies of the urban district “city of Kaspiysk” (Dagestan): United Russia 66.99%; CPRF 11.92%; New People 7.91%; A Just Russia 7.9%; LDPR 5.25%. Assembly of Deputies of the urban district “city of Kizlyar” (Dagestan): United Russia 70.61%; CPRF 8.92%; A Just Russia 8.85%; LDPR 7.64%; New People 3.54%. Assembly of Deputies of the urban district “city of Yuzhno-Sukhokumsk” (Dagestan): United Russia 66.30%; CPRF 13.36%; LDPR 13.34%; New People 6.67%; A Just Russia 0.08%. Assembly of Deputies of the rural settlement “Akhtynsky Selsoviet” of the Akhtynsky District (Dagestan): United Russia 85.71%, A Just Russia 14.02%. Assembly of Deputies of the Ketchenerovsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 80.79%; CPRF 12.54%; New People 5.62%; LDPR 0.48%; A Just Russia 0.44%. Assembly of Deputies of the Oktyabrsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 83.41%; CPRF 12.28%; LDPR 3.49%. Assembly of Deputies of the Sarpinsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 75.81%; CPRF 8.73%; A Just Russia 6.97%; LDPR 5.85%; New People 1.74%. Assembly of Deputies of the Chernozemelsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 75.45%; CPRF 12.3%; LDPR 5.9%; New People 3.05%; A Just Russia 2.26%. Assembly of Deputies of the Yustinsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 73.53%; CPRF 13.72%; LDPR 6%; A Just Russia 3.96%; New People 2.32%. Assembly of Deputies of the Yashaltinsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 79.17%; CPRF 12.19%; LDPR 5.68%; New People 0.99%; A Just Russia 0.8%. Assembly of Deputies of the Yashkulsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 79.73%; CPRF 12.66%; A Just Russia 4.03%; LDPR 3.19%. Council of Deputies of the municipal formation of Argun (Chechnya): United Russia 78.24%; LDPR 10.33%; A Just Russia 5.96%; CPRF 5.46%. Council of Deputies of the Shatoysky Municipal District (Chechnya): United Russia 89.99%; A Just Russia 7.28%; LDPR 2.41%. Council of Deputies of the Gudermesskoye Urban Settlement of the Gudermessky Municipal District (Chechnya): United Russia 77.98%; LDPR 8.5%; CPRF 8.41%; A Just Russia 5.05%. A mixed majoritarian-proportional system in the elections of representative bodies on 12–14 September 2025 was used in 93 municipal formations. United Russia is also in first place everywhere, but its percentage is marked by significant differentiation: the most competitive results are in a number of municipal formations of Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, and Pskov Oblast. The results in these 93 municipal formations are as follows: Assembly of Deputies of the Gorodovikovsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 68.83%; CPRF 18.8%; LDPR 5.33%; New People 3.6%. Assembly of Deputies of the Iki-Burulsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 72.15%; CPRF 15.36%; LDPR 5.16%; New People 2.93%; A Just Russia 2.54% Assembly of Deputies of the Lagansky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 77.56%; CPRF 15.57%, LDPR 5.74%. Assembly of Deputies of the Maloderbetovsky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 73.19%; CPRF 16.93%; LDPR 4.32%; New People 3.95%. Assembly of Deputies of the Priyutnensky District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 71.29%; CPRF 15.18%; LDPR 6.1%; A Just Russia 3.55%; New People 3.24%. Assembly of Deputies of the Tselinny District Municipal Formation (Kalmykia): United Russia 82.01%; CPRF 8.99%; LDPR 3.53%; New People 2.76%; A Just Russia 1.98%. City Council of Naberezhnye Chelny (Tatarstan): United Russia 69.80%; New People 12.93%; A Just Russia 5.1%; CPRF 5.24%; Communists of Russia 5.08%; LDPR 1.21%. City Council of Almetyevsk, Almetyevsky Municipal District (Tatarstan): United Russia 73.04%; CPRF 19.78%; LDPR 