Introduction

The current election campaign is the last before the 2026 State Duma deputy elections. This is a time to test political-technology innovations, raise the profile of future candidates, and strengthen one’s positions in specific territories.

This campaign is taking place against the backdrop not only of the now-traditional restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression, but also of regular mobile internet shutdowns and, in many regions, the threat of air attacks.

Moreover, in a whole series of regions, on the eve of and even during the elections, high-profile corruption scandals erupted, accompanied by the arrests of senior officials, including regional heads, and even the suicide of a federal minister, the former head of Kursk Oblast.

On the single voting day of 14 September 2025, heads of 20 regions are to be elected.

The “Election Atlas” project presents an overview of the main outcomes of the nomination and registration of candidates for the elections of senior officials of the federation’s constituent entities. Details on each election campaign can be viewed in the Index of (Un)freedom of Gubernatorial Elections – 2025, prepared by the project’s experts.

“Election Atlas” is a project by independent experts who study domestic politics and elections in Russia’s regions. Our goal is to show and analyse the things happening in domestic politics in all their regional diversity, and our special focus is shifted from the capital to the regions.

Key findings

1. Under the influence of the municipal filter and the shrinking number of registered political parties, there is a steady decline in the number of candidates wishing to stand for election as senior officials. Compared to 2020, the average number of nominated candidates has fallen by almost 20%. At the same time, a significant portion of those who did stand never planned to take part in the elections in the first place, but were either merely trying to make a name for themselves or were acting as technical candidates whose role is to prevent undesirable competitors of the authorities from overcoming the municipal filter.
2. The dropout rate was 30% — almost at last year’s level (34.7%) and lower than in 2020 (37.6%). Admittedly, such a high dropout rate is largely explained by the presence of 19 self-nominees, of whom only the incumbent head of Chuvashia was registered, while the rest, it seems, never even planned to seriously participate in the elections. On the other hand, in half of the regions — 10 — all nominated candidates remained in the pre-election race, meaning that only pre-agreed candidates were nominated there from the outset. That said, among the withdrawn candidates there are some who are genuinely important. For instance, the Communist Party (CPRF) was unable to register a strong candidate in Komi, and in Leningrad Oblast, environmental activist and municipal deputy Larisa Mukhina (also CPRF) was denied registration.
3. In the overwhelming majority of regions, the registered candidates are not real competitors to the incumbent regional heads. The leading political parties, as opponents to the incumbents, initially nominated people who cannot claim victory, or did not nominate their candidates at all. Thus, the CPRF did not nominate its candidate in Chuvashia; in 10 regions it nominated candidates who had previously taken part in regional head elections but posed no real competition; and in four, not the strongest possible candidates were fielded. A similar situation exists with the LDPR: they did not nominate in two regions; in nine, traditional sparring partners were nominated; in two — “outsiders”; in four — little-known “municipals”. A Just Russia did not field candidates in three regions (not counting Chuvashia, where their candidate is running as a self-nominee); in six, the current A Just Russia candidates have already ingloriously taken part in gubernatorial elections; in most of the remaining regions, the party simply fielded little-known politicians. New People, as has become traditional, practically ignored the regional head elections altogether.
4. Among the minor parties, the most noticeable participation is from the spoilers of the Pensioners’ Party, which fielded candidates in ten regions, and in eight of them they successfully overcame the municipal filter.
5. Overall, the current regional head elections turned out to be an imitation almost everywhere, rather than a way to establish the real will of the people living there. The imitative and negotiated nature of the campaigns is evidenced by cases of coordinated withdrawal from the elections by already nominated candidates. For instance, A Just Russia — For Truth revoked an already adopted decision to nominate a very prominent candidate in Kamchatka. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, the already nominated high-status candidate Stanislav Naumov withdrew from the elections, stating two weeks after his nomination that he could not collect the required number of signatures from municipal deputies. The party quickly found a replacement for him from among the traditional sparring partners of local governors, and that candidate encountered no problems. In the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the already registered New People candidate Vladimir Potapenko withdrew from the elections. This happened at the end of August, probably after sociological measurements were taken.
6. Nevertheless, hope for competition still exists in two regions — Arkhangelsk Oblast and especially Irkutsk Oblast, where high-status and well-resourced candidates from the CPRF have been registered.

