We analyzed turnout and the distribution of votes for candidates in Kurgan Oblast during the State Duma elections of 18–20 September 2026. The data show that the tasks assigned to local operatives differed — we studied the methods by which they were achieved. The results implicitly reveal an internal regional conflict between the head of the United Russia regional branch, Alexander Iltakov, who has now been elected to a third term in the State Duma, and the head of the region, Vadim Shumkov.
Turnout
The graph of final voter turnout eloquently indicates that a striking anomaly emerged in the regional center — the city of Kurgan: there is a clear division of the PECs involved into two groups:
The graph of final voting results for United Russia by PEC number correlates perfectly with this distribution:
Given the nationwide practice of administrative pressure to vote in the first half of the first day, it is worth separately assessing its scale during the period from 8:00 to 15:00 on 18 September, broken down by the region's territorial commissions.
Unsurprisingly, the smallest dispersion is found for the PECs of the Eastern and Western TECs of the city of Kurgan, as well as the Shadrinsk City TEC. The average turnout values for these territories during the noted period are close to 10% and may indicate minimal use of the administrative mobilization resource. As for all other TECs of Kurgan Oblast, the average turnout values for them before 15:00 on 18 September are already 20-25%.
The Shadrinsk City TEC shows the smallest dispersion in voter turnout overall over the three days, which strongly distinguishes it even against the background of the Eastern and Western TECs of Kurgan:
Such a result is completely normal for voters of one and the same city; it may indicate both the absence of attempts to influence turnout and the absence of signs of interference in the voting results in the interests of election participants. It is much more difficult to explain the serious differences in turnout for PECs located in the same building, as can be found, for example, in Kurgan.
Anomalous voting: signs of falsification
The most stable voting results in support of the leading party are observed at turnout up to 40%, deviating slightly from the indicator of the same 40%. However, as turnout increases, a "comet's tail" is clearly visible, which indicates both the artificial nature of the turnout and the questionable results of the party itself, which can be explained by classic ballot-box stuffing:
However, both the stable results of turnout and the level of voter support for United Russia at levels of 40%, as well as the most extreme values of these indicators in the far upper right rectangle of the graph, are entirely provided by PECs located in urban okrugs — Kurgan and Shadrinsk. The results of the rest of the region — in municipal okrugs, where about 53% of voters are registered — are more or less evenly scattered in ranges from 40 to 60 percent for both turnout and voting for the party.
For the Eastern and Western TECs of the city of Kurgan, both the general trend of real, undistorted results and precincts with obvious interference in the outcomes are clearly visible:
Eastern TEC of the city of Kurgan
Western TEC of the city of Kurgan
Why is there no such distortion at many Kurgan PECs, while it is present in a significant portion? How and under what circumstances are the "desired" voting results organized? Exhaustive answers to such questions are hardly possible under universal cover-up. However, as an example, it is worth considering a situation related to the organization of elections by the Eastern TEC of the regional center.
Just before the elections, on 3 August, the said TEC relieved the full rosters of PECs No. 882, 883, 885, and 887 of their duties and appointed other members in their place. The term of office of those who left was only due to expire in 2028. The first three of the mentioned PECs are located in the building of secondary school No. 49 in the city of Kurgan. In place of the departed commission members, who were mostly employees of that institution's staff, workers and employees of another were appointed, namely secondary school No. 43. The director of this school, Andrei Maltsev, was a candidate from United Russia in the simultaneous additional elections to the Kurgan City Duma held alongside the federal ones. Thus, the chairs of PECs No. 882, 883, and 885 were directly subordinate to a person interested in the outcome of the elections.
PEC No. 887 was supposed to be located precisely in the building of school No. 43, under the leadership of Andrei Maltsev. However, in the summer it was closed for repairs, and voting was organized in the premises of a children's center, where the primary classes were moved.
What were the voting results for United Russia at these four PECs?
At PEC No. 882, 82.5% of voters turned out, the party received 86.8%. At PEC No. 883, 77.2% of voters turned out, for United Russia — 88.2%. At PEC No. 885, turnout was 92.5%, for the party of power — 89.8%. Finally, the most outstanding result was achieved at PEC No. 887: with a turnout of 92.8%, 96.6% voted for United Russia. Not a single competing party managed to get even one percent of the vote here.
It is worth noting that just a year ago, in 2025, the main elections of deputies to the Kurgan Oblast Duma took place. At PECs No. 882, 883, and 885, which were located in school No. 49, the results for United Russia were far more modest than the current ones: 50% (with a turnout of 18.5%), 32.92% (with a turnout of 16%), and 32.7% (with a turnout of 13.1%), respectively.
