Editor’s foreword

We are publishing the full text of Alexander Kynev’s report “The regional nomenklatura in 2026: evolution and adaptation under new conditions”, originally posted on his Telegram channel. This report continues the author’s work on the study of regional administrative elites, which he began with his book “Who governs Russia’s regions and how” and the subsequent 2025 report.

We are talking specifically about “administrative elites”, not regional elites as a whole. Today’s regional administrators do not have the rights and powers that the elites of the 1990s possessed; they are more like managers appointed by the centre to administer territories than representatives of those territories before the centre. In most regions, the long-standing internal cohesion and mutual protection of the 1990s is absent — now these are frequently rotated officials, with a large share of “outsiders” (sent in from elsewhere).

When we speak of regional administrative elites, it must be remembered that despite our country’s formal name of “federation”, in reality regional authorities today have very little autonomy from the federal centre. All the most important appointments (which include all heads of the financial and socio-economic blocs of regional administrations) are coordinated with the relevant federal agencies — that is, a candidate for the post of regional finance minister must obtain consent for the appointment from the federal ministry, a candidate for the head of the healthcare system from the federal Ministry of Health, and so on. As a result, many members of the nomenklatura have no connection whatsoever to the region in which they are to work at the time of their appointment. Such officials, as a rule, do not rely on their own regional economic resources, local clans or federal industrial groups.

Among governors, the share of “outsiders” now stands at 55%, while among the rest of the nomenklatura it has reached 28–29%. There is only one group of regions where the studied segment of the senior administration contains virtually no “external” administrators — that is most of the ethnic regions of the North Caucasus, where the Kremlin is forced to seek a balance between the interests of various local clans.

It is rare for a senior regional official in Russia of the 2010s–2020s to hold their post for more than three years. That is not enough time to become a major independent political or administrative figure. As a result, such officials become conduits for federal departmental programmes/interests in particular sectors, and their future career depends primarily on intra-departmental relations and reporting, on relations with the security services, and only partly on attitudes towards them in the region.

Since the start of the SMO, the size of the regional nomenklatura has been gradually increasing: partly because of a growth in the number of officials in some regions (for example, an anomalous rise in the number of deputy governors in the sparsely populated Chukotka Autonomous Okrug), and partly because of the appearance of new staff positions as a consequence of the changing political and economic situation (deputy governors for work with “sponsored” territories in eastern Ukraine, for patriotic education, etc., are appearing).

Key findings of the report:

1. From 2015 until the start of the SMO, an average of 31% of the senior regional nomenklatura lost their previous posts each year (the record was in the period from 1 July 2018 to 1 July 2019, when 50.97% of the total number of the studied level of the regional nomenklatura was replaced). With the start of hostilities, personnel movement indicators fell sharply, dropping to 24–26%. In 2024, however, the indicators returned to the pre-war level, and 2025 continued this trend (in 2025 the figure was 33%).
2. There is, however, one distinctive feature of this new stage: many incumbent governors, having been elected for a new term, substantially reshuffled their teams. Such mass replacements within sitting administrations are not typical. This was probably caused by several factors: the effect of the 2024 federal elections and the upcoming 2026 elections, which stimulate the movement of officials; habituation to the new political and economic situation, which is perceived as the “new normal”; accumulated obvious administrative overstrain; the growing influence of the security services on the work of administrations; and accelerated “professional burnout” among officials working under stressful conditions.
3. The influence of the SMO on the composition of administrations is so far insignificant, amounting to about 2.6% of the number of posts studied (and even those include, among others, people who managed to work in civilian administrations in the regions of hostilities). Postings to the SMO zone remain, for the most part, an attribute of career advancement for the traditional nomenklatura, who could have occupied the relevant posts before (without the “SMO participant” attribute). For them, “SMO participant” status is an additional element on their professional CV. At the same time, it is sometimes difficult to separate “SMO participants” from officials who worked for some time in the government bodies of the annexed regions of eastern Ukraine (the regional and local press constantly conflates them). Professional military personnel (security-service officers) who are SMO participants and had no prior administrative or managerial experience are extremely poorly represented in administrations. SMO participants who have neither administrative nor professional military experience (in simple terms, “volunteers” from among ordinary workers and employees) are not represented in administrations at all. On the whole, regional administrations consist almost entirely of civilian specialists.
4. SMO participants mainly fill symbolic political posts and the deputy corps, where the work does not formally require specific professional skills. Since the appointment of key regional administration officials requires coordination with the relevant federal agencies under a special procedure, the possession of the necessary competencies, specialised education, work experience, recommendations, etc., SMO participants without the corresponding bureaucratic experience in their biography can only aspire to a limited range of posts without the right to issue regulatory and governing legal documents or to distribute significant budgetary resources (deputies overseeing relations with security structures; patriotic education; youth policy and sport, etc.).
5. Criminal prosecutions of regional officials (the “fight against corruption”) in 2015–2019 affected 1.5–2% of the total number of regional elites annually. In 2025, the author of the study identified 17 cases of criminal prosecution of officials out of a list of 821 people at the start of the year — that is 2.07%. Thus, the share of regional officials subjected to criminal prosecution has remained stable for at least the last 10 years and has hardly grown since 2022. Is that a lot or a little? According to the well-known Russian researcher Nikolai Petrov, it is “a figure comparable to the Stalinist repressions”.
6. Thus, the composition of the regional administrative elites possesses significant internal inertia. Even large-scale PR campaigns to promote SMO participants into government bodies (who are mostly the same officials) and to fight corruption in reality each affect 2% of the senior regional nomenklatura. The strict rules for forming the nomenklatura that have developed over the last 20 years are little susceptible to the influence of external PR campaigns and ritual procedures. Only the external style of behaviour of the nomenklatura and its public positioning are changing.
7. Given the upcoming 2026 federal elections, which always lead to chain movements within the regional nomenklatura, there is every reason to believe that the degree of rotation of regional officials will intensify in the coming year. Individuals whose careers have risen thanks to the SMO are becoming an increasingly visible part of the administrative elite; however, this mainly concerns the deputy corps, which, as a rule, has no real power. On the one hand, the positions and ambitions of former SMO participants are in many ways becoming an integral part of political and economic life. On the other hand, the question of whether SMO participants will in future represent some kind of unified force, united by corporate interests, remains largely open.

The report “The regional nomenklatura in 2026: evolution and adaptation under new conditions”

This text is devoted to an analysis of changes in the composition of the administrative elites of Russia’s regions and their personnel stability based on the results of 2025. It is a continuation of the previous report published by the author in June 2025 on the results of 2024 (“The regional nomenklatura in Russia in the third year of the SMO: elites begin to move”). All materials are taken from open sources (government body websites, mass media).

The study used the methodology previously set out in the book “Who governs Russia’s regions and how” (in which the statistics ended in January 2023). After the book’s publication, the report “The regional nomenklatura in Russia in the third year of the SMO: elites begin to move” was published (in which the situation was described as of 01.01.2025). This report provides data as of 01.01.2026; moreover, whereas last year’s report gave statistics for 85 regions (the DNR, LNR, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions were not included, because the methodology used requires continuous personnel statistics for a region over at least one and a half to two years of observation to calculate the share of personnel movements, which was lacking for these regions), this time it covers 88 (only Zaporizhzhia region is missing, for which elements of the necessary personnel statistics appeared in the public domain only at the end of 2025–beginning of 2026, and even then, evidently, incomplete).

I would like to stress at once the more correct use of the term “administrative elites” instead of the customary “regional elites”, in order to emphasise the essential difference between today’s administrative elites of the regions and the “old” regional elites of the 1990s. Unlike the elites of the 1990s, they do not have those rights and powers, and are more like managers appointed by the centre to administer territories than representatives of those territories before the centre; in most regions, the long-standing internal cohesion and mutual protection of the 1990s is absent — now these are frequently rotated officials, with a large share of “outsiders” (sent in from elsewhere), whose appointments are increasingly coordinated with federal agencies. Finally, with rare exceptions, they do not rely, as in the 1990s, on their own regional economic resources, local clans and FIGs, but usually interact with the local top management of federal vertically integrated corporate structures.

According to the methodology used, twice a year, as of 1 January and 1 July, a name-by-name list of the senior regional nomenklatura is compiled (governors and chairs of regional governments; deputy governors and deputy chairs of regional governments; regional finance ministers and heads of administration apparatuses, if they are not among the deputy governors or premiers; speakers of regional parliaments; heads of regional centres — for Moscow and Leningrad regions, the heads of the three largest municipalities were initially taken), as well as a chronology of changes in its composition over the previous year. Administrative stability (the number of official replacements) based on these data is calculated from the frequency of replacements of key regional and local officials over the chosen time interval for the year preceding the calculation date (shorter intervals are excessively short for assessing personnel policy and in most cases do not allow trends to be identified) — in particular, when calculating as of 1 July of the current year, the period from 1 July of the previous year is assessed. When calculating as of 1 January, the period is 1 January to 31 December of the previous year. The stability index is calculated as the ratio of dismissals and new appointments to the total number of officials of that level in the region at the start of the period, not counting as an addition a change of status from ordinary deputy to first deputy; from acting deputy governor to “full” deputy governor; renaming of a post, etc., and also counting a simultaneous replacement (dismissal of one official and simultaneous appointment of another to the same post) as one unit. At the same time, the dismissal of a deputy governor and the abolition of their post, but with the creation several months later of a different post with different functions, is treated as two units.

The statistics on the administrative stability of the senior segment of the regional administrative elites in 2015–2022 (that is, before the start of the SMO) unequivocally indicate that the key factor provoking “surges” in the replacement of regional officials was and remains the replacement of governors. It is these that, by the “domino principle”, led and lead to other personnel replacements: of deputy governors, sectoral ministers, often also to a change of the head of the administration of the regional centre, and sometimes to a change of the speaker of the regional parliament.

From the moment measurements began in 2015 until the start of the SMO, the stability index never fell below 31% (that is, in the year before each calculation date, no less than 31% of the members of the studied senior regional nomenklatura lost their previous posts). The record indicators of personnel rotation among the senior administrative tier of the regional elites were in 2018–2019 (the peak of replacements was shown in the period 01.07.2018–01.07.2019, when 50.97% of the total number of the studied level of the regional nomenklatura was replaced), when there was a mass replacement of governors with so-called “technocrats” (usually second- or third-tier federal nomenklatura officials sent to the region — deputy ministers, heads of directorates, top managers of state corporations, etc.).

With the start of the SMO, personnel movement indicators went down (there were fewer of them). During the “first year of the SMO” from 01.01.2022 to 01.01.2023, 30.63% of the total number of the studied level of the regional nomenklatura was replaced. But then movements became even fewer: the personnel system somewhat froze, movements fell sharply, usually only to forced situations (claims from the security services, illness or retirement, a clearly expressed personal desire of the official to leave the post). Movements became minimal for the entire period of measurements. In the period 01.07.22–01.07.2023, only 26.57% of the senior regional nomenklatura changed, 01.01.23–01.01.2024 — 24.6%, 01.07.23–01.07.2024 — 26.43%. Thus, from the beginning of 2022 to the beginning of 2024, personnel movements in the regions were minimal and forced.

The trend changed only following the results of 2024. On the one hand, this is also visible from the replacement of governors (in 2022 and 2023, five governors changed each year — an absolute minimum, but in 2024 already 13. Moreover, in one region, Kursk Oblast, twice, which can partly be explained by the “domino principle” — cyclical reshuffles following the presidential election and the formation of a new government, and partly by “deferred decisions”). In 2025, the number of governor replacements by presidential decrees again fell to five (Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, Novgorod, Tver regions, Nenets Autonomous Okrug); in the first five months of 2026, three more regional heads changed (Belgorod, Bryansk regions, Dagestan).

On the other hand, we also see a growth in personnel movements across the entire body of the studied nomenklatura — rotation indicators returned to the “pre-SMO” situation, and in the period from 01.01.24 to 01.01.2025 amounted to 32.29%, from 01.07.24 to 01.07.25 — 38%, from 01.01.25 to 01.01.26 — 33%. At the same time, of course, changes in the administration by the “domino principle” almost always follow a change of governor and represent the “personnel tail” of his restructuring of the administration to suit himself (and within a year to a year and a half after the change, the situation usually stabilises). However, if one looks closely, in 2024–2025 even many incumbent governors, having been elected for a new term, quite substantially reshuffled their teams (Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kostroma, Murmansk, Chelyabinsk regions, Kamchatka Krai, etc.). Such mass replacements within sitting administrations are not typical for the regions of the Russian Federation.

Table 1. Changes in the studied segment of the senior regional nomenklatura from 2015 to the present

Period	Average share of changes in the studied segment of the senior regional nomenklatura over the indicated period (to the total number of members of this nomenklatura according to the list at the start of the period)
01.01.2015–01.01.2016	33.85%
01.07.2015-01.07.2016	34.84%
01.01.2016–01.01.2017	37.33%
01.07.2016–01.07.2017	40.25%
01.01.2017–01.01.2018	32.04%
01.07.2017–01.07.2018	31.46%
10.01.2018–01.01.2019	36.16%
01.07.2018–01.07.2019	50.97%
01.01.2019-01.01.2020	38%
01.07.2019-01.07.2020	33%
01.01.2020-01.01.2021	36%
01.07.2020-01.07.2021	38%
01.01.2021-01.01.2022	34.42%
01.07.2021-01.07.2022	36%
01.01.2022-01.01.2023	30.63%
01.07.2022-01.07.2023	26.57%
01.01.2023-01.01.2024	24.6%
01.07.2023-01.07.2024	26.43%
01.01.2024-01.01.2025	32.29%
01.07.2024–01.07.2025	38%
01.01.2025–01.01.2026	33%

With the average annual level of replacement of senior regional officials of the regional nomenklatura at 30–35% of their total number, this means that it is rare for a senior regional official in Russia of the 2010s–2020s to hold their post for more than three years. As a rule, such a period is insufficient to become a major independent political or administrative figure. The high levels of rotation of the regional nomenklatura (both vertical and horizontal rotation) serve two purposes. First, they hinder the formation of new cohesive regional elites by reducing the factors of “mutual protection” and slow down the speed at which officials are incorporated into local informal communication networks. Second, they are an important element of the technocratic model oriented towards careerist bureaucrats, creating for some of them opportunities for rapid, continuous further career advancement, which serve as a stimulating symbol for them. Accelerated rotations promote the standardisation and uniformity of law enforcement, and the faster spread of innovations and various directives. As a result, such officials are primarily conduits for federal departmental programmes/interests in particular sectors, and their future career depends primarily on intra-departmental relations and reporting, on relations with the security services, and only partly on attitudes towards them in the region.