6.77%. City Council of Nizhnekamsk, Nizhnekamsky District (Tatarstan): United Russia 69.46%; CPRF 14.02%; A Just Russia 5.84%; New People 5.8%; LDPR 3.44%. Sarapul City Duma (Udmurtia): United Russia 66.52%; LDPR 9.67%; CPRF 9.05%; New People 6.85%; A Just Russia 3.13%; Rodina 1.93%. Votkinsk City Duma (Udmurtia): United Russia 61.16%; CPRF 11.12%; LDPR 9.54%; New People 7.68%; A Just Russia 7.38%. Duma of the urban district of Mozhga (Udmurtia): United Russia 56.13%; CPRF 20.37%; LDPR 10.1%; New People 6.08%; A Just Russia 4.68%. Achinsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 49.77%; LDPR 16.05%; CPRF 10.41%; RPSS 5.93%; A Just Russia 5.32%; New People 3.53%. Against all 6.24%. Balakhtinsko-Novoselovsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 61.1%; CPRF 11.59%; LDPR 6.4%; A Just Russia 4.72%; RPSS 4.43%; New People 3.93%. Against all 6.05%. Birilyussky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 51.13%; A Just Russia 14.84%; CPRF 11.36%; LDPR 10.18%; RPSS 4.35%; New People 1.79%. Against all 5.12%. Boguchansky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 43.51%; CPRF 19.32%; LDPR 11.25%; New People 6.94%, RPSS 5.73%. Against all 10.50%. Bolshe-Murtinsko-Sukhobuzimsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 58.20%; LDPR 10.31%; CPRF 8.39%; RPSS 6.10%; A Just Russia 4.09%; New People 3.27%. Against all 8.01%. Dzerzhinsko-Taseyevsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 50.98%; LDPR 18.01%; CPRF 9.56%; A Just Russia 4.62%; RPSS 3.43%; New People 3.14%. Against all 8.31%. City Council of Divnogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 38.98%; LDPR 25.34%; CPRF 19.23%; New People 3.55%; RPSS 3.39%; A Just Russia 1.7%. Against all 5.04%. Yemelyanovsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 58.49%; CPRF 10.36%; LDPR 9.42%; New People 6.83%; RPSS 4.77%; A Just Russia 1.69%. Against all 6.71%. Yeniseysky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 45.12%; LDPR 19.60%; CPRF 8.51%; A Just Russia 5.69%; RPSS 5.62%; New People 3.36%; REP “Greens” 1.20%. Against all 8.82%. Yermakovsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 39.09%; LDPR 21.39%; CPRF 15.33%; New People 9.62%; RPSS 3.49%. Against all 8.21%. Ilansko-Nizhneingashsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): UR 39.59%; CPRF 15.68%; LDPR 13.29%; A Just Russia 10.04%; New People 5.62%; RPSS 5.39%. Against all 8.59%. Irbeysko-Sayansky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 46.14%; CPRF 17.35%; LDPR 14.02%; A Just Russia 4.23%; RPSS 3.91%; New People 3.24%. Against all 8.47%. Kazachinsko-Pirovsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 62.84%; CPRF 13.34%; LDPR 7.15%; RPSS 5.97%; New People 3.72%. Against all 4.86%. Kansky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 43.88%; CPRF 15.02%; LDPR 8.22%; New People 9.49%; REP “Greens” 4.58%; RPSS 2.75%; A Just Russia 2.75%. Against all 9.31%. Karatuzsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 55.38%; CPRF 12.88%; LDPR 10.63%; A Just Russia 4.55%; RPSS 4.31%; New People 2.99%. Against all 6.41%. Kezhemsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 51.8%; New People 12.15%; A Just Russia 9.91%; LDPR 9.41%; CPRF 9.01%. Against all 6.2%. Kozulsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 51.76%; LDPR 14.45%; CPRF 9.45%; Rodina 7.28%; RPSS 5.0%; New People 2.5%. Against all 7.21%. Idrinsko-Krasnoturansky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 56.15%; LDPR 15.1%; CPRF 12.06%; A Just Russia 4.95%; RPSS 3.32%; New People 1.11%; Rodina 0.56%. Against all 5.23% Kuraginsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 46.90%; CPRF 20.79%; RPSS 9.83%; New People 4.86%; A Just Russia 4.25%. Against all 11.02%. Minusinsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 