Candidates and parties must have free and equal access to the media, and voters must have free and equal access to information about candidates. All relevant international conventions say so, and even rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation say so.
This is not about absolute equality, which is impossible to achieve because candidates and parties are not identical. Some will always generate more news hooks than others and, accordingly, receive different levels of media attention. However, the state is obliged to ensure equality of opportunity for all legitimate political forces.
Meanwhile, in Russia equality of opportunity in campaigning is absent because of the selective application of legislation.
The legislative basis for campaigning in the media
Quite decent parameters for assessing the equality of candidates and parties in the media were established by Federal Law No. 93-FZ of 21 July 2005 “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Elections and Referendums and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.”
Here, the boundaries between informing and campaigning in the media were clarified. For example, it is made clear that campaigning is not only a call to vote for someone, but also the expression of a preference for a particular candidate, the creation of a positive image of them, and the description of possible consequences if they are elected.
Below we will examine how the provisions of this law are in fact violated through the use of administrative resources.
Federal Law No. 66-FZ of 9 March 2016 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Elections and Referendums and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” extended campaigning rules to online media (although at that time these requirements did not yet apply to social networks, messengers and ordinary websites).
The entire systemic parliamentary opposition voted against this law.
Campaigning in the media: the example of the 2020 campaign
The unequal presentation of candidates and parties in the media has been measured repeatedly, and the results have always been more or less the same. For example, during the 2020 gubernatorial elections the Golos movement measured press mentions of gubernatorial candidates throughout the official campaign: from the publication of the decision to call the election until voting day. Mentions of “administrative” candidates — that is, candidates agreed upon within the Presidential Administration — were 7 times higher than those of all the others combined.
For example, in Leningrad Oblast the incumbent governor Drozdenko was mentioned 24 times more often than the three alternative candidates combined.
In the first instance, the promotion of agreed candidates is handled by state media, as well as those receiving state contracts, i.e. those directly dependent on governors’ offices. At the same time, the materials are not paid for from the electoral fund, as the law requires, because they are presented as “informational” — that is, ostensibly reporting facts important to all residents. In reality, they are poorly disguised or entirely undisguised campaigning.
For example, in that same year 2020 the TV channel “Kuban 24”, without a hint of embarrassment, aired a report about the incumbent governor of Krasnodar Krai, Kondratyev, entitled “Veniamin Kondratyev’s public support headquarters held its first meeting”. There, under the guise of “informing”, it was reported that Kondratyev was running for a new term and how much good he had done for the region — clear signs of campaigning were evident. At the same time, the sole participant of LLC “Kuban 24” is Krasnodar Krai, meaning that incumbent governor Kondratyev, as head of the region, can in fact dispose of the channel at his own discretion (although by law the media are considered “independent”).
Of course, the situation received no legal assessment. And such a story is more than typical for any elections in the Russian Federation.
As independent electoral experts believe, there is a lacuna in electoral legislation on this issue: only if incumbent governors went on leave during the election campaign could equality of candidates be ensured. Otherwise, simply by covering the governor’s activities, the media are de facto participating in campaigning.
Furthermore, holding office allows a pro-government candidate to secure the support of high-ranking officials when they interact with him publicly — for example, if Putin, at a meeting with the governor, praises him for his successes.
This method is widely used to support weak administrative candidates; sometimes genuine “landing parties” of federal officials descend on a region during the election campaign.
Thus, in August 2020 a large team of federal politicians flew to Irkutsk Oblast, tasked with supporting incumbent governor Kobzev:
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, together with Kobzev, inspected the progress of reconstruction after the 2019 floods;
Sberbank CEO German Gref, together with him, visited a hospital being built with Sberbank’s money;
Deputy Defence Minister Timur Ivanov discussed with Kobzev the construction of a Suvorov Military School in Irkutsk;
Russian Railways head Oleg Belozerov met with Kobzev to discuss the construction of new railway facilities;
Health Minister Mikhail Murashko, in the governor’s presence, personally presented awards to Irkutsk doctors for their work during the Covid pandemic;
Economic Development Minister Mikhail Reshetnikov resolved with Kobzev issues concerning Usolye-Sibirskoye and the territory of the former Khimprom plant.