On the whole, high rotation leads to the renewal and rejuvenation of personnel (although there are individual regions with very stable elites — see below for more detail). Thus, in the first months of 2025, veterans of the entire all-Russian corps of deputy governors for finance retired — Vyacheslav Kuzin in Vladimir Oblast and Vyacheslav Shcheglevatykh in Lipetsk Oblast, who had held their posts since the early 1990s and had outlasted all governors of all political eras of that time. The new appointees are predominantly in the 30–50 age range; they are often second- or third-tier officials from other regions, ready to change their place of residence for the sake of career advancement.

As a rule, from the moment of appointment as acting head of the administration, a new regional head hardly touches the previous administration he has inherited (but there were unusually many exceptions to this rule in 2024–2025 — Vologda, Kursk, Samara regions). During this period (it usually lasts from four to nine months), changes are usually extremely small and rare: the principle that destabilising the management system on the eve of elections is dangerous, and that it is important to preserve established control mechanisms, apparently operates. And only after official election through the municipal filter system (the second Sunday of September) does the main wave of personnel replacements begin. It usually takes a period of three to nine months. If developments are favourable, the personnel situation then stabilises again until the next governor replacement; if unfavourable, this begins to be perceived not as renewal but as personnel instability.

The main contribution to the overall fairly high indicators of personnel rotation of the studied nomenklatura list for the periods 01.07.2024–01.07.2025 and 01.01.2025–01.01.2026 was made by the ultra-high rotation indicators in such regions as Kursk Oblast (two consecutive governor replacements in 2024 and multiple changes of officials across a number of positions; for the calendar year 2025 it amounted to 193%), Vologda Oblast (since the appointment of acting governor Georgy Filimonov in October 2023, constant movements, often circular, when the same official is repeatedly moved from post to post, have not ceased in the region; for each studied interval, the ratio of replacements to the number of positions at the start of the period exceeds 100%), Samara Oblast (since the beginning of 2024, the level of rotation has exceeded 100% of the initial list of studied positions, which became possible due to constant multiple replacements and movements), the Komi Republic (after the appointment of Rostislav Goldstein as head of the region, an almost total replacement of all key regional and local officials occurred), the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (substantial reshuffles after the change of governor and the formation of a government headed by a premier).

The situation in Kursk Oblast after the resignation of Alexei Smirnov (he headed the region from 12 May 2024 to 5 December 2024) and the appointment of Alexander Khinshtein as acting governor was marked by extreme personnel instability. Smirnov himself had not yet finished forming his administration when he was dismissed, detained, and then the formation of Khinshtein’s administration began. The heads of the Ministry of Finance of Kursk Oblast alone changed six times (!) in 2025, even though the post of head of regional finances is one of the most stable in Russian regional administrations; this post is held for years, and sometimes for decades. In all the years of observation, heads of regional finances have never changed so frequently in any region of Russia. Under Governor Roman Starovoit, the Finance Committee of the regional administration became the Ministry of Finance and Budget Control of Kursk Oblast on 1 December 2022. Natalya Rudakova, a local, became minister. After the double change of governor in 2024, acting Minister of Finance and Budget Control of Kursk Oblast Natalya Rudakova resigned of her own accord in early March 2025, and she was replaced as acting minister by Inna Aponasenko from 3 March 2025. But already on 3 April 2025, acting head Inna Aponasenko resigned after a month of work, after which the performance of her duties as minister was entrusted to Lyudmila Gaponova, who had previously held the post of deputy minister of finance and budget control. On 10 July 2025, Lyudmila Gaponova also resigned of her own accord (she left her post as of 11 July). She was replaced by Alla Sivtseva, who worked for less than a month. Sivtseva was replaced by Elena Kaskova. Finally, on 22.10.2025, the ex-head of the Samara Oblast Ministry of Finance, Vladimir Panferov, was appointed acting minister of finance and budget control of Kursk Oblast.

The level of rotation was high in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (formation of a new administration under Irina Gekht), Kaliningrad Oblast (formation of a new administration), Rostov Oblast (formation of a new administration), Saratov Oblast (constant personnel changes in the regional administration are a local tradition), Belgorod Oblast (personnel changes in the region have proceeded in “waves” since the change of governor from Yevgeny Savchenko to Vyacheslav Gladkov in 2020), Mari El (in 2022, Yuri Zaitsev became head of the region; subsequently he tried to form a new, more loyal administration, then the composition of the new administration had to be adjusted). The administration of peripheral Zabaykalsky Krai has maintained high permanent personnel instability since the appointment of Alexander Osipov as governor in 2018 (a unique region in terms of the duration of such permanent instability).

In 2025, surges in the activation of movements occurred in the previously relatively stable Arkhangelsk, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kaluga, Kostroma, Orenburg regions, Kamchatka Krai, Kalmykia, Chuvashia; in 2024 in Astrakhan, Kurgan, Novosibirsk regions, Altai Krai, Bashkortostan; in 2023 in Udmurtia. In all these cases, these were chronologically localised surges after either a change of governor or the election of the incumbent for a new term and partial changes in the team in connection with this.

In 2024–2025, the level of rotation fell from high to moderate in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Chelyabinsk Oblast (in 2024, Alexei Teksler reshuffled the administration for a second term of office), Murmansk Oblast (also a reshuffling of the administration by Andrei Chibis in 2024 in connection with the start of a new term of office), Tula Oblast (the new administration of Dmitry Milyaev), the Altai Republic (reshuffling of the management system after the appointment of Andrei Turchak as head of the region), Khabarovsk Krai (sharp changes after the appointment of Dmitry Demeshin as governor and subsequent stabilisation).

Personnel movements were moderately high in St Petersburg and Sevastopol (in the administrations of both regions, there is constant personnel rotation of deputy governors), Tambov Oblast, Tver Oblast (ended with a change of governor and a new rise in the number of movements), Tomsk Oblast (personnel restructuring continues under the new governor Vladimir Mazur), KhMAO (formation of a new administration), Mordovia (in 2023–2025, the head of government changed twice — first, from 23.01.23, Dmitry Pozdnyakov (born 1980), son of the chairman of the board of the Norov group of companies and deputy of the State Assembly of the Republic of Mordovia Alexander Pozdnyakov, became head; then, from 01.04.2025, Deputy Premier Galina Lotvanova became acting premier; then, from 11.08.2025, Batyr Emeyev (born 1984), who had previously arrived from Dagestan and had also managed to work in the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, became the new premier).

The level of personnel changes in the administrative elites of Buryatia, Ingushetia, Karelia, Tyva; Vladimir, Kemerovo, Lipetsk, Magadan, Moscow, Omsk, Oryol, Ryazan regions; Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Primorsky and Stavropol krais was moderate.
Movements during this time were insignificant or moderate in Khakassia, the Chechen Republic, Perm Krai, Voronezh, Leningrad, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk, Tyumen regions.

The most stable administrative elites of the regions in 2024–2025 were in Moscow, Adygea, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Crimea, Sakha (Yakutia), North Ossetia, Tatarstan; Amur, Volgograd, Kirov, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod (with a small surge of movements under the new governor Alexander Dronov in 2025), Penza, Pskov, Yaroslavl regions, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

From 2022–2023 to 2024–2025: why did the pace of rotation of the senior regional nomenklatura change sharply?

As we can see, the pace of rotation of the senior regional nomenklatura in 2024–2025 changed sharply compared to 2022–2023, and became close to the situation before the start of the SMO.

The decline in the level of rotation in 2022–2023 appears to be the result of a combination of a number of reasons:

• The general priority of foreign policy topics, the SMO, armaments, sanctions, etc., over domestic issues, “administrative routine”, etc., which temporarily found themselves on the periphery of the centre’s attention. It is telling that the personnel decisions on the regions that had accumulated by spring 2022 were signed as a package of five governor replacements on a single day, 10 May 2022, which is an example of obvious protraction (the usual time for replacements is February–March, so that new governors have at least half a year before the elections in the region) — election campaigns start already at the beginning of June;
• A conscious or unconscious striving, under the conditions of extraordinary political and economic circumstances (the SMO and sanctions), to avoid excessively large-scale simultaneous replacements, which carries the risks of excessive destabilisation of regional administrative machines. Replacements and administrative restructuring always carry elements of risk, and excessive additional replacements in some regions could further destabilise the situation;
• The general uncertainty of political and economic prospects for the ruling nomenklatura itself, for which, in a situation of uncertainty, it would be more sensible to hold on to “tried and tested options” and avoid excessive movements and fluctuations until the situation becomes clearer.

Judging by everything, from 2024 the situation changed for the following reasons:

• Habituation to the new political and economic situation, which is perceived as the “new normal”, habituation to new rules and trajectories of personnel advancement;
• The effect of the presidential election, which always leads to chain personnel movements “along the chain”, when the movement of several officials upwards automatically triggers a whole pool of vertical and horizontal movements;
• Preparations for the 2024 and 2026 federal elections are returning interest both to domestic politics and to problems of internal development. The federal authorities’ attention is returning to domestic political issues, and the situation with the rotation of the regional nomenklatura itself, “slowed down” for 2022–2023, is returning to the “normal” state that measurements of administrative stability recorded before the start of the SMO;
• The obvious administrative overstrain that accumulated over 2022–2024, the accelerated “professional burnout” of officials working under stressful conditions. The very working conditions of officials have become tougher: abrupt changes of plans, constant emergency situations (especially in border regions), tightening of requirements and risks (from the impossibility of going on holiday to a number of destinations to excessive interference and intensified control over work by the security services), the growth of emotional tension and self-censorship in behaviour and statements, could not but lead to an increase in fatigue and professional burnout. Many administrative officials in such extreme conditions are themselves glad to move to less tense, calmer and politically neutral work;
• The strengthening influence of the security services on the work of administrations also increases personnel churn and provokes additional replacements.

As a result, we see fairly high rotation not only in regions where governors have changed, but also in regions where governors have remained the same.

Composition of administrations

What do we see regarding the overall composition of the regional nomenklatura? Its total number has gradually grown since 2020 (by about 10% over five years: from 998 to 1,099). From 2025, three regions of eastern Ukraine are added to the statistics (that is, all those incorporated into the Russian Federation, except Zaporizhzhia region, for which the necessary statistics are absent). If we count as of 1 January 2025, then 1,099 for 85 regions gave an average of 12.9294 per region. As of 1 January 2026, there are 1,163 for 88 regions, that is, an average of 13.2841. Thus, on average per region, the size of the nomenklatura continues to increase. This is happening partly because of a growth in the number of officials in some regions (for example, an anomalous rise in the number of deputy governors in the sparsely populated Chukotka Autonomous Okrug), and partly because of the appearance of new staff positions as a consequence of the changing political and economic situation (deputy governors for work with “sponsored” territories in eastern Ukraine, for patriotic education, etc., are appearing).

Table 2. Numerical characteristics of the administrative elites of the regions*

As of 01.01.2020	As of 01.01.2022	As of 01.01.2024	As of 01.01.2025	As of 01.01.2026	Heads of governments, deputy governors and premiers, heads of apparatuses, heads of regional finances as of 01.01.2020					Heads of governments, deputy governors and premiers, heads of apparatuses, heads of regional finances as of 01.01.2024					Heads of governments, deputy governors and premiers, heads of apparatuses, heads of regional finances as of 01.01.2025					Heads of governments, deputy governors and premiers, heads of apparatuses, heads of regional finances as of 01.01.2026
85 regions	85 regions	85 regions	85 regions	88 regions	L	FL/R	AO	NO	O	L	FL/R	AO	NO	O	L	FL/R	AO	NO	O	L	FL/R	AO	NO	O
998	1,042	1,071	1,099	1,163	533	5	9	10	168	554	9	19	10	204	573	9	21	14	204	615	16	18	22	216

* L — locals; FL/R — federalised locals and returnees; AO — adapted outsiders; NO — naturalised outsiders; O — outsiders.

1. “pure outsiders” — officials who have never lived or worked in the region of appointment;
2. “returnees” — officials who had some connection to the region of appointment in the past (for example, in childhood and/or at the start of their career), but then left it;
3. “adapted outsiders” — officials who, before appointment, worked for some time in the region, or held a post connected with the region but not requiring permanent residence in it (for example, a seat in the Federation Council);
4. “naturalised outsiders” — officials who are not local by origin, but have lived and worked in the region for at least five years before appointment. “Outsiders” of this type are more rooted in the region than “adapted” ones and are much more closely connected with local elites;
5. “federalised local” — a local official who worked for several years outside the region and had “federal” experience.

If we speak specifically about administrations, apart from governors (heads of governments, deputy governors and premiers, heads of apparatuses, heads of regional finances), then on average there are 8–10 officials of this type per region. The most compact administrations at the start of the year were in Tver Oblast (four deputy governors), Pskov and Kherson regions (six people each). The largest number of such officials was in Vologda and Chelyabinsk regions (17 each); Nizhny Novgorod, Tomsk and Tula regions (15 each); Irkutsk, Moscow regions and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (14 each); Kamchatka and Zabaykalsky krais, Penza and Rostov regions, KhMAO (13 each); Bashkortostan 12 and St Petersburg 12.

The greatest “density” of the senior regional nomenklatura is in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, which has a total of 47,700 residents. Previously, under Governor Roman Kopin, Chukotka usually had 3–4 deputy governors. Under the new governor Vladislav Kuznetsov, as of 1 January 2026, the region already had 14 deputy governors, of whom 13 were outsiders.

The share of various types of outsiders among premiers (where this post is separate from the governor), deputy governors and heads of regional governments, heads of regional finances and heads of administration apparatuses remains at the level of 28–29%. As of 1 January 2026, various outsiders accounted for 256 of the 887 members of this group of the nomenklatura (28.81%), federalised locals and returnees 16, locals 615 (69.3%).