Overall outcomes of nomination and registration of gubernatorial candidates

Elections for heads are taking place in 20 regions. In total, 134 candidates were nominated in these elections, or 6.7 candidates per region. Admittedly, in Sverdlovsk Oblast the LDPR nominated a candidate twice, but this has little effect on the indicator. In 2024 this indicator was 7.0, in 2023 — 5.9, in 2022 — 6.3, in 2021 — 5.7. The most telling comparison is with 2020, when regional head elections took place in most of the same regions — then this indicator stood at 8.1 candidates per region. That is, over five years there has been a noticeable drop in the number of people wishing to stand for election. There may be several reasons for this: an understanding that it is impossible to overcome the “municipal filter” independently, fear of repression, and the loss of attractiveness of elected positions.

95 candidates were registered, meaning the dropout rate was 29%. However, after registration, a candidate from the New People party withdrew from the elections in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, so we will consider that formal competition in these elections amounts to 4.7 candidates. This is also lower than in 2020, when this indicator was 5.1 candidates, and at the level of all recent years (in 2024 it was 4.6).

Table 1 shows that formally the most candidates were nominated in Kamchatka Krai (13), Komi (12) and Perm Krai (11). The fewest candidates — four each — were nominated in Tatarstan, Krasnodar Krai, Bryansk Oblast and Kursk Oblast. However, after registration, in 19 out of 20 regions, four or five candidates were registered. Only in Arkhangelsk Oblast were six registered.

Table 1. Candidate registration outcomes by region

This situation, repeating year after year, testifies to the managed nature of competition in gubernatorial elections. Increasing the number of candidates admitted to the elections also increases the number of voter groups represented in the elections, which can boost independent voter turnout and increase the risks of a second round.

We see that in 10 regions, all nominated candidates remained in the pre-election race, meaning that only pre-agreed candidates were nominated there.

Of the 134 candidates, 18 lost the status of nominated candidate by failing to submit documents for registration. They either did not attempt to overcome the filters or were unable to do so. Only 18 candidates received registration denials.

However, among those who lost candidate status, two cases stand out. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, high-status State Duma deputy from the LDPR Stanislav Naumov lost his nominated candidate status. He stated that he could not collect the “municipal filter”. However, a few days later, the LDPR nominated another, less high-status candidate, Alexander Kaptyug, who had less time to collect signatures but easily overcame the municipal filter. In the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the already registered New People candidate Vladimir Potapenko withdrew from the elections. This happened at the end of August, probably after sociological measurements were taken.

Both of these cases vividly demonstrate the imitative nature of most ongoing gubernatorial campaigns and the complete controllability of the municipal filter by regional administrations.

The dropout rate was 30% — almost at last year’s level (34.7%) and lower than in 2020 (37.6%). Admittedly, such a high dropout rate is largely explained by the presence of 19 self-nominees, of whom only the incumbent head of Chuvashia was registered, while the rest, it seems, never even planned to seriously participate in the elections (see Table 2).

Table 2. Candidate registration outcomes by party

Table 2 shows that only United Russia passed the registration stage without losses. At the same time, out of the 16 parties that nominated candidates, 10 managed to register at least one. A self-nominee was registered only in Chuvashia — this is the incumbent head of the region, Oleg Nikolaev, who is the only governor from among the representatives of the A Just Russia — For Truth party.

As a result, under current conditions (strict legal frameworks plus the cleansing of the regional political space of non-systemic and/or non-party politicians and activists), the institution of self-nomination has become completely harmless for the incumbent authorities.

United Russia nominated candidates in 19 out of 20 regions. There will be no candidate from the “party of power” only in Chuvashia, where the incumbent head of the region represents A Just Russia — For Truth, although he is running for re-election as a self-nominee.

Naturally, United Russia nominated the incumbent heads of regions or acting heads as candidates.

The CPRF did not nominate its candidate in Chuvashia and was unable to register candidates in Komi and Leningrad Oblast. In Komi, a very strong candidate was running from the party, incumbent State Duma deputy Oleg Mikhailov, while in Leningrad Oblast the incumbent governor was afraid to compete with an initially rather weak candidate — municipal deputy and environmental activist Larisa Mukhina.