Such a large-scale change in the political preferences and activity of residents of one and the same electoral district over a period of just 12 months seems absolutely unrealistic. However, some large-scale change did indeed take place — namely in the composition of the members of the said PECs.
At the same time, in the additional elections for a deputy of the Kurgan City Duma, Maltsev himself, as a candidate from United Russia, although he won at the same PEC No. 887, garnered only 24.7% with the same excessive turnout. This smoothly leads us to an assessment of the extent to which the same techniques were applied in the State Duma elections for the single-member district in the region, as well as what the tasks set for local operatives might have been.
The graph of final turnout is practically no different from that for the party-list vote:
However, if we again turn our attention to the voting results for the Eastern and Western TECs of the city of Kurgan (in the screenshot of the graph, the two widest gray and white bands with dots indicating PEC results), then for the single-mandate candidate from United Russia, Alexander Iltakov, such a confident correlation is no longer present:
The "comet's tail" on the scale of the entire region does not disappear, but at many PECs with turnout rising to unnatural levels, the percentage of votes received by candidate Alexander Iltakov remains within the range of 40%, in places even lower:
The share of anomalous voting in favor of the candidate in the Eastern TEC of the city of Kurgan is insignificant. If for the party list it is clearly present at 17 PECs, then for the single-mandate district it is only at three:
How are things, in particular, at the already mentioned PECs No. 882, 883, 885, and 887? Only at the first of these is high turnout of 82.8% accompanied by a high percentage of support for the candidacy of Alexander Iltakov — 77.7%. For the remaining three, where observed turnout is even higher (up to almost 93% at PEC No. 887), his results are 39.5%, 51.7%, and 24.1%, respectively. Here it is worth recalling that at PEC No. 887, the candidate from United Russia, Andrei Maltsev, had a very similar result in the additional elections to the Kurgan City Duma — 24.7%.
Thus, the tasks set for manipulating the voting results in the interests of the United Russia party clearly differed from those aimed at ensuring the victory of its single-mandate candidate. Judging by everything, this may well be about an internal regional conflict involving the head of the regional party branch, Alexander Iltakov, who has now been elected to a third term in the State Duma, and the head of the region, Vadim Shumkov.
The essence of the conflict
After Shumkov's large-scale municipal reform (when districts were turned into okrugs), the governor gained direct levers for appointing heads locally. At the same time, local self-government has always been a support base for United Russia and Iltakov. In backroom discussions and the media, it is regularly discussed that Shumkov's team is "squeezing out" old-school party members oriented towards Iltakov from the leadership of the okrugs, replacing them with technocrats loyal personally to the governor.
The governor has effectively completed the construction of a rigid vertical of power in the region, where the main spokesperson must be exclusively himself. Therefore, Shumkov reacts extremely painfully to situations where his subordinates or locally known politicians "pull the blanket over themselves" in the media space.
Alexander Iltakov regularly generates federal news stories with his controversial statements (loud declarations about pension reform, calls to give birth "while the birthing machine still works", resonant musings about family completeness). Such powerful and uncontrolled activity by Iltakov objectively overshadows the governor's agenda and irritates the region's internal political bloc.
The possession of his own large business, financial independence, and direct support from the federal center (as a State Duma deputy) makes Iltakov a figure whom the governor cannot fully control. In conditions where Shumkov channels all key economic processes in the region through himself, such an autonomous figure is a priori a source of potential systemic balancing, rather than blind obedience.
Finally, Iltakov heads the Kurgan branch of the party of power. Any intra-party lists, coordination of candidates for municipal and regional elections — this is always a field of hidden bargaining between Iltakov's party apparatus and the governor's administration. Periodic leaks to the press indicate that at the elections, Iltakov might be attempted to be replaced with more loyal and predictable figures. They indirectly confirm that the governor's team would prefer to see a less independent person at the head of the regional branch.
Both politicians depend on the federal center. For Vadim Shumkov, an open war with the head of the regional branch of the party of power before any elections is a huge reputational minus in the eyes of the Kremlin. For Alexander Iltakov, an open rebellion against the technocrat governor means an automatic loss of political prospects and the creation of problems for his business from regional tax and supervisory authorities. Meanwhile, thanks to his decisive influence on the system of election commissions in the region and such results in the elections that took place, Shumkov may achieve a reduction in federal center support for the newly elected State Duma deputy, and, ultimately, influence his removal from the post of head of the United Russia regional branch.