For comparison:

• As of 1 January 2020, chairs of regional governments, deputy governors, heads of administration apparatuses (or governor’s administrations), and heads of regional finances totalled 725. Of these, 533 (73.5%) were fully local, another 5 could be classified as “federalised locals” (0.7%), making a total of 538 locals (74.2%). Various types of outsiders numbered 187 (25.8%), of whom “pure outsiders” 168, adapted 9 and naturalised 10.
• As of 1 January 2023, out of 790 members of this group of the nomenklatura, 565 (71.5%) were fully local, another 6 could be classified as “federalised locals” (0.8%), making a total of 571 locals (72.3%). Various types of outsiders numbered 219 (27.72%).
• As of 1 January 2024, out of 1,071 members of this group of the senior regional nomenklatura, there were 796; of these, 554 (69.6%) were fully local, various types of outsiders 233 (29.27% of the studied body).
• As of 1 January 2025, out of 1,099 on the studied list, there were 821 in this group; of these, 573 (69.79%) were fully local, various types of outsiders 239 (29.11% of the studied body). These data do not take into account the four regions of eastern Ukraine due to the lack of complete data on them.

Thus, among chairs of government (where this is a separate post from the governor), deputy governors (chairs of governments), heads of apparatuses and heads of regional finances, the share of outsiders grew from 25.8% to 28–29% over 2020–2025. Thus, the share of the external nomenklatura in the composition of administrations had grown by 2024–2025 and has for now relatively stabilised. Among the governors themselves, the share of “outsiders” is now 49 out of 89, or 55% (of whom four can formally be recognised as “returnees”: they were born there, but subsequently had almost no connection to it).

The distribution of varyags within the upper tier of administrations is uneven across regions. They are absent from the studied segment of the administrations in most ethnic republics of the North Caucasus (Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Chechnya; in Dagestan, however, one out of 10, and in Ingushetia, two out of seven at the start of the year), Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Buryatia, Tyva; Krasnodar and Krasnoyarsk Krais; Bryansk, Kostroma, Novosibirsk, Tver, and Tyumen Oblasts, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.
In other regions, the maximum number of varyags in this group of officials is found in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (13 out of 14), Sevastopol (nine out of 11, plus a “federalised local” acting deputy governor since 19.08.2025, Maxim Kovalev, who previously served in law enforcement, was the commander of the “Berkut-S” detachment of the city’s Rosgvardia Main Directorate, and worked for some time in the administrations of Vologda and Samara Oblasts), the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (seven out of nine), Khabarovsk Krai (seven out of 10), KhMAO (eight out of 13), Samara Oblast (seven out of 11, plus one “federalised local” deputy chairman of the Government of Samara Oblast since 2 July 2025, Nikita Zubko, former prosecutor of Samara, and first deputy prosecutor of Ryazan Oblast in 2020–2025), Ulyanovsk (six out of 11), Kursk, Omsk and Sakhalin Oblasts (six out of 10 each), Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (nine out of 15), Kaliningrad Oblast (five out of nine), Belgorod and Ulyanovsk Oblasts (six out of 11), Tomsk Oblast (seven out of 15), the Altai Republic and Murmansk Oblast (five out of 11 each), Mari El (out of seven, three are varyags and one is a “returnee” — Stepan Vorontsov, who since 2013 worked as deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet for logistics), Tambov Oblast (four out of eight), the LNR (four out of nine), Arkhangelsk and Ivanovo Oblasts (four out of 10 each), Mordovia (four out of nine), Vologda Oblast (six out of 17), Irkutsk Oblast (five out of 14), and Ryazan Oblast (five out of 10 and one more “federalised local” first deputy chairman of the Oblast Government since 16.06.2025, Denis Bokov, who previously headed the Oblast’s Ministry of Social Protection but then decided to move to Moscow to work for the state corporation VEB.RF).

Structural changes took place in a number of regions. In Leningrad Oblast, after Alexander Drozdenko was elected for a new term, the Legislative Assembly of Leningrad Oblast approved a new government structure similar to that of St. Petersburg. Previously, there were separate deputy governors and separate deputy heads of government (although the governor is simultaneously the head of the Oblast government).

Thus, the cabinet, which previously included deputy chairmen of the government and vice-governors, now comprises:

• the governor (who is also the chairman of the government);
• a first vice-governor — deputy of the government;
• a first vice-governor;
• the governor’s representative in the Legislative Assembly of Leningrad Oblast;
  the head of the Representative Office to the Government of the Russian Federation;
• sectoral vice-governors (previously divided into vice-governors and deputy chairmen of the government), who will still total 12 people. And seven of them, according to the current rules, must be approved by the Legislative Assembly deputies.

Almost a year into his tenure as head of Kursk Oblast, Alexander Khinshtein reformed the structure of the regional government. He reduced the number of ministries from 24 to 17, abolished the posts of five deputy chairmen of the government, and increased the number of vice-governors from six to eight. Within his team, Khinshtein formed a so-called “Samara bloc” of officials and public figures with whom he had previously worked in Samara Oblast as a State Duma deputy from the region.

The introduction (restoration) of a separate post of head of regional government continues in a number of regions. As a rule, this is linked, on the one hand, to relieving the governor, in the eyes of the public, of some of the political responsibility for the socio-economic situation in the region. On the other hand, it allows the governor to play the role of a political figure, while transferring the bulk of day-to-day economic and administrative matters to the prime minister. This is particularly relevant when the governor himself lacks the necessary economic and administrative management experience (examples include Khinshtein in Kursk Oblast and, earlier, Dyumin in Tula Oblast). In some cases, this also makes it possible to broaden the administration’s support base within the regional and/or federal elite, forming a de facto coalition (when the governor and the prime minister represent different interest groups). However, the latter scenario is usually short-lived in Russian regional political practice (an example being the appointment of Alexander Bitarov, an experienced major entrepreneur and high-ranking official, as prime minister of Irkutsk Oblast under the communist governor Sergei Levchenko).

Thus, the post of chairman of the government was introduced in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast on 1 January 2025 by a decision of acting governor Maria Kostyuk. On 14 January 2025, the varyag Igor Chagaev, former vice-governor of Kuban and first deputy governor of Kherson Oblast, was appointed acting prime minister of the JAO. However, he worked for only four months and resigned on 26.05.2025, citing family circumstances. A local, Andrei Sadaev, deputy chairman of the Oblast government — head of the Finance Department, became acting prime minister. But he also resigned in September 2025. Valery Zhukov, who had been deputy chairman of the JAO Government since 2017, became the new acting prime minister, and from 10.02.2026 the permanent head of government.

Almost simultaneously, after the appointment of acting Kursk Governor Khinshtein, a separate post of head of government was introduced in Kursk Oblast. On 28 January 2025, the regional government was headed by the varyag Alexander Chepik. Since January 2008, Chepik had been deputy chairman of the Government of the Republic of Buryatia, and from 2017 he held the post of prime minister of Karelia.

In April 2025, deputies of the State Assembly adopted the constitutional law “On Amendments to the Constitution of the Altai Republic.” The post of chairman of the Government of the Altai Republic was introduced. Under the “political” governor Turchak, the post of prime minister was taken by businessman and politician Alexander Prokopyev. Since 2008, Prokopyev held the post of strategic development director of the famous company “Evalar” from Altai Krai, which belongs to his mother, Larisa Prokopyeva. From 2011, he was a State Duma deputy; on 3 July 2024, he resigned his deputy powers early in connection with a move to the Government of the Altai Republic to the posts of deputy chairman of the Government and minister of economic development. Since 10 June 2025, he has been acting chairman of the Government of the Altai Republic.

After Rostislav Goldstein was appointed head of Komi, the post of separate head of government was restored in the Republic of Komi. Dmitry Bratynenko, who had previously worked in many regions, became acting prime minister of Komi on 9 January 2025 and permanent head of government from 20.02.2025: originally from Samara, in 2005–2007 he was deputy head of the Government Staff of Samara Oblast; 2009–2014 adviser to the governor of Sakhalin Oblast, first deputy head of the staff, deputy governor — head of the Governor’s and Government Staff of Sakhalin Oblast; 2017–2018 acting vice-governor of Primorsky Krai; 2019–2024 vice-governor of the JAO — first deputy chairman of the JAO Government.

The post of separate head of government was also restored in Chuvashia. Earlier, the head of the region, A Just Russia representative Oleg Nikolaev, upon becoming head of the region in 2020, decided to head the government himself. However, the need to broaden support among the elites ahead of new elections led to the appointment on 25 April 2025 of a separate chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Sergei Artamonov, previously deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers — minister of agriculture. Unlike Oleg Nikolaev, Artamonov is a member of the presidium of the regional political council of the United Russia party.

At the same time, the posts of separate prime ministers were abolished in Zaporozhye Oblast (after regular conflicts between Governor Yevgeny Balitsky and the appointed varyag prime ministers) and in Irkutsk Oblast (after the 2025 gubernatorial elections). In both cases, this may be a sign of the personalisation of the governance system and attempts by the heads of regions to strengthen personal control over the administrations, but it is not a given that this will change the situation for the better as a result, and it will obviously strengthen the symbolic responsibility of the governors for the state of affairs in the region, both before the public and before the federal centre.

The increase in the number of separate heads of government somewhat strengthens, at least normatively, the number of approvals of regional official appointments in regional parliaments (in a trend corresponding to the format of the 2020 amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation). This is taking place against the backdrop of the total dominance of United Russia in the legislative assemblies, which, from the perspective of the executive vertical, does not currently appear to be a threat to its unity, but is rather partly perceived as a normative strengthening of United Russia itself (however, the situation could change in some hypothetical future). The most striking example is the Altai Republic. Previously, under the Constitution of Altai, the State Assembly approved appointments to the posts of deputy chairmen of the Republic’s Government and the member of the Government who heads the executive body of the Altai Republic for finance. Now, the procedure for approval by the State Assembly of candidates for posts has also been extended to the ministers of the Altai Republic.

Often, new administrations, especially in the first stage of a governor’s work, represent a “mixed bag,” where remnants of the previous administration, associates of the new governor from his previous place of work, and other officials recruited through a wide variety of channels are all mixed together.

In the Republic of Komi, under the new head Rostislav Goldstein, Dmitry Bratynenko, who had worked with him in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast as first deputy, arrived as prime minister (he had previously worked in Primorye, Sakhalin and Samara Oblasts). On 30 October 2025, the post of deputy chairman of the Government of the Republic of Komi was taken by Andrei Sadaev, a native of Birobidzhan, who before this appointment worked as deputy chairman of the Government of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast — head of the Finance Department of the JAO Government. The former mayor of Birobidzhan, Maxim Semenov, was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the head of Komi. He also worked in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast on the team of the current head of Komi, Goldstein.

Maria Badmatsyrenova was appointed to the post of minister of tourism of Komi; a separate ministry was created for this sphere. Badmatsyrenova previously worked as deputy director of the Investment Department of the Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, and before that she was involved in tourism development in Buryatia. On 17 February 2015, Yuri Khatanzeyevsky was appointed deputy minister of national policy of the Republic of Komi; he previously held the post of deputy head of the Administration of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug for Nenets and Other Indigenous Minorities of the North (meaning he was deputy governor of the NAO from 2013). Khatanzeyevsky is vice-president of the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation, and is a member of the regional council of the NAO branch of the Interregional Public Movement “Izyvatas.” For many years, he was a member of the regional public movement “Association of the Nenets People ‘Yasavey.’”

At the same time, Larisa Maximova and Sergei Yemelyanov, who had worked in the Government of Komi under previous heads, returned as deputy chairmen. Maximova had been head of the Federal Tax Service Directorate for Komi since 2010, and first deputy chairman of the Government of Komi in 2015–2019. Sergei Yemelyanov was minister of culture, tourism and archives of Komi in 2016–2021. From April 2021, he headed the National Drama Theatre of Russia (the Alexandrinsky Theatre).

Sometimes, the most unexpected personnel moves occur between regions. Thus, on 28.10.2025, Ivan Nifontov was appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the Government of Stavropol Krai (he officially took up the post on 5 November). Ivan Nifontov moved to Stavropol Krai in 2025. He had previously headed the Ministry of Sport of Altai Krai for two years and was a deputy of the Altai Krai Legislative Assembly. He explained his departure from the Altai agency by personal circumstances related to the move. In Stavropol, his appointments were accompanied by the recruitment of other specialists from Altai Krai: in August 2025, former deputy minister of social protection of Altai Krai, Oksana Kudinova, received the post of deputy minister of physical culture and sport of Stavropol Krai with a contract until August 2026.

The influence of the SMO on the composition of administrations

Although the SMO undoubtedly influences the composition of administrations, on the whole this influence is not yet significant, and what is happening is more an adaptation and adjustment of administrations to new requirements. SMO participants mainly fill symbolic political posts and the deputy corps, work in which formally does not require specific professional skills.

It is important to understand that the appointment of key officials in a regional administration requires approval from the relevant federal agencies under a special procedure that presupposes the necessary competencies, specialised education, work experience, recommendations, etc. This procedure has been enshrined since 2020 in the Constitution, federal laws (in particular, Federal Law No. 414-FZ “On the General Principles of Organising Public Authority in the Subjects of the Russian Federation” dated 21.12.2021), departmental resolutions and instructions. Thus, appointment to posts requiring such approval is possible only if the required professional skills are present (which is logical and understandable). As a result, outside these procedures and rather strict professional requirements lie mainly posts that do not presuppose that their holders issue regulatory and governing legal documents or distribute significant budgetary resources (deputies overseeing relations with security structures; patriotic education; youth policy and sport, etc.). It is precisely these posts that are mainly filled by SMO participants without the corresponding bureaucratic experience in their biography.
The very concept of “SMO participant” is broad and is not enshrined in a single federal law or a separate article that would provide an exhaustive definition. This term is a generalising one and is used to designate several categories of Russian citizens participating in the fulfilment of tasks in the SMO zone. Their status is regulated by a whole set of federal laws and regulatory acts.

