The Election Atlas project has launched a weekly social media monitoring programme covering the State Duma election campaign. We will examine the online activity of the parties and other participants in the electoral process.
Social media monitoring reports are published weekly.
The registration of party candidate lists was completed during the seventh week of the election campaign.
A total of 377,211 posts published between 28 July and 3 August were analysed. The principal news event of the week was the completion of party-list registration.
Key findings
For the second consecutive week, both Yabloko and New People have recorded clear and extremely sharp growth across the principal indicators. In terms of engagement – the combined number of reactions, comments and reposts – New People has doubled its figure over the past two weeks, while Yabloko’s has increased 4.5-fold. As a result, New People has caught up with the CPRF in absolute terms, while Yabloko has overtaken A Just Russia. A similar, though somewhat less dramatic, pattern can be seen in views: New People has nearly doubled its figure over two weeks, while Yabloko’s has almost tripled. Both parties are now approaching the CPRF on this measure. For the organisers of an election that was evidently intended to be a calm and uneventful campaign, this creates an obvious risk that developments may begin to slip beyond their control.
For the first time during the monitoring period, Telegram has drawn level with VKontakte in the number of posts mentioning political parties. This was driven by unusual posting activity from networks of Telegram channels receiving zero or near-zero views. These networks appear to exist largely to “use up budgets” and produce figures that can be reported back to clients. They are evidently connected to the editorial operation of VChK-OGPU and actively publish hundreds of identical posts containing compromising material. CPRF candidates have become one of the principal targets of this negative campaign.
Despite the relatively small number of party-related publications on YouTube, the platform remains highly influential, generating substantial views and engagement. Three of the five most-engaged publications of the week were YouTube videos. Much of this content was critical of the ruling party. The single most popular publication, however, was a VKontakte post concerning an LDPR proposal to reduce citizens’ debt burden.
Number of mentions
During the seventh week of the campaign, from 28 July to 3 August, 377,211 mentions of political parties were recorded – 1.7 times as many as the previous week’s 221,824.
United Russia was the principal driver of this increase, with the number of mentions of the party doubling week on week.
The sharp increase was particularly pronounced on Telegram, where mentions rose approximately sixfold.
A significant number of Telegram channels mentioning the ruling party have fewer than 100 subscribers. More tellingly, many of their posts receive no views at all.
One such text, for example, was published by almost 500 Telegram channels, yet in most cases the authors of this monitoring report appeared to have been its first readers.
Very often, if not invariably, these empty Telegram channels cite publications from other equally empty channels whose descriptions identify them as part of the “VChK-OGPU Media Group”.
They are probably part of a single network whose primary purpose is to demonstrate high levels of publishing activity and citation to clients.
Other parties also recorded substantial growth in mentions. A Just Russia’s figure increased 1.4-fold, the CPRF’s 2.3-fold, LDPR’s 1.4-fold and New People’s 2.1-fold.
The smaller parties also grew noticeably. Rodina recorded the largest increase, with mentions tripling.
In Rodina’s case, much of this growth again came from the same network of Telegram channels.
One post mentioning a former member of Rodina was reproduced verbatim 2,868 times. The person in question had been a member of a party called Rodina in 2005, meaning that the publication in fact referred to a member of a different party with the same name.
These posts likewise received no views.
All parties gained additional mentions from a large number of formal, purely informational posts announcing the completion of party registration.
As before, a substantial share of the posts concerning the most frequently mentioned parties came from centrally coordinated campaigns.
One of the principal themes in coverage of United Russia was the “special military operation” and related volunteer activity.
For example, a post concerning a visit to Dagestan by United Russia candidate Vladislav Golovin was distributed by 3,936 accounts and pages belonging to public authorities and publicly funded institutions in the republic.
United Russia also actively promoted issues including urban improvements and infrastructure repairs, its Active Longevity programme and support for older people, the renovation and construction of schools and childcare facilities, and the development of industrial production in Russia’s regions. These are all elements of the party’s programme.
A Just Russia likewise actively promoted themes connected to the “special military operation”.
For example, party-affiliated pages published more than 1,000 copies of a text in which party leader Sergei Mironov called for action against people falsely presenting themselves as war veterans.
The party also actively promoted proposals concerning supplementary payments for teachers, support for families with children, problems in housing and communal services, and rising prices and utility tariffs.
A substantial share of the CPRF’s mentions came either from conflicts with other political parties or from the coordinated distribution of compromising material.
A text alleging law-enforcement interest in State Duma deputy and Altai Krai CPRF leader Maria Prusakova, for example, was published 494 times by a network of Telegram channels.
Channels belonging to the now familiar VChK-OGPU network also published 494 copies of a post concerning another CPRF deputy, Anatoly Bifov.