59.99%; CPRF 11.65%; LDPR 7.13%; RPSS 4.62%; New People 3.43%; A Just Russia 2.74%; REP “Greens” 1.81%. Against all 6.01%. Motyginsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 66.75%; LDPR 13.28%; CPRF 9.38%. Against all 8.99%. Severo-Yeniseysky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 78.99%; CPRF 7.99%; LDPR 5.65%; New People 2.59%. Against all 3.25%. Sosnovoborsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 62.43%; LDPR 16.9%; CPRF 5.26%; New People 5.15%; RPSS 2.52%; A Just Russia 1.53%; RODP “Yabloko” 0.66%. Against all 4.09%. Turukhansky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 50.44%; CPRF 14.4%; LDPR 10.66%; A Just Russia 6.38%; New People 2.36%. Against all 13.62%. Uzhursky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 64.95%; CPRF 11.42%; LDPR 7.11%; RPSS 5.21%; New People 3.4%. Against all 5.2%. Sharypovsky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 49.88%; LDPR 16.11%; A Just Russia 10.7%; CPRF 9.58%; RPSS 4.77%; New People 2.12%. Against all 4.83%. Shushensky Municipal District, District Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 45.84%; A Just Russia 11.84%; CPRF 11.77%; LDPR 8.17%; New People 7.44%; RPSS 3.71%. Against all 8.19%. Bogotolsky Municipal Okrug, okrug Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 56.85%; CPRF 11.95%; LDPR 9.61%; New People 5.05%; RPPSS 4.99%; A Just Russia 3.93%. Against all 6.32%. Nazarovsky Municipal Okrug, okrug Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 60.50%; CPRF 11.38%; LDPR 5.37%; REP “Greens” 4.69%; New People 4.34%; RPPSS 4.26%. Against all 7.29%. Rybinsky Municipal Okrug, okrug Council (Krasnoyarsk Krai): United Russia 41.91%; LDPR 15.91%; CPRF 14.38%; RPPSS 6.23%; New People 5.79%; A Just Russia 4.01%; REP “Greens” 1.16%. Against all 8.92%. Duma of the resort city of Yessentuki (Stavropol Krai): United Russia 53.19%; CPRF 19.96%; LDPR 13.25%; A Just Russia 8.37%; New People 3.11%. Duma of the resort city of Zheleznovodsk (Stavropol Krai): United Russia 52.91%; LDPR 19.86%; New People 11.83%; A Just Russia 13.37%. Duma of the resort city of Kislovodsk (Stavropol Krai): United Russia 66.75%; CPRF 11.65%; LDPR 8.25%; A Just Russia 6.67%; New People 5.45%. Mineralovodsky Municipal Okrug, Council of Deputies (Stavropol Krai): United Russia 59.15%; CPRF 11.98%; LDPR 11.85%; A Just Russia 6.08%, New People 5.11%; Communists of Russia 5.04%. Duma of the resort city of Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai): United Russia 67.08%; CPRF 10.23%; LDPR 9.13%; A Just Russia 7.52%; New People 5.35%. Council of Deputies of Belgorodsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 70.45%; LDPR 9.97%; CPRF 6.07%; RPPSS 5.76%; Communists of Russia 3.24%; A Just Russia 3.21%. Council of Deputies of Borisovsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 81.22%; CPRF 8.70%; LDPR 6.07%; A Just Russia 3.51%. Council of Deputies of Veidelevsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 88.84%; CPRF 8.32%; LDPR 2.75%. Council of Deputies of Volokonovsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 85.92%; CPRF 9.42%; LDPR 4.07%. Council of Deputies of Ivnyansky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 89.82%; LDPR 8.19%; CPRF 1.56%. Council of Deputies of Korochansky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 67.37%; CPRF 18.96%; LDPR 10.58%. Council of Deputies of Krasnensky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 85.54%; LDPR 6.57%; CPRF 4.12%; RPPSS 3.56%. Council of Deputies of Krasnogvardeisky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 85.51%; A Just Russia 5.87%; LDPR 4.31%; CPRF 3.30%. Council of Deputies of Krasnoyaruzhsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 