In December 1993, more than 40 parliamentarians from over twenty countries came to Russia. They visited around two hundred polling stations in Moscow, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Tula, Tver and their environs, observing voting and the vote count. This was the first international election observation mission in history, organised by the Parliamentary Assembly of what was then the CSCE — the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, later renamed the OSCE. For this new institution of international observation, the Russian elections and the constitutional referendum served as a kind of starting point for its existence. (1993 mission document.)
A little over thirty years later, the situation looks entirely different. For the 2024 presidential election, Russia invited neither the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) nor the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Yet international observers were present in the country: according to the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 1,115 observers and experts from 129 states took part in the observation. The Russian side maintained that the absence of the ODIHR in no way diminished the quality of international observation; the OSCE, on the contrary, stated that the refusal to invite its mission contradicted the commitments undertaken by Russia.
What exactly changed over these years?
What international observation is and how it works
In Russian public debate, international observation is often described as granting foreigners access to control over a sovereign electoral process. Legally, this is incorrect.
In reality, an international observer has no authoritative powers whatsoever. An OSCE observation mission cannot annul the results from a polling station, demand a recount, remove a commission member or declare an election invalid. None of its conclusions carry binding legal consequences.
That is, the inviting state merely permits an independent external participant to see the process with its own eyes, gather data and publish its assessment.
A professional ODIHR mission is organised on several levels. Its core team usually includes specialists in electoral legislation, political analysis, the media, the work of electoral bodies, statistics and other matters. Long-term observers are then deployed across the regions. They usually arrive on site several weeks, or even months, before election day. Finally, shortly before election day, short-term observers arrive, who visit polling stations and observe the opening, voting, vote count and announcement of results. (Description of ODIHR mission composition.)
The ODIHR’s main methodological principle holds that elections are not a single-day event. Therefore, the mission’s experts study the legislation, the candidate registration process, the work of the commissions, the election campaign, the media, complaints and court disputes. The ODIHR defines its methodology as long-term, comprehensive, consistent and systematic. (ODIHR observation handbook.)
The formal status of an international observer may be held by a member of a foreign parliament, a representative of a foreign election commission, an expert, a representative of an intergovernmental organisation or a participant in a specialised professional mission. Therefore, the number of foreign observers in itself says nothing about the nature of the independent scrutiny — these may be either “political tourists” or professionals.
In the case of an OSCE mission, the host state invites an institution that independently determines the methodology, duration and scale of the scrutiny. But another option is also possible, where the state and structures linked to it invite numerous individual delegations and experts, each of whom may work according to their own programme and their own criteria.
Why observing other countries’ elections became necessary in the first place
The modern European system of international observation emerged at the end of the Cold War as one element of a new international security architecture. The CSCE states arrived at the understanding that security depends not only on borders, armaments and relations between states, but also on the situation within countries: respect for human rights, the existence of political freedoms and the stability of state institutions.
The key document is the CSCE Copenhagen Document, adopted in 1990. Its paragraph 7 describes in detail the essential elements of democratic elections: periodicity, universal and equal suffrage, secret ballot, honest counting and publication of results, the right to stand for office, the freedom to form parties, the ability to campaign without administrative obstacles or intimidation, and non-discriminatory access for participants to the media. (Text of the document.)
The next paragraph states that the presence of foreign observers can help improve the electoral process, and that states will therefore invite observers from other CSCE states and relevant organisations to national elections. (OSCE election mandate.)
The meaning of these paragraphs lay largely in reciprocity. The point was not that a certain group of “correct” states acquires the right to check the others. The participants in the new European system agreed that elections cease to be an entirely closed internal affair: each country invites external observers to its own elections, and its representatives, in turn, may observe the elections of other participants.
Here it is important not to overstate the legal force of the commitment.
The right of citizens to take part in genuine periodic elections is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires that elections be held on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, by secret ballot, and ensure the free expression of the will of the electors. (Text on the UN website.) However, the Covenant itself does not require that international observation missions be invited.
In turn, OSCE decisions are adopted by states by consensus and are not of an international-legal (binding) nature, but of a political (recommendatory) nature. The OSCE itself explicitly emphasises this feature of its status. (OSCE explanation of the legal nature of its commitments.)
In 1990, when the basic international commitments on election observation were being drafted and adopted, the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) laid claim to its place in the new pan-European security system. Mutual observation made it possible to demonstrate the openness of one’s own political transformations and, at the same time, gave Russian representatives the opportunity to be present at elections in other countries. For Moscow, participation in such a construct had obvious advantages.
Finally, Russia also has a more formal treaty obligation in the sphere of observation. In 2002, the CIS Convention on Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms was adopted, and on 2 July 2003 Russia ratified it. (Federal Law No. 89-FZ.)