The party was therefore subjected to large-scale distribution of material that clearly amounted to a negative political smear campaign.
A significant proportion of LDPR’s mentions was also generated by publications in the same network of Telegram channels.
The party itself, meanwhile, continues to campaign against migrants, voice support for the “special military operation” and promise action on problems in housing and communal services.
New People was mentioned most frequently in connection with the completion of party registration.
The party itself has sought to emphasise its opposition to internet shutdowns and the blocking of individual online services.
A speech by party leader Alexei Nechayev, in which he called for citizens to be told the truth about what is happening in the country, was also actively promoted.
Views
The total number of views received by party-related publications remained almost unchanged from the previous week: approximately 230 million, compared with 240 million.
The balance between the parties, however, changed considerably.
Views of publications mentioning United Russia declined by 10%, despite the enormous increase in the number of mentions.
Views fell by 27% for the CPRF and 22% for A Just Russia, while LDPR’s figure remained almost unchanged.
By contrast, views of publications mentioning New People increased sharply, by 42%, while Yabloko recorded an increase of 52%.
As a result, Yabloko has almost caught up with both New People and the CPRF on this indicator.
The single largest contribution to Yabloko’s increase came from a video on the YouTube channel of Alexander Shtefanov, who has been designated a “foreign agent”, entitled Yabloko: The Story of the Only Anti-War Party on the Ballot.
Among the 25 most-viewed publications mentioning Yabloko, only one appeared on VKontakte, ranking 25th. It was a purely informational post concerning the registration of the party list.
Most mentions of Yabloko came from Telegram.
New People likewise receives most of its audience through Telegram. None of the party’s 25 most-viewed posts appeared on VKontakte.
Its three most-viewed publications were all posts from the Telegram channel Topor Live.
The two parties are therefore competing largely on the same platforms and have recorded similar results for the second consecutive week.
Engagement
The pattern for engagement – the combined number of reactions, comments and reposts – is similar.
Yabloko and New People have followed almost parallel trajectories throughout the campaign, with New People remaining slightly ahead.
Both have now recorded substantial growth.
Over the past two weeks, New People has doubled its engagement figure, while Yabloko’s has increased 4.5-fold.
As a result, New People has caught up with the CPRF in absolute terms, while Yabloko has overtaken A Just Russia.
The most-engaged publication involving any party was a VKontakte post concerning an LDPR proposal to reduce the debt burden on citizens.
Second place was taken by the previously mentioned video on Yabloko by Alexander Shtefanov.
The difference between the two publications was relatively small: 35,000 reactions for the LDPR post and 32,000 for the Yabloko video.
Third place also went to a YouTube video, this time by another blogger designated a “foreign agent”, Ilya Varlamov.
The social media analysis system formally attributed the video to United Russia because the title and description mention only that party.
In reality, however, the video concerns the election as a whole and also discusses other participants in the campaign.
Entitled Elections During Wartime: How Will United Russia Win Amid Drone Attacks and a Fuel Crisis?, it is critical of the ruling party.
Fourth and fifth place in engagement, with almost identical results, were shared by another YouTube video, published by the Koroche, Novosti channel under the title CPRF: The Opposition We Deserve, and a Telegram post by Newsach/Dvach concerning United Russia’s ratings.
These were followed by several Telegram posts concerning New People’s criticism of proposals to block Telegram and accusations that Pavel Durov had facilitated terrorist activity.
The most popular of these was a post by political consultant Ilya Grashchenkov, who is associated with the party.
Distribution of posts across platforms
The balance between platforms changed radically during the past week.
Telegram caught up with, and slightly overtook, VKontakte in the number of party mentions.
This result, however, was driven by the questionable practice of distributing compromising material through networks consisting of hundreds of Telegram channels with zero or near-zero views.
The other two monitored platforms showed virtually no change.
Methodology
Four platforms currently used by Russian audiences were selected for the social media monitoring programme: VKontakte, MAX, Telegram and YouTube.
We have not yet been able to establish effective monitoring of Odnoklassniki and Instagram, both of which could have a substantial impact on the overall results. Should it become possible to incorporate these platforms in the coming weeks, the relevant data will be added.
The analysis covers mentions of 11 parties entitled to nominate lists and candidates without collecting voter signatures: United Russia, the CPRF, LDPR, A Just Russia, New People, Yabloko, Communists of Russia, the Party of Direct Democracy, Rodina, the Party of Pensioners and the Greens.
Should other parties nominate candidates in the election, they will be added to the monitoring programme.
We analysed posts on each platform, focusing on the following indicators:
the number of social media mentions, or posts, broken down by political party;
the number of mentions broken down by platform;
engagement, including reposts, reactions and comment activity;
duplicate posts, which frequently indicate the centralised distribution of materials;
key topics;
the use of administrative resources.