Two ways of ideal observation
Ideal election observation can be achieved in two ways. One of them is observation within the framework of common sense. It is more acceptable for the English (precedent-based) legal system and consists in the fact that any person may observe elections as they see fit, provided they maintain public order. Simply come to polling stations, including during the vote count, or to election commission meetings and watch what happens there, examine documents, and pay attention to violations if they occur. All conflicts in such a case are resolved through the courts, whose organisation through the principle of precedent is particularly well suited to such cases.
The minimisation of fraud under such a system is ensured by the very fact that any step by an election participant can be checked and made public — which in itself makes deliberate violations extremely risky.
The Roman (normative) legal system (to which the Russian one also belongs) requires a different approach: maximally detailed rules for observation, and above all — the rights and obligations of observers.
Ideal observation from the EU's point of view
There are several international standards for how to build an election observation system. Perhaps the most relevant of them is the European one. The EU unites countries with different traditions of organising elections; some of them are very old, while others, on the contrary, appeared quite recently. At the same time, the EU's supranational structures have come to the conclusion that a certain unified observation standard is necessary to guarantee the preservation of democracy within the countries belonging to the European Union.
One of the most interesting documents in this vein is the 2009 "Guidelines for giving election observers an internationally recognised status" (GUIDELINES ON AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED STATUS OF ELECTION OBSERVERSGUIDELINES ON AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED STATUS OF ELECTION OBSERVERS).
These guidelines state that the best way to organise national observation is to follow the rules for organising international observation. Indeed, international election observation in the EU and neighbouring countries has existed since the early 1990s. A multi-level system for organising this observation has been developed, and it has shown high effectiveness: European international observers generally assess correctly how particular elections were conducted and whether human rights and democratic standards were observed.
The fundamental difference between national and international observers is that international observers monitor selectively, while national observers should ideally cover all polling stations and all processes, primarily through the participation of civil society.
The role of observers should not be limited to election day; paragraph 13 of the Guidelines clearly divides observation into three phases: pre-election, observation on voting day, and post-election.
The pre-election phase includes, among other things, assessment of electoral legislation, the political context, election commissions, the registration of parties and candidates, as well as voters, media monitoring, etc.
The post-election phase consists of observing the processes of counting, tabulation, publication of interim and final results, consideration of complaints, and even the assumption of new offices by elected persons.
It is interesting that the Guidelines are equally strict about the duties of observers. There are obvious things, such as that observers must be politically neutral and must respect the electoral system and laws. But there are also, at first glance, surprising ones.
For example, observers have the right to hold press conferences, make reports, etc. But at the same time, in their individual capacity they are obliged to refrain from commenting in the media and must even decline requests for interviews. Moreover, the Guidelines state that election observers are obliged to "behave well at all times, including free time, in a professional and impeccable manner".
Preconditions for the attempted observation reform in the Russian Federation
It is obvious that the Russian system of organising election observation has not even come close to European standards.
Since 2005, the rights and opportunities of observers have been continuously reduced. The only articulated attempt to change the situation for the better was made after Ella Pamfilova became head of the CEC in March 2016.
Six months later, State Duma elections were held. They were observed by European experts from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and they noted an improvement compared with the previous elections of 2011. Moreover, ODIHR experts positively assessed the work of the CEC under Pamfilova's leadership — in particular, how the CEC responded to reports of falsification.
Soon Pamfilova, albeit cautiously, publicly stated the need for reform of electoral legislation. In particular, the matter concerned the adoption of an Electoral Code:
"Many of my colleagues at the CEC say, and experts say… that the need has already matured to form an Electoral Code in Russia, that is, to gather all this complex, sometimes contradictory legislation into one coherent, clear document linked by a single logic in the form of an Electoral Code. I support this idea."
Several expert groups began work in Russia, and conferences were held with the participation of the CEC. Civil society began to harbour some cautious hopes for fruitful changes.
However, the existing administrative vertical and the systemic political parties, above all United Russia, by no means wanted liberal reforms whose only consequence for them would be a more complicated life. Independent observers from civil society, especially strengthened after the protests of 2011–12, were consistently perceived by them as a hostile force.
For example, at the municipal elections in Balashikha in 2015, two observers recorded ballot stuffing into a ballot box; they were beaten and robbed right at the polling station. However, the chairman of the Moscow election commission, Irek Vildanov, accused the beaten observers of organising an "information carousel", the essence of which apparently consists in stirring up scandals "out of nothing" with certain sinister aims: "It is clear that a new information technology is being tested… A well-organised hand is felt". The puppeteers were declared to be the civil society associations "Citizen Observer", "Golos" and "Sonar", which had tried to prevent falsification.
