Today, a website that won’t open is an ordinary, everyday situation in Russia. Over the course of more than ten years, Russia has built a full-fledged legal and administrative system for managing the internet. At first, the state spoke of combating specific types of dangerous information: child pornography, drug propaganda, suicide methods. Then political websites, “extremist materials,” calls to participate in unsanctioned protests, “fake news,” materials about the war, social networks, mirrors of websites and methods for circumventing blocks all fell under restrictions. As a result, blocking ceased to be an emergency measure and became a routine way of managing the internet space.
2012: the “blacklist” as the foundation of the prohibition infrastructure
The first was Federal Law No. 139-FZ of 28 July 2012 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development’ and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” It provides for the creation of a unified register of domain names and network addresses containing information prohibited from distribution.
The law was adopted almost exclusively by the votes of United Russia. The CPRF, A Just Russia and the LDPR acted as the opposition at that moment.
The official justification for the need for the law looked entirely convincing: to protect children from obviously dangerous content. But, as often happens in Russian realities, what was more important was not so much the category of prohibited information itself, but the emergence of a legal way to introduce censorship. The state developed a mechanism whereby it could place any website or individual page in the register, and telecom operators were obliged to restrict access to them.
It soon turned out that blocking an individual page could affect more than just the disputed material itself. A telling example is the 2015 story with Wikipedia. The Chernoyarsky District Court of Astrakhan Oblast, on a prosecutor’s lawsuit, declared the article “Charas” (dedicated to a cannabis variety) prohibited from distribution in the Russian Federation. The court considered that the text contained detailed instructions for preparing a narcotic substance.
Several months before the court decision, Wikipedia had fully switched to a secure encrypted connection. Therefore, providers had no technical ability to cut off access to the individual page /wiki/Charas. The only way to enforce the court decision was to completely block all of Russian Wikipedia, which they did.
However, the very next morning, Roskomnadzor sharply backtracked and removed Wikipedia from the blacklist. The agency stated that the article “had been edited” and now “does not violate the law.” At the same time, Wikipedia editors noted that the essence of the article had not changed, and that officials simply needed a pretext to save face. At that moment, state bodies were not ready for the large-scale reputational and technical collapse that blocking one of the country’s most popular websites would have caused, and they preferred to compromise.
Thus, right at the beginning, one of the main features of the system being built came to light: the legal formula may speak of prohibiting specific material, but the technical execution can affect a much broader environment.
2013: copyright and “perpetual blocking”
The next major block consisted of anti-piracy norms. Federal Law No. 187-FZ of 2 July 2013 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Issues of Protecting Intellectual Rights in Information and Telecommunication Networks” established a procedure for protecting intellectual rights on the internet and granted the right to seek restriction of access to resources hosting content in violation of copyright and related rights.
The law was supported by United Russia and A Just Russia; the LDPR and CPRF did not vote.
At first glance, this is a neutral topic — protecting rights holders. But it was precisely here that an important logic was being refined: a website could be blocked not because of a security threat, but as the object of a legal dispute, and the consequences are borne not only by the site administrators, but also by millions of users.
A telling example is RuTracker. In January 2016, a decision came into force to block this largest Russian-language torrent tracker. The grounds were lawsuits from the publishing house “Eksmo” and the music label “S.B.A. Production,” owned by Warner Music. Access to RuTracker was closed. The court rejected mass appeals from ordinary users who tried to challenge the restriction of their right to access information.
In response to the authorities’ actions, the RuTracker administration completely ceased any cooperation with rights holders. The resource cancelled all special accounts through which authors and labels could independently remove distributions of their works.
Nevertheless, complete isolation of the resource did not occur; instead, a game of “cat and mouse” began. The site posted detailed instructions in advance, released its own official browser plugin, and within a few weeks taught Russians how to use proxies, VPNs and public DNS servers. And as soon as rights holders lost the “delete” button, thousands of files that had been unavailable for years returned to RuTracker — from the latest software and games to the complete discographies of famous music groups. Ultimately, the closure of RuTracker led to the opposite effect: instead of eliminating piracy, the state unwittingly staged the first digital literacy course for ordinary citizens in the history of the Runet.
December 2013: extrajudicial blocking and the “political” internet
A key political turn occurred with the adoption of Federal Law No. 398-FZ of 28 December 2013 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information.’” It was adopted in the State Duma in the third reading on 20 December 2013. The law introduced Article 15.3 into the law and established a procedure for restricting access to information disseminated in violation of the law. From 1 February 2014, Roskomnadzor gained the ability, at the request of the Prosecutor General or his deputies, to restrict access to resources without a prior court decision.
This time the law was supported by a tandem of United Russia and the CPRF.
Formally, it was about calls for mass riots, extremist activity, etc. But the new construction changed the balance: now access is restricted first, and only afterwards can the resource owner try to challenge the decision in court.