The main categories of citizens classified as “SMO participants”:

• Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops, military formations and bodies. This includes citizens performing military service under contract or called up for mobilisation;
• Volunteers. These are citizens who have signed a contract on voluntary assistance in fulfilling the tasks assigned to the RF Armed Forces or the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation;
• Employees of other state bodies performing tasks in the SMO zone as part of their official duties: employees of the FSB, Rosgvardia, the police and other structures.

For the professional training/retraining of “SMO participants” to continue bureaucratic and/or political careers, the “Time of Heroes” project was created. It was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin during his address to the Federal Assembly on 29 February 2024. In his speech, he called “the toilers and warriors who have proven their devotion to Russia” a new “elite.” Training is conducted under the programme of the Graduate School of Public Administration of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) at the “Senezh” management workshop, with members of the RF Government, staff of the Presidential Administration, and representatives of ministries and agencies acting as mentors.

Almost all Russian regions have also launched their own analogues of the federal personnel project “Time of Heroes.” Readiness to launch personnel projects for SMO participants in the subjects of the RF began to be announced en masse immediately after President Vladimir Putin proposed expanding the federal “Time of Heroes” programme to the regional level on 14 December 2024. The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug was one of the first to begin collecting applications (on 25 December); its example was followed by several more regions in January, and in February, registration of participants opened in more than half of the 89 subjects of the RF. In March 2025, programmes started in the last four regions: Penza, Rostov, Irkutsk and Vladimir Oblasts.

The majority of regional projects are created “in the image and likeness” of the federal one. This primarily concerns the names, which often use the word “heroes”: “Time of Heroes of St. Petersburg,” “Heroes of the Vostok” (Khabarovsk Krai), “Zaporozhye Heroes” (Zaporozhye Oblast). In the republics, national languages are often used: in Chechnya, the project is called “Turpalkho. Heroes of 95” (“turpalkho” — “hero,” “bogatyr”), in Tatarstan — “Batyrlar. Heroes of Tatarstan” (“batyr” — “bogatyr,” “daredevil”). But some subjects preferred more original names: “Valour of the Mountains” (Dagestan), “Steel” (Belgorod Oblast), “Siberian Character” (Krasnoyarsk Krai), “Stalingrad Call-Up” (Volgograd Oblast), “Victory-Bearer” (Astrakhan Oblast).

The requirements for potential participants are practically identical: they can be current participants or veterans of the SMO with secondary or higher education, who are citizens of the Russian Federation and have no criminal record. However, in Tomsk Oblast, the project also admitted “leaders engaged in volunteer activities related to the conduct of the SMO.” As Governor Vladimir Mazur explained, “those who organised the labour of dozens of people and set up essentially industrial-scale production of everything needed for the front” also deserve to participate in the programme. The candidate selection procedure is also similar: after registration, they must undergo remote testing and an interview to determine their “basic level of knowledge” and “direction of further work,” and the final selection is predominantly planned to be held in person. The start dates for training differ. For instance, in Chuvashia, Volgograd Oblast and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, training began in the summer of 2025, while in Tyva, Krasnoyarsk and Zabaikalsky Krais, classes started on 1 September. The educational course is most often designed for a year, but, for example, in Udmurtia it is shorter (eight to nine months), and in Buryatia, fighters studied for only half a year (502 academic hours).

The training platforms in many regions have become branches of RANEPA, which is represented in 49 subjects (on their basis, for example, training takes place in Khabarovsk Krai, Kirov and Kaliningrad Oblasts). In other cases, the academy somehow combines efforts with local universities: thus, in Magadan Oblast, the second operator will be the North-Eastern State University, and in Buryatia, local lecturers will work according to RANEPA standards. The participants’ mentors, as planned, will almost everywhere be vice-governors, regional ministers and their deputies, and, for example, in Bashkortostan and Kemerovo Oblast, the heads of regions have also expressed such a desire. As Kuzbass Governor Ilya Seredyuk explained, he is ready not only to “accompany the applicants” but also to take them with him on working trips around the oblast, “to involve them in events where serious decisions are made.”

The anticipated set of vacancies to be offered to programme graduates is also quite standard: these are bodies of state and municipal authority, and large local companies. In addition, in Primorsky Krai, veterans are promised employment in organisations of “patriotic orientation and for work with youth,” and in Tomsk Oblast, they will also be able to “engage in public or political activity.”

As for the applications submitted, according to data from Kommersant, their number mainly amounts to a few dozen per region. Although some programmes are seeing a very high level of competition: for example, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, 576 candidates are vying for 60 places, and in Yakutia, more than 350 for 25 places. Overall, in terms of the number of applications, according to Kommersant’s calculations, Dagestan (more than 1,000), Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (901) and Tatarstan (873) are currently leading.

On the whole, deployments to the SMO zone remain an attribute of career advancement for the traditional nomenklatura, who could have occupied the corresponding posts even before (without the attribute of “SMO participant”). In effect, obtaining the status of “SMO participant” is now an additional element of their professional resume, reinforcing their career ambitions.

At the same time, when analysing such appointments, it is sometimes difficult to publicly separate “SMO participants” from officials who have worked for some time in the government bodies of the annexed regions of Eastern Ukraine (the regional and local press constantly conflates them).

Among the governors of the 83 “old Russian regions” as of 01.01.2026, there were five who had either previously worked in the government bodies of the regions of Eastern Ukraine or were publicly designated as an “SMO participant,” all of them with extensive bureaucratic and administrative experience (it is clear that there is no point in including the regions of Eastern Ukraine themselves, Crimea and Sevastopol in this list in this case): Governor of Chukotka Vladislav Kuznetsov, who worked as first deputy chairman of the LNR Government in 2022–2023 (previously deputy governor in Kurgan Oblast); Vitaly Khotsenko, who was chairman of the DNR Government in 2022–2023, and his successor as head of the LNR Government in 2023–2025, Yevgeny Solntsev, who became the heads of Omsk and Orenburg Oblasts respectively (the former previously worked in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the latter in the Russian Railways system); Governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Irina Gekht, previously head of the appointed Russian government of Zaporozhye Oblast (formerly first deputy governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast); Governor of Tambov Oblast Yevgeny Pervyshov, previously head of Krasnodar and a State Duma deputy from a single-mandate constituency in Krasnodar. A sixth person who can be included in this group is the Governor of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Maria Kostyuk (born 1977); she previously worked in the JAO Government as deputy, first deputy head of the Governor’s and Government Staff of the JAO, and deputy chairman of the government — head of the Governor’s and Government Staff of the JAO. She did not work in government bodies in Eastern Ukraine, but from June 2023 she was head of the department for work with regions of the federal fund “Defenders of the Fatherland,” was the head of the “Time of Heroes” programme, and deputy director of the Graduate School of Public Administration of RANEPA. Maria Kostyuk’s son, Andrei Kovtun, died in the SMO zone and was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia. Maria Kostyuk and Yevgeny Pervyshov are graduates of the “Time of Heroes” programme.

Already after 1 January 2026, on 13.05.2026, Yegor Kovalchuk (born 1973) was appointed acting governor of Bryansk Oblast. He is the former deputy head of the Chelyabinsk Administration for housing and utilities and municipal services; minister of industry, natural resources and property relations of Chelyabinsk Oblast; minister of radiation and environmental safety of Chelyabinsk Oblast; head of the Department of Housing and Utilities Complex and Energy of KhMAO-Yugra; he worked for half a year in the Department of Special Projects of the Ministry of Construction; in September 2019, he returned to the Government of Chelyabinsk Oblast, where he took the post of vice-governor and oversaw issues of industry, housing and utilities and energy; in 2023, he became mayor of Miass; in June 2024, he resigned early in connection with his appointment to the post of chairman of the Government of the Lugansk People’s Republic. On the same day, 13.05.2026, Major General, Hero of Russia Alexander Shuvaev (born 1981) was appointed acting governor of Belgorod Oblast. He was deputy governor of Irkutsk Oblast from 19 January 2026 to 13 May 2026. He oversaw issues of security, interaction with law enforcement agencies, territorial defence, mobilisation work and support for the families of SMO participants. A career military man, he participated in combat operations in Syria, the North Caucasus and the operation in Georgia in August 2008. From 2022, he served in the SMO zone. In June 2025, he became a participant in the second intake of the “Time of Heroes” programme; his mentor was the Governor of Irkutsk Oblast, Igor Kobzev. With Kovalchuk and Shuvaev, the number of governors of the “old regions of the RF” who are SMO participants or worked in Eastern Ukraine reached eight out of 83 (9.6%), of whom six are professional officials and only Shuvaev is a professional military man.

***

Among the heads of regional governments (where this post is separate from the governor), deputy governors and heads of regional governments, chiefs of staff, and heads of regional finance who held their posts in the period from 01.01.2025 to 01.01.2026, 17 professional officials can be noted who, according to open data, are “SMO participants” or managed to work in the regions of Eastern Ukraine, meaning they constitute 2.07% of this nomenklatura group (its total number as of 01.01.2025 was 821).

In this group:

Alexander Alexandrovich Agibalov, born 1988. Deputy Governor of Krasnodar Krai for quality, sport and mobilisation work since 28.10.2025. Born in Krasnodar, educated at the Kuban State University of Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism. From 2011, he held various positions in institutions and government bodies of Kuban, and was chairman of the Union of Cossack Youth of the region. From 2020, he held leadership positions in Sakhalin Oblast, and was an adviser to the governor of Khabarovsk Krai. He left for the SMO in January 2025 as a volunteer. Afterwards, he signed a contract and served as a reconnaissance scout in the BARS-32 detachment.

Dmitry Viktorovich Berdnikov, born 1966. First deputy chairman of the Government of Orenburg Oblast for interaction with federal bodies since 02.09.2025. Son of Albina Semyonovna Kovalyova, a prosecutor’s office worker, honorary citizen of the city of Irkutsk, and State Counsellor of Justice 2nd Class (Lieutenant General). From 2006 to 2014, he held leadership positions in business structures. On 27 March 2015, he was elected mayor of the city by deputies of the Irkutsk Duma. On 17 March 2020, he became first deputy governor of Irkutsk Oblast. On 12 November 2020, he was appointed acting deputy chairman of the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). In November 2022, he was appointed first deputy head of Mariupol (DNR). From 17 May 2023 to 18 February 2025, he was deputy chairman, and from February to September 2025, first deputy chairman of the DNR Government.

Sergei Vyacheslavovich Bychkov, born 1978, born in Birobidzhan. Acting deputy chairman of the Government of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast since 29.11.24, deputy chairman of the JAO Government since 24.09.2025. Responsible for the implementation of state powers in the following spheres: combating crime and coordinating the activities of crime prevention subjects; ensuring the operation of the staff of justices of the peace of the JAO; mobilisation preparation; civil defence; emergency situations and fire safety. Graduated from the Academy of the FSB of the RF (2002, lawyer). From 10.2006 to 02.2007 — chief specialist of the economic security department of the “Moskovsky” branch of JSCB “Agroimpuls”; 2007–2011 general director of OOO “Tekhnologii Bezopasnosti”; 2011–2014 general director of OOO “Sistemy Bezopasnosti”; 2009–2023 general director of OOO “VVD.” From 07.2023 to 11.2024 — head of the Department for Work with the Regions of the Central, Northwestern, Southern and North Caucasus Federal Districts of the State Fund for Support of SMO Participants “Defenders of the Fatherland.”

Dmitry Viktorovich Vodolatsky, born 1986. In March 2025, appointed deputy governor of Rostov Oblast. Son of State Duma deputy Viktor Vodolatsky, ataman of the Military Cossack Society “Great Don Host” (1999–2013), former deputy governor of Rostov Oblast for Cossack affairs and ecology. D. Vodolatsky worked in the administration of the city of Krasnodar in 2017. In 2020, he was appointed head of the Western District of Krasnodar. From 2023 — 1st deputy head of the Regional Directorate of Special Communications for the North Caucasus Federal District. From 2024, he was deputy commander for military-political work of the 36th Rifle Battalion “Bars.” Awarded the LNR medal “For Merits” II class.

Yegor Andreyevich Gorbatenko, born 1995. Acting deputy since 22.07.24, deputy chairman of the Government of Omsk Oblast since July 2025, from 22.07.2024. Oversees the work of the Ministry of Internal Policy and the Ministry of Regional Security of Omsk Oblast, in particular, regarding the implementation of state policy towards the Russian Cossacks. In 2016, he graduated from the National Research University “MPEI,” and in 2018 from the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. His career began with work in the RF Ministry of Industry and Trade. Worked as an assistant to the chairman of the DNR Government.

Sergei Vladimirovich Dovgalyuk, born 1975, born in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. Until 2009, he served under contract. Then he worked in structural subdivisions of the Rosrezerv Directorate for the Central Federal District. From December 2020 to March 2021, he was deputy director of the Customer Service of Irkutsk Oblast. In July 2021, he became deputy chairman of the Government of Irkutsk Oblast. In this post, he oversaw the ministries of housing policy and energy, construction, transport and road management, the tariff service and the state housing inspectorate. In January 2023, he was appointed deputy governor of Irkutsk Oblast. He led the restoration of Kirovsk in the LNR, oversaw the organisation of humanitarian support for residents of the DNR and the provision of assistance to SMO participants. In August 2023, he resigned. On 11 September 2023, he was appointed deputy governor of Belgorod Oblast — minister of housing and utilities of the region. His remit includes housing restoration, water supply and solid municipal waste management.

Sergei Viktorovich Yefremov (1973–2025). Vice-governor of Primorsky Krai for internal policy (28.02.2024–02.02.2025). Graduated from the Ussuriysk Suvorov Military School and the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School, also graduated from RANEPA with a degree in “State and Municipal Administration.” He had experience of military service in air assault troops, worked as first deputy head of the Ussuriysk Urban District, where he oversaw the sphere of property relations, procurement and urban planning. He was chairman of the DOSAAF Russia branch for Primorsky Krai. From 2022, he participated in the SMO, was the commander of the volunteer detachment “Tigr,” formed in Primorye on the basis of the 155th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet. Already serving as vice-governor, in August 2024, at the head of the “Tigr” detachment, he again left for the SMO in Kursk Oblast. On 2 February 2025, he died in Kursk Oblast — the vehicle carrying Yefremov hit a mine. According to the Governor of Primorsky Krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, Yefremov “died returning from a combat mission.”