It is symbolic that Russia became the first country in history to host an international observation mission of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
1993–2004: from experiment to norm — and from praise to mounting criticism
On 12 December 1993, elections to the Federal Assembly and a referendum on the new Constitution were held simultaneously. The CSCE PA delegation numbered more than 40 parliamentarians from more than twenty countries. They visited around 200 polling stations and, based on their — as the document specifically noted, limited — study, deemed the elections and referendum to be generally free and fair. (CSCE PA communication of 19 December 1993.)
The scale of the international observer presence grew rapidly. For the 1995 State Duma elections, the OSCE PA delegation alone numbered 114 observers, including 85 parliamentarians from 26 countries. They visited more than 400 polling stations. (OSCE PA report on the 1995 elections.)
The conclusions were generally positive. The delegation deemed the second multi-party parliamentary elections to be free and fair. Improvements compared to 1993 were noted: clearer legislation and greater transparency of the electoral process. At the same time, the report recorded shortcomings: the advantage enjoyed by better-funded parties in television advertising, isolated instances of voting on behalf of others, and certain organisational problems at polling stations.
For the 1996 presidential election, the ODIHR mission established itself in Moscow as early as February — four months before the first round. It observed both rounds, on 16 June and 3 July. All mission documents, including statements on both rounds and the final report, are collected on the official ODIHR page; the final report is published separately.
It was at these elections that a theme was first voiced that would subsequently arise constantly in international assessments of Russian elections — the theme of inequality among election campaign participants. The mission acknowledged an active political campaign and a genuine possibility of choice, but drew attention to the unbalanced coverage of the candidates’ campaigns in the media, where the advantage of the incumbent president, Boris Yeltsin, was very noticeable.
Nevertheless, it can be stated that by the mid-to-late 1990s, international observation in Russia had ceased to be an exotic experiment and had become a customary element of federal campaigns.
The 1999 State Duma elections were observed by the ODIHR jointly with the OSCE PA, PACE and the European Parliament. International observers worked in dozens of Russian regions. (ODIHR report on the 1999 elections.)
The assessment was to a significant degree positive. The final report spoke of substantial progress in consolidating representative democracy, a broad political choice and the professional work of the CEC. At the same time, observers noted interference by the executive branch in the electoral process in a number of regions, as well as an extremely conflict-ridden media environment dependent on owners.
Three months later, in March 2000, early presidential elections were held. These were again observed jointly by the ODIHR, the OSCE PA and PACE. (Mission page and final report.)
The ODIHR generally rated the organisation of voting and the professionalism of the election commissions highly. At the same time, the report voiced problems that would subsequently worsen: the use of the advantages of official position, pressure on the media, the blurring of the boundary between state functions and the campaign, and the weakening of political pluralism.
For the 2003 State Duma elections, the ODIHR mission’s core team and long-term observers were joined by short-term observers from the OSCE PA and PACE. In total, the joint mission included almost 500 people from 42 states. (Mission page and final report.)
Observers rated the organisation of the voting itself relatively highly. But the overall assessment of the elections became noticeably more critical. According to the mission’s conclusion, the use of the state apparatus and the nature of the campaign coverage by state television channels seriously violated the equality of participants, giving an unjustified advantage to United Russia. (Statement of the international mission after the elections.)
The 2004 presidential election was observed by 336 representatives from 39 OSCE states. The ODIHR again rated the technical level of organisation positively, but again concluded that the process lacked competitiveness: observers pointed to a lack of political pluralism, the advantage of the incumbent president in state media, and problems with the secrecy of the ballot. (All 2004 mission documents.)
2007–2008: the first major rupture
In the run-up to the 2007 State Duma elections, a dispute arose over the organisation of the next mission.
The ODIHR reported that it had requested entry for twenty experts and fifty observers, but the issuance of visas was delayed, and in the end the ODIHR announced that it would be unable to observe the elections. (ODIHR statement.)
Nevertheless, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly remained, which, jointly with PACE, sent a delegation. The OSCE PA itself later specifically recalled: when the ODIHR withdrew from the mission, the OSCE PA and PACE conducted joint observation.
The assessment proved critical. The parliamentary observers traditionally acknowledged the good technical organisation of the voting, but declared that there were no equal conditions due to the use of administrative resources, the dominance of United Russia and Vladimir Putin in the electronic media, and restrictions on political competition. (Joint statement of the OSCE PA and PACE on the 2007 elections.)
2007 became a harbinger of the conflict over the terms on which observation should be conducted.
For the presidential election in March 2008, the ODIHR again did not deploy its mission.