In 10 regions — Tatarstan, Krasnodar and Perm Krais, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Novgorod, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Tambov Oblasts — the CPRF nominated candidates who had previously taken part in regional head elections but posed no real competition.

In another four regions, not the strongest possible candidates were fielded. Thus, in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, instead of the regional committee first secretary, the third secretary of the Birobidzhan city committee is running; in Kostroma Oblast, the party nominated a rather odd secretary of the regional committee for organisational and party work, who holds nationalist (pro-Slavic) views; in Orenburg Oblast — a municipal deputy of the Orenburg City Council; and in Sevastopol — a little-known general director of a commercial company who has been nominated three times as a candidate for city deputy and has never been elected.

On the other hand, in Irkutsk Oblast, former head of the region Sergei Levchenko has been nominated as a candidate, and in Arkhangelsk Oblast, the well-resourced State Duma deputy Roman Lyabikhov was unexpectedly nominated and registered.

The LDPR did not nominate candidates in Bryansk and Orenburg Oblasts, and in Sverdlovsk Oblast it urgently replaced a candidate right in the midst of the campaign — probably at the request of the Presidential Administration. In his place, a familiar competitor was nominated, who had already participated in regional head elections and had not shown great prospects in them.

Besides Sverdlovsk Oblast, traditional sparring partners of the incumbent governors were fielded by the party in Tatarstan, Krasnodar and Perm Krais, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Tambov Oblasts and Sevastopol.

In Komi and Kamchatka, candidates were fielded who have no connection whatsoever to these regions. In the JAO, Arkhangelsk and Kostroma Oblasts — little-known municipal deputies, and in Irkutsk Oblast — a deputy head of a rural settlement.

A Just Russia — For Truth did not field candidates in Chuvashia (the incumbent governor representing the party is running as a self-nominee), Tatarstan, Kamchatka and Perm Krais. Notably, in Kamchatka the party revoked an already adopted decision to nominate a prominent candidate — the well-known regional TV presenter Alexandra Novikova. In the JAO, the formally highest-status opponent of the governor — deputy chairman of the budget and economic policy committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Vladimir Dudin — was not registered.

In Krasnodar Krai, Kaluga, Kursk, Orenburg, Sverdlovsk and Tambov Oblasts, the A Just Russia candidates have already ingloriously taken part in gubernatorial elections.

In most of the remaining regions, the party simply fielded people completely unknown to anyone, often not even deputies at the regional or even municipal level. This happened, for example, in Bryansk Oblast, where a little-known businessman is running from the party. In Leningrad Oblast, a deputy of the Magadan Oblast Duma was fielded; in Rostov — the head of the party’s public reception office; in Sevastopol — the head of a public organisation.

New People fielded candidates in fewer than half of the regions — in seven, and in the JAO the candidate withdrew his candidacy after registration, at the end of August. Everywhere, little-known people are running from the party.

Among the minor parties, the greatest activity was shown by the Pensioners’ Party, which fielded candidates in 10 regions, in eight of which they were registered. In all cases, these are outright spoilers.

In five of the six regions where they nominated their candidates, Communists of Russia successfully passed the municipal filter. In three regions — candidates from Green Alternative. One candidate each was registered by Rodina and the Greens. Civic Initiative, Yabloko, RPSS, the Party For Justice!, the Party of Social Protection and the Russian All-People’s Union nominated at least one candidate each, but were not registered anywhere.

The remaining seven parties did not nominate a single candidate.

The distribution of candidates by party and region can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Number of nominated/registered candidates for regional heads by party and region

* In Sverdlovsk Oblast, one candidate was initially nominated, who later withdrew his candidacy, and another was nominated to replace him.

** In the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the New People candidate withdrew from the elections after registration

Table 3 shows that all five parliamentary parties have their candidates in the gubernatorial elections in only three regions — Sverdlovsk and Tambov Oblasts, as well as Sevastopol. Last year, there were four such regions out of 21. The fewest representatives of the “parliamentary five” are registered in Chuvashia — two (LDPR and New People); in Komi, Tatarstan, Kamchatka Krai, Bryansk, Leningrad, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblasts — three each. Thus, in more than a third of regions, at least two parliamentary parties are not taking part in the gubernatorial elections.