Rakhim Ramzanovich Isayev, born 1966. First deputy governor of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Born in the city of Kamensk, Rostov Oblast. In 2019–2022, general director of OOO “Krasnosulinsky Meat Processing Plant.” In the period from 2022 to 2023, he worked in the economic sphere, was a deputy in one of the urban districts of Rostov Oblast and the official representative of the head of the Chechen Republic in the LNR and DNR. In 2023, he was appointed adviser to the governor of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Since December 2023, he has held the post of First Deputy Governor of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. From 1 September 2024 to 1 March 2025, he participated in the SMO on the territories of the LNR and DNR, and in the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of Kursk Oblast. In what exact capacity is unknown.

Artyom Vyacheslavovich Melnikov, born 1976. Vice-governor — head of the Government Staff of Khabarovsk Krai since 19.08.2024. From 1998, he worked in various positions in the prosecutor’s offices in different regions, including: Yegoryevsk City Prosecutor of Moscow Oblast; assistant prosecutor of Kaluga Oblast; head of the Directorate of the Prosecutor’s Office of Leningrad Oblast; deputy head of the Main Directorate of the RF Prosecutor General’s Office in the Southern Federal District; head of the Directorate of the RF Prosecutor General’s Office in the North Caucasus Federal District. In 2018–2022, he headed the internal audit service of the state corporation “Roscosmos.” In 2022–2024, in the SMO zone. Awarded the Order of Courage.

Rustam Ramilevich Mingazov, born 1978. First deputy chairman of the Government of Omsk Oblast since 21.11.2023. From 2013, he worked at the Investment Development Agency of the Republic of Tatarstan. Then he became deputy minister of energy of Stavropol Krai under Vitaly Khotsenko. Afterwards, the new head of the DNR Government, Khotsenko, appointed Mingazov as his first deputy from November 2022. In November 2023, the Governor of Omsk Oblast, Vitaly Khotsenko, appointed Rustam Mingazov as first deputy chairman of the regional government.

Marat Fatykhovich Mirkhaidarov, born 1978 — Zabaikalsky Krai. For some time, he was considered a key associate of the Governor of Zabaikalsky Krai, Alexander Osipov. This native of Bashkiria and businessman met Osipov back when they both worked in “Delovaya Rossiya.” It is interesting that Mirkhaidarov began his work in the Government of Zabaikalsky Krai as head of the regional representative office in Moscow, then returned to business for a time. First deputy governor from 11 January 2019 to 21 January 2020; on 20 March 2023, he became head of the Governor’s Administration and also first deputy chairman of the regional government. He actively advanced himself through the SMO line, hoping to make a successful political career. Mirkhaidarov was even touted in the media as allegedly being destined for the post of head of Bashkiria. In January 2024, Mirkhaidarov spoke about his joining the “Akhmat” battalion, but in April 2024 he returned to Chita. To the questions of citizens surprised by this, he replied that his contract had been concluded for only four months. On the other hand, Mirkhaidarov managed to receive the medal “For Combat Merits” and post quite a few photos in military uniform on social networks. In March 2025, it became known that Mirkhaidarov would leave the region from 8 March 2025. He explained this by the need for rehabilitation after leg surgery (an injury received in the SMO), which he needed after a New Year’s trip to the SMO. He was replaced by Nikita Alexandrovich Ganchar, who served in the FSO, then headed the department for managing organisational work and public relations of the State Duma Staff.

Konstantin Nikolayevich Patrayev, born 1967. Vice-governor of Leningrad Oblast for internal policy since 17.11.2025. Former first deputy mayor of Svetogorsk in the Vyborg District. From 2002, he held various positions in the administration of the Vyborg District; in 2006–2012, he was head of the administration of the Vyborg District. In March 2012, he became vice-governor of Leningrad Oblast. In June 2012, he was promoted to first vice-governor, where he worked until 2015. Then adviser to the general director of AO “Teploset Sankt-Peterburga,” adviser to the governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, etc. In 2021–2025 — head of the administrative staff of the general director, adviser to the general director of AO “Lengazspetsstroy.” In 2024–2025, pro bono adviser to the governor of Leningrad Oblast on interaction with the DNR. A fighter in the volunteer battalion “Alania,” formed in North Ossetia. It was reported that Patrayev was the head of the classified documents section in the “Alania” detachment, performing combat tasks in the SMO zone.

Dariy Viktorovich Tyurin. Deputy chairman of the Government of Khabarovsk Krai for natural resources and agriculture, born 1972. From 2014 to 2022 — minister of housing and utilities. From 29 August 2022 — deputy chairman of the Government. In March 2025, he suspended his civil service and signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence. On 29.09.2025, he returned to the post of deputy chairman from the SMO zone.

Nikolai Mikhailovich Tsiganov, born 1973. Vice-governor of Leningrad Oblast — head of the Representative Office to the RF Government since 05.03.2024. In August 2022, he was sent to oversee the restoration of the sponsored city of Yenakiyevo, and then settled in Mariupol. Until the end of 2023, he held the post of minister of construction of the DNR. According to 47news, Tsiganov, in the rank of vice-governor, not only heads the Representative Office of Leningrad Oblast to the RF Government, but his remit also includes the task of creating and organising the work of a representative office of Leningrad Oblast in Novorossiya.

Denis Gennadyevich Tsukanov , born 1985. Deputy chairman of the Government, Minister of Digital Development and Communications of Omsk Oblast since 11.07.2023. From 2014 to 2022, deputy director of the Department of Regional Industrial Policy and Project Management of the RF Ministry of Industry and Trade. From October 2022 to May 2023 — deputy chairman of the DNR Government — Head of the DNR Government Staff. Was detained and held in a pre-trial detention centre, but returned to work on 28 August 2025.

Igor Olegovich Chagaev, born 1987. After working in the administration of Kherson Oblast, he headed the Government of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (but for only four months). Born in the city of Labinsk, Krasnodar Krai. Worked in institutions of Krasnodar Krai. In 2009, he was elected a deputy of the Council of the Labinsk Urban Settlement. From 2016, in the administration of the municipal formation “Labinsky District,” he was deputy head of the District Administration for organisational work and interaction with local self-government bodies. On 28 February 2018, he was elected head of Labinsky District by deputies. On 11 December 2019, he was appointed head of the Department of Internal Policy of Krasnodar Krai. On 30 September 2020, he was appointed vice-governor of Kuban. On 27 April 2023, he left the post he held in connection with a move to a new place of work. On 1 June 2023, he was appointed first deputy governor of Kherson Oblast for internal policy; on 10 January 2025, he resigned. On 14 January 2025, he was appointed acting prime minister of the JAO. Already on 26.05.25, Igor Chagaev resigned from the post of acting prime minister. As the acting governor of the region, Maria Kostyuk, reported on her Telegram channel, the official submitted a letter of resignation of his own accord, citing family circumstances. According to Mr. Chagaev, he has been away from home for almost two years, and his four children are growing up without a father.

Andrei Viktorovich Shpilenko, born 1975. Deputy chairman of the Government, representative of Omsk Oblast to the RF Government since April 2023. From 1993 to 2002, he served in the Armed Forces of the RF. He worked as deputy head of the staff of the United Russia faction in the RF State Duma, vice-rector of the Moscow State University of Technologies and Management, and deputy general director of OAO “Intellekt Telekom.” He was director of the Association of Clusters, Technoparks and SEZs of Russia. In 2022–2023 — Chairman of the Board of the State Concern “Corporation for the Development of Donbass.”

After the period under review had ended (and therefore not reflected in the statistics), on 11 February 2026, SMO participant Sergei Fofanov was appointed deputy governor of Kursk Region. He will oversee agriculture, ecology and industry in the region. Sergei Fofanov is 56 years old. He is an SMO veteran, decorated with the Order of Courage and the medals “For Valour” and “For Bravery” 2nd class. He holds two higher-education degrees, in “Jurisprudence” and “Organisation of Waterborne Freight Transport”. According to the Kursk governor, he worked as deputy head of the Forestry Agency and headed JSC “Nefteflot” in Samara Region. Rusprofile.ru data shows that only a closed joint-stock company of the same name is registered in the region. Sergei Fofanov was its director from April 2022 to June 2024. CJSC “Nefteflot” was founded in January 1996 in Samara. Its main activity is the construction of ships, vessels and floating structures. On 30 January 2026 it became known that a journalist from Vladivostok, the well-known TV journalist and Channel One war correspondent from Primorye, Alexei Kruchinin, would become the new deputy governor of Sakhalin Region. He will oversee state information policy. Kruchinin made multiple trips to the SMO zone and has been awarded the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” 1st class and commendations from the President and the Government of the Russian Federation. The incumbent deputy governor, Sergei Grebenyuk, moved to the government apparatus on 30 January 2026. He also continued to oversee state information policy and the implementation of special projects. On 10 February 2026, Ilya Yemelyanov was appointed deputy chairman of the government of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). He is a Hero of the DPR, holds combat decorations — two Orders of Courage and the medal “For Valour” — and took part in the federal programme “Time of Heroes”. As the Head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, noted, “the new deputy prime minister’s main focus will be work on life-support for the liberated territories”. “Ilya has defended Russian land since 2014; now it is his task to launch constructive processes here. Under Ilya Yemelyanov’s command, the 114th Brigade carried out combat missions heroically. Since last summer I have been his mentor in tackling peacetime issues, and I saw his complete immersion in the specifics of the work, his dedication, and his systematic approach to supporting residents of the liberated territories. Ilya joined the Donbass team long ago and has become a firm part of it; I am confident that in his new post he will strengthen it,” Denis Pushilin stressed. Ilya Yemelyanov was born in 1992 in the village of Troitskoye in the Republic of Kalmykia. From April 2014 he served in the militia, later commanded the legendary 114th Brigade, and took part in the battles for Peski, Donetsk Airport and the Avdiivka industrial zone. In June 2025, Ilya Yemelyanov was among the 85 participants admitted to the second cohort of the “Time of Heroes” programme.

SMO participants who are professional military personnel (siloviki) with no prior administrative or managerial experience are extremely poorly represented in the administrations. Among the studied group of regional nomenklatura (deputy governors and heads of regional governments) there are only four such individuals. Thus, together with professional officials, these two groups of SMO participants accounted for 2.56% of this part of regional administrations during the period 1 January 2025–1 January 2026.

Roman Yuryevich Balashov, born 1989. Deputy governor of Lipetsk Region, SMO veteran; his forthcoming appointment was announced in November 2024 and he was officially appointed on 14 April 2025. He oversees mobilisation preparedness, sport and youth policy. The veteran spent several months on a placement in the Lipetsk Region government under the supervision of the head of the region, Igor Artamonov. He graduated from the Military Aviation Engineering University in Voronezh (now the N. Zhukovsky and Yu. Gagarin Air Force Academy). He served in the army for more than 17 years and fought in hot spots. He has been in the SMO since September 2022. A major and the chief of reconnaissance of the 344th Motorised Rifle Regiment, he was wounded twice. In 2024 he was selected for the “Time of Heroes” programme.

Maxim Vladimirovich Kovalev, born 1982. Acting deputy governor of the city of Sevastopol since 19 August 2025. An SMO participant, he will oversee housing and utilities and ecology. He worked for some time in Vologda and Samara regions. He was born in Sevastopol and served in the Ukrainian police unit “Berkut” until 2014. After Crimea became part of the Russian Federation, “Berkut” was transferred to the authority of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and later the National Guard. In 2022, unit fighters took part in the special operation in Ukraine, and in the summer of 2022 local media reported that “Berkut” had returned to Sevastopol. From 2023, Kovalev held the post of commander of the Sevastopol “Berkut-S”. In August 2024, Kovalev took up the post of deputy governor of Volgograd Region, where he oversaw public safety and the protection of public order and coordinated the work of the committee for civil defence and social security. The official left the post as early as September 2024. On 14 October 2024 he became vice-governor of Samara Region. In Samara Region he headed the department for law-and-order and anti-corruption. On 16 July 2025 it became known that Vice-Governor Maxim Kovalev was leaving the government of Samara Region. On 19 August 2025 he became acting vice-governor of Sevastopol for housing, utilities and ecology.

Artyom Mikhailovich Nikolayev, born 1995. On 7 April 2025 he was appointed deputy chairman of the government of Penza Region. He is responsible for youth policy, patriotic education and the implementation of national and federal projects in the region; he coordinates interaction with volunteer organisations and oversees the rehabilitation and employment of SMO veterans. In 2018 he graduated from the Chelyabinsk branch of the Military Educational and Scientific Centre of the Air Force, the “Air Force Academy”. He was posted to Khabarovsk for service in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. He took part in Russia’s military operation in Syria as a navigator of a Ka-52 combat helicopter. From 2022 he has been deployed in the special military operation zone in Ukraine. During his service in the SMO zone, the Guards captain flew more than 130 combat sorties, was wounded but returned to duty. In May 2024 he was sent for training under the presidential personnel programme “Time of Heroes”. He completed a placement under the governor of Penza Region, Oleg Melnichenko. After his appointment as deputy chairman of the regional government, he transferred to the state civil service and is now in the reserve. He holds two Orders of Courage, the Nesterov Medal and two medals “For Valour”. Nikolayev has no experience of state or municipal service.

Alexander Anatolyevich Shlyapnikov, born 1986. In December 2024 he was appointed deputy governor of Kaluga Region for public safety and interaction with security agencies. A graduate of the “Time of Heroes” programme. A holder of two Orders of Courage and the medal “For Valour”. He has served in the Armed Forces since 2003. In 2018 he graduated from the A. M. Vasilevsky Military Academy of Army Air Defence. From 2022 he took part in the special military operation in Ukraine. It is reported that the new deputy governor “completed a placement in Kaluga Region and worked on projects in the sphere of patriotic education, the adaptation of special-operation participants and security provision”. He replaced Vasily Bykadorov, born 1958, who until August 2018 was the head of the research centre of the military institute (national defence management) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

SMO participants who have neither administrative nor professional military experience (in simple terms, “volunteers” from among ordinary workers and employees) are not represented in the administrations at all.

