Back in the spring, before the start of the election campaign, a number of media outlets reported that the CEC intended to abandon the use of ballot processing complexes (KOIBs) for counting votes. At the end of August, this was confirmed: usually about a month before election day, resolutions of regional commissions on the distribution of KOIBs across polling stations would appear, but now there are no such resolutions, and a number of election commissions have already openly declared that there will not be any.
For example, such a statement was made by the chairman of the election commission of Chelyabinsk Oblast, Yevgeny Golitsyn:
"The service life of the KOIBs was limited, and during previous campaigns we noticed that their software malfunctions, for example, in the date and time. When processing and counting ballots, this could raise questions among observers about the legitimacy of the protocols. There were also hardware failures: the printer did not print, the scanner did not recognise things, something else. The equipment is already a bit worn out. Therefore, KOIBs will not be used in the current elections. But this will not affect the result of the expression of citizens' will."
I would like to draw particular attention to the last phrase, since the results of the 2024 presidential elections cast serious doubt on this assertion.
Indeed, a priori, the way votes are counted at a polling station (by hand by commission members — the so-called manual count or by a KOIB electronic scanner — the so-called machine count) should not affect the results of voters' expression of will, provided, of course, that all prescribed procedures are followed. The counting method is merely a neutral tool in the hands of commission members. However, comparing voting results at PECs with KOIBs and PECs without KOIBs raises questions and doubts about the equivalence of these counting methods. By a strange coincidence, at stations with KOIBs, voter turnout is lower, and the results for the opposition are higher.
For example, in the 2024 presidential elections in Chelyabinsk Oblast, 379 KOIBs were used, which were relatively evenly distributed among 13 TECs in Chelyabinsk, Kopeysk, Zlatoust, Miass and Magnitogorsk (on average from 20 to 39, only in Zlatoust — 55). The machines were installed at stationary stations throughout the respective districts, so that PECs with KOIBs were territorially adjacent to PECs with manual counting, i.e., the social composition of voters at "machine" stations could hardly have differed significantly from the composition of voters at stations with manual counting. Meanwhile, the differences in results at these stations turned out to be quite noticeable: turnout on average is consistently lower than turnout at ordinary stations; Putin's result is lower at stations with KOIBs; Davankov's (New People) result is higher at stations with KOIBs. Moreover, at stations with machine counting, Davankov took second place, while at ordinary stations he took third or even fourth place. The results of the Communist Kharitonov at stations with KOIBs turned out to be almost twice as low as at stations with manual counting.
Overall in the region, at stationary stations with manual counting, turnout was 78%, and at stations with KOIBs, 71% — a difference of 7 p.p. is quite noticeable. Davankov received 4.7% and overall third place at ordinary stations and 6.8% and second place at stations with KOIBs, and Putin — 84% and 81.7%, respectively. One might assume that this is merely the difference between the activity and preferences of voters in relatively large cities, where KOIBs were predominantly placed, and voters in small settlements, where turnout and political loyalty are traditionally higher. Therefore, it is more correct to compare the results broken down by those territories where KOIBs were installed.
Let's look.
Chelyabinsk: turnout — 85.2% at PECs without KOIBs and 75.7% at PECs with KOIBs (a difference of almost 10 p.p.), Davankov — 4.1% and third place without KOIBs and 7.8% and second place with KOIBs, Putin's results are roughly the same — 83.6% and 82.2%, but Kharitonov's results at "non-machine" PECs turned out to be twice as good — 8.2% instead of just 4.1% at stations with KOIBs. Moreover, at a number of "non-machine" PECs, the Communist showed some completely unique results of 30% or more, and at several of them he even overtook Putin himself (however, at stations with KOIBs literally in neighbouring microdistricts, he received completely ordinary results). No other candidate has such a spread in results between stations with and without KOIBs.
Magnitogorsk: turnout — 76.7% without KOIBs and 72.9% with KOIBs, Davankov — 5.1% and 7.2%, Putin — 81.9% and 79.9%, Kharitonov — 6.2% and 4.9% respectively (however, here there are no such spreads in results as in Chelyabinsk — only ten PECs in the range from 10 to 17 p.p.).
Kopeysk: here the differences in turnout are most noticeable — 80.4% at PECs without KOIBs and only 66.1% at PECs with KOIBs (i.e., by 14 p.p.), while the candidates received quite comparable figures: Davankov — 3.5% and 5.6%, Putin — 86.8% and 84.9%, Kharitonov 4.5% and 4.3% respectively.