Practical application began almost immediately. On 13 March 2014, access was restricted to the opposition resources “Grani.ru,” “Kasparov.ru,” “Ezhednevny Zhurnal,” as well as to Alexei Navalny’s blog on LiveJournal and its reprint on the “Echo of Moscow” website. It was obvious that this was no longer a concern for child safety or copyright. Blocking had become a tool for influencing political communication.
From site to its copies: the state begins to fight resource resilience
After blocking became a mass tool, the state faced a predictable problem: owners of blocked websites began moving them to other domains — creating “mirrors.” The state responded with a new level of regulation.
Federal Law No. 156-FZ of 1 July 2017 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information’” introduced a procedure for restricting access to copies of blocked websites. The law was adopted almost unanimously.
Now, if a site moved and appeared on another domain, the blocking mechanism was supposed to “catch up” with that copy as well. Search engines were also included in enforcement: they were required to stop displaying information about such copies.
2017: VPNs, anonymizers and the fight against circumvention of blocks
The state’s practical problem at that moment was that users were increasingly using VPNs.
Federal Law No. 276-FZ of 29 July 2017 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information’” prohibited owners of VPN services, anonymizers and similar tools from providing the ability to access information resources blocked in Russia. The law was supported by all Duma factions, with the exception of the LDPR.
It was precisely during this period that the technical cost of blocking became obvious. During the attempt to block Telegram in 2018 (albeit on other formal grounds — the authorities demanded that they be handed so-called encryption keys that would allow them to independently monitor “suspicious” correspondence), Roskomnadzor massively restricted IP addresses associated with cloud infrastructure. As a result, not only users of the messenger experienced problems, but also third-party services using the same servers: these included ordinary online stores, courier services, online games, etc. As we recall, that episode effectively ended in nothing — Roskomnadzor stated that it had fulfilled its tasks, and Telegram, in turn, stated that the confidentiality of user correspondence had been fully preserved.
2019: “fakes” and “disrespect” as an expansion of extrajudicial logic
In 2019, Federal Law No. 31-FZ of 18 March 2019 “On Amendments to Article 15.1 of the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information’” amended the relevant article and established a procedure for blocking “unreliable socially significant information” disseminated under the guise of reliable reports — the “Fake News Law.” This time it was solidly supported by United Russia and A Just Russia, while the CPRF and LDPR voted against.
At the same time, also by the votes of United Russia, Federal Law No. 30-FZ “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information’” was adopted, concerning information expressing, in an indecent form, clear disrespect for society, the state, official symbols, the Constitution or bodies of power.
The concept of “dangerous information” became broader and more vague. It was no longer just about drugs, suicide, child safety, pirated content or calls for mass riots — the breadth of the wording allowed any content to be banned, primarily content critical of the authorities.
The practical consequences, as usual, were not long in coming. That same year, 2019, saw the first cases concerning “disrespect” for state symbols. For example, the meme generator Risovach.ru was blocked for “obscene description of the Russian flag and insults directed at Russian citizens.” To avoid a complete block of the entire resource, the site owners promptly removed the disputed content. A couple of weeks later, in August of the same year, the Prosecutor General’s Office found another meme on the same site with a similar “offensive” context, which was also removed under threat of blocking.
Notifications were also sent to Instagram and Facebook. In total, in 2020, Roskomnadzor reported that 172 websites or internet pages had been removed or blocked under the “fake news” law.
For media outlets and bloggers, this created an additional field of self-censorship: sometimes it is safer to remove disputed material or even refuse to publish it altogether than to argue about it after a block.
2020: blocking moves inside platforms
Up to a certain point, blocking looked like an external action by the state: Roskomnadzor adds a resource to the register, the telecom operator restricts access. But with the development of social networks, this model seemed insufficient to the state. User content lives not only on media websites, but also inside platforms — VKontakte, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Telegram and other services. Therefore, the state began to transfer the filtering function inside the platforms themselves.
Federal Law No. 530-FZ of 30 December 2020 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information’” was adopted by United Russia and introduced Article 10.6 into the law “On Information…” — this is an article on the specifics of disseminating information in social networks. Owners of social networks were obliged to independently identify and restrict access to prohibited content.
Roskomnadzor began forming a register of social networks. Later, fines appeared for failure to comply with the “self-monitoring” requirements. According to Roskomnadzor data, in 2023, owners of social networks were fined for such violations for a total amount of more than 21 million rubles.
2022: a sharp narrowing of the information space
With the start of the war in Ukraine, blocking became one of the main tools for controlling information. The State Duma adopted Federal Law No. 32-FZ of 04.03.2022 “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Articles 31 and 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation,” which established criminal liability for disseminating “knowingly false information” about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. All Duma factions were unanimous in supporting this law — it is obvious that, against the backdrop of war, it was especially important for all Duma factions to demonstrate loyalty to the state’s new, aggressive policy.