***

Overall, regional administrations consist almost entirely of civilian specialists. Khabarovsk Krai remains an exception, where on 15 May 2024 the former deputy prosecutor general, Dmitry Demeshin, became acting governor. Representatives of security agencies, or people evidently connected with them, are actively working in the new administration, which apparently speaks to the federal centre’s continuing deep distrust of Khabarovsk’s own politicians:

• Oleg Sergeyevich Ignatov — vice-governor of Khabarovsk Krai — head of the Representative Office of the Government of Khabarovsk Krai to the Government of the Russian Federation, former prosecutor of Khimki, assistant to the deputy prosecutor general;
• Sergei Borisovich Abramov, First Deputy Chairman of the Krai Government, former auditor of the Accounts Chamber, former prime minister of Chechnya and acting head of Chechnya after the assassination of A. Kadyrov;
• Artyom Vyacheslavovich Melnikov, Vice-Governor of Khabarovsk Krai, former prosecutor, worked at Roscosmos;
• Sergei Alexeyevich Sergeyev, Deputy Chairman of the Krai Government — head of the Governor’s and Krai Government’s administration, former head of the Moscow Region State Traffic Inspectorate.

The number of siloviki in the administration of Stavropol Krai has decreased. As of 1 January there were three out of nine deputy chairmen of the krai government. By 1 January 2026 two remained: Igor Ivanov, the former head of the Investigative Committee’s krai directorate in 2017–2024, and Yuri Kovalenko, who from 1997 until his appointment to the Stavropol Krai management team served under contract in the Russian state security agencies. In September 2025, Sergei Dubrovin (the former head of the Investigative Committee’s krai directorate in 2007–2016) left the post of deputy prime minister and went to the SMO as part of a volunteer formation. In the krai government, Sergei Dubrovin was responsible for, among other things, interaction with the territories of the LPR and support for fellow countrymen taking part in the SMO.

***

For the most part, SMO participants without administrative experience are replenishing not regional administrations but the deputy corps or municipal posts.

In 2024, at least 15% of the total number of candidates who won mandates following elections to regional legislative assemblies had studied under the presidential personnel programme “Time of Heroes”. On the single voting day in 2025, SMO participants accounted for less than 2% of nominated candidates. On 12 August 2025, the CEC published a note reporting that 1,607 SMO participants had expressed a wish to become candidates in the September elections. At that point, 1,397 people had successfully passed the registration procedure. The largest number of such candidates was registered for municipal elections — 1,052 in 67 regions. A further 187 candidates were running for regional parliaments, and 156 for seats on the councils of regional capitals. At the same time, the total number of nominated candidates across all elections was 91,032. Thus, only 1.7% of candidates had any connection to the SMO. The most numerous category of nominees was state-funded workers — more than 37,000 candidates (40.6%) were linked to work in state and municipal institutions. It is worth noting that among those whom the CEC classifies as “SMO participants”, a significant percentage are also serving officials who use the SMO. Judging by preliminary data on preparations for nomination, the number of SMO participants in the new convocation of the State Duma of the Russian Federation will rise sharply (figures of 100 deputies out of 450 are cited).

Among regional centres, on 4 December 2025, Alexei Andreyevich Kuzmin, born 1994, described as an “SMO veteran”, became the new head (mayor) of Birobidzhan. Kuzmin is a participant in the regional personnel programme “Valour of the Khingan” and has experience working in local government bodies. From 2016 to 2019 he held various municipal posts in the administration of Obluchensky District. In 2019 he was appointed first deputy head of the administration of Obluchensky Urban Settlement, and from February 2021 he headed its administration. From September 2024 he took part in the SMO as a volunteer. In April 2025, Kuzmin resigned early from his powers as head of Obluchensky Settlement and moved to work in the administration of Leninsky District as first deputy head for transport, energy, construction and architecture, road and housing-and-utilities infrastructure, civil defence and emergency situations, and fire safety. From October 2025 he held the post of deputy head of Birobidzhan for internal policy. Answering a question from one of the deputies about how long he had spent in the SMO zone, Alexei Kuzmin replied that it was six months. After his fixed-term contract ended, the official returned to the Jewish Autonomous Region.

The head of the administration of Belgorod since 17 January 2023 (acting from 8 November 2022 to 17 January 2023), Valentin Valentinovich Demidov, born 1976, is a “varangian” from Eastern Ukraine. It was reported that on 22 May 2025, Valentin Demidov completed his service in the SMO zone in the volunteer detachment “Bars-Belgorod” and returned to his duties. He recounted this on his Telegram channel. At an extraordinary session of the city council, deputies decided to extend his contract from 22 May 2025. The mayor of Belgorod joined the volunteer detachment on 18 April 2025 (meaning he served for one month). At the end of April 2025, Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov explained why Belgorod officials are going to serve in “Bars”. He believes it is necessary in order to understand the situation in the border territories.

On 10 October 2025, Yevgeny Nikolayevich Maslov, born 1980, was elected mayor of Kursk. He worked in the Kursk branch of “Rostekhinventarizatsiya”, from which he moved in 2014 to work for United Russia, where he immediately became the head of the regional executive committee. In 2022 he was elected to the Kursk City Assembly, after which he left for a year-and-a-half work assignment in the DPR. There he also held the post of head of the executive committee of the regional branch of United Russia.

The new convocation of the Tambov City Duma, elected in September 2025, was headed by special military operation (SMO) veteran and participant in the “Time of Heroes” training programme, Konstantin Kuteinikov. A Guards lieutenant colonel who sustained several wounds during combat operations, he completed a placement in the local regional government under the mentorship of the then governor, Maxim Yegorov. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Kuteinikov headed the United Russia party list in the city duma elections. He was born in Tambov on 17 December 1985. In 2009 he graduated from the Ryazan Airborne Troops Academy, and in 2021 from the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In early 2024, Mr Kuteinikov wrote on his social media that he had decided to take part in the “Time of Heroes” programme in light of the circumstances that had arisen and because of the “latest wound” he had received. In the summer of 2024, Governor Maxim Yegorov presented Kuteinikov as a career officer who had risen from platoon commander to battalion commander and had taken part in the special operation “from the very first days”. Yegorov took the serviceman on working trips and invited him to meetings and public events, and then stated that he had successfully completed his placement. After Maxim Yegorov’s resignation, which was followed by his arrest and remand in custody on a bribery charge (Part 6, Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, up to 15 years’ imprisonment), the then acting governor, Yevgeny Pervyshov, said that Mr Kuteinikov plays an important role in the work of the regional analogue of the federal “Time of Heroes” programme — “Heroes of the Tambov Land”. At the same time, the administration in Tambov is headed by Maxim Kosenkov. Kosenkov already held the post of head of the administration of the regional centre in 2005–2008, and then in 2020–2022 as acting head. In February 2022 he was officially appointed to the post. He was expelled from the United Russia party, headed the regional branch of the “Rodina” party and formed its list for the city duma elections in 2020, but in 2025 he returned to United Russia.

In November 2024, SMO participant Guards Major Sergei Sechenov, born 1989, was elected the new speaker of the city duma in Tomsk. The previous speaker of the Tomsk City Duma, Chingis Akatayev, resigned his powers early due to loss of trust. This was linked to errors in his income declaration. In addition, a criminal case was opened against him over fraud involving air tickets. The proceedings were discontinued after some time, and Akatayev paid a fine of 50,000 roubles. By a majority of votes, deputies elected Sergei Sechenov, who had joined the duma after the September by-elections, to the post of duma chairman. Sechenov is a former participant in combat operations in Ukraine. He graduated from the Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky Military Academy of Army Air Defence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. After being wounded, he was demobilised. Judging by Sechenov’s social media, he frequently visited schools in Tomsk and held talks there “aimed at patriotic education”.

Appointments of SMO participants as heads of individual local-government bodies were reported in Irkutsk, Vologda, Kurgan, Ivanovo and Kirov regions, in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, and also in Mordovia, Dagestan, Kalmykia and Crimea.

Corruption incidents and their influence on the composition of administrations

The media traditionally devote a great deal of attention to the fight against corruption and the criminal prosecution of regional and local officials, which can create the impression that such cases have become substantially more numerous. Nikolai Petrov, who previously studied the statistics of repression against the regional nomenklatura, wrote back in 2019: “It is important that since 2015 the number of convicted persons has been growing (while the number of accused has remained almost unchanged). Repression, in terms of the number of people repressed, has thus reached a certain design capacity reflecting the current state of the system. Is this a lot or a little? It is difficult to judge with regard to federal elites, but with regard to regional political elites it is roughly 1.5–2% of their total number annually — a figure comparable to Stalinist repression.”

In preparing this report, statistics were collected on officials who held the posts under study in regional administrations from 1 January 2025 to 1 January 2026 and became the subject of criminal prosecution during the year. That is, officials who were already former officials as of 1 January 2025 and became subjects of investigations are not counted — so as to avoid artificial manipulation and to keep the list of positions under study initially closed; if former officials were included, it would be unclear what total number the share should be calculated from. Also not counted are officials not included in the list under study (regional ministers, heads of departments, etc., who are not deputy governors or heads of governments).

The collected data produce a picture close to Nikolai Petrov’s data for 2018–2019 — 17 cases out of a list of 821 people at the start of the year is 2.07% (it appears that even if one or two cases were possibly missed, this hardly changes the overall ratio). Thus, despite all the PR noise, which often mixes together current and former regional officials, deputies, municipal employees and heads of municipal enterprises, a strictly methodological count based on the posts held shows a fairly stable share of regional officials subjected to criminal prosecution over at least the last 10 years. In other words, the real share of officials at this level subjected to repression has hardly grown since 2022.

According to the collected data, the following officials from the list under study became subjects of criminal prosecution during the period 1 January 2025–1 January 2026:

Republic of Buryatia. On 19 June 2025, Yevgeny Lukovnikov — deputy chairman of the government of Buryatia for infrastructure development. On 19 June 2025 he announced that he had submitted his resignation on personal grounds, effective 30 June. Lukovnikov himself said that he had made the decision because of health problems. On 2 March 2026 his dismissal was reclassified as “loss of trust”. Earlier, a prosecutor had filed a lawsuit demanding that the wording of the dismissal be changed. It was established that in 2024–2025, Yevgeny Lukovnikov was responsible for infrastructure development, construction and housing and utilities, road infrastructure, and the activities and development prospects of transport organisations. At the same time, he did not take measures to prevent and resolve a conflict of interest while exercising state-management functions in relation to affiliated legal entities, the prosecutor’s office reported. According to the agency’s version, in order to conceal the conflict of interest, the official did not disclose during his employment that he had previously worked in three organisations engaged in the construction of large infrastructure facilities, nor that a person affiliated with him was continuing to work in two of the companies. In addition, he did not provide information on the income, property and obligations of his minor child. The Sovetsky District Court granted the lawsuit. In January 2024, Lukovnikov had already resigned of his own accord, but returned as early as September 2024. Before that, he had headed the infrastructure block since 2017.

Karachay-Cherkess Republic. Deputy chairman of the government of the KChR, Yevgeny Alexandrovich Gordiyenko. Detained on 9 April 2025. He long oversaw the construction sphere (including road construction) in the KChR government as a minister and, from 7 April 2021, in the rank of deputy prime minister. Ye. A. Gordiyenko was born in 1974 in Stavropol Krai. In 2014–2015 he was the minister of property and land relations of the KChR. From September 2015 he became the minister of construction and housing and utilities of the KChR. It was reported that the matter preliminarily concerns the embezzlement of 12 million roubles during the construction of a sports hall in the aul of Khabez. Documents were allegedly signed for procurement from a single supplier — the company “LedokolStroy”. The sum in the contract was 130 million. The sports hall was never opened. The investigation also believes that Gordiyenko, together with accomplices, siphoned off 53 million by inflating the volumes of work during the construction of a school in the stanitsa of Kardoninskaya. The company “YugPromStroy”, which executed the contract, was effectively run by Gordiyenko himself. Accused of fraud are not only the deputy prime minister but also three representatives of firms linked to him.

Republic of Tyva. Deputy Chairman of the Government of Tyva, Aidyn Alexeyevich Chyudyuk. On 9 September 2025, the Kyzyl City Court of the Republic of Tyva arrested Chyudyuk, who is accused of taking a bribe on a large scale (Part 6, Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). According to the investigation’s version, the accused, while holding the post of head of one of the departments of the Kyzyl mayor’s office in the period 2017–2019, received bribes in the form of monetary funds on a large scale for granting land plots on the territory of the city of Kyzyl.

Krasnodar Krai (three incidents). Former acting head of Krasnodar Krai and ataman of the Kuban Cossack Host, Alexander Vlasov, was detained on 30 September 2025 in Krasnodar. He is charged with fraud and abuse of authority in the handling of humanitarian aid intended for fighters in the SMO zone. The day before, he had announced his resignation in connection with his deployment to the SMO zone. Vlasov was born on 27 June 1980 in the village of Oktyabrskoye in Chelyabinsk Region. In 2001–2010 he served in enlisted and officer positions. A veteran of combat operations in Chechnya and Georgia. Afterwards he worked as director of the “Kavkazskaya Liniya” supplementary education centre in Gulkevichsky District of Krasnodar Krai. In 2014–2020 he was ataman of the Gulkevichsky District Cossack Society. In 2017 he became deputy head of Gulkevichsky District. In 2020 he was appointed deputy governor of Krasnodar Krai for Cossack affairs and sports development. A year later, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, he was confirmed as ataman of the Kuban Cossack Host. In March 2023, the President of the Russian Federation conferred on him the highest rank of Cossack general; in the summer of the same year the ataman was awarded the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” 2nd class. The detention took place immediately after the conclusion of the krai council of atamans, at which the official announced his resignation from the post of vice-governor. “I have taken the decision to go to our ‘Kuban’ brigade to carry out combat tasks of the special military operation,” Alexander Vlasov told those assembled. The official explained his decision by saying that he is a combat veteran who took part in carrying out tasks in the Chechen Republic in the early 2000s, as well as in the peace enforcement operation in Georgia in 2008.