84.02%; LDPR 9.1%; CPRF 5.84%. Council of Deputies of Prokhorovsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 81.16%; LDPR 8.93% CPRF 8.70%. Council of Deputies of Rakityansky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 94.08%; CPRF 3.76%; LDPR 1.66%. Council of Deputies of Rovensky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 65.46%; CPRF 21.93%; LDPR 10.08%. Council of Deputies of Chernyansky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 94.22% LDPR 4.24%; CPRF 1.37%. Council of Deputies of Shebekinsky Municipal Okrug (Belgorod Oblast): United Russia 67.39%; LDPR 13.2%; RPPSS 11.33%; A Just Russia 4.98%. Council of People’s Deputies of Zhukovsky Municipal Okrug (Bryansk Oblast): United Russia 64.02%; LDPR 13.46%; A Just Russia 9.11%; New People 8.13%. Council of People’s Deputies of Starodubsky Municipal Okrug (Bryansk Oblast): United Russia 83.74%; LDPR 8.13%; A Just Russia 3.6%; New People 3.58%. Duma of the urban okrug of Vichuga (Ivanovo Oblast): United Russia 72.38%; LDPR 11.92%; CPRF 10.92%; A Just Russia 1.83%; New People 1.69%. Duma of the urban okrug of Teikovo (Ivanovo Oblast): United Russia 64.74%; LDPR 17.87%; CPRF 6.75%; New People 6.15%; A Just Russia 2.87%. Duma of the urban okrug of Shuya (Ivanovo Oblast): United Russia 75.26%; LDPR 11.34%; CPRF 6.63%; New People 2.03%; A Just Russia 1.54%; Communists of Russia 1.50%. Duma of the urban okrug of Kokhma (Ivanovo Oblast): United Russia 69.01%; CPRF 10.01%; New People 8.63%; LDPR 5.15%; A Just Russia 1.79%; Communists of Russia 1.74%. Council of People’s Deputies of Guryevsky Municipal Okrug (Kemerovo Oblast — Kuzbass): United Russia 76.89%; A Just Russia 7.41%; CPRF 4.35%; New People 4.26%; LDPR 4.18%. Council of Deputies of Bolotninsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 60.65%; LDPR 12.2%; CPRF 9.71%; A Just Russia 7.49% New People 5.48%. Council of Deputies of Kargatsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 52.95%; CPRF 14.94%; LDPR 13.46%; RPPSS 7.06%; A Just Russia 3.47%; New People 3.47%. Council of Deputies of Kolyvansky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 44.02%; A Just Russia 23.09%; CPRF 9.80%; LDPR 9.06%; RPPSS 5.51%; New People 3.58%. Council of Deputies of Kupinsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 61.6%; LDPR 16.72%; CPRF 11.85%; A Just Russia 6.47%. Council of Deputies of the town of Kupino, Kupinsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 48.7%; LDPR 20.83%; CPRF 16.34%; A Just Russia 8.76%. Council of Deputies of Kyshtovsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 59.44%; LDPR 17.72%; RPPSS 18.32%. Council of Deputies of Moshkovsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 56.54%; A Just Russia 9.39%; LDPR 9.29%; CPRF 8.82%; RPPSS 6.33%; New People 5.57%. Council of Deputies of Novosibirsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 48.19%; LDPR 10.51%; New People 10.17%; RPPSS 8.74%; CPRF 8.67%; A Just Russia 8.11%. Council of Deputies of Chistoozyorny District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 57.94%; CPRF 17.44%; LDPR 12.41%; A Just Russia 8.13%. Council of Deputies of Chulymsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 67.87%; LDPR 14.82%; A Just Russia 7.12%; New People 5.86%. Council of Deputies of Kuibyshevsky Municipal District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 51.44%; CPRF 12.07%; A Just Russia 9.8%; LDPR 9.10%; New People 7.5%; RPPSS 6.6%. Council of Deputies of the workers’ settlement of Linevo, Iskitimsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 34.56%; CPRF 27.92%; LDPR 12.99%; A Just Russia 8.61%; New People 5.05%; REP “Greens” 2.68% Council of Deputies of the town of Toguchin, Toguchinsky District (Novosibirsk Oblast): United