Managed result: how Chelyabinsk Oblast is preparing for the elections on 18–20 September

In the 2021 State Duma elections in Chelyabinsk Oblast, United Russia received 34.31% — the worst result in the Urals Federal District. For comparison: in Sverdlovsk Oblast, considered liberal, the party of power got 34.71%. Under Texler's predecessor Boris Dubrovsky the result was 38.11%, under Mikhail Yurevich — 50.5%. In other words, under Texler the bar fell to a historic low.

The only single-member district that United Russia lost in 2021 was Korkinsky: there the winner was A Just Russia candidate Valery Gartung, who received 46.7% of the vote. The party of power's candidate, children's clinic head physician Andrei Ryzhy, ran a nominal campaign. Experts called this a "horse-trade" with the systemic opposition — ceding the district to Gartung in exchange for moderate rhetoric.

Ahead of the 2026 campaign, the Presidential Administration set Chelyabinsk Oblast target indicators: 55% for United Russia with 45% turnout. Party General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev personally took charge of the Central Election Headquarters. Adding 20 percentage points to the oblast's 2021 result is a task that political consultant Yevgeny Maklakov described as "an optimistic target indicator and a serious challenge," and Chelyabinsk Oblast has been placed in the "yellow zone" — moderately difficult but not critical.

The main risks identified by the federal centre: the special military operation and a tense budget situation. Additional factors — rising tariffs, housing and utility problems, public fatigue. If in 2021 under Texler the result collapsed, this time Moscow, apparently, and the oblast authorities after it, intend to obtain a controlled figure.

Closing a gap of 21 points solely by mobilising the electorate while "ceding" the Korkinsky district to the same Gartung is impossible. A restructuring of the entire vertical is required — from the oblast government down to precinct commissions. And that is precisely what we have been observing over the past few months.

The precinct election commissions were "dealt with" back in 2025: new compositions were approved and reinforced with United Russia members. But this work was only the beginning of preparations for the 2026 Duma elections.

Event one: the prosecutor's office vs. the Zlatoust city assembly

On 12 August the Zlatoust prosecutor's office issued a representation demanding the early termination of powers for 12 of the 25 deputies of the city assembly. The grounds — inaccurate income data in their declarations. For five deputies the violations were deemed serious, for seven they were subject to "correction in the shortest possible time." If the demands are not met — the materials go to court, the assembly loses its legitimacy, and new elections are called. Truly: dossiers are prepared for everyone, ready to be pulled out from under the cloth at any convenient moment!

The key figure among those to whom the representation is addressed is Alexei Karyukov, chairman of the Zlatoust City District Assembly of Deputies and simultaneously secretary of the local branch of United Russia. All of the party's field work in the city goes through Karyukov's hands: meetings with work collectives, "party landings," charity events, implementation of the "People's Programme."

The timing is telling: the representation was filed three months after Oleg Kolesnikov withdrew from the primaries and exactly one month before the elections. Kolesnikov — a twice-elected State Duma deputy for Zlatoust district No. 192, the only current federal parliamentarian serving in the special military operation, holder of the Order of Courage. In May he withdrew from the United Russia primaries, explaining the decision by "non-political motives." Maklakov said bluntly at the time: the district had already been "given away" to Anton Kovalyov, and pushing ahead would have meant an intra-party scandal.

Kovalyov is 41, co-owner of the Ferrum group of companies, founder of the "Club of Young Industrialists," a Manturov protégé. In May Texler held a personal meeting with him. Kovalyov won the primary with 24,680 votes — a staggering margin. Campaign financing — through the family business: OOO Ferrum-S, whose general director is the candidate's father Ivan Kovalyov, formed a starting fund of 4.35 million rubles; by mid-September the fund had grown to 11.6 million.

Competition in the district has been cleared out: Valentina Komkova (Yabloko) was removed by a court on 10 September — without the text of the ruling. The remaining six candidates are party nominees without serious resources. In July Kolesnikov became head of the supervisory board of the regional office of the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives — a "soft landing," honourable but without political weight. However, Kovalyov remained an outsider to the local political machine. And the conflict associated with the regional authorities replacing "their man" in the Duma seemed to have been extinguished, but in reality — was merely smouldering.

The essence of the instrument: Karyukov is needed for mobilisation, so he is not removed immediately but kept under threat. If Kovalyov wins with a good result — Karyukov "corrects his declarations," the prosecutor's office closes the case. If the result is weak — the prosecutor's office takes the case to court, the assembly is dissolved, and new elections are held with a fully loyal composition.

In parallel, the oblast duplicates the local machine with its own resources: in September United Russia is conducting a series of "party landings" in Zlatoust — events, meetings with work collectives, distribution of charitable aid. Kolesnikov does not appear at them — he has been erased from the public space of the local branch.