According to the Office’s version, the invitation from the Russian CEC arrived only on 28 January, and the Russian side imposed restrictions on the composition and duration of the mission. The ODIHR maintained that by that point it was already impossible to observe properly. In the end, the sides could not agree even on a minimal format, and on 7 February the ODIHR cancelled the mission. (ODIHR statement on the reasons for cancelling the observation.)
As a year earlier, only a delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, consisting of 22 people, came to the elections. PACE concluded that the voting result reflected the will of the voters, but the democratic potential of the elections was not fully realised; among the problems cited were the limited choice of candidates and unequal campaign conditions. (PACE communication before the elections, PACE final report, preliminary assessment after the voting.)
A little later, the Russian position on observation was formulated. The Russian delegation to the OSCE proposed building international observation on the principles of universality, reciprocity, transparency, professionalism, sovereignty and impartiality. Under the principle of sovereignty, it was proposed that the OSCE should agree in advance with the host state on the format of the mission, its head, the number of observers and the timing of its work. (Full text of the 2008 Russian statement.)
Here the main divergence emerged. For Russia, the right of the host state to determine or agree on the parameters of the external scrutiny became fundamental. For the ODIHR, on the contrary, the ability to independently establish the necessary number and duration of the mission was a condition for the independence of that scrutiny.
2011–2018: the return of missions — and a mixed picture of Russian elections
After a four-year conflict, the ODIHR once again had the opportunity to work fully in Russia for the 2011 State Duma elections.
The mission consisted of 14 core team experts and 40 long-term observers. Short-term observers and parliamentary delegations joined the work on election day. In fact, the joint international mission of the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and PACE numbered around 325 people on election day. They observed voting at approximately 1,500 polling stations. (ODIHR mission page.)
The final report became one of the best-known documents of international observation in Russia. It noted that the count was accompanied by frequent procedural violations and instances that the mission qualified as falsifications, including mass ballot-stuffing. The ODIHR characterised political competition as skewed in favour of the ruling party, pointing to the insufficient independence of election commissions, the bias of a significant portion of the media, and interference by state bodies. (ODIHR final report, summary of its findings.)
The report also noted that, due to mass falsifications, mass demonstrations took place in Russia after the results were announced.
For the 2012 presidential election, the ODIHR sent 15 core team experts and 40 long-term observers; a further 160 short-term observers were requested for election day. The joint international mission on election day was smaller than three months earlier — around 262 observers, including representatives of the ODIHR, the OSCE PA and PACE. (Mission page.)
The assessment was again mixed. Observers did not question the very fact of Vladimir Putin’s decisive victory and noted that all candidates were able to campaign. However, the ODIHR concluded that the campaign was noticeably skewed in favour of the incumbent president thanks to an advantage in the media and the use of state resources. The voting itself was assessed predominantly positively; however, problems were recorded during the count, which observers assessed negatively at almost a third of the polling stations visited. (Preliminary findings of the international mission, communication on the final report.)
For the 2016 State Duma elections, Russia again officially invited the ODIHR. The mission included 13 core team experts, around 60 long-term observers; the Office requested 420 short-term observers for election day. (2016 mission page.)
Compared to 2011, the international mission noted important improvements. The new CEC composition worked, in its assessment, more transparently and enjoyed broad confidence among participants. Election day overall passed in an organised manner, and the CEC responded promptly to reports of ballot-stuffing and carousel voting. At the same time, observers recorded numerous procedural violations during the count and maintained their complaints regarding restrictions on political rights, the work of the media and the use of administrative resources. (Preliminary conclusion of the international mission, final report.)
The 2018 presidential election became the last federal election in Russia to date at which a full-scale ODIHR mission worked.
It included 13 experts and 60 long-term observers; jointly with the OSCE PA, the international mission on election day numbered 583 observers, of whom 482 were deployed by the ODIHR and 101 by the OSCE PA. (Mission page, composition of the joint mission.)
Observers again rated the technical component of the elections highly. Election day passed predominantly in an organised manner. But the political assessment remained critical: in the mission’s view, restrictions on candidate registration reduced genuine competition, and the extensive coverage of the incumbent president in his official capacity created unequal conditions. Problems with the secrecy of the ballot and the transparency of certain counting procedures were also noted. (2018 preliminary conclusion, final report.)
It should be noted that the OSCE constituted only part of the international presence. At these elections, the CEC accredited a total of around 1,500 international observers.
2021–2024: from restricting the mission to refusing to invite the ODIHR
For the 2021 State Duma elections, the ODIHR and the OSCE PA were officially invited. But then the Russian side limited the maximum size of the ODIHR mission to 50 observers, and the OSCE PA delegation to ten. The reason given was the sanitary-epidemiological situation.
The ODIHR responded that a necessary condition for the effective and credible work of the mission was the ability to independently determine the required number of observers. The Office also pointed out that the entry and movement rules in force in Russia at the time did not in themselves prevent more large-scale observation. In the end, neither the ODIHR nor the OSCE PA sent observers. (Joint statement of the ODIHR and the OSCE PA.)
