Russian elections rarely turn into an equal contest of programmes, candidates and teams. As a rule, they are structured asymmetrically: some participants are forced to constantly prove their right to campaign, while others conduct theirs under the cover of the administrative machine, budgetary support and a loyal media field.
Formally, the law is the same for everyone. Every candidate has the right to meet voters, distribute printed materials, put up banners, use premises, defend themselves against slander and challenge violations. But in reality, the same action receives a different legal and administrative assessment depending on who performs it.
An opposition candidate spends energy not only on persuading the voter, but also on fighting for the very possibility of running a campaign. A pro-government candidate, on the contrary, receives the main advantage — a predictable and friendly environment.
Street activity: a ban on picketing versus a “courtyard festival”
The basic election law, Federal Law No. 67-FZ of 12 June 2002 “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation”, defined in Article 48 the main rules of campaigning that are still in force. It states that citizens and associations have the right to conduct campaigning and to independently determine its content, forms and methods permitted by law. That is, to put it simply: in campaigning, everything that is not prohibited is permitted.
In practice, however, street campaigning is almost always in a risk zone for the opposition. Cubes, pickets, motorcades, leaflet distribution and courtyard meetings can be blocked under the pretext of sanitary restrictions, the law on rallies, complaints from the administration, “occupancy” of venues or “obstruction of pedestrians”. The political subtext of a ban is usually not voiced: formally, the matter concerns order, safety or technical impossibility. Moreover, the legal grounds for the actions of participants in the electoral process often remain entirely off-screen.
Such logic was observed in Moscow in 2024. On 29 August, two activists of Moscow City Duma candidate Dmitry Pavlov were detained and a campaign cube was seized; the activists were taken to the Orekhovo-Borisovo Severnoye police division. On the same day, another Moscow City Duma candidate — Nikolai Sergeyev — was detained and taken to the Zyablikovo police division. The formal grounds for the detentions and the seizure of the cube were not publicly reported.
A widespread practice in countering the opposition is to apply laws to campaigning that are not directly related to it. For example, Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 “On Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing”.
In 2021 in Petersburg, Yabloko candidate Yuri Bagrov was detained near the Ozerki metro station while distributing leaflets next to campaign stands. According to media reports, the police cited a complaint from the Vyborgsky District administration, whose head Valery Garnets was also running for deputy. Bagrov was charged with violating the rules for holding public events. After a report was drawn up, Bagrov was released on a written undertaking to appear.
However, in the case of a pro-government candidate’s campaign, street and courtyard activity is described differently. What for the opposition is a “picket” or an “unauthorised event” becomes a “courtyard festival”, a “meeting with residents”, a “working visit” or a “community event”. Such events can take place with the participation of officials, budgetary institutions and children’s groups — and yet the authorities and law enforcement agencies do not regard them either as campaigning or as mass events.
In Vladimir in 2015, the administration of the Frunzensky District held a “courtyard festival” dedicated to the 1,025th anniversary of the city. The event was opened by the head of the district administration Nikolai Markin and United Russia city council candidate Oleg Kashitsyn. The official announcement separately emphasised the role of a commercial firm belonging to the candidate in installing sports equipment; the event featured gifts, contests, performances by children’s groups, tea and pies (signs of voter bribery, prohibited by the basic election law; clause 3 of Article 56 of the law expressly prohibits holding prize draws as campaigning). The number of participants was estimated at more than 300 people — a sign of a mass event. In fact, this was a campaign event not paid for from the electoral fund, but the candidate incurred no sanctions.
In Krasnodar Krai in 2015, Russian Flag Day was celebrated in all districts of the region, with representatives of United Russia and its Young Guard actively participating in the celebrations. The party’s regional branch website posted 13 reports about such events. The mass celebration became a way for the party of power to have a legal presence in public space without needing to register it as street campaigning or a mass action.
The same scheme was observed in 2024, when in Kurgan, during a television raffle at a “courtyard festival”, voters’ contact details were collected, and people were later called with an appeal to vote for New People candidate Ksenia Kovalchuk and promised 100 roubles credited to their phone. Political mobilisation was disguised as a district event with prizes and entertainment, which subsequently grew into direct voter bribery. And again, without any consequences for the candidate.
Visual campaigning: the banner that must not hang
An opposition candidate constantly faces the risk that their visual campaign products — banners, posters, cubes — will not reach the voter. Campaign materials can be seized “for inspection”, removed from a paid-for spot, dismantled after a phone call from the administration or blocked through a contractor. Even if the materials are paid for from the electoral fund and properly registered, this does not guarantee their safety.