Miass: roughly the same picture: turnout — 70% without KOIBs and 65% with KOIBs, Davankov — 4.5% and 6.4%, Putin — 82.1% and 80.8%, Kharitonov 6.7% and 5.9% respectively.
Finally, in Zlatoust we observe almost no noticeable differences in results between PECs without KOIBs and PECs with KOIBs: turnout at machine stations is even slightly higher than at ordinary ones — 57.8% without KOIBs and 58.2% with KOIBs (however, it is noticeably lower than in other territories of the oblast), Davankov — 5.6% and 5.4%, Putin — 81.7% and 81.8%, Kharitonov — 5.6% and 6.1% respectively. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that in Zlatoust, KOIBs were installed at 55 out of 81 PECs, or almost 70% of stations, while for comparison in Chelyabinsk — only just over 35%, i.e., in Zlatoust the space for significant adjustment of results — and it seems to us that this is precisely what we are talking about — on the remaining stations with manual counting turns out to be very limited. And, conditionally, super-high turnout (to pull up the overall percentage for the city) at stations without KOIBs would become especially noticeable against the backdrop of the relatively low turnout at stations with KOIBs.
Roughly the same situation is developing in other regions. A compact distribution of KOIBs across the majority of PECs (close to 2/3) of one large or several smaller populated localities, as a rule, protected voters in that territory from politically motivated adjustment of results. For example, in Yekaterinburg in the presidential elections, 502 out of 600 PECs had KOIBs with an average turnout of about 62% and Davankov confidently in second place in both cases; in Izhevsk, KOIBs were at 140 out of 249 stationary stations — as a result, the average turnout at both types of stations was a similar 55-56%, and Davankov also took second place with a result of about 8.5%). A dispersed distribution of KOIBs, a few each, across a large number of TECs and populated localities (as, for example, in Tatarstan and Perm Krai) — this is an attempt to hide normal results among adjusted ones, and to respond to any suspicions by pointing to some "local peculiarities" or a "special electoral culture" of local voters.
The differences in voting results at polling stations with and without KOIBs are especially notable in Tatarstan — a region well known for its high, ultra-loyal voting. In the 2024 presidential elections, only 44 KOIB-2017 units were used across the entire republic, distributed a few each among 17 TECs in nine cities of the region. Remarkably, voters only at stations with KOIBs showed some kind of extreme support for Davankov from New People, while voters at ordinary stations practically did not notice him. Judge for yourselves: Kazan — an average of 10.73% at 19 PECs with KOIBs and 2.15% at all others, Naberezhnye Chelny — 6.3% at nine PECs with KOIBs and 1.8% without KOIBs, Almetyevsk — 5.6% and 1.4% respectively, Nizhnekamsk — 7.8% at three PECs with KOIBs and only 0.7% at all others, roughly the same picture in Chistopol, Leninogorsk, Yelabuga, Bugulma, Zelenodolsk, where there were one or two stations with KOIBs and where Davankov received 4-5%, and at ordinary stations less than 1%. At the same time, Putin in Kazan, Chistopol, Nizhnekamsk, Naberezhnye Chelny received 5–10 p.p. less at stations with KOIBs than the citywide average. But the results of Slutsky and Kharitonov turned out to be practically insensitive to the installation of KOIBs. Naturally, turnout in most cases at stations with KOIBs is noticeably lower than the official results (by 10 p.p. or more). It seems that it would have been even lower if not for voting "at home," which was noticeably higher precisely at stations with KOIBs (sometimes by 10 p.p. or more). The number of spoiled ballots is also two or more times higher than at ordinary stations. Truly, some kind of "devil-machines."
Finally, regarding the technical condition of the KOIBs. Indeed, in the first years after their appearance, the media and experts noted a large number of breakdowns and malfunctions in their operation, but later the situation normalised, especially with the advent of the KOIB-2017. In recent years, regional election commissions regularly reported that no significant malfunctions were observed in their operation. In the 2024 presidential elections, 13.8 thousand PECs out of 94 thousand were equipped with KOIBs, and reports of any problems were literally isolated. In many regions, KOIBs successfully operated again in 2025. Furthermore, in the event of a malfunction, it was always possible to switch to ordinary voting and manual counting.
Overall, the explanations from representatives of the electoral system about the reasons for the absence of KOIBs in the 2026 elections do not seem convincing. The complete absence of KOIBs at polling stations only strengthens the assumption that the voting results here will be adjusted as needed. Indirect confirmation of this may also be the instructions to observers from the Public Chambers, United Russia and its satellites to leave the polling stations before the start of the vote count and not to insist on receiving the final protocols, as well as the refusal to issue protocols to the remaining observers until some kind of "verification" at the TEC.