Deputy governor of Krasnodar Krai for construction, Alexander Nesterenko. Confirmed on 10 July 2024. He worked in this post until 21 May 2025, when Governor Veniamin Kondratyev proposed his resignation due to ineffectiveness. Born 1989. In 2018–2020, chief inspector of the Control and Accounts Chamber of Krasnodar Krai. From May 2023, deputy head, and from August 2023, head of the State Public Institution “Main Construction Directorate of Krasnodar Krai”. The day after his resignation from the post of deputy governor, on 22 May, it became known that Alexander Nesterenko was suspected of abuse of official powers. The Oktyabrsky District Court of Krasnodar arrested the former official for two months.

Deputy governor of Krasnodar Krai for social policy, Anna Alexeyevna Minkova, born 1978. She worked in the post from 28 April 2015 to 28 October 2025. She began her career in 1999 as a correspondent for the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company “Kuban”. From 2004 she worked in the administration of Krasnodar Krai, where she held the posts of adviser and, later, head of a number of divisions linked to information policy and the social sphere. After her resignation, she became general director of the media group “Kuban-24”. In January 2026, officers of the krai FSB detained the former vice-governor of Kuban, Anna Minkova. She was placed under house arrest and charged with fraud and money laundering. In the end, Minkova managed to avoid a penal colony. According to TASS, Anna Minkova gave testimony about all the corruption offences known to her that were committed by heads of regional and municipal government bodies. On 13 May, the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar found Anna Minkova guilty of fraud and the legalisation of property acquired by criminal means, sentencing her to 5.5 years’ suspended imprisonment with a probation period of 5 years. In 2022, while serving as vice-governor overseeing the region’s healthcare sphere, Minkova supported the candidacy of the sister of a Krasnodar developer — who was, among other things, building the “Arbat” residential complex in the city centre — for appointment to the post of director of the State Budgetary Professional Educational Institution “Krasnodar Krai Basic Medical College”. After the appointment, Minkova, through an intermediary, approached the developer with a request for help in buying an apartment with a total area of 63 square metres in the “Arbat” residential complex, with a market value of more than 12 million roubles, at a reduced price of 5.4 million roubles. At the same time, she did not pay for this apartment at all, counting on the fact that, because of her position, no one would make claims against her. She initially registered the apartment in her mother’s name, and then, with the aim of legalising the illegally acquired property, re-registered it in her son’s name. Minkova was charged with fraud committed by an organised group or on an especially large scale, and with the legalisation of monetary funds or property acquired as a result of committing a crime. During the investigation she was under house arrest. The Prikubansky District Court of Krasnodar converted the property of Minkova and her family members into state revenue under an anti-corruption lawsuit. The court specified that Minkova had acquired property worth 338.6 million roubles using unconfirmed income and registered it in the names of relatives; part of the corrupt property had been alienated, and the court recovered compensation of 90 million roubles for it.

Belgorod Region (two incidents, one formally linked to Kursk). Vice-Governor Rustem Shaukatovich Zainullin, born 1976. He worked as vice-governor of Belgorod Region from the beginning of 2022. He oversaw property and land relations in the region; after Vladimir Bazarov moved to the government of Kursk Region, he received the construction block under temporary management. Before coming to Belgorod, Zainullin worked in Udmurtia and Sevastopol. He served for a month and a half in the volunteer detachment “Bars-Belgorod”.

Detained on 21 June 2025 in Belgorod. According to RBC, he was charged with embezzlement on an especially large scale (Part 4, Article 160 of the Criminal Code) and taking a bribe on an especially large scale (Part 6, Article 290 of the Criminal Code), but the article on fraud on an especially large scale (Part 4, Article 159 of the Criminal Code) was ultimately excluded. According to the investigation’s data, as recounted by RBC’s interlocutors, Rustem Zainullin, businessman Sergei Petryakov and unidentified persons developed a scheme for the embezzlement of budget funds no later than October 2022. According to the charges, the scheme envisaged the conclusion of state contracts for the construction of defensive structures between the regional ministry of construction and the regional state budgetary institution “Capital Construction Directorate of Belgorod Region”, with the subsequent transfer of the work to controlled structures — LLC “Region Sibir” and LLC “Stroyinvestrezerv”. The investigation asserts that the companies either did not conduct real economic activity or did not possess the resources sufficient to fulfil such contracts. They lacked, the charges state, qualified employees, the necessary equipment and experience in construction. Two months after Zainullin’s detention, Belgorod Region Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that the decision on his dismissal would be made based on the outcome of the court proceedings.

Acting deputy governor of Kursk Region and former deputy governor and head of the construction department of Belgorod Region, Vladimir Vasilyevich Bazarov, born 1970, was detained on 25 August 2025. He worked in the administration of Surgut in various posts, including holding the post of deputy head of the administration, which he left in 2016. After that, he came to work in the government of Sevastopol, where he worked as deputy governor until moving to Belgorod, to which he was invited by Vyacheslav Gladkov, with whom they had worked together in Sevastopol. He is charged with embezzlement during the construction of defensive structures on the border of Belgorod Region with Ukraine. Presumably, the official received bribes from contractors and, in return, gave instructions to procure and install concrete anti-tank obstacles — the so-called “dragon’s teeth” — of a smaller size than was necessary. The security agencies believe that, together with accomplices, Bazarov allegedly embezzled 251 million roubles from the budget by inflating the cost while simultaneously understating the technical specifications of the “dragon’s teeth”. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, four criminal cases have been opened against V. B. Bazarov and his possible accomplices, including for taking bribes on an especially large scale from representatives of commercial organisations for assistance in concluding contracts for the construction of fortifications (Part 6, Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, up to 15 years’ imprisonment). The construction of defensive structures (platoon strongpoints, anti-tank pyramids, dugouts, equipment fortifications, trenches, ditches, etc.) took place in Belgorod Region in 2022–2023. Almost 20 billion roubles were allocated from the federal budget for the work. Embezzlement during the work was estimated at almost 1 billion roubles; the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation demanded that this sum be recovered from the organisers of the construction of the protective structures. On 3 September 2025, the acting deputy governor of Kursk Region, Vladimir Bazarov, who had been remanded in custody, was released from his post and stripped of his access to state secrets.

Vladimir Region. First deputy governor of Vladimir Region, Alexander Alexandrovich Remiga (oversaw the economy). Born 1982. In 2009, Remiga was appointed to the post of specialist in the investment projects department of the Directorate for Waste Management of the Housing Committee of the Government of St Petersburg. He later became deputy head of the Directorate for Waste Management of St Petersburg. In 2014 he moved to Oryol Region under V. Potomsky, where he began serving as deputy head of the Department of Construction, Transport and Housing and Utilities. He subsequently became a member of the Government of Oryol Region and headed the Department of Construction, Fuel and Energy Complex, Housing and Utilities, Transport and Road Infrastructure. He was later appointed deputy chairman of the Government of Oryol Region. In 2019 he transferred to service in the Government of the Republic of Komi, where he headed the Ministry of Investment, Industry and Transport. From 28 May 2020, first deputy governor of Vladimir Region. Detained on 9 June 2025, arrested on 10 June by decision of the Basmanny Court of Moscow. Remiga is suspected of taking a bribe on an especially large scale. The head of the Investigative Committee of Russia, Alexander Bastrykin, said in an interview with RBC that, according to the investigation, from 2021 to 2025 the official systematically received money for patronising businesses, and the total sum exceeded 53 million roubles. The case is being handled by the central apparatus of the Investigative Committee, which is why Remiga was taken to Moscow — a first for officials of Vladimir Region. Before this, deputy governors under Svetlana Orlova — Renat Chagayev, Yelena Mazanko and Dmitry Khvostov — as well as a deputy under Vladimir Sipyagin, Grigory Vishnevsky, were held in custody and tried in Vladimir.

Ivanovo Region. Deputy chairman of the government of Ivanovo Region, director of the regional health department, Anton Yevgenyevich Arsenyev. Born 1982. After graduating from the Ivanovo State Medical Academy, Arsenyev worked at City Clinical Hospital No. 3 in Ivanovo. There he rose from district general practitioner to head of the therapy department. In 2020 he was appointed deputy chief physician for medical affairs at one of Ivanovo’s largest departmental clinics. He worked as the chief freelance therapist of “Russian Railways-Medicine” for the Central Federal District. On 22 April 2024, Anton Arsenyev was appointed deputy chairman of the government of Ivanovo Region. He oversaw the development of the region’s healthcare.

Residents of Ivanovo Region constantly complained about problems with the provision of subsidised medicines even after Anton Arsenyev’s appointment. The prosecutor’s office of Ivanovo Region became involved in the matter. An inspection showed that from November 2024 to February 2025, vital subsidised medicines were not procured in the required volume by officials of the Health Department of Ivanovo Region. As a result, a shortage of drugs for patients with diabetes, bronchopulmonary and oncological diseases built up in warehouses. At the same time, funds for the procurement of subsidised medicines were allocated from the budget of Ivanovo Region in the required volume. The regional prosecutor’s office forwarded the inspection materials to an investigative body. A criminal case was opened there under Part 1 of Article 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (negligence). In total, from January to July 2025, prosecutors filed more than 100 lawsuits in court demanding that the Health Department of Ivanovo Region issue the necessary medications to people. On 18 October 2025, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Ivanovo sent him into custody. He is accused of exceeding official powers with the infliction of grave consequences out of mercenary or other interest. These acts are covered by points “c, e” of Part 3 of Article 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Anton Arsenyev is already the third director of the regional health department since 2015 to be charged under criminal articles. The trial began in May 2026.

Novgorod Region. Deputy governor of Novgorod Region, Stanislav Vasilyevich Shultsev, born 1989. Originally from Krasnodar Krai. In 2010 he began working in the road sector. In Novgorod Region since 2017; from 1 January 2018 to 26 December 2019, minister of transport, road infrastructure and digital development of Novgorod Region; from 27 December 2019, deputy chairman of the Government of Novgorod Region.

In July 2025 it became known that Deputy Governor of Novgorod Region Stanislav Shultsev and Transport Minister Konstantin Kuranov had been detained in Moscow. It later became known that the head of “Novgorodavtodor”, Kokhanovsky, had also been detained. They are accused of receiving 250 million roubles from representatives of a firm engaged in road works in Novgorod Region. Acting Governor Dronov reported on his Telegram channel that the authorities were assisting the investigation. At the same time, he did not rush to dismiss the disgraced officials. On 15 October 2025 it became known that Stanislav Shultsev had not been included in the new composition of the government of Novgorod Region.

Omsk Region. Deputy chairman of the government, minister of digital development of Omsk Region, Denis Gennadyevich Tsukanov. Born 1985. He was appointed in July 2023; before that he held the post of deputy chairman of the government and chief of staff of the DPR. From 2014 to 2022 he was deputy director of the department of regional industrial policy and project management of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia.

On 12 December 2024 he was detained; after his detention he was transported to Moscow. The official Telegram channel of the Moscow courts of general jurisdiction specified that Tsukanov is accused of committing a crime covered by Part 4 of Article 160 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“misappropriation or embezzlement committed by an organised group or on an especially large scale”). Tsukanov turned out to be the second person implicated in the case. Before him, a measure of restraint had been chosen for Denis Petkun, who held the post of chief of staff of the government of the DPR in May–June 2023. Tsukanov held the same post immediately before Petkun. Tsukanov tried to challenge the detention decision, but unsuccessfully. The court initially imposed house arrest on him, but in February changed the measure of restraint to remand in a pre-trial detention centre. Despite his suspension from office, he has not been formally sent into resignation. On 28 August 2025, Tsukanov was released from the Moscow pre-trial detention centre and returned to his workplace without additional public explanation.

Rostov Region (2 incidents). Minister of agriculture and deputy governor of Rostov Region, Konstantin Rachalovsky, born 1962. He graduated from the Don Agricultural Institute. He worked as the chief agronomist of the “Oktyabrsky” state farm in Aksaysky District. He then headed it — it became JSC “Oktyabrskoye”. In 1996, Rachalovsky moved to state service: deputy head of the administration and head of the agriculture and food directorate of Aksaysky District, then first deputy head of the district administration. On 7 May 2014 he became minister of agriculture and food of Rostov Region under Governor Vasily Golubev. In 2023 he became deputy governor while retaining the post of minister. He remained in these same posts with the arrival of the new acting governor of the region, Yuri Slyusar.

On 17 February 2025 he was detained. The press service of the regional FSB directorate reported that a criminal case had been opened against the minister. He is suspected of exceeding his powers and engaging in machinations with grain subsidies totalling 155.2 million roubles. According to the investigation’s version, the minister illegally allocated state support funds to agricultural enterprises. The recipients of the subsidies were subsequently declared bankrupt, and monetary funds in the amount of 155.2 million roubles were embezzled, the FSB press service reported. At the same time, Rachalovsky had been saying that the region needed more money for the allocation of subsidies. On 21 February 2025, the Leninsky District Court of Rostov-on-Don placed the former minister under house arrest. In May 2025 he was dismissed from his post. A few days after the former minister’s detention, it became known that similar charges had been brought against the adviser to the governor of Rostov Region and chairman of the Board of Directors of the Regional Development Corporation, Viktor Goncharov. According to the investigation’s version, he was also involved in the illegal issuance of subsidies to agro-industrial enterprises. The court chose a measure of restraint for Goncharov in the form of remand in custody, initially until 17 April, and then extended the arrest until 20 June 2025. On 17 June 2025, Konstantin Rachalovsky was released from house arrest. A measure of restraint in the form of a ban on certain actions was imposed on him. In particular, from 17 June the former official was prohibited from communicating with witnesses and other participants in the proceedings and from using means of communication and the internet.

Deputy governor of Rostov Region — minister of finance, Lilia Vadimovna Fedotova. Born 1959. She was born in the town of Vidnoye. She worked as head of the finance directorate of the administration of Leninsky Municipal District of Moscow Region, where Vasily Golubev was head of the administration. After his appointment as governor of Rostov Region, she became the region’s minister of finance on 2 September 2010.