Russia 45.18%; RPPSS 16.12%; LDPR 13.08%; New People 11.39%; A Just Russia 7.48%. Assembly of Deputies of Gdovsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 58.87%; RUDP Yabloko 23.38%; LDPR 5.95%; CPRF 3.35%; A Just Russia 1.98%; RPPSS 1.91%; New People 1.80%; Rodina 0.69%. Assembly of Deputies of Dedovichsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 66.40%; LDPR 7.28%; CPRF 5.82%; RUDP Yabloko 5.62%; A Just Russia 5.33%; RPPSS 4.95%; New People 2.42%. Assembly of Deputies of Kunyinsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 69.62%; CPRF 13.33%; LDPR 6.54%; A Just Russia 3.86%; New People 2.22%; RPPSS 2.13%; RUDP Yabloko 0.77%. Assembly of Deputies of Novosokolnichesky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 67.49%; RUDP Yabloko 6.88%; CPRF 6.75%; LDPR 6.31%; A Just Russia 5.06%; RPPSS 3.61%; New People 2.37%. Assembly of Deputies of Ostrovsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 44.84%; Rodina 10.3%; LDPR 8.99%; CPRF 8.93%; New People 8.82%: RPPSS 7.81%; RUDP Yabloko 4.43%; A Just Russia 3.61%. Assembly of Deputies of Palkinsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 72.21%; CPRF 5.27%; LDPR 5.17%; A Just Russia 4.81%; RUDP Yabloko 4.18%; RPPSS 3.61%; New People 2.25%. Assembly of Deputies of Pskovsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 61.21%; Rodina 8.55%; LDPR 7.63%; CPRF 6.39%; A Just Russia 4.27% RPPSS 4.21%; New People 3.93%; RUDP Yabloko 2.24%. Assembly of Deputies of Pustoshkinsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 54.98%; CPRF 13.92%; RPPSS 7.02%; A Just Russia 6.67%; RUDP Yabloko 6.48%; LDPR 6.09%; New People 2.48%. Assembly of Deputies of Pushkinogorsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 72.87%; CPRF 8.82%; LDPR 4.61%; RUDP Yabloko 4.24%; RPPSS 2.99%; A Just Russia 2.87%; New People 2.49%. Assembly of Deputies of Sebezhsky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 59.20%; LDPR 10.52%; A Just Russia 9.11%; CPRF 7.65%; RUDP Yabloko 4.45%; RPPSS 3.86%; New People 3.13%. Assembly of Deputies of Velikoluksky Municipal Okrug (Pskov Oblast): United Russia 71.89%; CPRF 7.58%; LDPR 6.36%; A Just Russia 5.47%; RPPSS 3.65%; New People 2.55%; RUDP Yabloko 1.1%. Michurinsk City Council of Deputies (Tambov Oblast): United Russia 84.32%; CPRF 7.76% A Just Russia 3.64%; LDPR 3.45%. 4. Conclusion ↑The results of the regional and local elections in 2025 suggest that, with a high degree of probability, the 2026 federal election campaign will be aimed at preserving the current relative status quo (a five-party State Duma) with some redistribution of positions among the political parties. The most likely scenario is a decline in the CPRF’s nationwide result and an adjustment of the shares of other parties, including with account taken of the informal distribution of single-mandate constituencies. With a high degree of probability, turnout in the 2026 federal elections will be substantially higher than in 2021, thanks in part to increased turnout in large cities and previously protest-voting regions. This could lead to an increase in the share of votes for the New People party and some improvement in the CPRF’s situation compared with the elections in 2022–2025, provided it runs an adequate election campaign. In most regions, the opposition should think through campaigning aimed at expanding participation in REV voting as one of the reservoirs for growing its support. Most likely, “results management” or the correction of results through REV will not be mass-scale but targeted (either in regions with an overly strong opposition, as was the case in 2025 in the Komi Republic, as a channel for additional administrative mobilisation; or to soften overly uncompetitive results in some regions given their