Also, and with the same unanimity, Federal Law No. 31-FZ of 04.03.2022 “On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses” was adopted, amending the Administrative Offenses Code and establishing administrative liability, including for actions qualified as discrediting the use of the Armed Forces.
According to official data from the Investigative Committee alone, from the moment criminal liability was introduced in March 2022 until March 2025, more than 600 criminal cases were opened on “fakes” and “discrediting” the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Of these, 444 cases were under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code on “fakes” about the army, and 171 cases were under Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code on “discrediting” the army. According to the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, cases against 365 individuals were sent to the courts: 252 people in cases on “fakes,” 113 people in cases on “discrediting.”
Administrative prosecution was even more widespread. According to data from the OVD-Info project, from 24 February 2022 to 24 July 2025, 11,591 cases under Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Offenses Code on “discrediting the army” were filed in courts of first instance. For 2025, according to OVD-Info data, 1,500 such administrative cases were filed in courts of first instance; in 2024 — 2,158. Despite the fact that the intensity has somewhat decreased compared to the first years of the war, the article continues to be actively applied.
Here are just a few examples. In December 2022, politician Ilya Yashin was sentenced to 8.5 years in a general-regime colony in a case on “fakes” about the army. The grounds were his stream about the events in Bucha. In February 2023, blogger and publisher Veronika Belotserkovskaya was sentenced in absentia to 9 years in a colony under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code. The grounds were publications about Bucha and Mariupol. In March 2023, the administrator of the Telegram channel “Protestny MGU,” Dmitry Ivanov, was sentenced to 8.5 years in a colony in a case on “fakes” about the army. He was charged with publications about the war in Ukraine, including reports about Bucha, Mariupol and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In September 2023, journalist Mikhail Afanasyev, editor-in-chief of the publication “Novy Fokus” in Khakassia, was sentenced to 5.5 years in a colony in a case on “fakes” about the army. The grounds were a publication about Russian National Guard members who refused to participate in the war. Journalist Maria Ponomarenko was sentenced in 2023 to 6 years in a colony under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code for a publication about a Russian airstrike on the drama theatre in Mariupol. The list goes on.
It is important to distinguish: the blocking of media outlets themselves in March 2022 continued to be formalized through the already existing Article 15.3 of the law “On Information…” But the new norms on “fakes” and “discrediting” radically intensified the overall regime of pressure. They created for journalists, editorial offices and bloggers the risk not only of blocking, but also of administrative or criminal prosecution.
Immediately after the law was adopted, access was restricted to the websites of “Meduza,” “Radio Svoboda,” Deutsche Welle, the BBC Russian Service and other resources. Also in March 2022, Roskomnadzor restricted access to Facebook and Instagram; subsequently, a Russian court recognized Meta, which owns these platforms, as an extremist organization. Small businesses, charitable projects, cultural initiatives, and professional contacts operated through Instagram and Facebook. The blocking of social networks became a blow not only to political communication, but also to everyday social and economic interactions.
Thus, the blocking system effectively became a system of information mobilization. The state sought to control the permissible language for describing events and limited the list of permissible sources and channels through which people could receive alternative information.
2023–2025: not only content, but also the path to it falls under prohibition
Since 2022, the issue of circumventing blocks has become a categorical necessity for millions of users. People installed VPNs en masse, because without them it became impossible to open familiar media outlets, social networks, work tools and educational resources.
Federal Law No. 406-FZ of 31 July 2023 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information,’” among other things, made information about methods of circumventing blocks grounds for blocking. And again the Duma voted almost unanimously; only deputies from the CPRF voted against.
In 2025, this logic was developed further. Federal Law No. 281-FZ of 31.07.2025 “On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses and the Federal Law ‘On Communications’” was adopted, introducing fines for the intentional search for extremist materials on the internet and gaining access to them, including through the use of means of access to restricted resources. The State Duma adopted it almost exclusively by the forces of United Russia. It is interesting that the other systemic parties dared to show defiance on such an important issue for the authorities, which may indicate a shift in public sentiment.
This law shifts responsibility from the person who publishes prohibited material onto the user themselves, the reader of “harmful” information, which is a significant step from authoritarian dictatorship towards totalitarianism.
As of today, blocking has become an everyday reality. Over the last decade, a typical “arms race between sword and shield” has been observed — the state introduces ever new ways to hide information important to citizens from them, and citizens each time make efforts to circumvent these prohibitions.
This struggle has clearly transitioned into a new quality — now, instead of targeted blocking of dangerous resources, the authorities have moved to completely shutting down the internet and introducing “whitelists.”