On 4 February 2025 it became known that the Investigative Committee of Russia (ICR) had opened a criminal case against Lilia Fedotova for abuse of office in the conduct of the region’s financial and credit policy (Article 286(3)(c) of the Criminal Code). This was reported by the press service of the Rostov Oblast ICR directorate. According to the investigation, in 2020, although the region had free budget balances, Lilia Fedotova unjustifiably raised commercial bank loans totalling 12 billion roubles at rates above 6% per annum for its needs. The rate exceeded 6% per annum, even though the law allows state borrowing at a lower interest rate. Investigators estimate that the finance minister’s actions in connection with the disputed loan caused damage of 1.9 billion roubles, which left the budget in interest payments in 2020–2023. A law-enforcement source told Kommersant that Lilia Fedotova was detained at her home on the morning of 3 February. Searches were carried out at the suspect’s place of residence and place of work.

Since 14 March 2025, Larisa Anoshina has been acting finance minister; Lilia Fedotova left the post and was released from her duties due to the expiry of her service contract. On 6 May 2026, the Kirovsky District Court of Rostov held the next hearing in the case of former Rostov Oblast Finance Minister Lilia Fedotova. For the first time in a long while the hearing was held in open session, so journalists were able to attend. The trial is currently at the stage of examining the prosecution’s evidence.

Ryazan Oblast. Deputy Chairman of the Government of Rostov Oblast Artyom Aleksandrovich Nikitin, born 1995. Born in Ryazan. From 2010 he worked in the Young Guard of United Russia (MGER), becoming chairman of the MGER regional branch and federal coordinator of the Central Territorial Group by 2016. He subsequently held the posts of head of the state regional industrial development fund and of the Agency for the Development of Production Systems and Competences; from February 2021 he headed the Ryazan Oblast Development Corporation. In December 2021 the then governor Nikolai Lyubimov appointed the 26‑year‑old Nikitin deputy chairman of the government of Ryazan Oblast. In 2025 Nikolai Lyubimov (by then a member of the Federation Council who had just stepped down) was arrested on suspicion of taking a bribe on an especially large scale.

On 27 February 2025 it became known that Nikitin had left the post of deputy chairman of the government of Ryazan Oblast. A few hours later the local ICR directorate reported the opening of a criminal case concerning the receipt of a bribe on an especially large scale by an official of the regional government. According to the investigation, the official demanded remuneration from an individual entrepreneur for assistance in concluding contracts with the organisations he oversaw. He provided the businessman with data on the terms of upcoming procurements, enabling him to win auctions. In total the politician illegally received more than 17 million roubles. The official’s name was not disclosed, but the media linked the reports to one another. The media reported that Nikitin allegedly demanded from entrepreneur acquaintances — beneficiaries of several legal entities — 10% of the value of all contracts concluded for organising cultural events in the region. Over three years of work in the government, the total was 17,346,700 roubles. On 22 October 2025, at a hearing of the Sovetsky District Court, it became known that Nikitin had been charged with an additional offence — Article 174.1 of the Criminal Code (money laundering on an especially large scale) — but no new details emerged in the case.

Sverdlovsk Oblast. Vice-Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast Oleg Leonidovich Chemezov, born 1964. Born in Sverdlovsk into a family of doctors; he spent his childhood in the Urals. He graduated from a medical institute in Tyumen and worked, like his father, as a psychiatrist, then moved to Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and began a political career. Chemezov headed the territorial mandatory medical insurance fund of KhMAO for five years and at the same time became a deputy of the Tyumen Oblast Duma from Khanty-Mansi Okrug. In 2004, at the invitation of Sergei Sobyanin (then governor of Tyumen Oblast), he moved to Tyumen. There Oleg Chemezov became first deputy head of the region with responsibility for the economy. When Sobyanin was promoted to Moscow, Chemezov moved into the oil industry. In parallel he was a deputy of the Tyumen City Duma and later of the oblast duma. Until 2013 he worked in senior positions at TNK‑BP, RN Management Sibir, and then moved to the company Partikom, which was engaged in construction. He had known Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Yevgeny Kuivashev since the 2000s, when Chemezov worked in KhMAO. Kuivashev then became mayor of Tyumen (2007–2011) and Chemezov a city duma deputy. In 2019–2021 he was deputy governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast. From January 2021 he served as Sverdlovsk vice-governor overseeing political matters. In March 2025 Kuivashev removed the Ministry of Finance, the Department of State Procurement and the Regional Energy Commission from Oleg Chemezov’s purview and stripped him of the status of chairman of the board of the Territorial Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund (TFOMS) of the oblast. The vice-governor retained oversight of the Department of Internal and Information Policy. After Yevgeny Kuivashev’s resignation, Chemezov kept his post and was formally responsible for running the election campaign of the head of Sverdlovsk Oblast.

The new governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Denis Pasler, dismissed Oleg Chemezov with effect from 25 September 2025. In September 2025 Oleg Chemezov was named among the defendants in a Prosecutor General’s Office lawsuit seeking the confiscation of the assets of Artyom Bikov and Alexei Bobrov for the state. According to the supervisory agency, the vice-governor “patronised” the STS Corporation and lobbied government bodies for “extortionate tariffs” in favour of the businessmen’s utility structures. In return, the Prosecutor General’s Office asserts, the entrepreneurs provided property to his relatives and trusted persons on preferential terms. On 29 September 2025 it became known that Chemezov had been detained as a suspect in a case of fraud on an especially large scale (Article 159(4) of the Criminal Code). Earlier Oleg Chemezov reported that his accounts and those of his wife (officially divorced) Irina Chemezova had been frozen. At the end of December 2025 he was transferred from the Chelyabinsk pre-trial detention centre to house arrest on health grounds.

Tyumen Oblast. Former Deputy Governor Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Vakhrin, born 1967. From 1998 to 2010 he was general director of the law firm Pravovaya Initsiativa. In 2001–2006 Vakhrin was a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Perm Oblast. He also sat on the Perm Oblast judicial qualifications board as a public representative elected by the oblast legislative assembly. On 28 January 2010 he was appointed head of the State Housing Inspectorate of Tyumen Oblast. Two years later, on 6 July 2012, Vakhrin became deputy governor of the region. He was dismissed only on 30 April 2025 after being accused of bribery. On 8 June 2024 he was arrested on charges of taking a bribe on an especially large scale (Article 290(6) of the Criminal Code). The maximum penalty under this article is 15 years’ deprivation of liberty. Also remanded in custody for the same period was another person implicated in the case of the deputy Tyumen governor — Alexei Gotsyk, director of the limited liability company Specialised Developer Vostok Development. He is accused of giving a bribe on an especially large scale (Article 291(5) of the Criminal Code, up to 15 years’ imprisonment). On 16 April 2025 it was reported that Vakhrin had signed a contract to perform military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and had been released from custody.

Already outside the period under study, after 1 January 2026 (meaning they were not included in the statistics presented), the following incidents occurred:

On 5 February 2026, in Chukotka, the head of the Department of Agriculture and Food of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Pavel Koshcheyev, was detained. He previously headed the agro-industrial complex department of Kurgan Oblast. It was reported that the investigative actions were connected with his previous place of work. In April 2024 Koshcheyev left the post of director of the agro-industrial complex department of Kurgan Oblast, which he had headed since December 2021, of his own volition. Later, in August 2024, it became known that Koshcheyev had become acting deputy governor — chairman of the government of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Pavel Koshcheyev was born in 1981 in Kurgan Oblast. He began working in the Department of the Agro-Industrial Complex of Kurgan Oblast in 2008, rising from first-class specialist to director of the department.

On 27 February 2026, Deputy Governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast Andrei Faleichik, who had become a person of interest in a corruption case, was dismissed. The employment contract was terminated at his request. He is accused of receiving a bribe of 1.8 million roubles from Mikhail Bleizer, the owner of the limited liability company Yunost, for granting a long-term lease of a children’s health camp. As Kommersant‑Yuzhny Ural reported, the criminal case is linked to Andrei Faleichik’s previous work as head of Kopeysk. According to a law-enforcement source, the amount of bribes received by the ex‑mayor exceeds 6 million roubles.

Conclusion

The results of 2025 in terms of changes in the composition of the upper tier of regional administrative elites repeat the situation of 2024: the trend towards a return to a high level of rotation of the senior regional administrative nomenklatura persists. While the number of governor replacements in 2025 fell compared with 2024 (five instead of 13), the number of replacements within the administrations themselves remained high. Usually the main personnel changes in administrations almost always follow a change of governor and represent the “personnel tail” of the governor’s reorganisation of the administration to suit himself. However, in 2024–2025 even many incumbent governors, having been elected for a new term, substantially reshuffled their teams (Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kostroma, Murmansk and Chelyabinsk oblasts, Kamchatka Krai, etc.). Such mass replacements within sitting administrations are not typical for Russia’s regions and may indicate both increasingly difficult working conditions (leading both to a more frequent desire to leave the post and to a desire on the part of the leadership to replace staff) and corresponding directives “from above.”

Although the special military operation (SMO) undoubtedly affects the composition of administrations, on the whole this influence is not yet significant; rather, administrations are adapting and adjusting to new requirements. For the most part, SMO participants fill symbolic political posts and the deputy corps, work in which formally does not require specific professional skills. It is important to understand that the appointment of key officials in a regional administration requires approval from the relevant federal agencies under a special procedure that presupposes the necessary competences, specialised education, work experience, recommendations, etc. As a result, outside these procedures and fairly strict professional requirements lie mainly posts that do not involve their holders issuing regulatory and normative legal documents or allocating significant budget resources (deputies overseeing relations with law-enforcement structures; patriotic education; youth policy and sport, etc.). It is precisely these posts that are mainly filled by SMO participants without the corresponding bureaucratic experience in their biographies.

On the whole, deployments to the SMO zone remain an attribute of career advancement for the traditional nomenklatura, who could have occupied the relevant posts even before (without the attribute of “SMO participant”). In effect, obtaining the status of “SMO participant” is now an additional element of their professional résumé that bolsters career ambitions. That said, when analysing such appointments it is sometimes difficult to distinguish publicly between “SMO participants” and officials who have worked for some time in the government bodies of the annexed regions of Eastern Ukraine (the regional and local press constantly conflate them).

Among the governors of the 83 “old Russian regions” as of 1 January 2026, there were five who had either previously worked in the government bodies of the regions of Eastern Ukraine or were publicly designated as “SMO participants”; all of them had extensive bureaucratic and administrative experience (it goes without saying that there is no point in including the regions of Eastern Ukraine themselves, Crimea and Sevastopol in this list). After 1 January 2026, on 13 May 2026, Yegor Kovalchuk, chairman of the government of the Lugansk People’s Republic, was appointed acting governor of Bryansk Oblast. On the same day, 13 May 2026, Major General Alexander Shuvaev, a Hero of Russia and SMO participant, was appointed acting governor of Belgorod Oblast. With Kovalchuk and Shuvaev, the number of governors of the “old regions of the Russian Federation” who are SMO participants or worked in Eastern Ukraine reached eight out of 83 (9.6%), of whom six are professional officials and only Shuvaev is a professional military officer.

Among heads of regional governments (where this post is separate from that of governor), deputy governors and heads of regional governments, chiefs of staff and heads of regional finance who held their posts between 1 January 2025 and 1 January 2026, one can note 17 professional officials who, according to open data, are “SMO participants” or managed to work in the regions of Eastern Ukraine; that is, they make up 2.07% of this nomenklatura group (its total number as of 1 January 2025 was 821). Professional military SMO participants (siloviki) with no previous administrative and managerial experience are extremely poorly represented in the administrations. Among the studied group of the regional nomenklatura (deputy governors and heads of regional governments) there are only four such individuals. Thus, together with the professional officials, these two groups of SMO participants numbered only 2.56% of this part of the regional administrations during 1 January 2025–1 January 2026.

Thus, in the case of regional administrations, programmes for the advancement and professional training/retraining of “SMO participants” generally concern the very same officials who previously belonged to the managerial elite. Consequently, in this part of the nomenklatura the issue is not the formation of some “new elite” but merely the implementation of certain programmes to strengthen some kind of corporate solidarity within this nomenklatura and to stimulate activity within a single ideological paradigm set from above.

The media traditionally devote great attention to the fight against corruption and the criminal prosecution of regional and local officials, which can create the impression that such cases have become significantly more numerous. Earlier, in 2015–2019, calculations showed that repressions against regional political elites covered 1.5–2% of their total number annually. In preparing this report, statistics were collected on officials who held the posts under study in regional administrations from 1 January 2025 to 1 January 2026 and became the subject of criminal prosecution during the year. The data collected produce a picture close to the 2015–2019 figures — 17 cases out of a list of 821 people at the start of the year is 2.07% (it appears that even if one or two cases were missed, this hardly changes the overall ratio). Thus, despite all the PR noise, which often mixes together current and former regional officials, deputies, municipal employees and heads of municipal enterprises, a strictly methodological count by the posts held shows a fairly stable share of regional officials subjected to criminal prosecution over at least the last 10 years. That is, in reality the share of officials at this level subjected to repressions has hardly grown since 2022.

Thus, even large-scale PR campaigns to promote SMO participants into government bodies (who are mostly the same officials) and to fight corruption in reality each affect only around 2% of the senior regional nomenklatura. Consequently, the constantly rotating and self-reproducing composition of regional administrative elites possesses significant internal inertia; the rules for forming these administrative elites presuppose complex hierarchisation and mechanisms of coordination and subordination, and require the characteristics and competences established by federal legislation itself. The strongest regional administrative elites have adapted to these rules and have grown accustomed to functioning under these conditions. These rules, gradually formed over the past 20‑plus years, are minimally affected by external PR campaigns and ritual procedures, which influence only the external behavioural style of the nomenklatura and its public positioning.

Given the upcoming 2026 federal elections, which always lead to chain movements in the regional nomenklatura, there is every reason to believe that the degree of rotation of regional officials will intensify in the coming year. At the same time, individuals whose careers have risen thanks to the SMO are becoming an increasingly visible part of the managerial elite; however, this mainly concerns the deputy corps, which as a rule lacks real power. On the one hand, the positions and ambitions of former SMO participants are in many ways becoming an integral part of political and economic life. On the other hand, the question of whether SMO participants will in future represent some kind of unified force united by corporate interests remains largely open.