In March 2022, Russia ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe. Consequently, the previous model of participation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Russian federal elections also disappeared. PACE, which had worked for decades in joint international missions in Russia, could no longer perform this function in the previous format after the termination of Russian membership. (Council of Europe decision of 16 March 2022.)
Thus, by the 2024 presidential campaign, the institutional architecture of international observation was noticeably poorer than at any time during the existence of the Russian Federation.
Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, Russia took another step: the ODIHR and the OSCE PA received no invitation at all.
The OSCE stated that this contradicted Russia’s commitments as a participating state and deprived Russian voters of an independent assessment of the electoral process. The organisation recalled that it had been trying since September 2023 to agree with the Russian side on a preliminary needs-assessment mission. (Statement of the ODIHR and the OSCE PA of 29 January 2024.)
Moscow maintained that the ODIHR does not hold a monopoly on international observation or the authority to “certify” elections, accused the Office of a politicised and inconsistent methodology, and recalled the conflicts of 2007–2008 and 2021. The Russian side stated that, instead of the ODIHR, around a thousand representatives of other states and organisations would be present at the elections. (Full text of the statement of the Permanent Mission of Russia to the OSCE.)
And so it happened. According to the annual report of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 1,115 observers took part in observing the presidential election. (Report of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation for 2024.)
But who were these people? According to CEC data, 706 people had the status of officially accredited international observers; a further 185 were invited by the Civic Chamber as “international experts”, and 224 people turned out to be participants in the World Youth Festival held shortly before the elections, who were offered the chance to extend their stay in Russia and familiarise themselves with the organisation of voting, now in the capacity of experts. (Vedomosti, 15 March 2024.)
The corps was not formed by an independent observation organisation: the Civic Chamber writes directly that it organised the international observation jointly with the CEC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Duma and the Federation Council, and CEC representative Pavel Andreev explained that invitations were sent to Russian “partners” and were not sent to “unfriendly countries”.
The CEC did not publish a complete list of the names of the foreign participants in 2024. The European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), having studied Russian media reports and social networks, was able to independently establish the identities of 178 of them. The composition proved to be highly heterogeneous. Among those invited, there were indeed people with relevant experience: for example, the president of the Council of Electoral Experts of Latin America (CEELA), Nicanor Moscoso, and the head of the executive body of the National Election Commission of Egypt, Ahmed Bandari. But alongside them, acting as observers or experts were politicians, journalists and activists not professionally connected with elections: the French far-right activist Yvan Benedetti, several members of regional parliaments in Germany from the AfD, the former French general Dominique Delawarde, the film director Wilhelm Domke-Schulz, and the blogger Thomas Röper, who resides in Russia. Moreover, for some of these participants, the issue was not only the lack of specialised electoral qualifications.
The EPDE established that many of the European and American participants it identified had previously taken part in events supporting the Russian position: Benedetti, for example, acted as an “observer” at the Russia-organised “referendum” in 2022 in the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast; Röper collaborated with the German edition of RT and observed the same “referendum” in Kherson Oblast; the Bavarian Landtag deputy Ulrich Singer had already participated in observing the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections.
Unlike an ODIHR mission, they did not constitute a corps selected by an organisation independent of the Russian authorities, working according to a unified methodology and analysing the entire electoral cycle. It is for this reason that the international institute IDEA, even before the voting, proposed distinguishing such a scheme from a full-fledged observation mission and called it rather a programme for foreign visitors: the host side itself selects the participants and shows them individual elements of the process, whereas such a model does not envisage a systematic, independent assessment of the entire campaign.
What ultimately changed — and what was lost
International observation has obvious limitations. Several hundred foreigners cannot monitor tens of thousands of polling stations. They are incapable of independently proving the honesty or dishonesty of the entire voting process. They depend on the access granted by the host state. Their methodology can be criticised, and their conclusions challenged. And, all the more so, no international observer can replace domestic observers, commission members, candidates, journalists and courts.
At the same time, an institutional international mission possesses a quality that is difficult to obtain by other means: an external, independent measurement system, tested in practice over the course of many elections in different countries. This makes it possible to compare not only Russia with other countries, but also Russia with itself in different years.
This, perhaps, is the main point of independent international observation. Russia participated in its creation, used it for decades and still formally recognises the very institution of international observers. But the history from the first mission in 1993 to the absence of the ODIHR in 2024 shows a gradual rejection of its most essential element — the independence of the observer from the one being observed.
International observation in its current form represents a non-public “deal” between state and quasi-state structures and a set of loyal guests, simulating their participation. Though, roughly the same can be said about today’s elections as a whole.