traditional technologies of “election management” at ordinary polling stations). Critically important for preserving a workable composition of the opposition factions is the informal allocation to the parties of the parliamentary systemic opposition of reserved constituencies for the State Duma; independent victories by their candidates in single-mandate constituencies will be extremely difficult under conditions of harsh opposition. The main risk to preserving the federal political balance is administrative excesses in the tabulation of election results at the local level amid the destruction of the system of electoral checks and balances (no one at the grassroots level wants to be last in terms of turnout and the percentage for the party of power, and as a result the sum of local excesses produces an overall excess at the national level). The guaranteed entry of A Just Russia and New People into the 2026 State Duma depends to a significant extent on electoral policy in the “electoral sultanates”: if, as before, they “pessimise” these parties, then their chances of getting in drop sharply. At the same time, it can be noted that the previously very weak positions of New People in the electoral sultanates are clearly strengthening in 2024–2025: Tyva, Kuban, Tatarstan, Rostov Oblast, Stavropol Krai (it can be noted that the authorities of the “electoral sultanates” are extremely electorally conservative), although still not everywhere (the republics of the North Caucasus remain a failure zone). Conversely, the positions of A Just Russia are weakening in the “electoral sultanates”. With appropriate federal supervision and directives, the “electoral sultanates” can guarantee the entry into the State Duma of both New People and A Just Russia. The chances of A Just Russia and New People entering the State Duma in 2026, and of preserving the current status quo, could be increased by reducing the dilution of votes by “small parties” that themselves have no chance of overcoming the threshold. This can be achieved both by “sterilising” the ballot paper (simply by such parties as Rodina, Civic Platform, the Greens, the Russian Party of Pensioners for Social Justice, and Yabloko not participating in the elections; to preserve their party status, amendments could be made to the law “On Political Parties”, and participation in State Duma elections could be counted not only by the registration of a party list but also by candidates in single-mandate constituencies) and by minimising the election campaigns they run. The report was prepared by A.V. Kynev, Candidate of Political Sciences [1] In 2010–2011, legislative assembly elections were held on 14.03.2010 in Voronezh, Kaluga, Kurgan, and Ryazan oblasts and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, on 10.10.2010 in Belgorod, Kostroma, Magadan, Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk oblasts, and on 13.03.2011 in the Komi Republic. [2] Matveeva Yu. In which regions REV will be used in the 2025 elections. // Vedomosti. 11.06.2025. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2025/06/11/1116630-budet-deg [3] Kornya A. Troublemakers did not disturb the calm. 11.09.2024. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7064627 [4] In 2020 its official result in Krasnodar was 4.97% and it fell short of the 5% threshold by just 69 votes. Given the blatant falsification at many polling stations in Krasnodar (at many stations over 10%, at PEC No. 2058 even 15.3%, but because at several stations the party was awarded only 12–15 ballots each, citywide it fell short of the threshold; thus at PEC No. 2171 the party was left with only 0.92%, at PEC No. 2174 and No. 2162 only 0.96% and 0.97%, etc.). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||