Zlatoust is not Texler's first testing ground. In 2019 he came to the city, publicly berated head Vyacheslav Zhilin and conducted a citywide survey on trust in the mayor parallel to the gubernatorial elections. The polling showed: 51% of residents completely distrusted the head, another 25% "simply" distrusted him. That ended with a change of city leadership. The current situation is the same pattern, but at a new level: not a public flogging of the mayor, but a systemic purge — the parliament, candidates, the mobilisation machine.

Event two: resignation of the government 11 days before the elections

On 7 September Texler dismissed the entire cabinet of ministers. Formally this is linked to the creation of a separate post of chairman of the government (a decision taken back in June). But the fact that it was done 11 days before the vote — does not look accidental.

Key moves:

• The premier became Ivan Kutsevlyak — previously first deputy governor, Texler's confidant;

• Deputy governor Andrei Faleichik was dismissed, his place taken by Andrei Grachev — a 38-year-old outsider from Samara;

• Minister of Housing and Utilities Lyudmila Alpatova was fired;

• Some ministers kept their posts (health, education, sport), some — are in question.

The political bloc remained under deputy governor Roman Wollert — operational management of the election campaign was not interrupted.

The resignation of the government is not a real reset (most ministers returned to their posts), but a demonstration effect. A signal to the entire vertical: the result of 18–20 September is the criterion for evaluating your work. No one is immune — from minister to head of a rural settlement…

Other territories: the same logic, different instruments

Zlatoust is the most vivid case, but not the only one. A system for managing the electoral process has been deployed across the oblast, where each municipality receives its own dose of pressure depending on the level of risk.

Kopeysk — dismantling the Faleichik team

In February, deputy governor Andrei Faleichik was detained by the FSB right at his workplace — charged with receiving bribes on an especially large scale, some of them dating from his time as head of Kopeysk. Texler stated publicly: "If guilt is proven — he will answer to the full extent of the law. Without allowances for ranks and titles." In July Svetlana Loganova, appointed head of Kopeysk on Faleichik's recommendation, resigns. On the same day, the head of the Bredinsky District Nikolai Plokhikh leaves. The political machine of Kopeysk has been completely dismantled: the mayor left, the ex-mayor is in pre-trial detention, his successor fired, a new head not yet chosen. Kopeysk is on the list of 15 municipalities with by-elections.

Magnitogorsk — intrigue with the mayor and removed candidates

Mayor Sergei Berdnikov has been in office for 10 years, filed documents for a third term. But in parallel, two candidates not admitted to the State Duma race filed documents for the post of mayor: Stanislav Naumov (removed for invalid signatures) and Vladimir Kornev, who also intended to run for the Duma. Naumov is preparing an appeal to the Supreme Court — the story is not closed. Magnitogorsk district No. 191 — one of five single-member districts, where everyone was removed: Sergei Faryma (Yabloko), Stanislav Naumov (self-nominated). The opponents have been eliminated, but the residue remains.

Bredinsky District — simultaneous resignation

Head Nikolai Plokhikh left on 3 July — the same day as Loganova in Kopeysk. Formally "for health reasons," he is 70. But the synchrony of two resignations on the same day looks like a coordinated purge. Bredinsky District is on the list of 15 municipalities with by-elections.

Chelyabinsk — prosecutor's office vs. city duma deputies

City duma deputy Alexander Galkin surrendered his mandate after losing a court case brought by the prosecutor's office — over an undeclared apartment in Moscow. His departure is one of four reasons for by-elections to the city duma. The prosecutor's office works with deputies' declarations in exactly the same way as later — in Zlatoust: the same methodology, different scales.

Miass — a prosecutor's precedent

In May 2024, the Miass City Court stripped deputy Anastasia Zakharova — wife of Legislative Assembly deputy Yevgeny Subachyov — of her mandate due to a conflict of interest. The prosecutor demanded the removal of two more deputies, but the court found no evidence. This case is a methodological precedent: prosecutor's pressure on local assemblies is not a novelty of the Zlatoust campaign, but a proven instrument, now being applied on a larger scale.

The summary of measures to secure the electoral result looks as follows:

The logic of the system is simple: if "our people" and mobilised personnel are working locally — the bar of 55% with 45% turnout is achievable. If even one municipality "fails" — the entire oblast result falls. Therefore Texler strikes on all fronts simultaneously: changes people, applies prosecutor's pressure, dismisses the government, floods districts with money and duplicates the local machine with oblast "landings."

Each instrument is not an end in itself, but an element of a unified system for managing the electoral process. Criminal prosecution (Faleichik) — a demonstration for everyone. Prosecutor's pressure (Zlatoust, Chelyabinsk, Miass) — a permanent lever. Resignations of heads (Kopeysk, Bredinsky) — rotation before elections. Resignation of the government — a signal to the entire vertical. Clearing of districts — controllable candidates. The mobilisation apparatus — control of turnout.

All elements are focused on a single goal: to close the gap between 34% and 55%. The question — whether the system will manage to do this without breakdowns at the local level.

Zlatoust is the indicator: if Kovalyov wins with a comfortable result, the model works. If not — pressure will intensify, and Zlatoust will get a new, fully loyal composition of the city assembly…