All these meetings were used as news hooks for active media coverage, right during the election campaign. And again — without legal consequences.
Campaigning in the media: the example of the 2024 campaign
After the start of the full-scale war, the situation with campaigning in the media worsened further.
Many media outlets, including strong regional editorial offices, simply closed down on their own or were destroyed — for example, designated as foreign agents, or squeezed out of public life in other ways.
By law, the media have the right to participate in an election campaign by publishing campaign materials in favour of candidates. To do so, media outlets are obliged to notify election commissions that they are ready to place such publications, and then any candidates gain the opportunity to place their campaigning there, paying for it from their electoral fund.
However, by 2024 it turned out that the risks of such participation in a campaign for the media outweighed the benefits of the opportunity to earn money. After all, the law obliges media to publish the campaigning of any candidates, including opposition ones — and that is a direct path to incurring the displeasure of the authorities.
In the elections of deputies to the Kurgan City Duma, the only publication that notified the Kurgan City Election Commission of its readiness to provide services for placing campaign materials was the city newspaper “Kurgan i Kurgantsy”. But even there, only three thematic materials were published during the campaign, two of which were general information on all nominated and registered candidates, and only one — with campaigning for representatives of the New People party.
This does not mean that the media were not used by administrative candidates for campaigning — it is simply that this was again done not at the expense of electoral funds, but under the guise of “informational articles”.
For example, in Orenburg Oblast the regional government newspaper “Orenburzhye” published news about the submission to the election commission of signatures in support of the nomination of gubernatorial candidates from the United Russia, A Just Russia and New People parties. However, there were no materials about the signature campaign of the CPRF candidate Vladimir Gudomarov! Despite the fact that Gudomarov faced difficulties in passing the municipal filter, and there genuinely were news hooks there.
There were also no materials about the submission of signatures by the candidate from Communists of Russia, Ramil Gafarov. As for the candidate Oksana Rodimtseva from the Party of Russia’s Rebirth, on the contrary, an article was published entitled “Orenburg gubernatorial candidate to be checked for extremism” with a clearly negative slant.
Also, the media again “inform” about the everyday working activities of pro-government candidates who already hold some office.
Thus, the state and municipal media of Bashkortostan during the election campaign wrote very actively about the work of the United Russia candidate, the incumbent head of the republic Radiy Khabirov. The agency “Bashinform” in the period from 6 to 30 August 2024 mentioned Khabirov 324 times, the CPRF candidate Artur Shainurov — 7 times, the LDPR candidate Ivan Sukharev — 8 times, the candidate from A Just Russia — Patriots — For Truth Vladimir Nagorny — 8 times, the New People candidate — 8 times. Thus, Khabirov was mentioned 10.5 times more often than all the other candidates combined.
Moreover, news hooks were specially created to support Khabirov’s campaign. His activities on 30 and 31 August 2024 during the celebration of the 450th anniversary of the founding of Ufa received extensive coverage. At the same time, the festivities usually take place on 12 June — Ufa City Day. But in the election year, the authorities moved the celebration in advance as close as possible to the September elections.
The free daily publication of the St Petersburg administration, “Peterburgskiy Dnevnik”, during the campaign published articles every day about the activities of the incumbent governor and candidate Alexander Beglov, including describing Beglov’s plans for the development of St Petersburg — that is, directly violating the provisions of the previously mentioned Law No. 93-FZ.
Also, materials about Beglov in June–August 2024 were printed in every issue of the official newspapers of the administrations of at least seven districts of St Petersburg: about measures to support older residents, about the abolition of kindergarten fees, about Beglov’s participation in protocol events, and again — about his plans for the city’s development. The plans of any other gubernatorial candidates were not mentioned in the newspapers.
The opposition sometimes tries to challenge the clearly biased behaviour of the media during the campaigning period. In Ryazan Oblast in 2015, the RPR-PARNAS party sent five complaints to the regional election commission about ostensibly informational TV reports featuring United Russia candidates, where party banners and flags appeared. However, not one of these reports was recognised as campaign material. That is, visual signs of a party campaign were present, but the legal assessment proved favourable for the party of power.
It can be stated that without a change in the judicial system, establishing equality of opportunity for candidates in the media will be impossible to achieve.