A myth about the "observer carousel" was also spread — something like a money-laundering attempt, when a large number of observers are assigned to one polling station, they come to the station for literally a few minutes, but receive full pay for the whole day. In reality, such a scheme has never been recorded, but it was precisely this myth that was used as grounds for limiting the number of observers at one polling station to two people from one candidate or party.
This norm was introduced by Federal Law No. 29-FZ of 15 February 2016 "On Amendments to the Federal Law 'On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum' and Article 33 of the Federal Law 'On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation' regarding the activities of observers".
This law also introduced the requirement to submit lists of observers to election commissions no less than three days before voting — previously no notification had been required.
At meetings with experts, Ella Pamfilova said that she was against both of these amendments, but she did not publicly criticise them.
Independent experts also advocated at least restoring to the law the right of representatives of public associations to send their observers to elections. Such a norm existed until 2005 and was repealed by Federal Law No. 51-FZ of 18 May 2005 "On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation".
Results of the attempted observation reform in the Russian Federation
At first there were hopes. For example, in autumn 2017 the CEC held a conference "Observation at elections in the Russian Federation", at which Ella Pamfilova herself asserted that she was "interested in qualified and honest observation".
It is characteristic that at the same conference the chair of the Election Commission of Primorsky Krai, Tatyana Gladkikh, stated that in 2005 public observation had been abolished on objective grounds — because "observers from public associations abused the right". However, she did not explain exactly what abuses were meant.
It is interesting that Ella Pamfilova herself held different views in that same year of 2005. As chair of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society, at the international conference "Russian elections in the context of international electoral standards" she stated: "I am greatly alarmed that the provision on organising civic control over the conduct of elections is deficient. My colleagues from public organisations and I have a very hard-to-realise dream — it existed already at the previous elections — we tried, we are trying and we do not abandon these attempts to create a system of large-scale civic control over the conduct of elections. Now, with the change in legislation, this has become more difficult. But we will not abandon such attempts. First, on the one hand, we will try to contribute to changing this norm banning observers from public associations, but on the other hand, we will seek opportunities to try, even under these conditions, to organise large-scale civic control over compliance during the election campaign with even such imperfect legislation".
However, in 2017 it was obvious that even if Ella Pamfilova really had some aspiration to reform the electoral system, she would meet resistance not only from the State Duma and the administrative vertical, but also within her own election commissions.
On Pamfilova's initiative, in summer 2017 a Working Group on Improving Electoral Legislation and the Electoral Process was created, headed by Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko. However, the matter never went beyond public discussion.
In 2018, presidential elections were held. At these elections, international observers from ODIHR were present for the last time in the current history of the Russian Federation. They noted a deterioration in the context of election transparency compared with 2016.
The Working Group worked for two years. With great difficulty, under pressure from Pamfilova, who even met specially with Putin for this purpose, in 2019 the Working Group agreed to support small changes concerning the easing of the municipal filter in gubernatorial elections. However, none of these proposals made it into the laws actually adopted by the State Duma.
At the end of 2019, Ella Pamfilova effectively stated that she was giving up and ceasing the struggle for liberalisation of the electoral system, and even honestly explained why:
"Now they are discussing that Pamfilova is proposing some incredible reform. There can be no radical legislative reform now. I will say why. It is obvious. Has any of you heard that a serious radical change in the political vector, in political strategy, is now being proposed? Has anyone heard that the authorities are now initiating any radical changes in the political sphere? I do not know of this. Electoral legislation in the country must flow from the political vector that exists in the country. It cannot exist on its own. What reform can there be separately from political processes?"
In 2020, the Working Group simply quietly ceased its work and no longer met. Along with this, Ella Pamfilova's attempts to reform electoral legislation also came to an end.
In the run-up to the State Duma elections in 2026, Ella Pamfilova supports the authorities' general course of continuing the war against Ukraine and speaks of the "risk of provocations and sabotage by certain foreign states", as well as of the possibility of the spread of fakes about the elections:
"There are information risks — they are connected with the spread of unreliable or distorted information about the course of voting, vote-counting procedures, and the work of commissions. Risks of discrediting the electoral system may be both open and covert in nature".
It can be assumed with a certain degree of probability that in this case Ella Pamfilova is anticipating reports by independent observers about the falsifications that will take place at the elections in September 2026.