In Arkhangelsk during the 2023 campaign, the dismantling of CPRF campaign posters with the slogan “Fed up with the masters? Choose comrades!” began. The placement was paid for until 7 September, the posters were on bus shelter pavilions, but the outdoor advertising operator notified the party on 4 August that it could not fulfil the contract “for technical reasons”. Formally, this is a commercial dispute; politically, it is the removal of campaigning from the street during the most valuable period of the campaign, i.e. yet another violation of the law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of Citizens”.
Let us name more similar examples. In Ivanovo Oblast in 2023, a banner of CPRF candidate Mikhail Varentsov was cut down. And in the city of Ivanovo itself, a banner of the New People party was taken down; party representatives claimed that the advertising firm received an informal command from the administration and carried it out, fearing it would lose the opportunity to work with state contracts. Thus, pressure was exerted not through the election commission, but through contractors dependent on the authorities.
In 2024, a similar picture was repeated in various regions. For example, in Chelyabinsk, the banners and campaign cubes of city duma candidate Andrei Kondratyev were slashed; he estimated the damage at more than 120,000 roubles. In this case, there is a criminal act that was not investigated.
At the same time, even very serious violations in the visual campaigning of pro-government candidates are often forgiven. These can be materials without imprint data, products with logos of official state bodies, banners on state and municipal buildings, party texts disguised as informational messages — yet these clear violations of the 2002 basic election law meet with no sanctions from election commissions or courts.
During the 2018 Moscow mayoral election, materials with quotes and images of the incumbent mayor Sergei Sobyanin hung in all MFCs (which, among other things, accept voter applications for voting at the place of location). Although such materials are formally not campaign materials and were printed earlier, in the context of an election campaign they can significantly influence the expression of citizens’ will, thus violating the principle of equality of candidates.
In addition, a large number of images of Sergei Sobyanin were recorded on screens in Moscow metro carriages during this election.
In Kostroma Oblast in 2015, even before the official registration of the approved candidate Sergei Sitnikov, a leaflet “Time of Professionals. United Russia” was distributed through mailboxes without imprint data or an indication of the print run. In an ordinary campaign, the absence of the requisite details on a campaign material would be a serious complaint. In an administrative campaign, such materials often exist in a grey zone between “party information”, “primaries” and campaigning proper — another violation of the 2002 basic election law.
In Tatarstan in 2024, observers recorded large-scale visual campaigning for the party of power on objects belonging to the state and municipalities: hospitals, executive committees, houses of culture, kindergartens. The 2002 basic election law prohibits the participation of state and municipal employees in campaigning, as well as organisations with a municipal and state participation share of more than 30%. However, these clear violations of it again aroused no interest from election commissions or the police.
Counterfeit leaflets and black PR in the district
Black PR is poorly regulated by the election law. There is only one article there, which says that if an election commission discovers counterfeit campaigning, it must contact law enforcement agencies. What exactly should be considered black PR and how to fight it is unknown. Therefore, it flourishes, and both pro-government and some opposition candidates do not shy away from using it.
At the local and regional level, black PR often looks like the physical littering of a district: fake newspapers in mailboxes, bogus leaflets “on behalf of” a candidate, banners without imprint data, damage to or substitution of campaign materials.
For an opposition candidate, this is especially dangerous: they are forced to spend the last days of the campaign not on meetings with voters, but on explaining that they “did not print this”, are “not connected with this alliance”, “did not make such statements”. Even if the material is quickly removed or publicly refuted, its effect has already worked: some voters received a distorted image of the candidate, and the law enforcement response, as a rule, is delayed or remains formal.
In Yekaterinburg, during the 2023 city duma elections, unknown persons placed fake banners and leaflets. On billboards reading “Yekaterinburg is developing”, Mayor Alexei Orlov, who headed the United Russia list, was depicted alongside candidates from opposition parties — the CPRF, SRZP and Yabloko; there were no imprint data on these posters, and the candidates themselves denied involvement in their placement.
Later, leaflets against the communists appeared: a portrait was composed of halves of the faces of CPRF candidates Alexander and Victoria Ivachev, the image accompanied by the captions “Pseudo-communists” and “Husband and wife — one Satan!”. According to Kommersant data, the print run was stated as 50,000 copies, and the leaflets were pasted at bus stops, in building entrances and on fences in district No. 22 of the Chkalovsky District.
In Arkhangelsk, during the 2021 State Duma elections, voters were confused by fake leaflets on behalf of candidates: newspapers were distributed in the name of Yabloko candidate Oleg Mandrykin and A Just Russia candidate Irina Chirkova. Mandrykin contacted the police, and Chirkova stated her intention to contact the election commission.
The fake leaflets were distributed through residents’ mailboxes. This is a typical method of counterfeit campaigning: the voter is brought material visually similar to what the candidate uses in their campaign, but with content intended to discredit them or confuse the audience.
Sergei Mitrokhin, a Yabloko candidate in the 2021 State Duma elections in Central District No. 208, reported the distribution of fake leaflets claiming that he was supported by United Russia, as well as humiliating images featuring him.
A print run that they try to keep from the voter
Another “black” form of working with campaigning is an attempt to deprive a candidate of an already printed print run: to steal newspapers, remove them from mailboxes, buy them up from canvassers or otherwise intercept them before distribution. For a campaign, this is painful not only financially but also organisationally, since the release of printed materials is usually planned for specific districts, days and routes. And if a print run disappears in the last weeks or even days of a campaign, it is simply impossible to replace it quickly.
Moscow, 2019 Moscow City Duma elections, candidate Daria Besedina. Maxim Katz, who ran her campaign, described an episode in which representatives of the headquarters of pro-government candidate Vadim Kumin tried to buy up Besedina’s campaign materials from people working with her headquarters.
At that moment, the candidate happened to have a defective print run of the campaign newspaper, and Besedina’s political strategists decided to sell exactly that to Kumin. An intermediary bought up the newspapers at 6 roubles per copy, and as a result, Besedina’s electoral fund was replenished by 430,000 roubles.
This example is important precisely as an illustration of campaign sabotage: the goal is to physically prevent the opponent’s campaigning from reaching the addressee.
Moscow, 2021 State Duma elections. Yabloko candidate Nikolai Kavkazsky complained to the police about the theft of leaflets from his headquarters, believing that the disappearance of materials was aimed at disrupting his campaigning. In the same campaign, there were complaints from the CPRF about the actions of structures of the managing company “Zhilishchnik”: according to the communists, its employees tore down campaign posters and stole newspapers from mailboxes.
Access to commercial infrastructure
For an opposition candidate, the physical infrastructure of campaigning — halls, schools, houses of culture, advertising surfaces, buses, shopping centres, municipal venues — is most often inaccessible. The formulas are repeated from region to region: “occupied”, “renovation”, “technical reason”, “breakdown”, “political advertising is prohibited”, “force majeure”, “we got a call”. The political ban is not articulated, but in reality: the meeting does not take place, the banner is taken down, advertising surfaces in public transport become unavailable.
In Veliky Novgorod in 2023, the city administration created obstacles for Yabloko’s public events: the party had to go to court to defend the right to hold campaign pickets. This shows that access to the street and municipal space can require not organisational work, but judicial protection.
Another classic method of countering the campaigning of opposition candidates is pressure on commercial venues. Owners of premises refuse candidates the right to hold a meeting with voters, having received threats from the administration. Advertising firms refuse to work with them, for the same reasons.
In Ivanovo Oblast in 2023, an attempt was made to disrupt a CPRF meeting with Nikolai Bondarenko. First, the owner of the “Tourist” hotel refused the already agreed event, citing a burst heating, water supply and sewage pipe. Then the meeting was moved to the conference hall of the “Parus” business centre, but the administration there also refused, citing “force majeure circumstances”.
In Yakutia in the same year, 2023, Sardana Avksentyeva complained about the pressure of administrative resources and United Russia on the New People campaign: flights to districts were suddenly cancelled, venues for campaign events were closed, candidates were threatened, advertising was taken down. The “Tuymaada” shopping centre in Yakutsk removed the party’s paid-for video from its screen, and the manager explained this by management’s ban on political campaigning.
With pro-government candidates, by contrast, commercial structures often work willingly.
In Kurgan Oblast in 2024, campaign materials in support of United Russia candidate Vadim Shumkov were placed in the “Metropolis” supermarket chain. CPRF candidate Viktor Zyryanov stated that he received a refusal to place his posters in the same commercial structure. Soon, the CPRF and the Party of Pensioners faced a refusal to place campaigning on city passenger transport buses: the carriers cited an instruction “from above” not to allow political advertising. However, just two days later, campaigning for the same Shumkov appeared on the buses.
The pressure of administrative resources is often described by the phrase: “To friends — everything, to enemies — the law.” In the context of election campaigning, this is incorrect.
In relation to independent candidates, the law is often violated, diminishing their rights; in relation to approved ones — it is also violated, but in the opposite way — so that their clearly illegal actions pass unnoticed by election commissions and law enforcement.